

CHAPTER VII.

WITHDRAWAL TO THE JAMES.—THE "SEVEN DAYS' BATTLE."

AFTER the battle of Fair Oaks there was a pause in active operations in front of Richmond, partly owing to the exhaustion consequent upon that event, and partly to the weather, which for the next two weeks was unfavorable to such a degree as to render any advance almost impossible. All the bridges had been carried away; the wings of the Union army were separated by the river, and on the only avenue of supply for the three corps on the right bank, the railroad bridge and trestlework were threatened with momentary destruction; the ground, which consisted of alternate layers of reddish clay and quicksand, had turned into a vast swamp, and the guns in battery sank into the earth by their own weight. That most arduous of tasks in inclement weather, entrenching, occupied the interval. The line laid out beyond Seven Pines by the Engineer Corps was strengthened and completed from Golding's to White Oak Swamp.

Changes were made in the disposition of the troops. The front at Seven Pines was heavily reinforced. Franklin's corps was brought over from the other bank of the Chickahominy and posted on the right of the line; on his left was Sumner, and Heintzelman on his left extending toward the White Oak Swamp, with Keyes' corps in reserve. The as-

signment of General Casey to the command of the supply depot at the White House occasioned some changes in the latter corps, Peck being given Casey's division, now composed of Naglee's and Wessel's brigades. Porter's corps alone remained on the left bank of the Chickahominy in the vicinity of Gaines' Mill, with McCall's division of Pennsylvania reserves, which had come by water from McDowell's corps, posted farther on at Mechanicsville and Beaver Dam Creek.

The rebel force, under command of R. E. Lee, augmented in numbers by drafts on their resources in every direction, was now composed as follows: Longstreet's division—six brigades: Pickett's, Anderson's, Wilcox's, Kemper's, Pryor's, and Featherstone's. A. P. Hill's division—six brigades: Anderson's, Gregg's, Field's, Pender's, Branch's, and Archer's. D. H. Hill—five brigades: Rhodes', Garland's, Anderson's, Colquitt's, and Ripley's. McGruder's command—six brigades: Sumner's, Kershaw's, Griffiths', Cobb's, Toombs', and D. R. Jones'. Huger's division—three brigades: Mahone's, Armistead's, and Wright's. Whiting's division—two brigades: his own and Hood's. Jackson's division—three brigades: Winder's, Cunningham's, and Fulkerson's. Ewell's division—three brigades: Elzey's, Trimble's, and Seymour's. Holmes' command—four brigades: Walker's, Ransom's, Daniels', and Wise's. Lawton's brigade, unattached, under General Jackson's command. Total effective, Lee's army, in seven days' battle before Richmond, by one official estimate, 80,762 men.

McClellan's army in the last week of June stood as follows: Five corps—Porter's on the right of the general line facing Richmond, composed of Morell's and Sykes' divisions, with McCall's temporarily attached. Next across the Chickahominy, we have Franklin with the divisions of Smith and Slocum;

then Sumner with the divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick ; then Heintzelman with Kearney's and Hooke's divisions, and lastly Keyes in reserve with Couch's and Peck's divisions. Total effectives, 92,500.

There were now to come seven days of almost continuous fighting—a great struggle for the mastery of the situation around Richmond. McClellan foresaw that the crisis was at hand, and he continued to apply for reinforcements. McCall had arrived, and, in addition, some scattering regiments ; but the bulk of McDowell's corps, which he still hoped to have with him, was detained in Northern Virginia.

With Richmond less than five miles distant, the Commander-in-chief now prepared to push still nearer.

On June 25th it was determined by McClellan to move the line in front of Seven Pines forward to a large clearing on the other side of a heavily timbered piece of ground, through the middle of which ran a small stream, whose swampy borders had until that time formed the extreme picket line of the opposing forces in that direction. This was known as the affair of Oak Grove. Heintzelman's corps, part of Sumner's, and Palmer's brigade of Keyes' corps, advanced in good order through the timber, met and repulsed a strong force of the enemy, and occupied the position, throwing out pickets within four miles of Richmond. This advance makes manifest the fact that while General McClellan may, and doubtless did, entertain the plan of moving his base of supplies from White House to the James, he was induced to make this latter move by Stewart's cavalry raid on the 11th rather than with any intention of changing his line of attack or transferring his army to that point.

It is at this point that we reach the crisis of the Peninsula campaign. Despite delays, drawn battles, losses, and unlooked-for natural obstacles, McClellan had succeeded, as

he had promised, in reaching the vicinity of the rebel capital—thus relieving Washington, alarming the Southern leaders, and raising the anticipations of the North. It would seem that under this favorable outlook the Government would have strained every nerve to carry the campaign successfully through by reinforcing the army. That its disposition was to do so and reap the advantages of the situation, we believe to be beyond question. It was the fear for the safety of Washington that had caused it to change its strategy at every move of the enemy and produce confusion where system and plan were necessary. It was this fear that retained McDowell at the capital at the opening of the campaign, and it was this fear that withheld him again as he was about to move down from Fredericksburg. And now, once more on June 11th, as Jackson seemed to have ceased his operations in the Shenandoah, McDowell was promised to McClellan, one of whose divisions, under McCall, soon reached the latter.

This promise and expectation of reinforcements in reality proved a hinderance to our success. McClellan called for them, depended upon them, and waited for their arrival. It was so at Yorktown when Franklin joined; it was so again now after Fair Oaks, when McClellan wrote, June 7th, "I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment McCall reaches here and the ground will admit the passage of artillery." That the reinforcements were needed is clear enough; but on the other hand the delay and indecision caused by a dependence upon them gave the enemy the opportunity of forming plans of their own and anticipating those of McClellan. This was obvious now when matters were nearing a crisis: for while McClellan was preparing to strike with his reinforced army (if, indeed, he was not waiting for McDowell and his entire

command), Lee and Jackson were devising and executing a scheme which was to put an entirely new face upon the situation.

It is here we encounter the turning-point of the campaign.

Stonewall Jackson was the disturbing factor again. The first suggestion that he might be of use in the immediate operations around Richmond, after the termination of his Valley movements, seems to have come from this officer himself. From Port Republic he wrote to General Johnston as early as June 6th: "Should my command be required at Richmond I can be at Mechanics' Run Depot, on the Central Railroad, the second day's march." Two days later, General Lee noticed the hint and replied to Jackson: "Should there be nothing requiring your attention in the Valley so as to prevent your leaving it for a few days, and you can make arrangements to deceive the enemy and impress him with the idea of your presence, please let me know, that you may unite at the decisive moment with the army near Richmond." On the 11th he wrote again, and on the 16th a final decision was reached, as appears from the following letter, which, on account of its interest and importance, is here inserted in full:

HEADQUARTERS, NEAR RICHMOND, VA.,

June 16, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL T. J. JACKSON,

Commanding Valley District:

General—I have received your letter by the Hon. Mr. Boteler. I hope you will be able to recruit and refresh your troops sufficiently for the movement proposed in my letter of the 11th. You have only acknowledged my letter of the 8th. I am therefore ignorant whether that of the 11th has reached you. From your account of the position

of the enemy, I think it would be difficult for you to engage him in time to unite with this army in the battle for Richmond. Fremont and Shields are apparently retrograding, their troops shaken and disorganized, and some time will be required to set them again in the field. If this is so, the sooner you unite with this army the better. McClellan is being strengthened; Burnside is with him, and some of McDowell's troops are also reported to have joined him. There is much sickness in his ranks, but his reinforcements by far exceed his losses. The present, therefore, seems favorable for a junction of your army and this. If you agree with me, the sooner you can make arrangements to do so the better. In moving your troops, you could let it be understood that it was to pursue the enemy in your front. Dispose those to hold the Valley, so as to deceive the enemy, keeping your cavalry well in their front, and at the proper time suddenly descending upon the Pamunkey. To be efficacious, the movement must be secret. Let me know the force you can bring, and be careful to guard from friends and foes your purpose and your intention of personally leaving the Valley. The country is full of spies, and our plans are immediately carried to the enemy. Please inform me what arrangements you can make for subsisting your troops. Beef cattle could at least be driven, and, if necessary, we can subsist on meat alone.

Unless McClellan can be driven out of his intrenchments, he will move by positions, under cover of his heavy guns, within shelling distance of Richmond. I know of no surer way of thwarting him than that proposed. I should like to have the advantage of your views and be able to confer with you. Will meet you at some point on your approach to the Chickahominy. I enclose a copy of my letter of the 11th, lest the original should not have reached you.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,
General.

To convey the impression that Jackson was to continue his operations on the Shenandoah, Lee sent him Whiting's and Lawton's brigades from in front of Richmond as reinforcements, and contrived to have the fact reach the Union head-

quarters. In reality, Jackson took these brigades and Ewell's division of his own command, and, leaving Harrisonburg on the 17th, faced toward Richmond. On the 25th he reached Ashland Station, twelve miles north of the city, having previously met Lee in person and arranged for an immediate, simultaneous, and heavy attack upon McClellan's right wing on the north side of the Chickahominy.

Now upon this same date, the 25th, McClellan and Stanton were telegraphing to each other respecting Jackson's position, the Secretary stating that neither McDowell, Banks, nor Fremont had "any accurate knowledge" in the case, and that among the mass of conflicting rumors his own belief was that Jackson's "real movement" looked toward Richmond. McClellan replied that contrabands coming in on that day reported Jackson's advance at or near Hanover Court House, which confirmed the previously doubted statement of a rebel deserter, that he was certainly moving to take part in a general attack on the Union forces. The doubt remained until the afternoon of the 26th, when McClellan reported that Jackson was driving in his pickets "on the other side of the Chickahominy."

Thus, suddenly, the Army of the Potomac, which was actually pressing toward Richmond, as shown by the affair of Oak Grove on the 25th, found itself thrown again upon the defensive, in the midst of its offensive operations, by Jackson's preconcerted and timely reinforcement of Lee. From this moment we have to follow the fortunes of that army on its *retreat*.

On the other side of the Chickahominy, on the extreme right of the Union line, General McCall had taken position at Mechanicsville on June 19th, with his division, consisting of the brigades of Seymour, Reynolds, and Meade, Cooper's

battery of 10-pounder Parrotts, Smead's (regular) four 12-pounders, De Hart's (regular) six 12-pounders, Easton's of four and Kerns' of six 12-pounders, both of Pennsylvania. On the 26th, one of his regiments, the Sixth Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel McKean, was at Tunstall Station, and the Eleventh, Colonel Gallagher, on picket on the lower Chickahominy. On the morning of the 26th, Jackson's advance, Whiting's division, was detained by some Union skirmishers, who destroyed the bridge over Tolopotomoy Creek; but, driving these in, the bridge was repaired, and he pushed on toward McClellan's right and rear.

The position occupied by McCall was naturally strong: its front on the left bank of Beaver Dam Creek, the left on the Chickahominy, the right extending to the thick woods beyond Mechanicsville, which were occupied; on the right of the road crossing at Ellison's Mill, an epaulment for four pieces of field artillery was thrown up, rifle-pits were dug in front of each regiment, and a strong picket-line was maintained from Mechanicsville Bridge to Meadow Bridge. Cooper's and Smead's batteries commanded the right and left approaches of the upper road, and De Hart's battery near the front centre, the same road at a distance, and also the lower road direct to Mechanicsville. The Second Brigade (Meade's) was held in reserve ready to support Reynolds and Seymour, or prevent the enemy from crossing at New Bridge. In view on the opposite side of the Chickahominy were encamped A. P. Hill's division and Cobb's legion of the rebel army, holding strong lines of rifle-pits and two redoubts overlooking the river. About noon on the 26th the enemy was seen to be in motion; at 12.30 the Union pickets at Meadow Bridge were driven in, and line of battle was at once formed. Reynolds, on the right, Seymour on the left, Meade with Easton's and Kerns' batteries in reserve.

The rebel General A. P. Hill, whose division, 14,000 strong, was in front of McCall, had, in pursuance of orders, concentrated his division near Meadow Bridge on June 25th. Branch's brigade, with Johnson's battery, was sent to a bridge some seven miles above, where the Brook turnpike crosses the Chickahominy, with orders to communicate with Jackson's advance; and as soon as it had crossed the Central Railroad he was to cross the Chickahominy, take the river road, push on and clear Meadow Bridge, when Hill was at once to cross the bridge, and sweep down to Mechanicsville. Jackson was expected at dawn, but it was ten o'clock before he and Branch communicated, and Branch's advance was delayed by the Union skirmishers. At 3 P.M. General Hill became impatient lest the whole plan should fail, and put his force in motion with six batteries, with four extra horses to each gun. General Field seized the bridge and crossed, meeting but slight opposition; Anderson and Archer followed. Gregg and Pender turned short to the right and moved through the fields to co-operate on the right of the first column. Field's advance was met by a concentric fire of artillery, and forming in line of battle, with Pegram's guns in the centre, forced the Union troops from Mechanicsville, upon their stronghold on the other side of Beaver Dam Creek. McIntosh and Anderson endeavored by a movement to the left to capture a Union battery. Archer, Field, Gregg, and Pender, came into line, but met a terrific artillery fire from the Union line. A direct assault on the position was, as the rebel commanders assert, sure to result in heavy loss, and none was ordered. At this time General Branch came up, and was put in support of those already engaged. An attempt was made to turn our left lower down the creek, which failed disastrously. Two regiments of Ripley's brigade, with Pender's brigade, endeavored to flank the position at Ellicott's

Mills, but being exposed to the magnificent Union artillery, were repulsed with heavy loss. In the attempt at the Mills there was prolonged fighting. Hour after hour passed, the enemy constantly putting in fresh men from his superior force. General Morell with Griffin's and Martindale's brigades of his division, and two batteries, came to the support of the right of McCall, and at about sunset Griffin went into action and assisted in compelling the enemy to retire. The latter suffered heavy loss, the Union troops losing not over three hundred men.

The force under General McCall was stationed to observe the bridges over the Chickahominy. The position selected was of great natural and artificial strength, and the turn of the road from Mechanicsville to Meadow Creek Valley, where it runs nearly parallel to it, presented the flank of the enemy to the Union troops, who, upon the advance of the hostile column in heavy force, reserved its fire until the head of the column was nearly across, and then poured it in with such close and destructive effect that the enemy made no further attempt to cross the road. That they held their position so long against superior numbers is proof of the discipline and steady valor of our men. After the firing ceased they lay on their arms, replenishing empty cartridge-boxes, refilling haversacks, and caring for the wounded. The General-in-Chief was with General Porter until one o'clock A.M. Reports from scouts and outposts poured in constantly, all of which corroborated the stories in regard to Jackson's movements, which had been the subject of so much mystery in the army and at Washington. Jackson had been delayed this day and took no part in the action; but his presence was ascertained, and on the next morning McCall was ordered to fall back on Gaines' Mill.

It is to be noticed here that McClellan's base of supplies at the White House had become a source of anxiety, since he seemed to doubt his ability to keep his connection with it secure, and because the rain and mud had rendered the roads almost impassable for wagons. Some time in June, the General called General Porter to a meeting with himself alone, half-way between their respective headquarters, to discuss the advantages of the James River as a base. The conclusion reached was that necessity, and necessity only, would warrant such a movement; that it was dangerous and difficult in the face of such a vigilant foe as General Lee, and a disaster would endanger our cause at home and abroad. The necessity of keeping up a constant threat upon Richmond itself for the purpose of showing our confidence in our strength, was then felt. However, it was considered that the necessity might come, and it was determined that we should be prepared for the emergency.

At this time the enemy had begun to show renewed activity in their field works, portending some movement of importance on their part. For security, General McClellan thereupon determined to send General Averill to the James River with a proper force of topographical engineer officers for the purpose of mapping the country from White Oak Swamp to the James, and for obtaining all information necessary to enable him to make a change of base.

BATTLE OF GAINES' MILL.

The morning of June 27th found the Fifth (Porter's) Corps, composed of Sykes' and Morell's divisions of three brigades each, and Berdan's First United States Sharpshooters armed with breech-loading rifles and supported by several batteries of artillery, with McCall's division withdrawn from Mechanicsville, preparing for battle in the vicinity of Gaines' Mill.

Stories of deserters and natives all agreed that Jackson with an overwhelming force was near by, and that with Longstreet and the two Hills he was about to make an effort to destroy the Army of the Potomac. The past two weeks had been dry and warm; the soil had been changed from clinging mud to dust, which, rising from the advancing columns of the enemy betrayed their line of march for miles. Scouts confirmed the rumors. Porter's force consisted of Morell's division—Griffin's, Martindale's, and Butterfield's brigades; McCall's division—Reynolds', Seymour's, and Meade's; Sykes' division—Buchanan's, Lovell's, and Warren's, in all 17,330 infantry for duty. There were present with him 2,534 artillery, of which, from the very nature of the ground, but a very small portion could be used. Six hundred and seventy-one of the regular cavalry under General Emory were put in position covering the bridges across the Chickahominy and the communications with the rest of the army on the right bank. The line occupied by Porter under orders of the General-in-Chief, lay to the east of Powhite Creek, and was well chosen for defence, but the extent of ground to be held was greater than the disposable force at hand. Further, the men of McCall's and a part of those of Morell's divisions had been engaged with the army for hours on the previous day, and were wearied with the battle and retreat from Mechanicsville. The new line of Porter's troops extended from the extreme right, covering the roads leading from Old and New Cold Harbor to Despatch Station with the McGee house in the rear of the right, the troops here being the division under General Sykes. General Cooke with parts of the First and Fifth Regular Cavalry and Rush's Pennsylvania Lancers watched our left.*

* During the night of the 26th, Sykes' division and Butterfield's brigade of Morell's division retired to what became the battle-field of Gaines' Mill. Butterfield


In front of Morell's right was a small stream flowing south-erly toward the Chickahominy—between steep banks—some two hundred yards west of the Watt house, its borders fringed by a growth of heavy timber which disappears as it nears the low land about the river. From the stream the land rises for about three-quarters of a mile to the Adams house, whence it falls off sharply to the river; toward the west it was open and rolling to the Gaines house. On the left front of Morell's position was Boatswain's Swamp. The approaches were covered by dense woods, which furnished cover for the enemy's advance. In anticipation of a retreat many of the wagons had already been sent to the rear and some stores destroyed. The position occupied by Sykes'

was posted on the extreme left near the Watt house; Sykes' division on the extreme right, leaving an interval to be filled by the two brigades returning with Morell from Mechanicsville, which they occupied. Martin's Battery "C," Massachusetts Artillery, was posted between Morell and Sykes; a section of Weedon's Rhode Island Battery, under Lieutenant Buckley, occupied an opening through the timber in Martindale's brigade, and a section of Allen's Massachusetts in a like position in General Butterfield's. The rest of the artillery from the nature of the ground could not be brought into action. Kingsbury's regular battery was on the high ground some distance in rear of Morell's left, to command the low ground toward the valley of the Chickahominy. Sykes' batteries were those of Tidball and Weed.

On the morning of the 25th, General Porter ordered General Morell to detail two regiments of not less than 500 men each, to serve under General Stoneman with the cavalry. He detailed the Eighteenth Massachusetts, Colonel Barnes, and Seventeenth New York, Colonel Lansing, who reported to Stoneman immediately, marched with him to the White House—were transported by water to the James River and rejoined Morrell at Westover, and thus were not engaged in the six days' battles. Porter thus had less than 18,000 infantry at Gaines' Mill.

General McClellan and some of his staff remained with General Porter at his headquarters, just in rear of the troops engaged at Beaver Dam, until after midnight of the 26th; all the plans for the 27th were then and there arranged, and the position to be held behind Boatswain Swamp Run was then selected, but McClellan did not give the positive order until after he had returned to his own headquarters, where he hoped to hear something further of Jackson's force. The General was also at this time considering the proposition made by General Porter to hold his own at the Beaver Dam line, slightly reinforced, while General McClellan moved the main body of the army upon Richmond. Thus the final order did not reach Porter until three or four o'clock in the morning.

division was known to the enemy as Turkey Hill, the crest of which is some sixty feet higher than the plain, over which the troops of Longstreet were obliged to advance for about a quarter of a mile in face of a fire of sharpshooters.



Battle-field of Gaines' Mill.

The infantry line was formed on the slope of the hill, behind a line of light barricades, formed in some parts of felled trees, and in others of rails, knapsacks, and such material as lay at hand.

About two o'clock the enemy's pressure was felt. Jack-

son's march was more circuitous than that of Hill and Longstreet. The latter had crossed the Chickahominy the previous night, after the battle at Mechanicsville. A. P. Hill, who was in the advance, came upon the Union line near Gaines' Mills. Gregg's division in advance, came up with the Union line and was eager to attack at once, but was wisely restrained. Branch came next and was put in on the right of Gregg; Anderson, Field, and Archer in the order named on Branch's right, with Crenshaw's and Johnson's guns in battery on the left of the road in Gregg's rear.

At half past two o'clock P.M., having communicated with General Longstreet, A. P. Hill sent in his division to the attack, and was soon of the opinion that he had the whole Army of the Potomac in his front; at least he formed that opinion, and expressed it in his report, from the incessant roar of musketry and the continued artillery fire which his attack provoked. The men who held that line were Sykes' and Morell's divisions. For two long hours the struggle lasted and then at length aid came from Longstreet and Jackson. The latter, who had been detained on his march by broken bridges and skirmishers, now came on the ground and at once put his entire force into action. Longstreet, who with his division drawn up in lines, massed behind a crest of a hill, had been held in reserve, was now ordered to Hill's support. Pickett's brigade developed the Union position, and Longstreet with a soldier's instinct saw that a mere feint would not relieve A. P. Hill, and gave orders for a general advance, Anderson's and Pickett's brigades joining in the direct assault with the exception of a portion guarding the right flank of the brigades under Wilcox. Whiting's division coming on the field at this moment, made the rebel line complete, and it was hurled with fury against

Porter's small but compact and determined line. In the general charge now made a Union battery which enfiladed the line of D. H. Hill's advance was taken and held for a short time, when it was recovered. General Ewell pushed forward on the road from Gaines' Mill to McGee's house, but found so stubborn a resistance that after four hours of effort he relinquished the task of proceeding farther, and withdrew about dusk. Some of Winder's brigade essayed a like advance, but, not successful in so great measure as they desired, were prevented by night from proceeding more than a few yards beyond McGee's house.

Later in the afternoon, Slocum's division of Franklin's corps crossed the river, and came to the rescue of Porter's hard pressed men, and for a time the tide of battle was more decidedly in the Union favor. So far no impression had been made on the stubborn line. Hard pushed as our men had been since noon, there had not been a sign of wavering at any point. If victory were not in their grasp, it seemed at least that night would put an end to the conflict, and leave them in possession of the hill. They answered the yell of the advancing rebels as they swarmed out of the woods and across the ravine and over the open, with defiant cheers. On they came, Whiting's division hot and eager; Hood's and McLaws' Texan brigades rushed on, pushing their way through hordes of their own disordered and retreating regiments, which had faltered at the line of fire, which had so far marked the limit of their progress. Would they pass it, or recoil as had all the others who had penetrated so far? As Whiting's brigade made its last rush up the slope, at about 7 P.M., the enemy came on in deployed lines and columns by battalions closed in mass, one battalion immediately behind the other. Each line fired as they came down the hill, as

soon as it was unmasked by the line in front. They struck us in that manner.

The line was broken after sundown in or near the centre of Morell's division, and one or two brigades of the Pennsylvania reserves and some New Jersey regiments of Slocum's division; and at the point General Porter considered strongest, two regiments, presumably taken in the rear, were captured. The regulars and zouaves did not break, but brought up the rear in excellent order, quietly moving off the field. They had resisted Jackson's onslaught. A desperate charge was made by five companies of the Fifth U. S. Cavalry, which only served to add to the confusion. The beaten Union troops fell back slowly and in good order. Jackson reports that there was apprehension of a rally, and Whiting sent back to Longstreet for reinforcements. French and Meagher, of Richardson's division, arrived on the field near dark. Their steady front restored the broken Union line, which fell back under the fire of its own guns, supported by the heavy battery south of the river, to the bridges, which they crossed that night.

Two regiments—one the Second New Jersey, of Slocum's, and the Eleventh Pennsylvania, of McCall's, were captured; having continued on the field after their comrades on either flank had retired, they found themselves surrounded, and were obliged to surrender. The loss in guns was heavy; the horses, in many instances, having been killed, and the infantry supports having broken, many were necessarily abandoned to the enemy; others were captured by Whitney's charge, the gunners standing to their pieces to the last, and falling among them. The total loss in artillery was 22 pieces.

The precise number of the attacking force cannot be ascertained. General Magruder says he was on the south

bank of the Chickahominy with 25,000 men on the 27th. If the number of Lee's army, as given by Taylor—80,762—be assumed as correct, Jackson had for the attack 55,000 men, a number more than sufficient to equalize Porter's advantage of position. Jackson claims the capture of 14 pieces of artillery, and admits a loss of 1,000 men in Whiting's successful charge, and gives an estimate of loss—which he admits is based on incomplete returns—at 3,284. The total loss in Porter's corps, as reported by the division commanders, was 6,000 men. While the battle of Gaines' Mill was in progress, the enemy's force—25,000 strong—under Magruder, by a succession of feints, advanced along different portions of the Union line south of the Chickahominy. Furious outbursts of artillery fire, and a resort to every device known which could lead to the belief that an attack in force was imminent, so engaged the Union generals that, when they were appealed to for reinforcements for Porter, General Franklin answered, "I do not think it prudent to send any more troops from here at present." Sumner sent French and Meagher, but, in announcing the fact, adds, "Everything is so uncertain, that I think it would be hazardous to do it."

Magruder was repeating the tactics of Yorktown, and was in momentary apprehension that the small force would be swept away by the advance of McClellan's left, and that the city would fall into his hands. Magruder says: "I received instructions enjoining the utmost vigilance. I passed the night without sleep. Had McClellan massed his whole force in column and advanced it against any point in our line of battle—as was done at Austerlitz, under similar circumstances, by the greatest captain of any age—though the head of his column would have suffered greatly, its momentum would have insured him success, and the occupation of

our works about Richmond, and, consequently, of the city, might have been his reward."

General McClellan had fought an army with one corps; yet so stubborn had been the resistance of that corps that Lee and Jackson both believed, and so reported to Richmond, that they had encountered the bulk of McClellan's force. In addition Jackson says (p. 41, Confederate Reports, vol. iv.): "Although swept from their defences by this rapid and almost matchless display of daring and valor, the well-disciplined Federals continued in retreat to fight with stubborn resistance;" and General Whiting (page 47) adds: "The enemy continued to fight in retreat with stubborn resistance, and it soon appeared that we had to do with his best troops."

Lee and Jackson were convinced that McClellan would endeavor to hold his line of supply by the White House, and that if he fell back it would be by way of the Peninsula, as he had advanced, and acting under this belief, General Ewell, preceded by a cavalry force, advanced down the north side of the Chickahominy to Despatch Station and destroyed a portion of the railroad track on the 28th, and on the 29th moved to Bottom's Bridge, when he was recalled to join in the operations above. In the interval the movement on the James, determined on after the battle of Mechanicsville and when the close proximity of Jackson on our right flank was known, had been put into execution. Casey's troops at White House had been ordered down the Pamunkey, via the York and James, to the new base on the latter river. All the material that could not be put on board the transports was burned; the engines and cars, some of the latter loaded with supplies, were put under a full head of steam and were run into the river. The wagons, to the number of five thousand, loaded with everything that could be

carried, were set on their way across White Oak Swamp: the reserve artillery took the same road. Twenty-five hundred head of cattle on the hoof were added to this long column. There were few stragglers on that march. What could not be carried away was destroyed. Lines of fire marked the camps and depots of the Union troops. Millions of rations, hundreds of tons of fixed ammunition and shells for the siege guns were thus lost. Lee's uncertainty as to the movements of McClellan, gave the latter twenty-four hours to perfect and carry out his arrangements, and when Lee saw the intentions of the Union General, the retreat was well advanced, and the roads across the swamps guarded to protect the passage of the trains from attack by way of the New Market and Charles City and Williamsburg roads. On the 29th, headquarters were moved from Savage's Station across White Oak Swamp, and on the same day at daylight, Sumner abandoned the works at Fair Oaks and fell back to Orchard Station, where the mass of stores accumulated for the army was destroyed.

BATTLE OF ALLEN'S FARM.

Sumner's and Heintzelman's corps bivouacked on the morning of June 29th at the Allen farm, their forces being disposed fronting Richmond, across the railroad. Richardson, Sedgwick, and Heintzelman from right to left in the order named. General French of Richardson's division held the first line, Caldwell in his rear; a log house in front of Richardson was occupied by Colonel Brooks of the Thirty-seventh Pennsylvania, and immediately in the rear, on a rising piece of ground, four pieces of Hazzard's battery were posted.

Pettit's battery of this division had been sent in advance to Savage's Station with their own and Hazzard's caissons.

These were soon brought back, before Hazzard's limbers were empty, and aided materially in repelling the enemy's attack, which was made with infantry and a battery of artillery, their principal efforts being directed against the position held by Colonel Brooks, who, reinforced by the Seventy-first New York of Sedgwick's division, held his own. This attack was made by Griffiths' brigade of Magruder's division and Jones' division, marching from Golding's across the swamp. Skirmishers were thrown out in front of the rebel divisions, and Jones' men reported the enemy in his front and fortified. Magruder gave orders to remove an obstruction on the railroad so as to permit the passage of a heavy rifled gun, mounted on a railway carriage. Magruder found his reception a warm one, and went in person to bring up reinforcements. But Generals Jackson and Huger had been ordered elsewhere by General Lee. Magruder states that he was suddenly reduced from an expected force of thirty-five thousand to thirteen thousand men, and was thus deprived of the force upon which he had relied to capture "a large portion of the enemy." His command was three times repulsed.

As soon as the attack of Magruder ceased, Sumner fell back on Savage's Station. Lee had at this time divined McClellan's retreat, and was pressing forward in pursuit. His plan was as follows: Longstreet's division was to cross the New Bridge and take position on the extreme right so as to intercept McClellan in his attempt to reach James River, Huger's division to march down the Williamsburg road on Magruder's right flank, and Jackson's division to cross the Chickahominy at Grape Vine Bridge, and operate down that river on its right bank, while Magruder pressed in front. When McClellan's army fell back, it destroyed all the bridges over the Chickahominy, and thus

retarded Jackson's advance, and detained him during the 28th and 29th in building the Grape Vine Bridge. Meantime the Union troops were urging their retreat across the White Oak Swamp, a region which had become familiar through reconnoissances made under direction of General Casey.

BATTLE OF SAVAGE'S STATION.

On the 29th Franklin's corps, which had been obliged to abandon its camp at Golding's farm on account of the heavy artillery fire kept up by the enemy from the positions which they had secured after the battle on the 27th, had moved by orders of the General-in-Chief to a position in the vicinity of the railroad at Savage's Station, Slocum's division at the station in reserve, Smith to a point between the river and the station, joining on the right with McCall's division, and on the left with Sumner's corps. Slocum was ordered by General McClellan to cross White Oak Swamp. When General Smith arrived on the ground about seven A.M., neither Sumner nor McCall could be found.

Learning from the report of a staff officer that General Sumner was in front and that there was a break of a mile between his right and Franklin's left; that General Sumner was warmly engaged, and that the enemy was crossing in force by a bridge nearly in his own front, and that both his flanks were unsupported, Franklin directed General Smith to fall back to Savage's Station, and sent word to General Sumner and requested him to fall back to the same place, which Sumner immediately did, having kept back Magruder's advance so that his movement was undisturbed.

Line of battle was formed, Franklin on the right, with Hancock of Smith's division thrown on the right into the woods to hold the railroad; Second Brigade, Brooks, in the

woods on the left; Third, Colonel Taylor (General Davidson of this brigade being disabled by sunstroke), in reserve. Smith was supported by Osborn's First New York Artillery, which did good service. Sumner's corps joined on Franklin's left, Richardson on the right, Sedgwick on the left. Heintzelman had withdrawn his corps, 15,000 strong, much to the astonishment of Sumner, who had ordered him to take position on his own left. His reason for so doing is that he saw that the open space about Savage's Station was so crowded with troops that there was no room for more to be usefully employed, and that as there was but one road through the swamp direct from Savage's, he judged it wise to retire by that, after destroying the cars and supplies collected at Savage's Station. The force of the enemy which attacked at this point was that of Magruder, which had been in Sumner's front in the morning, and the same rifled gun on car-wheels figures in this battle. The rebels advanced under cover of the woods, and were several times held in check by the vigorous artillery fire from our side. General Sumner in his report states, "The assault was met by Burns' brigade in the most gallant manner." Hazzard's, Kirby's, Tompkins', Petit's, Osborn's, and Bramhall's batteries were all engaged. A short time before sunset the enemy made an advance along our whole line, coming up with a rush in the face of the heavy fire which was poured into them. The roar of musketry now became steady and continuous, and was maintained for about half an hour, when our troops made several charges and pressed them so hard that their line at length gave way and left the road to the swamp open. Our men, as soon as their officers had restored order and the wounded had been properly cared for, moved out on the retreat. The rebels admit a loss of 4,000, and give that of the Union troops as 3,000.

At this point was situated the great hospital, containing 2,500 sick and wounded, with vast supplies of hospital stores, which was abandoned, and, with the medical men, surgeons, and attendants, who remained behind, to the number of 500, fell into the hands of Jackson, who arrived the next morning, having repaired the bridges across the Chickahominy the previous night, and who now pressed forward in pursuit of the retiring Union men. General Magruder passed by way of the Darbytown road and is next heard of at Malvern Hill.

On the afternoon of the 29th the Commander-in-Chief ordered Keyes' to move during the night to the James River, to occupy a defensive position near Malvern Hill, communicate with the gunboats, and cover Turkey Bridge, Porter to follow and form on his right. Keyes fortunately discovered an abandoned road running parallel with the Quaker road, which he easily opened, and which furnished another way for the trains to pass under cover of the whole line of the army.

The General-in-Chief had passed the day in examining the ground, keeping the trains in motion, and posting troops in such position as to cover their passage from attacks by way of the New Market and Richmond roads. Early in the day there was a sharp skirmish with the rebel cavalry on the Quaker road. This affair is called the skirmish near Willis Church, and showed the danger to which the retreat was exposed, as well as the fact that our line of movement had become known to the enemy. The position of affairs was critical. Longstreet and Hill were almost in contact with Sumner and Franklin by way of the Williamsburg road. Magruder and Huger were coming in on the flank on the New Market road, and Jackson was pressing hard on the rear by way of the Chickahominy and the White Oak Swamp. For-

tunately for the success of the retreat, Stuart's cavalry, owing to Lee's misapprehension of McClellan's movements after the battle of Gaines' Mill, was all on the north side of the Chickahominy, pressing Stoneman's cavalry toward White House, and thus the march along the narrow blockaded roads of the swamp was not impeded. Heintzelman had crossed at Brackett's Ford on the evening of the 29th, and occupied the position on the southerly part of the great clearing called there Glendale, lately vacated by Porter's corps, which had followed Keyes toward the James. The cleared tract near White Oak Bridge was held by Franklin.

On the morning of June 30th, by order of the General-in-Chief, Franklin posted Slocum's division on the right of the Charles City cross-roads. The divisions of Smith and Richardson, together with that of Naglee, who had been put under General Franklin's orders, were stationed in the woods in a position to command the White Oak Swamp bridge. The artillery of the Second Division, commanded by Captain R. B. Ayres, Fifth Artillery, composed of his own, Mott's, and Wheeler's batteries—the latter so reduced that he had but two guns available for service—was placed in position to cover the crossing. About noon the enemy opened so heavy a fire upon this position, that the artillery was compelled to withdraw, abandoning one gun of Mott's battery—which was left on the field—in direct disobedience of Ayres' orders. It was from this direction that Jackson was approaching, and the furious fire of artillery opened on Franklin was from a battery of 28 guns, posted under cover on the north side of the swamp, which compelled the Union batteries to retire. A cavalry force took advantage of this to cross the creek, but was soon driven back. Wooding's battery, of Jackson's corps, was unable to keep its position in face of the fire of the Union sharpshooters; and Jackson, finding that the crossing was

controlled by our fire, bivouacked that night in hearing of the heavy firing at Glendale, which told him that Longstreet's men were engaged; but the character of the soil, the destruction of the bridge over the marsh and creek, and the strong position of our troops prevented his advance until the following morning. After our troops retired, the bridge was rebuilt, and Jackson pressed on in pursuit.*

BATTLE OF GLENDALE, OR NELSON'S FARM.

Longstreet and A. P. Hill, as soon as they were informed of the direction of McClellan's retreat, in pursuance of Lee's orders crossed the New Bridge, and moved by the Darbytown road to the Long Bridge road, and came upon our men strongly posted across the Long Bridge road, about a mile from its intersection with the Charles City road, on June 30th. By order of General McClellan, McCall's division halted on the New Market road, near where it turns off to Quaker Church, with Meade's brigade on the right, Seymour's on the left, and Reynolds' (captured at Gaines' Mill) in command of Colonel Simmons, Fifth Pennsylvania, in reserve, Randol's regular battery on the right and front, Kerns' and Cooper's in the centre, and Dietrich's and Knierim's batteries of the reserve artillery all in front of the infantry line. Slocum's line, composed of Generals Newton's, Taylor's, and Bartlett's brigades, extended to the right from Charles City road. He had with him Upton's, Porter's, and Hexamer's batteries. General Kearney's division was posted so as to guard the space between the Charles City and the New Market roads, Robinson on the left supporting Thompson's battery, General Birney on his right, and General Berry in reserve. General McCall was on Kearney's left and front.

* Jackson's Report, iv., p. 42.

Hooker's division of Heintzelman's corps on the right of Sumner's corps, with Thompson's and Kirby's batteries, were in the rear of McCall's line, which was formed with the left refused. This irregular formation of the line of battle was in part due to the irregularities of the ground and the thick woods. The line of battle not being perfectly true, the artillery of the several divisions was in position in most cases in front of the covering infantry. The attack began about 2.30 P.M., in great force, and with furious violence, and was directed mainly against General McCall, whose division suffered so severely at Gaines' Mills, and which now numbered but 6,000 men.

The battle began on his front at 2.30 o'clock P.M., and soon after 3 P.M. his left was threatened by a heavy column of the enemy which passed through the woods and fell upon General Seymour, who was promptly reinforced by Colonel Simmons, sent to his aid by General McCall just in time to repel a furious attack with infantry and artillery on that flank; the fight lasted here for about two hours, when the enemy retired. The two German batteries, Diedrich's and Knierim's, were driven to the rear. General McCall sent them back to their position, but with little avail—as the guns were soon after abandoned by the cannoneers.

Six companies of the Twelfth Pennsylvania Regiment, Colonel Taggart, had been posted at two log-houses and breastwork of logs two hundred yards in advance of the extreme left of the Third Brigade, and the remaining four companies of the regiment were posted to cover two pieces of artillery on a hill in rear of the regiment. The enemy advanced in heavy columns from the road in front and opened with artillery on the six companies. These, seeing themselves in danger of being cut off by a party advancing up a ravine to their rear, broke and fled; the remainder

supporting the two-gun battery was also driven back. The regiment did not appear on the field again that day as an organized body. The fugitives from this part of Seymour's line are those referred to in Hooker's report (p. 490) as rushing down the road and over the fields, breaking through his lines and firing on his men as they passed. Colonel Taggart gives his loss in this action as 6 killed, 36 wounded, and 23 missing.

Meantime a steady pressure had been kept up along the whole of McCall's line.

In the charges of the enemy which were repulsed three stand of colors were captured; one by Private W. F. Gallagher, of the Ninth Regiment, who killed the rebel color-bearer in a bayonet charge. The Third and Tenth charged a rebel battery and routed its infantry support, capturing 100 prisoners, but being suddenly assailed by a large force of the enemy were forced to retire, bringing their prisoners with them. The six companies of the Twelfth Regiment which had been sent to the support of General Seymour, and detached from the line by this countercharge of the rebels, were cut off, and at the same moment the section of a "Dutch" battery belonging to Porter was abandoned by the artillerymen, who cut loose their horses and broke through the cavalry and the infantry, bringing the prisoners to the rear. This separation of the Twelfth Regiment General McCall considers the one injudicious or unfortunate movement on his part of the line during the day.

Soon after this a charge was made on Randol's battery of a peculiar and most determined character. A brigade of rebels in wedge shape, without order, trailing arms, made a dash at the battery. Like charges by single regiments had been previously repulsed by the artillery, and in this instance so confident was Captain Randol of his ability to hold the

ground that the Fourth Regiment was requested to withhold its fire. The guns tore great gaps in the advancing host, but the gaps were closed up, the mass moved on swiftly, steadily, with wild yells. Before its momentum could be checked or the guns limbered up it was upon them, among them, over them; the limbered guns were overturned, the horses killed, and the great surge of rebels sweeping onward drove all of the Fourth Regiment, except Company B, before it. This company, with men of other commands, stood their ground, and presented a brave front. General McCall rode in among the men, endeavoring to rally them, with partial success. A fierce bayonet fight under his own eye followed—it was a melee in which point or butt was used; the gallant company was carried to the rear surrounded by the yelling rebels, who were so intent on pursuing those in front that they walked through a gap in a fence which they passed, and escaped capture. McCall's right was now broken, and his entire line borne to the rear, with the loss of some guns. Falling back with two men of his cavalry escort, General McCall about two hundred yards in rear of his own line came upon two regiments of Berry's brigade, Kearney's division. Shortly after, General Kearney came up and formed two lines in the wood on the right of the road, saying as he did so, "If you (General McCall) can bring on another line in a few minutes I think we can stop them," and in the gathering darkness General McCall rode forward for this purpose, but fell into the lines of the Forty-seventh Virginia, by whom he was taken prisoner. General Kearney took measures at once to fill up the break in the line caused by the defeat of McCall. He posted the First New Jersey Brigade in that place and moved forward to where General Caldwell was putting two regiments into line on the right of the road, a quarter of a mile in the rear of breastworks then


unoccupied, toward which the rebel skirmishers were distrustfully approaching. Kearney led a regiment to take possession of this work, and these misapprehending orders, fired at the rebels and at a part of Kearney's line; thus, while the rebels were driven off, for a time our own men were firing into each other, and in this fire General Kearney supposed, and so reported, General McCall as killed.

This attack at 4 P.M. struck Kearney also, and he states in his report that he was astonished at the vigor and determination of the assault in mass on his line. The slightly sloping ground in his front was swept by the fire of Thompson's battery, with such execution upon the advancing host that they were mowed down by ranks. The survivors halted for a moment, the gaps were filled, and the wave swept on, across the open ground in Kearney's front, advancing at a run over the two hundred paces which separated the hostile forces. Notwithstanding the loss caused in their heavy masses by this terrible fire, they still pressed on with a fortitude and persistency that, as Kearney says, put artillery out of the "calculation." Then the Sixty-third Pennsylvania, Colonel Hayes, and half the Thirty-seventh New York Volunteers moved up to the line of the guns and charged the enemy and opened on them such rapid and well-sustained volleys that what grape and canister had failed to accomplish, musketry effected. The artillery recommenced its fire; three times during the afternoon was this advance on the guns repeated, and as often was it driven back.

About the time General McCall's division gave way, General Heintzelman had become assured that the attack on the Charles City road was not the serious one, and rode over to General Sumner's headquarters in front of Nelson's farmhouse, to make preparations to meet the enemy who had turned the left. De Russy's battery, with several other bat-

teries which were already put in position, were firing over the heads of the retreating troops. General Burns' brigade was advanced to meet the enemy and it soon drove them back. At this time the troops from White Oak Swamp were coming on the field, and Heintzelman, knowing that Sumner's troops were all engaged, sent General Slocum's New Jersey brigade, under General Taylor, with a battery to General Kearney, who had called for aid. These soon drove back the enemy. Heintzelman rode out on the Charles City road far enough to learn that there was nothing to fear from the enemy in that quarter. He apprehended that they might bring up fresh men against our worn-out ones, and learning that General Franklin's men had already begun the retreat, arrangements were speedily made for the whole force to follow, which it did. Heintzelman reached headquarters at 1.30 A.M., and soon after daylight his divisions were in position on Malvern Hill.

General Sumner receiving intelligence that General Franklin had retreated and that General Heintzelman was about to do so, at 9 P.M. fell back with reluctance. He knew he had won a victory and did not wish to leave the field. The object of the rebels in this attack on the retreating column was to cut it in two at the Charles City crossroads and gain possession of the Quaker road. Had this attempt been successful, or had they been able to detain the Union troops long enough to enable Jackson to gain the rear at White Oak Swamp, the result might have been disastrous. As it was, they were baffled in their attempts either to break our line or delay the march. Franklin kept Jackson at bay and prevented him from crossing at White Oak Bridge, while Sumner and Heintzelman with Slocum and McCall repulsed the attacks of Longstreet and Hill. The only reverse suffered was that on McCall's line, where we



Field of the "Seven Days" Battle.

lost ten pieces of artillery, and some of these were abandoned on the field and not secured by the enemy until the next day. The retreat was resumed at night, and by morning of the next day all were posted on the slopes of Malvern Hill. The rebels did not make any extravagant claims to success. Longstreet says: "Owing to the nature of the ground—that concert of action so essential to complete success could not obtain—particularly attacking such odds against us in position. The enemy, however, was driven back slowly and steadily, contesting the ground inch by inch. He succeeded in getting some of his batteries off the field and, by holding his last position until dark, in withdrawing his forces under cover of night." General A. P. Hill states: "The charge which broke McCall's line was made by Field and Pender's divisions; the Sixtieth and Fifty-fifth Virginia captured two batteries of Napoleon guns, and the Sixtieth crossed bayonets with the enemy, who obstinately contested their possession. About dark the enemy pressed us so hard along the whole line—that my last reserve was directed to advance cautiously: it seemed that a tremendous effort was being made to turn the fortune of the battle. The volume of fire that, approaching, rolled along the line, was terrific; in five minutes all firing ceased."

Longstreet reports his loss from June 27th to 30th, aggregate, 4,429; A. P. Hill from June 26th to 30th, aggregate, 4,074; D. Hill, aggregate, 3,955, Total, 12,458. Hill captured 14 guns and two stand of colors. In all this there is nothing of the exultation of victory.

General George G. Meade, afterward famous as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Potomac in the battle of Gettysburg, was badly wounded at this battle and was obliged to retire from the field.

On this date also, the 30th, still another affair occurred

which calls for a brief reference. While one part of the army was holding Jackson in check at White Oak Bridge, and another saved our line of retreat at Glendale, a portion of Hunt's reserve artillery, supported by Sykes' regulars, prevented a third body of rebels from intercepting our march.

General Sykes reached the plateau of Malvern Hill about 11 o'clock A.M. on the 30th, where, by order of General Porter, the artillery was posted so as to control the approaches in front. Part of Colonel Buchanan's brigade was on the right in a pine grove, the other two regiments in support of Weed's regular battery, the Tenth Infantry, Major Lovell, to the left, covering the regular batteries of Edwards, Carlisle, and Smead, and a New York battery of the reserve. Warren's brigade on the extreme left covered the river road to Richmond, supported by the Eleventh Infantry and Martin's battery of Napoleon guns, and a detachment of cavalry for outpost duty. Sykes says, "Nothing could be more commanding than the line I held." The rebel Generals Holmes and Wise, in the afternoon saw the troops moving along the Quaker road, as they say in their reports, in great haste and disorder toward Malvern Hill, and, feeling strong with their detachment of 7,000 men and 6 batteries, were eager to attack. They pushed down the river road, where they met General Lee, and by his advice put their infantry into position to support their guns, of which they had sent forward six rifled pieces to within eight hundred yards of Malvern Cliff, that being the name given by them to this affair. Before they could get their guns to work, they were astonished to find our troops opening on them from the hill with twenty-five or thirty pieces, while a gunboat in the river began dropping huge shells among the infantry supports. Their battery of six rifles was destroyed,

two caissons were blown up, and the artillerists and some cavalry rushed in wild flight to the rear, riding over the infantry, who were not slow to follow the example set them. General Holmes declared that to attack an enemy so strongly posted would be madness, in which opinion General Wise concurred, and they retired, to take no part even in the battle of the following day.

Thus the Union troops had successfully resisted three separate attacks on flank and rear on this eventful 30th of June. There was no more critical day in the campaign; and that the crisis was safely passed was due mainly to the courage and discipline of our men, and the alertness and skill of corps, division, and brigade commanders, whose best energies were exerted to take the army intact to the James.

It now remains to notice the closing scenes of the campaign.

CHAPTER VIII.

BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL.

It will be remembered that, by orders of the Commander-in-Chief, General Keyes had crossed White Oak Swamp with his corps, and on the afternoon of the 29th had put the trains in motion from Turkey Bridge for the James River. He had become familiar with this region through scouting parties of the Eighth Illinois and Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry. Captain Kernan, of the latter regiment, an excellent officer, and as skilful as an Indian in woodcraft, who lost his life in a grand charge which stayed the rush of Jackson's men on the Eleventh Corps at Chancellorsville, in 1863, is mentioned by Keyes as of special aid to him in finding out the roads in this unknown region. Fitz John Porter's corps was in support of Keyes, and both were ordered to occupy a position resting on the James, at or near Turkey Bend, perpendicular to the river and covering Charles City road, and to open communication with the gunboats, while the wagon-train was pushed on to Haxall's and Harrison's plantations. Harrison's Landing was afterward selected as the base by General McClellan, after consultation with Commodore Rodgers on board the gunboat Galena, as from that position better protection could be given to the camps by the fire of the gunboats.

After the close of the several engagements on the 30th, the whole army was put in position on Malvern Hill.

Malvern Hill is an eminence near the north or left bank of the James River, sixty feet in height, its summit presenting an open plateau of some extent. It rises somewhat abruptly at its northern side, and on the south and east is guarded by Western River and thick underwood; its western edge is also protected by forests and swamp, difficult for horse or artillery. Between the two rivers is the approach to the northern front, up which the Quaker road passes, in front of the Crew house, where it divides. The western foot of the hill is traversed by the New Market road. The slopes of the hill formed an admirable position to post or manœuvre troops; and either flank, if threatened, could be supported across the plateau on the top. General McClellan had given orders for placing the troops, before they had all arrived upon the spot, and had assigned positions to Porter's corps and Couch's division of Keyes'; the other corps, as they came on the ground, were put in position by General A. A. Humphreys, who had examined the ground thoroughly the day before. The army was disposed in the form of a huge semicircle, its wings resting on the river, with the right at Haxall, where it was protected by the fire of the gunboats. General Morell was posted on the extreme left, with his headquarters at the Crew house, the brigade of Griffin in advance; Martindale's brigade in the Crew field immediately north of the Richmond road, Butterfield's in its rear on the south side of the Richmond road, both in close order, the men lying down, and ready to support Griffin's brigade or meet an attack on the left. General Griffin had command of all the artillery on the left, and Colonel McQuade's Fourteenth New York Volunteers, with a section of Weedén's battery, was watching that flank. Buchanan's and Lovell's brigades of Sykes' division was near and in rear of Morell, Warren's brigade having been thrown into the valley below

the plateau, watching the river road. McCall's division was in rear of Porter and Couch. Couch's division, with its left near Morell, was deployed half way to the woods at the foot of the hill, its right on a ravine, which extended almost as far as the West house, and separated the left from the centre; Heintzelman, from the ravine to the wood at the West house in the centre, across the Quaker road, Kearney on the left, Hooker on the right. Between Hooker and the Binford house was Sumner's corps, prolonged until it met the divisions of Smith and Slocum, of Franklin's corps. The bridge at Carter's Mill and the approach to Haxall's, where several roads converge, were guarded by Keyes, with Peck's division. The position was most favorable for the use of cannon. The reserve artillery, under General Hunt, was posted by that able officer on the height on the west of the plateau and in front of the brick house. Batteries of 20- and 32-pounders, with rifled and Napoleon guns, formed a terrible array; below them were the infantry awaiting attack with firm confidence. Sixty pieces had a converging fire from Porter's line, and all along the crest of the hill, wherever one was needed, a battery made its appearance at the moment. Those who had toiled to drag the guns across the swamp and up the hill were rewarded for their labor—the First Connecticut Heavy Artillery distinguishing itself among volunteers in this branch of the service.*

The artillery reserve under General Hunt, with Colonels Wm. Hays and Getty as brigade commanders, together with the horse-batteries of Tidball, Benson, and Robertson, also contributed to the success of this movement to a degree which entitles them to a special mention in this connection.

On the right of General Couch's position, extending

* An examination of the reports of nearly all the Union generals discloses many details of Malvern Hill which cannot be introduced here for lack of space.

down toward the enemy, was a grove which General Humphreys desired to have slashed, that it might not afford a cover for attack; but he was unable to secure the men necessary for the work. Though a part of it nearest his lines was occupied by Couch, the enemy found opportunity to use it, but were driven out later in the day by Abercrombie, so that Couch was able to advance his line for some distance, so as to effectually command the ravine on his left. The foot of the hill was densely wooded; in front of Crew's house at the base of the hill, and one mile distant, about one hundred yards from the farm fence, was a deep ravine running parallel to it. Here Armistead's rebel division formed.

During the battle of Glendale, when McCall's division broke, many fugitives did not rejoin their command, but passed to the rear as rapidly as possible, joining the ever-increasing column that led the way to the river and the shelter of the gunboats. These cast away everything that might impede their flight, save their arms and ammunition, and while intent on safety, were not unprepared for resistance. When they reached a point from which the waters of the James were brought into view, and they saw the gunboats swinging at anchor, their spirits revived, discipline asserted its power, and they sought to join their commands. All through the long morning, dusty and powder-stained men in close column climbed the steep Quaker road, under direction of staff officers who had carefully examined the ground. In front of some parts of the line were slight trenches, barely deep enough to be called rifle-pits. Of entrenchments there were none; the crests and inequalities of the ground served as sufficient cover to the artillery, and the men below and between the guns looked out over the wide sweep of open ground between them and the forest which hid the enemy from view. From the Crew house McClellan could overlook

the movements of the enemy, and see the divisions of Longstreet and Hill filing into position in the rear of Jackson. These troops had been so roughly handled the day before, and their numbers so diminished, that they required rest, and took no active part in the movements of the first day. Lee, whose army was as weary with the labor of the past week as our own, felt it a necessity incumbent upon him to attack, although he was urged by some of his best officers not to press McClellan further. He and his staff were more ignorant of the roads and the approaches to the hill than our own men, who had studied the topography of the region assiduously with a view to this movement. Magruder, for instance, who cannot be accused of lack of zeal in his cause, pressed forward to the Quaker road with his own division and that of the veteran General Huger; but both lost their way, and their failure to reach Glendale in time to take part was most disastrous to the rebels.

Lee marshalled his forces, Jackson's command with D. H. Hill on his right, Whiting on his left, with one of Ewell's brigades occupying the interval, the rest of Ewell's and Jackson's own division in reserve. Two of Huger's brigades were formed next to Hill; Magruder was on the right with his own and one of Huger's brigades. Ignorance of the country, the difficulty of communication, the density of the forests, which hindered the movement of artillery and made it impossible to bring up a sufficient force of that arm to oppose successfully the extraordinary strength in that regard opposed, are among the reasons advanced by General Lee why this final effort of his army was not a success. His report, and those of all the other rebel commanders who took part in the action, are meagre.

On the rebel side the orders were to advance at a given signal, which was to be a yell, cheer, or shout, to be uttered

by Armistead's brigade as it took the lead. But Armistead's brigade was cut off by part of Huger's division and by Magruder's, and the sound of a shout when a shout was raised was not heard all along the line, being lost in the sound of the guns on the hill.

About 1 o'clock P.M. Whiting's and D. H. Hill's advance appeared in the plain beyond the belt of woods at the foot of the hill, and were immediately fired on by our artillery, which inflicted a heavy loss while they were crossing an open field and fording a stream to get under cover. Here they were halted for a while to examine the Union position. When the examination was completed, D. H. Hill was confirmed in his opinion, previously expressed, that the attack could not but be hazardous to their arms. While this portion of the rebel army was halting here, awaiting the proper disposition of their artillery, so as to distract and crush the fire of the Union guns, the division of General Hill was put in motion, that of General Whiting being held on the road near Poindexter's house, covering batteries which were exposed to a concentrated fire from the hill, and which were disabled and retired almost as fast as they were brought up, until the weight of the attack upon the left was developed, when these guns were turned so as to command the rebel approach.

During the whole morning there had been a constant artillery fire; occasionally small bodies of the enemy emerged from the woods and approached near enough to open musketry fire upon the gunners, but as often as they appeared the concentrated fire of four batteries drove them away with loss. In front of Couch this was repeated three times, twice on his right and once on his left; the last, at three o'clock, was made on Palmer and Abercrombie on the right of Couch, in which a stand of colors of the Fourteenth Virginia, of

Armistead's brigade, was captured. The division of D. H. Hill waited for the signal. Huger and Magruder on his right did not wait. As soon as Magruder could get a battery in position he opened fire, and sent a regiment to charge up the hill in front on Couch's left. The battery was crushed by the fire brought on it, and the charging regiment hurled back with loss. Three times he tried the same experiment, and three times met with a like repulse. General Magruder's report is very like a romance; but bold as his final charge was, and far as it was pushed, his determined men were never near enough to threaten seriously the safety of the main Union batteries. Some of the field batteries which were in exposed positions were limbered up and withdrawn to more favorable ones, and again opened fire on his advance. As to the signal for the rebel attack, it is enough of a military curiosity to be given in full. It is appended to Magruder's report as Inclosure No. 5, July 1, 1862:

Batteries have been established to rake the enemy's line. If it is broken, as is probable, Armistead, who can witness the effect of the fire, has been ordered to charge with a yell. Do the same.

By order General Lee.

R. H. CHILTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

General Armistead, to whom the duty of shouting was prescribed, advanced three regiments to drive off some skirmishers, which he says were repulsed, but went so far that one regiment, mentioned above, lost its colors, and neither of them could either advance or recede. They were obliged to take advantage of an inequality of the ground and lie down to escape from the fire of the artillery. They were not relieved until after nightfall. Armistead also begged for more artillery, but failed to have his wants supplied, although Longstreet promised to do so. Magruder

wanted thirty pieces of rifled artillery, but it did not come. D. H. Hill sent Jackson a message stating that the fire of isolated batteries was worse than useless, only exposing the batteries to be destroyed in detail, and insisted that one hundred guns should be concentrated upon the Union line. Jackson replied by repeating the order to advance at the signal. Later in the afternoon, about 5.30 o'clock, Hill heard the sound of loud shouting on his right, followed by heavy musketry fire; this he supposed to be the appointed signal, and gave orders for his men to advance. Garland in front attacked the hill with impetuous courage, but soon sent for reinforcements. The Sixth Georgia, and the brigade of General Toombs, which was under partial shelter in the rear, were sent to his assistance. General Hill in person accompanied the column. They approached the crest in handsome order, but discipline was of no avail to hold them there, much less to make them advance farther. They soon retreated in disorder. Gordon, commanding Rhodes' brigade, had made a gallant advance and some progress, as had also Ripley and Colquitt's and Anderson's brigades; all these were now streaming wildly to the rear. Heedless of command and deaf to entreaty they sought the woods near Willis church on the Quaker road. Ransom's brigade of Huger's division was sent to the aid of Hill, but these manifested no eagerness to tempt fate in front of those batteries. Winder, of Jackson's division, and later Early came to the rescue, but both these brigades were soon huddled together with the same disorganized mass of troops. They suffered from the fire, but accomplished nothing. A careful reading of D. H. Hill's report of his part of the battle, shows plainly the loss and demoralization of his division, and gives a glimpse of the disorder hidden by the woods about the little parsonage.

No more positive admission of defeat with loss and disorder can be looked for. Hill upbraids everybody, from the Commander-in-Chief down to Whiting and Holmes, whom he asserts were not engaged at all. He complains of want of concert and unity of action, and is eager to assert and probably believes that he did, as he says, engage the whole "Yankee" force with his single division.

The plain truth is Hill attacked on Couch's right. What he describes as the breaking and retreat of the whole line was only that of some of Sedgwick's men, who had been sent to act as supports when the attack was heaviest, changing places with those of the infantry in front of the line whose cartridge-boxes were empty, that they might go to the rear and replenish—a movement which was made in good order without confusion, and which no doubt tended to accelerate the withdrawal of Hill's men to the grove about the parsonage. He further says that, so far as he can learn, no one of the rebels drew trigger except McLaw's division, his own, and a part of Huger's. His report is dated —— 1862, and written, as it must have been, long after the battle. Hill betrays at least great ignorance of the actions of his brother officers. Nevertheless it is true that the rebel force was not handled as a whole in concert of action. After giving the final orders for battle, General Lee apparently left the execution to the division commanders. The signal for onset was inadequate for fighting in thick woods. But while there was a want of absolute coincidence in the movements of the rebel generals, Hill is inaccurate in saying that there was no attack made at the same time as his own. Magruder had placed his three divisions on the right of Huger's *en echelon* to the right and rear. Magruder, who was ordered to support Armistead, went forward to reconnoitre the position. He found part of Armistead's

brigade in line of battle under the brow of a wooded hill, along the crown of which passed a road which was parallel to a field occupied by the Union troops. Here he selected his own line, taking the road as a good position on which to form troops.

The field in which the batteries nearest to him were placed was the Crew farm, and the nearest and best line was that which led up to it from the meadow on the extreme right of his line, where the advance would be in a measure protected by the natural cover of the hill. Crew's house was the key to the position; about it were grouped the heavy siege-guns, while battery above battery, with long lines of infantry, sometimes protected by slashing and sometimes by rifle pits, which Kearney had dug in front of his division, held the salient points of the position. As Magruder got his men in place, the fire from these batteries became, as stated, intense. His plan was to put 15,000 men in line and charge the batteries and supporting infantry, to follow up success with fresh troops, and if repulsed to hold the line where he then was on the hill. His caution as to repulse was one that did credit to his military sagacity and was fully justified by events.

Although the batteries were not carried, the assault contributed much to the rout, panic, and demoralization which marked the enemy's escape from the field early in the night. Darkness set in and he concluded to let the battle subside and occupy the field; pickets were set and a part of Armistead's brigade encamped within one hundred yards of the Union guns. Lee is satisfied that the Union loss was far greater than his own, and winds up with the remark that there was no attack so far as he knows by General Holmes on his right. Holmes and Huger seem to be impediments in the way of the rebel commanders in this

campaign, and are made the scapegoats of rebel reports. Having seen what General Magruder claims, let us look further at what he did on the field.

About the same time that D. H. Hill advanced to make his attack—say about 5.30 P.M.—Magruder, who waited in vain for the thirty pieces of rifled artillery for which he had sent to silence the Union fire, became impatient at the delay, and ordered General Armistead's brigade to advance, and at the same time put his own division in motion. He sent forward Wright's brigade first, Mahone's next, substituted three regiments of Cobb's for the remainder of Armistead's raw troops, sent in General Ransom to his left, in person superintended the advance of Barksdale's brigade of his own division, and sent staff officers in quick succession to urge an attack by Huger on his left. As they emerged from the cover of the woods in which their line was formed and breasted the slope of the hill, now swept by the converging fire of the heavy batteries at the Crew house, the advance was checked, but they were easily rallied and led again with fury to the attack; but the line made no further progress, even in Magruder's report. Ransom and Jones, with the remainder of Armistead's men, were urged forward to the support of their faltering comrades. McLaw's division was also sent in by order of General Lee, and Magruder was urged to press the enemy on the right. They advanced bravely all along the line, but only to recoil before the storm of missiles which each fresh effort on their part drew from the heavy guns. The day was drawing to an end and Magruder gave his attention to securing the ravine and woods where he had formed his line, and to procuring reinforcements to guard against any reverse. All the rebel generals ascribe their failure to reach the hill to the preponderance of the artillery fire on the

Union side, their own inefficiency in that arm, and to want of support and co-operation in attack. In truth there seems to have been few orders issued on the 1st by the rebel general-in-chief.

Magruder claims to have had under his command that day between twenty-six and twenty-eight thousand men, and estimates his loss at 2,900, and that of the Union troops at 6,000 or 7,000 from his fire alone!

The battle began by an advance against Porter's and Couch's position on the left and centre of the line by an advance by skirmishers which drove in Berdan's sharpshooters. The rebels were speedily repulsed by artillery alone. Along other parts of the line there was a desultory artillery fire kept up with no material result, save the annoyance it caused to the men who were under fire and obliged to be passive. On the extreme right Smith and Slocum of Franklin's corps were not engaged during the day. Between the left of Smith and the right of Sumner was a point which was deemed weak, as it was here that the main road from the crossing at White Oak Swamp came in; near the mill pond on Smith's right the trees had been slashed by Duane, of the Engineers, by order of General Humphreys, who remained on the front of Sumner and Heintzelman during the greater part of the day, as there were indications of an attack in that quarter, but no attempt was made here save a slight one on Sumner's right, of which that General made no report, as he says that during the action the commanding general came on the field and he (Sumner) ceased to command.

The weight of the battle, it will be seen, fell upon Morell of Porter's corps, and Couch of Keyes'. About 3 p.m., Anderson, of Huger's division, charged against the right of Couch and became engaged with Palmer's brigade. They were met by a sharp musketry fire, and as soon as a battery

could be brought to bear were put to rout, leaving the flag of the Fourteenth Virginia in the possession of the Thirty-sixth New York Regiment. An assault, which was made by a part of D. H. Hill's division, spread along the centre, also involving the left of Heintzelman, and was speedily repulsed. The ravine between Couch's right and the left of Heintzelman, a point which invited attack, was held by a strong detachment from Palmer's and Birney's brigades, which were protected by intrenchments along their front. In the furious assault made on this portion of the line later in the day these regiments assisted in repulsing the enemy.

There are discrepancies as to the time at which the most fiercely contested encounters of the day took place. D. H. Hill gives the hour of his order advance as about one and a half hour before sunset; Magruder that of his at 5.30 p.m.; Couch says that about 4.30 p.m. the enemy rapidly pushed forward a heavy column into the open field and advanced boldly from their right and opened the attack upon Griffin, of Morell's division, whose front was protected by fourteen rifled Parrott guns, and eleven field pieces, supported by the Fourth Michigan, Ninth Massachusetts, and Sixty-second Pennsylvania. Here was the pinch of this fight. The enemy advanced steadily until it came within range of the rifled guns, when it was stopped and formed line. Kingsbury's battery of six Parrott guns, having exhausted its ammunition, was withdrawn, and three guns of Battery C, Rhode Island Artillery, and two of the Fifth Massachusetts substituted.

This is the last effort of D. H. Hill's left, and the next scene in the drama is the charge of Magruder, the most famous of any made that day, already described.

As the efforts of Hill's men relaxed, there was still a heavy cannonade kept up by the rebels. Porter, who had fathomed

the design of the enemy, husbanded his ammunition and reserved his musketry fire. His men were for the most part protected by the inequalities of the ground, by slight trenches and rifle pits in their front, and suffered comparatively little from the rebel fire. As soon as any man was wounded, he walked if able, or if not, was carried to the shelter of a bank in the rear, chosen as a temporary hospital; the bearers returned quietly and promptly to their places in the ranks.

In Morell's division they were disposed: Martindale in the centre, lying down, Griffin in front, Butterfield in the rear. The force of the final assault, for the first time that day, aroused the infantry into vigorous action along that part of the line, from Sykes' right to Heintzelman's left. The advancing rebel columns rushed forward upon the infantry line, which rose up to repel the onset. Morell was advised that a strong body of the enemy were availing themselves of the natural advantages to push up a valley upon his left and rear. Arrangements were promptly made to meet him, and were hardly completed when he appeared ascending the hill near the Crew house, and was promptly met by the Fourteenth New York, and after three attacks was driven off and did not renew his attempt in that quarter. At the same time a determined and powerful attack was made upon Morell's left front; the first assault was repulsed, but the enemy's line being constantly reinforced, the regiments which had advanced to support the batteries were compelled to fall back, their ammunition exhausted. These were regularly relieved by other regiments, who continued the conflict against superior numbers until these in turn were relieved by part of Sykes' division and Meagher's brigade of Richardson's, who came on the field led by General Porter in person.

In front of Couch's line was a like desperate encounter,

marked by the violence of the assault and the steady tenacity of the resistance by which it was met and repelled. The enemy made repeated efforts to drive in his right. If but once the rebels could only pierce that line and get among the guns which had held them at bay so long, the Union centre was parted, the army cut in two. But if Magruder saw the importance of the position, so did the Union commanders. Sumner, prompt to divine the place of danger, sent Caldwell's brigade, which went promptly into action. Heintzelman sent Seely's battery, which, under De Russy, Chief of Artillery, was put in position in front of Howe, and did its duty well. Sickles, with three regiments from Hooker's division, took an effective part, relieving some of the regiments whose ammunition was exhausted.

The struggle continued until nine o'clock P.M., when the rebels withdrew. The author, as an eye-witness, can assert that never for one instant was the Union line broken or their guns in danger. During the night the troops were withdrawn from the hill and put in motion toward Harrison's landing, seven miles distant, the Navy Department having decided that, owing to the narrowness of the James in the vicinity, it would be impossible for it to cover the transports and supplies against attack from the opposite bank. The post at Harrison's Landing was shelled by Stewart, who had been a week on his chase after Stoneman, but before Jackson, whom Stewart had notified of the opportunity, could come up to hold the hill (Evlington Heights), which commanded our camp, Stewart was driven off. The camp was afterward bombarded by the rebels from the opposite side of the James. They fired from heavy rifled guns and withdrew at daylight. This position was also occupied to guard against a repetition of the attempt.

Thus ended the first advance upon Richmond.

CHAPTER IX.

TERMINATION OF THE CAMPAIGN.

IF, in reviewing the history of the Army of the Potomac as narrated in the foregoing chapters, we are to derive any great lessons from our experience, it must obviously be from a study of the events of the entire twelve months, rather than from the isolated engagements. In giving opinions in regard to the plans and movements, we have been governed by the documentary evidence now brought before us by both sides. We have not differed very much from the criticisms of abler writers, who came to the same conclusions years ago without the use of these documents. We only confirm their views.

General McClellan was correct in his declaration, made to the Secretary of War, in October, 1861, that the object of the Government should be to "crush the army under Johnston, at Manassas." We believe that he could have done this, and that he failed because he overestimated the strength of the enemy's forces, and underestimated the fighting qualities of his own army. He had made a plan which required that he should move from Washington with 140,000 men, and still leave the city secure. From the moment it was thought that he was determined to abide by his demand for this large body of men with which to take the field, and he was considered unmindful of the requirements of the political situation, the active hostility of the strongest

friends and advisers of the Administration was aroused. These men considered a forward movement of the Army of the Potomac a political necessity, and demanded it.

Centreville should have been retaken when Johnston held it with but 47,000 men. At that period General McClellan had 180,000 men. President Lincoln felt this, and the people were with him, when, relying on his instincts solely, he demanded "action." All the so-called interference, all the real interference with General McClellan's plans—all the want of confidence in his ability as the leader of an active army—all the want of faith in his intentions to fully support the views of the Government in regard to the objects of the war, and as to the means to carry them out, arose from the belief that in and about General McClellan's headquarters there was a lack of faith in the Government itself and of sympathy with the Administration. McClellan proceeded to create, equip and discipline the Army of the Potomac with a skill and persistency which will be the admiration of military students for all times. He inspired the army with confidence; it believed him to be right in all his measures, because it loved and respected him, and because he was its appointed leader and guide. It was prepared to do whatever he demanded. He did not display the dash and brilliancy necessary to obtain from it the best service of which it was capable, but he still commanded its implicit confidence. The Army of the Potomac never lost the reputation of being the best disciplined, best equipped, and most efficient army on this continent; and this reputation was due solely to General McClellan's system of organization.

The more prominent of the lessons of our experiences of these three months worthy of the study and discussion of military men, are based upon the following general state-

ments of the main facts which relate to the strategy and movements of that period.

Manassas was not taken, but was abandoned by Johnston when he heard of the order of the President requiring the Assistant Secretary of War to provide the necessary transportation to move the Army of the Potomac to the lower Chesapeake. What had we done to force this evacuation of a position which had been held by the rebels in sight of the dome of the Capitol for eight long months? Nothing but to build up an army many times as strong as that of our foes. Not a single effectual reconnoissance, not a successful attempt to discover the actual strength of the rebels, had been made; yet General McClellan had confidence in his own plans. He believed that in the end he would be proved to be right, if his own propositions were kept secret and carried out; but still the Potomac was blockaded for months, Norfolk was used to build Merrimacs, and gunboats, and we remained in front of Washington, growing ourselves and watching the rebel forces grow, until we saw the latter fold their tents and steal away, having done all that they expected to do—having been able to keep us about Washington until they became able to meet us upon battle-fields.

Read the letter of Admiral Goldsborough* upon the taking of Norfolk—take your map, place thereon Burnside's forces, Wool's force of 11,000 men, the Army of the Potomac and its detachments, and pause to wonder why we permitted

* INCLOSURE.

“NAVY DEPARTMENT, April 24, 1862.

“HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

“SIR—I have the honor to transmit to you a copy of despatch No. 214 of Flag-Officer Goldsborough, received this day at this department. The views expressed by him in regard to the possession of Norfolk accord so fully with my own that I deem it a duty to communicate them to you. I know not that it is possible, in the existing state of things, to re-enforce General Burnside as proposed; but the

the James River to be lost to us, with such forces at our disposal.

How can we be less impatient than was our noble President at that hour? how less anxious and demonstrative than

capture of Norfolk would, in my opinion, next after New Orleans, be the most decisive blow that could be struck for the suppression of the rebellion.

"I also send you an extract from a despatch of Commander Missroon, of the steamer Wachusett, York River, in relation to the works of Yorktown.

"I am, very respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"GIDEON WELLES."

FIRST INCLOSURE.

"U. S. FLAG SHIP MINNESOTA.

"HAMPTON ROADS, April 22, 1862.

"HON. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy :

"SIR—Three white men—one of them accompanied by his wife and two children—were picked up last night by the Baltimore. They were in a boat, and had, as they say, escaped from Norfolk. One of them has been working for a long time past in the Gosport Navy Yard. He describes the Merrimac as being off the yard, with a large gang of men working upon her day and night, fitting shutters to all her side ports; she has always had them, he says, to her end ports. He also informs me that four new wooden gunboats have been completed at the Norfolk yard, and a fifth over in Norfolk, and that all are now ready for service. Furthermore, that at the Norfolk yard they are building rapidly a vessel to be just like the Merrimac in every respect, except in size, which is only to be about a thousand tons; that she is already far advanced toward completion in her wood-work, and has even the wood-work of her covering or house finished. Neither of her engines, nor any of her iron plates, have yet been put in place. It is expected that she will be ready for use in about a month or so. This, he says, is the only vessel to be plated that the enemy is preparing at Norfolk. Besides the above five gunboats, they are now building there four more.

"I am perfectly satisfied of the truth of all these statements.

"I am, respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH.

"Flag-Officer commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

"N.B.—By a late Norfolk paper, which I forward to the department to-day, it appears that a fight came off last Friday, near Elizabeth City, between some of Gen. Burnside's men and the enemy, and that the latter were driven half way to Norfolk. The object of the attack on our part was, I know, to destroy the lock of the Dismal Swamp Canal at South Mills, which I have no doubt has been accomplished effectually. With this lock destroyed and the Currituck link of the Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal kept choked, no iron-clad or other gunboats can go from Norfolk to the sounds of North Carolina. No vessel drawing over three,

were the people shouting "On to Richmond." On to Richmond was only a phrase. Had we gone to Norfolk, that demand would have been satisfied. But a nation guided by minds capable of perceiving the main political benefits to be derived from the strife thrust upon us, was dissatisfied with the want of action on the part of the Army of the Potomac, and the people felt that the rebels grew faster in numbers and in confidence than did our own army, and through their representatives they demanded that the Army of the Potomac should try its strength with the rebels. The only man who did not seem to feel the full force of this public demand was the commander of the army himself.

At that moment, had he become more disposed to act than to secure his army from every possible chance of failure, he could have silenced all his enemies and have placed upon the shoulders of those who were antagonistic to him the full responsibility for any want of success which might have attended his movements. At this period General McClellan could have led the whole sentiment of the country, had he either moved on Manassas, had he cleared the lower Potomac of rebel batteries, or had he taken Norfolk.

or three and a half feet of water, can pass through Currituck Sound from Norfolk and so get into Croatan and Pamlico Sounds. I speak from positive information on this point, for I had the experiment tried in effect, by Lieut. Jeffers, when he was despatched by me in charge of an army stern-wheel boat, drawing only three feet or so of water, to destroy some salt-works at Old Currituck Inlet.

Could Gen. Burnside be promptly re-enforced with a body of 40,000 men, I am convinced that he could possess himself of Norfolk in a fortnight after their arrival at Roanoke Island. This idea I have entertained ever since that island surrendered to our arms, and the more I think of it, the more I am confirmed in my belief. With the force the General would then have, he would undoubtedly use the roads leading from Powell's Point, Winton, and Gatesville, all three of which are good and practicable, and hold Roanoke Island and Winton as bases of operation.

"These considerations may be of moment before a great while, if they are not so now.

"Most respectfully,

"L. M. G."

This is, then, to be the first deduction from the narrative of the events of 1861 and 1862: General McClellan did not give to the will of the President and the demands of the people that weight in the formation of his plans of campaign to which they were entitled.

When Johnston evacuated Manassas the rebels still held their position at Norfolk, thus securing to themselves a navy yard, and effectually blockading the James River against the navy and the United States transports. The Army of the Potomac was to be moved under new plans of campaign. General McClellan could no longer expect to surprise General Johnston, or cut his lines of communication with Richmond.

President Lincoln had assumed command of all the armies. To whom was he to turn for advice and assistance? To the general who had determined that all his plans as commander-in-chief, thus far ordered or submitted, were faulty?

President Lincoln was commander-in-chief, and as such, loved and respected by the whole people as a pure, earnest, honest ruler—brighter and quicker in perception of right and wrong than was any member of his cabinet. He knew the history of past wars. He shrank from no duty, but acted as his predecessors acted. He could not interfere; he could order, and he should have been obeyed. At least, the people and the army should never have known of any disagreements between him and the Commander of the Army of the Potomac.

From the records of the War Department we can determine the relative positions occupied by the President and the commanders of our armies during the War of 1812 and the Mexican War.

It appears that on November 25, 1846, the Secretary of

War wrote to General Taylor, in reply to the General's animadversions upon a despatch of the Secretary's in relation to the Tampico Expedition under General R. Patterson, as follows :

“ You must be aware that in my official communications I am only the medium for presenting the views of the President, and you will not question his right, as Commander-in-chief, to make suggestions as to the movements of the forces under your command, or as to the officers to be employed in these movements. Having, in this instance, carefully qualified his suggestions so as to prevent them from being regarded as positive directions or commands, and expressly disclaimed the intention of employing any part of the troops which in your opinion ‘ would interfere with your operations,’ he is entirely unconscious of having given any just cause for protest and complaint.”

Again, on May 31, 1847, the Secretary of War reviews General Scott's action in not carrying out the instructions of the President respecting peace negotiations with which Mr. Trist was charged, and concludes as follows :

“ Under these circumstances can you conceive that, as commanding general of the force in Mexico, you have the right to raise a question upon your duty to obey this direction, coming, as it does, through a proper channel from your superior, *the Commander-in-chief?* In my opinion you could not have wandered farther from the true view of the case than by supposing that the President or myself has placed you in a condition of deferring ‘ to the chief clerk of the Department of State the question of continuing or discontinuing hostilities.’ I cannot conceive that any well-founded exception can be taken to the order you have received in relation to suspending hostilities, and I am fully persuaded that, if the contingency requiring you to act upon it shall ever occur, you will promptly carry it into full effect.”

On June 15, 1847, the Secretary of War, referring to the same subject, and in reply to a letter from General Scott, says :

“In relation to the direction for an armistice or suspension of hostilities, the President, after duly considering all you have said on the subject, does not doubt that it was an order proper and right for him to give, and consequently one which you were bound to obey.”

Judging from the actions of other Presidents, who, for reasons sound or otherwise, relieved other generals in command, President Lincoln should have relieved General McClellan, as was done on January 13, 1848, when the Secretary of War informed General Winfield Scott that the President had determined to relieve him from further duty as Commanding General in Mexico, and ordered that he turn over the command of the army to the senior officer present.

Wherein can we find a difference between the position of General McClellan with President Lincoln and that of the other generals who had commanded our armies, with their Presidents? None, except that General McClellan was nearer the President, and had greater facilities for explaining his plans and views to him. President Lincoln's orders and wishes should have been obeyed so far as it was in the power of the General commanding the Army of the Potomac to obey them, and the records do not show that any efforts were made to keep in accord with the President, or to prepare even for the carrying out of *his* plans, particularly that embracing an overland route to Richmond. No direct and earnest effort, such as the President had directed, was made. Nothing pointing toward a bold attack upon Johnston, or the turning of his position by the route chosen by the President, seemed to be even contemplated.

Thus was the confidence of the Government in General McClellan impaired, if not destroyed.

The Army left Washington for Fortress Monroe, to carry out a plan of campaign which we may describe as follows: The base was to be the Fortress; the James River was to be

useless, being closed to us by the Merrimac. We were to move up the Peninsula, past Yorktown, and invest that place while McDowell was to invest and reduce Gloucester. We were then to make West Point the new base, and fight a battle between that point and Richmond. To do all this it was determined that we would require about 140,000 men.

This was the plan of General McClellan, with the base changed from Urbana, thus involving the siege and reduction of Yorktown and Gloucester, but still a proposition of his own.

The Warwick River was supposed to run from north to south; the road to Williamsburg from Newport News was supposed to run past Yorktown and not across the Warwick. No one thought of a line of works from Yorktown and down the Warwick, with its right on rebel gunboats. The Army of the Potomac was fairly bottled up unless it carried those works at Yorktown by coup-de-main, or seized Gloucester and forced the evacuation of Yorktown by running its batteries.

And now the salient features of the first and second plans of General McClellan became of vital importance. They are, in brief, the co-operation of the navy and the seizure of Gloucester by a large corps of the Army of the Potomac detailed for that purpose, and the holding of a force in the valley of the Shenandoah subject to the orders of the General himself.

General McClellan dismisses the subject with these few words:

"On my arrival at Fortress Monroe the James River was declared, by the naval authorities, closed to the operations of their vessels, by the combined influence of the enemy's batteries on its bank, and the Confederate steamers Merrimac, Yorktown, Jamestown, and Teazer.

"Flag-Officer Goldsborough, then in command of the United States

squadron in Hampton Roads, regarded it (and, no doubt, justly) as his highest and most imperative duty to watch and neutralize the *Merimac*, and, as he designed using his most powerful vessels in a contest with her, he did not feel able to detach for the assistance of the army a suitable force to attack the water-batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester. All this was contrary to what had been previously stated to me, and materially affected my plans.

"At no time during the operations against Yorktown was the navy prepared to lend us any material assistance in its reduction until our land batteries had partially silenced the works."*

At this point we must reiterate our assertion made in the body of this work: "Co-operation by the navy was not and could not have been secured at that date, *because Norfolk had not been taken* during the winter, as was urged by Admiral Goldsborough."

The Navy Department had not been impressed with the importance of this co-operation. Thus was the first step taken without proper provision for carrying out the main feature of a water approach to Richmond, as contrasted with the overland or direct route by Fredericksburg, which required no material aid from the navy. Truly was the Army of the Potomac in a false position.

What was to be done? Here was an army of invasion confronting a rebel line whose flanks rested on a fortified town and on gunboats, whose front was covered by a marsh, a river, and in large part by earthworks. Since McDowell's corps had been detained to defend Washington on the ground that General McClellan had disregarded the orders

* McC. Report, page 138. "I had no expectation of being relieved from the charge of the operations in the Shenandoah Valley and in front of Washington, the President's War Order No. 3 giving no intimation of such an intention; and that, so far as reference was made to final operations after driving Jackson back and taking such a position as to prevent his return, no positive orders were given in the letter, the matter being left for future consideration when the proper time arrived for a decision."

of the President, and had not, in the opinions of Generals Hitchcock and L. Thomas, complied with the requirements of the recommendations of the council of war, no assault upon the works at Gloucester could be attempted with any probability of success.

The army found itself, immediately after the order which removed McDowell, in such a reduced state in point of numbers, and in such a false position in regard to the contemplated movement up the Peninsula, that it was absolutely imperative upon the Commanding General to do something to give spirit and morale to his troops, however hazardous such a course might appear to be. Thus, it was imperatively demanded of him to assault the rifle-pits in front of the enemy's centre at once. Here it was that General McClellan failed to seize upon the only opportunity then afforded him to place himself right before the nation. He should have then and there taken Yorktown. Desperate situations require desperate measures. We now know that he could have taken the place. But it seems to have been ordered otherwise.

An army not considered fit to assault new and not well-built field-works was to be used for a regular siege, ordinarily requiring a desperate final assault.

This was indeed a miserable plight in which to place an army of invasion. The Government (for it was not President Lincoln alone, but Secretaries Chase and Stanton, Generals Hitchcock and Thomas, and whoever else were in the secret councils)—the Government, we repeat, was responsible for this state of things. The greatest military error that could possibly have been committed was that which removed so important a corps from an army already in motion to carry out what was a well-digested plan.

It was the President's duty to secure Washington, if General McClellan had not done so already, but it never was

his duty to strip General McClellan of a portion of his army in the field, in order to do this. He could not disregard the advice of those who counselled with him as military experts. It would have been better had he chosen men of more even temper and well-balanced mind. The resources of the country had not been drained—Washington was not in danger; if McClellan was active and the campaign in the Shenandoah had been under his direction, the works around Washington could have been held by bodies of militia alone. But, with blind indifference to whatever might result from it, these men persuaded the President to cripple the army sent out on a special mission, left the operations in the Shenandoah Valley under a thoroughly incompetent general, and in fact did everything to insure disaster to the Peninsula campaign.

Relieved from command of all the armies, fatally crippled after he was committed to the campaign up the Peninsula, General McClellan was fairly in the hands of those who had learned to distrust him and had become his adversaries.

Thus the army lay before Yorktown, prepared to consume weeks in conducting a siege against it. Encamped, and digging defences and approaches to field-works, the army was daily lowered in its own estimation by reading the mass of abuse which was found in the public press, and which was inspired by those principally active in the orders, recommendations, and investigations which led to this disastrous condition of affairs; abuse which was mostly personal and levelled against the commander who was directing the work. No wonder General Barnard is forced to say: "We did not carry away from Yorktown so good an army as we took there." Had General McClellan lost 6,000 men in making a single strong reconnoissance, no blame would have been attached to the attempt by the army or by the people. It was the only way out

of the scrape, and we believe that upon the arrival of Smith, of Keyes' corps, with his division in front of Lee's Mills, the capture of the rebel breastworks was possible, the destruction of the rebel line and the capture of Yorktown following; and we now know that General Smith, upon his second reconnaissance on April 16th, proved that it was not impossible to force the rebel line at any period before that date.

The removal of McDowell's corps, we must again assert, was an act unworthy of any men pretending to be the military advisers of the President. They either knew nothing of the usual consequences of moving an army to attack the capital of a nation, or for partisan political purposes they were contented to advise the crippling of McClellan. They pretended not to know that the very reason they assigned for moving more troops to defend Washington would compel the rebels with their small force to keep all their troops to defend Richmond. No one then knew how little General McClellan was adapted to push matters after the armies had "locked horns"; the Government had the right to suppose that he needed but the opportunity, to attack with vigor, especially as the plan under which he was working was his own.

In the third chapter we have referred to the shrewdness of General Johnston in evacuating Yorktown as soon as he had become convinced that he delayed as long as prudence dictated. Had he remained, his army would have been captured.

General McClellan has been censured by many critics for remaining behind at Yorktown; but we must recall that it was known that the rebels intended to make the narrow portion of the Peninsula, near Williamsburg, their second line of defence to cover their retreat to Richmond. On page 74 of his report General McClellan writes: "It was also known that there were strong *defensive* works at or near Williamsburg."

Williamsburg is situated about one-third of the distance from Yorktown to the new base which was to be established by General McClellan at West Point, and from Yorktown to West Point is about thirty miles by water. It was not at all impossible, but, on the contrary, it was highly probable, that any strong corps sent by water to West Point, or to a point near it, would, under ordinary circumstances, completely cut off Johnston's retreat. It was therefore the duty of the Commanding General to urge on such troops as he intended should form this flanking column, which was to be under General Franklin. He had been distinctly informed by Chief Allen that, on May 3d, the rebels had had present in Yorktown from 100,000 to 120,000 men, and this chief had reported that he knew this because 119,000 rations had been issued. General McClellan had for the pursuit 109,335 men, and it was subsequently determined that the rebels withdrew from Yorktown with but 53,000 men. This false estimate of the rebel strength must always be an element in any discussion of the operations of the Army of the Potomac on the Peninsula.

This strange discrepancy between the actual numbers of the rebels at a given point and the number contained in General McClellan's despatches and official reports, wherever found, are all due to the gross miscalculations made by the Secret Service Division of the Army of the Potomac. Thus, March 8, 1862, the rebel Army of the Potomac is stated to have been 150,000 strong, of which 80,000 were reported stationed at Centreville and vicinity; on March 11th there were only 47,000 men at that point. On March 17th, Chief Allen reports again, 150,000 men in the rebel Army of the Potomac—a report just as reliable as the first. May 3d, from camp at Yorktown, he states the force to be from 100,000 to 120,000, and bases this information upon reports of persons connected with the Commissary Department at Yorktown.

He finally states to General McClellan that these statements are "under rather than over the truth." The truth is, there were not over 53,000 effective men there. From Camp Lincoln, June 26th, he reports that the forces at that time were over 180,000 men. We know they did not amount to more than 85,000, while their official returns give them but 80,000. Finally, on August 14th, he reports that the rebel army about Richmond contained 200,000 men, and that their losses in the seven days' battles were 40,000 men. They lost 18,000.*

General McClellan remained behind at Yorktown, to push Franklin and Porter to a point twenty miles beyond Williamsburg, but failed to do so in time to render their flank movement of any decided effect.

Now, it turned out that the battle of Williamsburg was fought without any plan, and General McClellan has been censured for having relied too much upon the discretion and ability of the corps commanders present. His absence from the field has been referred to somewhat in detail by the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and in his testimony before that committee the General stated that he was not informed of the nature of the contest, but distinctly states that he considered it at that period a mere affair with the rear-guard of the enemy. In his official report he very naturally places some blame upon the members of his staff who failed to inform him of the operations in the advance.†

In justice to General McClellan we must state that he was exceedingly kind-hearted in his animadversions upon the action of his staff officers. At that time the general staff of the Army of the Potomac did not and could not assist him as a General Commanding should have been assisted. There

* See Taylor: Four Years with General Lee. 1878.

† See Allan's Report, p. 521. Mil. Repts. War Dept., vol. iv.

was a good organization of the special staff departments at the army headquarters, but there was not a large personal staff of experienced and talented officers, capable of keeping the General fully informed of the operations of his corps, and of the necessity for his presence when that necessity became obvious. The following is his report concerning the battle of Williamsburg :

“At an early hour of the morning I had sent two of my aids to observe the operations in front, with instructions to report to me everything of importance that might occur. I received no information from them leading me to suppose that there was anything occurring of more importance than a simple affair of a rear-guard, until about 1 o'clock P.M., when a despatch arrived from one of them that everything was not progressing favorably.”

This report of the General has called for these remarks in regard to the formation of his general staff, and we find good cause for this condition of affairs. From the Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, we gather, upon reading the testimony of General Richardson, and the character of the questions submitted to him, that there had been at that time a strong adverse feeling in regard to the composition and number of the staff of the General Commanding the Army of the Potomac. It was but natural, therefore, that General McClellan felt that the Government and the public were not ready to understand the necessities of his position in this regard, and that he abstained from requiring the necessary details from the army and appointments at large to his staff in deference to these views. General McClellan's field-work was therefore restricted by this unwillingness on his part to relieve himself from the burden of the details which afterward crowded upon him.

It was probably the duty of the Government to appoint to

the general staff many prominent foreigners who desired to observe our military operations, and, as in the case of the French princes, such officers might at times render brilliant services; but their presence should not have excluded American officers of ability and experience.

Most of his failures were due to these causes. No one seemed to encourage action or to report when or where he could act. He could not be present at all times with his advance, and often no one represented him at this point. He endeavored to do in person that which he should have done through a proper staff. The result was apparent inefficiency on his part and want of unity in the efforts of his corps.

After the evacuation of Yorktown, the main body of the Army of the Potomac had a plain duty to perform, *i. e.*, to overtake the enemy—to engage him—to capture or detain him until his flank should be gained by Franklin's command. The performance of this duty was very naturally left to the next general in order of rank—the commander of the first corps—when General McClellan deemed it to be his duty to remain at Yorktown to push the selected force rapidly to Eltham. But unfortunately the troops could not be pushed rapidly to Eltham, and the result of his labors at this point did not compensate for the loss of his presence at Williamsburg. He could not know it, but at that time it is stated by the rebel General Hood that General Johnston had made up his mind to retreat beyond Richmond, and to detain him anywhere was of the greatest importance.

If General McClellan could have been informed at once of what was occurring at Williamsburg, he would have gone there, and, by his presence and with his knowledge of his own plans, he would have forced the rebels to have abandoned their works at once, or he would have detained them

in their lines until he could have succeeded in placing Generals Franklin, Porter, Sedgwick, and Richardson on their flank. At any rate, he would have punished them more severely, knowing that they were forced to fight to save their trains, and also forced to retreat to save their communications with Richmond. Here, by reason of his absence and by reason of the want of knowledge of the position of affairs on the part of his staff officers, he failed in all his plans most signally, and the failure appeared all the greater because he had promised rapid marches and brilliant operations. The rain and the mud were nearly as bad for the rebels as for the United States troops. Another fatal error was made, and an opportunity to inspire the whole army and the Government was lost on May 5, 1862.

General Johnston reports that at no time was he pressed or uncertain. Two-thirds of the Union army under its senior corps commander could have both "pressed" him and produced "uncertainty." For work of this kind no man save the General Commanding himself was fitted at that time. Johnston actually got away from the Union front and attacked General Franklin's turning or flanking column on the 7th inst., at 10 A.M., and drove a portion of it out of his way, and so passed on.

However, we did derive some benefits from the battle of Williamsburg. Generals Hancock, Kearney, and Hooker then and there gave evidence of their fitness for command on such occasions.

The reasons assigned for not following Johnston more rapidly were the exhaustion of the troops, want of ammunition, the want of rations, the rain, and the mud. The Army of the Potomac was hampered by the necessity for establishing a new base, and the result was that it was not until twelve days after the battle of Williamsburg that it arrived

in front of Richmond. Concerning the events following the assumption of the advanced position in front of Richmond, there is little beyond what has been narrated to which we would desire to call attention. An army inexperienced in field operations had been finally brought near to the rebel capital. It was enthusiastic and confident, but it needed an especial training to carry on an offensive campaign. It is therefore impossible for us to agree with General Barnard in regard to the affair of Hanover Court-House, which he calls a useless battle. In point of fact this battle was exactly what the army wanted. If there was to be a junction made with McDowell, it was well to drive General Branch out of the way, even if it was not necessary to do so. But, beyond all this, it was high time for the new army to exhibit some character and determination in its operations; and all successful affairs of this kind, whether on its flanks or in its front, would have been of importance as giving esprit and morale to the forces engaged; and would have assisted in developing the talents and increasing the experience of the generals taking part in them. To the Army of the Potomac, for these reasons, the battle of Hanover Court-House was of great service. The writer made the preliminary reconnoissance with the cavalry, and guided the column of General Porter when he moved to defeat General Branch, and to communicate if possible with General McDowell. He knows the effect upon the troops of our success at that point, and he considers the moral effects of that success to have been of the greatest importance in the subsequent battle of Gaines' Mill.

The story of Fair Oaks and Seven Pines is well known to all. Since the war we have discovered that we could have gone to Richmond. General McClellan was sick, and if he believed his secret service report he was probably glad to

have prevented the overwhelming of his left flank by 150,000 rebels under Johnston. As usual, he was grossly and persistently deceived. But there was another case at Gaines' Mill.

At the battle General McClellan found 70,000 of the enemy on the left bank of the Chickahominy, desperately contending to overwhelm Fitz John Porter, who resolutely defended himself for many hours from being driven into the river, or down it, by this overwhelming force. We have narrated exactly what occurred on both banks of the stream. But the writer was present with General Porter on that day, having been ordered to join him, and having left the general headquarters for that purpose. He carried with him to General Porter the distinct impression then prevailing at the headquarters of the army, that he was to hold this large force of the enemy on the left bank of the Chickahominy, in order that General McClellan, with the main army, might break through and take Richmond. At that time it was generally understood that this was the plan of the General Commanding, and the criticism that General Porter should have been taken to the right bank of the river before the battle, is in our opinion the correct one. The sacrifice at Gaines' Mill of 7,000 men was warranted, if we were to gain Richmond by making it, and the troops engaged in carrying out this plan, conceiving it to be the wish of the General Commanding, were successful in holding the rebels on the left bank. But General McClellan had made up his mind to move to the James River to a new base before this battle, and he had made every preparation to make this change in the presence of the army defending Richmond. His subsequent movements and orders clearly show that he did not believe that the entrance of the army into Richmond at that time, leaving the major part of the rebel army on the left bank of the Chickahominy,

was a proper military movement. In this view of the military position he has already encountered, as he will always encounter, a strong adverse criticism from most military writers. The whole strength of the United States Government would have been instantly turned toward maintaining his army in the rebel capital, and Generals Lee and Jackson would have had a slight chance of success if they presumed to cross the Chickahominy to its right bank for the purpose of regaining Richmond. From this moment until the taking of the army from the Peninsula, everything seems to have been subordinated to the movements necessary to defend the Union lines from the repeated attacks from the rebels, who, after concentrating their forces on the right bank of the Chickahominy, seemed animated by the hope that they would ultimately drive our army from the Peninsula, or carry much of it to Richmond as prisoners.

Chief Allen about this time reports 200,000 men as opposed to the Army of the Potomac. General McClellan found Porter opposed to about 70,000, and supposed 125,000 men were in position between him and Richmond. He thereupon made *one* of the most able flank movements ever made in war. It may be called "retreat" or change of base, as different writers may prefer; the army certainly did not move of its own accord, as in retreat, but it was directed by General McClellan to its final position at Malvern Hill, and there it fought and maintained its reputation. The lessons taught the Army of the Potomac during the past three months were never lost to it. Inexperienced officers and men became veterans, to serve under other commanders in "defending the constitution of the country and the nationality of its people."*

* See General McClellan's farewell order.

And now, what saved the Army of the Potomac from further disaster than that consequent upon a forced change of base? It was the perfection of its organization, which was due to the personal affection entertained for General McClellan by the officers and men of his army. As an evidence of the influence this attachment of the army to the General Commanding had upon the authorities at Washington, we quote the following from a letter addressed to the writer by one of the ablest generals of the regular army, who has from the fall of Sumter until to-day enjoyed the respect and confidence of every administration: "General Hitchcock said to me, I presume about the time he visited the Peninsula, 'It is impossible for me now to command that army,' referring, I understood, to its training by McClellan, its known devotion to him, to the fact that its corps commanders and highest officers were almost entirely of his selection, so that the whole army, officers and men, were in a special manner devoted to him, and would thus be with difficulty guided and controlled by a general new to it and to them, and whose military reputation belonged to a long-passed war—that with Mexico."

These officers were correct in their estimate of the influence which this personal affection for its commander had upon the Army of the Potomac. It was so strong that every one naturally shrank from interfering between General McClellan and his men. His own regard for his troops may have at times made him unwilling to sacrifice some for the good of the whole. It is but charitable to consider this feeling on his part to have been one cause of our failure. We must write, however, in regard to facts of history just as the record presents these facts to us. There was failure, and the causes of that failure have been largely hidden from us. We, who belonged to the Army of the Potomac, the

grandest army gathered on this continent, at all times true to its commander-in-chief, whoever it might be, hope that he who organized that army will yet deem it wise and proper to give some fuller vindication of the policy he adopted, no matter whom he may strike. As it is, his friends and admirers have to deplore the necessity of writing in general criticism of the results which have been variously attributed to "want of support," "interference," or "inaction."

APPENDIX A.

THE original organization of the Army of the Potomac was of a temporary character, extending no farther than the formation of brigades and divisions, in which subsequent changes were to be made, as their efficiency demanded. The final composition, on April 1, 1862, commencing with the portion which went to the Peninsula, and giving afterward the regiments and batteries left on the Potomac, in Maryland and Virginia, was as follows: *

TROOPS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC SENT TO THE PENINSULA IN MARCH AND APRIL, 1862.

I.

CAVALRY RESERVE. BRIGADIER-GENERAL P. ST. G. COOKE.

Emory's Brigade.

5th United States Cavalry.
6th " "
6th Pennsylvania "

Blake's Brigade.

1st United States Cavalry.
8th Pennsylvania "
Barker's Squadron Illinois Cavalry.

* This Roster is taken from General McClellan's official report, as published by himself.

II.

ARTILLERY RESERVE. COLONEL HENRY J. HUNT.

Graham's Battery	"K" & "G"	1st U. S.,	6 Napoleon guns.
Randol's	"E"	1st "	6 "
Carlisle's	"E"	2d "	6 20-pds. Parrott guns.
Robertson's	" "	2d "	6 3-inch ordnance guns.
Benson's	"M"	2d "	6 " " " "
Tidball's	"A"	2d "	6 " " " "
Edwards'	"L" & "M"	3d "	6 10-pds. Parrott "
Gibson's	"C" & "G"	3d "	6 3-inch ordnance "
Livingston's	"F" & "K"	3d "	4 10 pds. Parrott "
Howe's	"G"	4th "	6 Napoleon "
De Russey's	"K"	4th "	6 " " "
Weed's	"I"	5th "	6 3-inch ordnance "
Smead's	"K"	5th "	4 Napoleon "
Ames'	"A"	5th "	6 { 4 10-pds. Parrott } guns.
			2 Napoleon }
Diederick's	"A" N. Y. Art. Batt'n,		6 20-pds. Parrott guns.
Voegellie's	"B" " " "		4 " " " "
Kn'eriem's	"C" " " "		4 " " " "
Grimm's	"D" " " "		6 32-pds. howitzers.
			100 guns.

III.

VOLUNTEER ENGINEER TROOPS. GENERAL WOODBURY.

15th New York Volunteers.
50th " "

REGULAR ENGINEER TROOPS. CAPTAIN DUANE.

Companies "A," "B," and "C," U. S. Engineers.

ARTILLERY TROOPS WITH SIEGE TRAIN.

1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery. *Col. Tyler.*

SECOND CORPS. GENERAL SUMNER.

CAVALRY.

8th Illinois Cavalry. *Col. Farnsworth*
One Squadron 6th New York Cavalry.

RICHARDSON'S DIVISION.

ARTILLERY.

Clark's Battery	"A" & "C"	4th U. S.,	6 Napoleon guns.
Frank's	"G"	1st N. Y.,	6 10-pds. Parrott guns.
Pettit's	"B"	1st "	6 " " "
Hogan's	"A"	2d "	6 " " "

INFANTRY.

Howard's Brigade.

5th N. H. Vols.
81st Penn. "
61st N. Y. "
64th " "

Meagher's Brigade.

69th N. Y. Vols.
63d " "
88th " "

French's Brigade.

52d N. Y. Vols.
57th " "
66th " "
53d Penn. "

SEDGWICK'S DIVISION.

ARTILLERY.

Kirby's Battery	" I "	1st U. S.,	6	Napoleon guns.	
Tompkins "	" A "	1st R. I.,	6	{ 4 10-pds. Parrott 2 12-pds. Howitzers	} guns.
Bartlett's "	" B "	1st "	6	{ 4 10-pds. Parrott 2 12-pds. Howitzers	} guns.
Owen's "	" G "	—	6	3-inch ordnance guns.	

INFANTRY.

<i>Gorman's Brigade.</i>	<i>Burns' Brigade.</i>	<i>Dana's Brigade.</i>
2d N. Y. S. M.	60th Penn. Vols.	19th Mass. Vols.
15th Mass. Vols.	71st " "	7th Mich. "
34th N. Y. "	72d " "	42d N. Y. "
1st Minn. "	106th " "	20th Mass. "

NOTE.—*Blenker's division* detached and assigned to the *Mountain Department*.

THIRD CORPS. GENERAL HEINTZELMAN.

CAVALRY.

3d Pennsylvania Cavalry. *Col. Averill.*

PORTER'S DIVISION.

ARTILLERY.

Griffin's Battery	" K "	5th U. S.,	6	10-pds. Parrot guns.
Weeden's "	" C "	R. I.,	—	—
Martin's "	" C "	Mass.,	6	Napoleon guns.
Allen's "	" E "	" "	6	3-in. ordnance guns.

INFANTRY.

<i>Martindale's Brigade.</i>	<i>Morell's Brigade.</i>	<i>Butterfield's Brigade.</i>
2d Maine Vols.	14th N. Y. Vols.	17th N. Y. Vols.
18th Mass. "	4th Mich. "	83d Penn. "
22d " "	9th Mass. "	44th N. Y. "
25th N. Y. "	62d Penn. "	Stockton's Michigan.
13th " "		12th N. Y. Vols.
1st Berdan Sharpshooters.		

HOOKER'S DIVISION.

ARTILLERY.

Hall's Battery	" H "	1st U. S.,	6	{ 4 10-pds. Parrott 2 12-pds. Howitzers	} guns.
Smiths "	" "	4th N. Y. Battery,	6	10-pds. Parrott guns.	
Bramhall's "	" "	6th " "	6	3-in. ordnance "	
Osborn's "	" D "	1st N. Y. Art'y,	4	" "	

INFANTRY.

<i>Sickles' Brigade.</i>	<i>Nagle's Brigade.</i>	<i>Col. Starr's Brigade.</i>
1st Excelsior (N. Y.)	1st Mass. Vols.	5th N. J. Vols.
2d " "	11th " "	6th " "
3d " "	25th Penn. "	7th " "
4th " "	2d N. H. "	8th " "
5th " "		

HAMILTON'S DIVISION.

ARTILLERY.

Thompson's Battery	" G "	2d U. S.,	6	Napoleon guns.	
Beam's "	" B "	N. J.,	6	{ 4 10-pds. Parrott 2 Napoleon	} guns.
Randolph's "	" E "	R. I.,	6	{ 4 10-pds. Parrott 2 Napoleon	} "

INFANTRY.

<i>Jameson's Brigade.</i>	<i>Birney's Brigade.</i>	— <i>Brigade.</i>
105th Penn. Vols.	38th N. Y. Vols.	2d Mich. Vols.
63d " "	40th " "	3d " "
57th " "	3d Maine " "	5th " "
87th N. Y. " "	4th " "	37th N. Y. " "

FOURTH CORPS. GENERAL KEYES.

CAVALRY.

COUCH'S DIVISION.

ARTILLERY.

McCarthy's Battery	"C" 1st Penn.,	4 10-pds. Parrott guns.
Flood's " "	"D" 1st " "	6 " " "
Miller's " "	"E" 1st " "	4 Napoleon " "
Brady's " "	"F" 1st " "	4 10-pds. Parrott " "

INFANTRY.

<i>Graham's Brigade.</i>	<i>Peck's Brigade.</i>	— <i>Brigade.</i>
67th N. Y. Vols. (1st L. I.)	98th Penn. Vols.	2d R. I. Vols.
65th " " (1st U. S. Chas.)	102d " "	7th Mass. " "
23d Penn. " "	93d " "	10th " "
31st " "	62d N. Y. " "	36th N. Y. " "
61st " "	55th " "	

SMITH'S DIVISION.

ARTILLERY.

Ayres' Battery	"F" 5th U. S.,	6 { 4 10-pds. Parrott 2 Napoleon } guns.
Mott's " "	3d N. Y. Battery,	6 { 4 10-pds. Parrott 2 Napoleon } " "
Wheeler's " "	"E" 1st N. Y.,	4 3 in. ordnance " "
Kennedy's " "	1st N. Y. Battery,	6 " " " "

INFANTRY.

<i>Hancock's Brigade.</i>	<i>Brooks' Brigade.</i>	<i>Davidson's Brigade.</i>
5th Wis. Vols.	2d Vermont Vols.	33d N. Y. Vols.
49th Penn. " "	3d " " "	77th " " "
43d N. Y. " "	4th " " "	49th " " "
6th Maine " "	5th " " "	7th Maine " "
	6th " " "	

CASEY'S DIVISION.

ARTILLERY.

Regan's Battery	7th N. Y. Battery,	6 3-in. ordnance guns.
Fitch's " "	8th " " "	6 " " "
Bates' " "	"A" 1st N. Y. Art'y,	6 Napoleon " "
Spratt's " "	"H" 1st " " "	4 3-in. ordnance " "

INFANTRY.

<i>Keim's Brigade.</i>	<i>Palmer's Brigade.</i>	— <i>Brigade.</i>
85th Penn. Vols.	85th N. Y. Vols.	104th Penn. Vols.
101st " "	98th " "	52d " " "
103d " "	92d " "	56th N. Y. " "
96th N. Y. " "	81st " "	100th " " "
	93d " "	11th Maine " "

V.

PROVOST GUARD.

2d U. S. Cavalry.
Battalion 8th and 17th U. S. Infantry.

AT GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

2 Cos. 4th U. S. Cavalry. 1 Co. Oneida Cav. (N. Y. Vols.),
1 Co. Sturgis Rifles (Ill. Vols.).

The following troops of the Army of the Potomac were left behind, or detached, on and in front of the Potomac for the defense of that line, April 1, 1862. Franklin's and McCall's divisions at subsequent and different dates joined the active portion of the army on the Peninsula. Two brigades of Shields' division joined at Harrison's Landing.

FIRST CORPS. GENERAL McDOWELL.

CAVALRY.

1st New York Cavalry. 4th New York Cavalry.
2d " " 1st Pennsylvania "

SHARPSHOOTERS.

3d Regiment Berdan's Sharpshooters.

FRANKLIN'S DIVISION.

ARTILLERY.

Platt's Battery "D" 2d U. S.,	6 Napoleon guns.	
Porter's " " "A" Mass.,	6 { 4-10 pds. Parrott	} guns.
	2 12-pds. Howitzers	
Hexamer's " " "A" N. J.,	6 { 4 10-pds. Parrott	} "
	2 12-pds. Howitzers	
Wilson's " " "F" 1st N. Y. Art'y,	4 3-in. ordnance	"

INFANTRY.

<i>Kearney's Brigade.</i>	<i>Stocum's Brigade.</i>	<i>Newton's Brigade.</i>
1st N. J. Vols.	16th N. Y. Vols.	18th N. Y. Vols.
2d " "	27th " "	31st " "
3d " "	5th Maine " "	32d " "
4th " "	96th Penn. " "	95th Penn. " "

MCCALL'S DIVISION.

ARTILLERY.

Seymour's Battery "C" 5th U. S.,	6 Napoleon guns.	
Eaton's " " "A" 1st Penn.,	4 " "	
Cooper's " " "B" 1st " "	6 10-pds. Parrott guns.	} guns.
Kein's " " "C" 1st " "	6 { 2 10-pds. Parrott	
	4 12-pds. Howitzers	

INFANTRY.

<i>Reynolds' Brigade.</i>	<i>Meade's Brigade</i>	<i>Ord's Brigade.</i>
1st Penn. Res. Reg't.	3d Penn. Res. Reg't.	6th Penn. Res. Reg't.
2d " " "	4th " " "	9th " " "
5th " " "	7th " " "	10th " " "
8th " " "	11th " " "	12th " " "
	1 Penn. Reserve Rifles.	

KING'S DIVISION.

ARTILLERY.

Gibbon's Battery "B"	4th U. S.,	6 Napoleon guns.
Monroe's " " "D"	1st R. I.,	6 10-pds. Parrott guns.
Gerrish's " " "A"	N. H.,	6 Napoleon. "
Durrell's " " Penn.		6 10-pds. Parrott "

INFANTRY.

<i>— Brigade.</i>	<i>Patrick's Brigade.</i>	<i>Augur's Brigade.</i>
2d Wis. Vols.	20th N. Y. S. M.	14th N. Y. S. M.
6th " "	21st " Vols.	22d " Vols.
7th " "	23d " "	24th " "
19th Ind. "	25th " "	30th " "

FIFTH CORPS. GENERAL BANKS.

CAVALRY.

1st Maine Cavalry.	5th New York Cavalry.
1st Vermont "	8th " "
1st Michigan "	Keyes' Battalion Penn. Cavalry.
1st R. I. "	18 Cos. Maryland "
	1 Squadron Virginia "

Unattached.

28th Penn. Vols.	4th Reg't Potomac Home Guard (Maryland Vols.).
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WILLIAMS' DIVISION.

ARTILLERY.

Best's Battery "F"	4th U. S.,	6 Napoleon guns.
Hampton's " "	Maryland,	4 10-pds. Parrott guns.
Thompson's " "	" "	4 " " "
Mathews' " "	"F" Penn.	6 3-in. ordnance "
— " "	"M" 1st N. Y.	6 10-pds. Parrott "
Knapp's " "	Penn.	6 " " "
McMahon's " "	N. Y.	6 3-in. ordnance "

INFANTRY.

<i>Abercrombie's Brigade.</i>	<i>— Brigade.</i>	<i>— Brigade.</i>
12th Mass. Vols.	9th N. Y. S. M.	28th N. Y. Vols.
2d " "	20th Penn. Vols.	5th Conn. "
16th Ind. "	27th Ind. "	46th Penn. "
1st Potomac Home Brigade (Md. Vols.).	3d Wis. "	1st Maryland "
1 Co. Zouaves d'Afrique (Penn. Vols.).		12th Ind. "
		13th Mass. "

SHIELDS' DIVISION.

ARTILLERY.

Clark's	Battery "E"	4th U. S.	6	10-pds. Parrott guns.
Jenks'	" " "A"	1st Va.,	6	4 10-pds. Parrott } guns.
				2 6-pds.
Davy's	" " "B"	1st "	2	10-pds Parrott guns.
Huntington's	" " "A"	1st Ohio,	6	13-pds. James "
Robinson's	" " "L"	1st "	6	2 12-pds. Howitzers } guns.
				4 6-pds.
		4th Ohio Inf'y,	1	6-pds. gun.

INFANTRY.

— Brigade.	— Brigade.	— Brigade.
14th Ind. Vols.	5th Ohio Vols.	7th Ohio Vols.
4th Ohio "	62d " "	29th " "
8th " "	66th " "	7th " "
7th Va. "	13th Ind. "	1st Va. "
67th Ohio "	39th Ill. "	11th Penn "
84th Penn. "		Andrew Sharpshooters.

GENERAL WADSWORTH'S COMMAND.

CAVALRY.

1st New Jersey Cavalry, at Alexandria.
4th Pennsylvania " east of the capital.

ARTILLERY AND INFANTRY.

10th New Jersey Vols.	Bladensburg Road.
104th N. Y. Vols.	Kalorama Heights.
1st Wis. Heavy Art'y.	Fort "Cass," Va.
3 Batteries N. Y. "	Forts "Ethan Allen" and "Marcy."
Depot of N. Y. Light Art'y.	Camp "Barry."
2d D. C. Vols.	Washington City.
26th Penn. "	G St. Wharf.
26th N. Y. "	Fort "Lyon."
95th " "	Camp "Thomas."
94th " "	Alexandria.
88th Penn. " (Detachment).	"
91st " "	Franklin Square Barracks.
4th N. Y. Art'y.	Forts "Carroll" and "Greble."
112th Penn. Vols.	Fort "Saratoga."
76th N. Y. "	" "Massachusetts."
59th " "	" "Pennsylvania."
88th Penn. " (Detachment).	" "Good Hope."
99th " "	" "Mahan."
2d N. Y. Light Art'y.	Forts "Ward," "Worth," and "Blenker."
107th Penn Vols.	Kendall Green.
54th " "	" " "
Dickerson's Light Art'y.	East of the capital.
86th N. Y. Vols.	" " "
98th Penn. " (Detachment).	" " "
14th Mass. " (Heavy Art'y).	{ Forts "Albany," "Tellinghast,"
56th Penn. "	{ "Richardson," "Runyon," "Jack-
	{ son," "Barnard," "Craig," "Scott."
	{ Fort "Washington."
4th U. S. Art'y (Detachment).	} " " "
37th N. Y. Vols. (Detachment).	Fort "Corcoran."
97th " "	
101st " "	
12th Va. "	
91st N. Y. "	

THE PENINSULA.

IN CAMP NEAR WASHINGTON.

6th New York Cavalry, Dismounted.
 10th " " "
 Swaim's " " "
 2d Pennsylvania " "

(These troops, 3,359 men, were ordered to report to Colonel Miles, commanding Railroad Guard, to relieve 3,306 older troops, ordered to be sent to Manassas to report to General Abercrombie.)

GENERAL DIX'S COMMAND. (BALTIMORE.)

CAVALRY.

1st Maryland Cavalry. Detachment of Cav. Purnell Legion.

ARTILLERY.

Battery "I" 2d U. S. Artillery.
 " — Maryland Artillery.
 " "L" 1st New York Artillery.
 2 Independent Batteries, Pennsylvania Artillery.

INFANTRY.

3d New York Volunteers.
 4th " "
 11th Pennsylvania "
 87th " "
 111th " "
 21st Massachusetts " (Detachment).
 2d Delaware "
 2d Maryland "
 1st Eastern Shore Home Guards (Maryland Volunteers).
 2d " " "
 Purnell Legion (Maryland Volunteers).
 2 Battalions —.

In this mere outline of the formation of the Army of the Potomac, it is impossible to treat of the eminent services of the prominent members of the general staff in detail. The erection of a line of forts covering a large city like Washington,—a line thirty-three miles in length, was the work of able engineers under General Barnard. He well represented the corps of United States Engineers, of which the country has always been proud. Skill and diligent labor were necessary, and the Commanding General gives full credit to all engaged in the work, in his final report. General Barton S. Alexander, General D. P. Woodbury, and Captain J. C. Duane organized and equipped the engineer troops, comprising the United States Engineers, the Fifteenth New York Volunteers, and the Fiftieth New York Volunteers, the latter well adapted for this service, containing, as they did, many sailors

and mechanics. Captain Duane prepared the engineer and bridge train, afterward so necessary to the movements of our army. By General William F. Barry, Chief of Artillery, eighty-one batteries were organized and equipped in a few months,—thirty regular and sixty-two volunteers, if we include the nine present after Bull Run. General Stoneman, in spite of all obstacles, rendered a praiseworthy service in giving to the army its first real cavalry organization.

APPENDIX B.

CONFEDERATE NAMES OF THE SKIRMISHES AND BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND.

EVENTS.

- May 31st, Battle of Seven Pines, Va.
June 1st, Battle of Fair Oaks, Va.
June 13th to 15th, Pamunkey Expedition, Va.
June 15th, Skirmish at Seven Pines, Va.
June 18th, Skirmish at Nine Mile Road, Va.
June 20th, Affair at Gill's Bluff, James River, Va.
June 25th, Battle of King's Schoolhouse (French Field, Oak Grove, or the Orchard), Va.
June 25th, 26th, Artillery Engagement on Garnett's Farm, Va.
June 26th, Engagement at Point of Rocks, Appomattox River, Va.
June 26th, Skirmish at Atlee's Station, Va.
June 26th, 27th, Skirmishes at Hundley's Corner, Va.
June 26th, 27th, Battle of Mechanicsville or Ellison's Mills, Va.
June 27th, Battle of Cold Harbor, or Gaines' Farm, Va.
June 27th, Engagement at Garnett's Hill, Va.
June 28th, Affair near Garnett's House, Va.
June 29th, Battle of Savage Station, Va.
June 29th, Battle of Garnett's Farm, Va.
June 30th, Battle of Frazier's Farm, Va.
June 30th, Battle of White Oak Swamp, Va.
June 30th, Affair at Willis Church, near Malvern Hill, Va.
June 30th, Engagement at Turkey Bridge, or Malvern Cliff, Va.
July 1st, Battle of Malvern Hill, or Crew's Farm, Va.
July 2d, Affair near Haxall's Landing, Va.
July 4th, Skirmish at Westover, Va.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN
VIRGINIA DURING ENGAGEMENTS AROUND
RICHMOND, VA.

JACKSON'S CORPS.

MAJOR-GENERAL T. J. JACKSON, COMMANDING.
FIRST DIVISION.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. H. C. WHITING.

<i>First Brigade.</i>	<i>Third Brigade.</i>	<i>Fourth Brigade.*</i>
Brig.-Gen. J. B. HOOD.	(1) Brig.-Gen. WHITING,	Brig.-Gen. A. R. LAWTON.
18th Georgia.	(2) Col. LAW, Com'd'g.	Reilly's Battery.
1st Texas.	2d Mississippi.	Balthis' Battery.
4th Texas.	11th Mississippi.	
5th Texas.	4th Alabama.	
Hampton Legion:	6th North Carolina.	
	Staunton Artillery.	

SECOND DIVISION.

MAJOR-GENERAL T. J. JACKSON.

<i>First Brigade.</i>	<i>Second Brigade.</i>
Brig.-Gen. C. S. WINDER.	(1) — JONES.
2d Virginia.	(2) Col. CUNNINGHAM, Com'd'g
4th "	21st Virginia.
5th "	42d "
27th "	48th "
33d "	1st Virginia Battalion.
Irish Battalion (Capt. Lee).	Hampden Artillery.
Rockbridge Artillery.	Jackson's "
Carpenter's Battery.	
<i>Third Brigade.</i>	<i>Fourth Brigade.</i>
(1) Col. J. V. FULKERSON,	Brig. Geo. A. R. LAWTON.
(2) Col. E. T. H. WARREN, Com'd'g.	13th Georgia
10th Virginia.	26th "
23d "	31st "
37th "	38th "
Wooding's Battery.	60th " or 4th Battalion.
Danville Artillery.	61st "

THIRD DIVISION.

MAJOR-GENERAL R. S. EWELL.

<i>Fourth Brigade.</i>	<i>Seventh Brigade.</i>
(1) Brig.-Gen. A. ELZEY, and	Brig.-Gen'l I. R. TRIMBLE.
(2) Brig.-Gen. J. A. EARLY, Com'd'g.	15th Alabama.
13th Virginia.	21st Georgia.
25th "	16th Mississippi.
31st "	21st North Carolina.
44th "	Wharton's Battalion.
52d "	
58th "	
12th Georgia.	

* Transferred to Jackson's Division.

Eighth Brigade.

- (1) Col. SEYMOUR, and
 (2) Col. L. A. STAFFORD, Com'd'g.
 6th Louisiana.
 7th " "
 8th " "
 9th " "

Maryland Line.

- Col. B. T. JOHNSON.
 Brockenbrough's Battery.
 Courtenay's " "
 Carrington's " "
 Munford's Cavalry. "

MAJOR-GENERAL D. H. HILL'S DIVISION.*

First Brigade.

- Brig.-Gen. R. E. RODES.
 3d Alabama.
 5th " "
 6th " "
 12th " "
 26th " "
 Carter's Battery.

Second Brigade.

- Brig.-Gen. G. B. ANDERSON.
 2d North Carolina.
 4th " "
 14th " "
 30th " "
 Hardaway's Battery.

Third Brigade.

- Brig.-Gen. S. GARLAND.
 5th North Carolina.
 12th " "
 13th " "
 20th " "
 23d " "
 Bondurant's Battery.

Fourth Brigade.

- Col. A. H. COLQUITT.
 6th Georgia.
 23d " "
 27th " "
 28th " "

Fifth Brigade.

- Brig.-Gen. R. S. RIPLEY.
 1st North Carolina.
 3d " "
 44th Georgia.
 48th " "
 Rhett's Battery.
 Jones' Artillery.
 Nelson's Artillery.

MAJOR-GENERAL J. B. MAGRUDER'S COMMAND.

FIRST DIVISION.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL D. R. JONES.

First Brigade.

- Brig.-Gen. R. TOOMBS.
 2d Georgia.
 15th " "
 17th " "
 20th " "

Third Brigade.

- Col. G. T. ANDERSON.
 1st Georgia (Regulars).
 7th " "
 8th " "
 9th " "
 11th " "
 Garnett's Battery.
 Brown's " "
 Lane's " "

McLAWS' DIVISION.

MAJOR-GENERAL L. McLAWS.

First Brigade.

- Brig.-Gen. P. J. SEMMES.
 10th Georgia.
 53d " "
 15th Virginia.
 52d " "

Fourth Brigade.

- Brig.-Gen. J. B. KERSHAW.
 2d South Carolina.
 3d " "
 7th " "
 8th " "
 Alexander's Artillery.

* This was not a part of Jackson's corps, but co-operated with it.

MAJOR-GENERAL J. B. MAGRUDER'S DIVISION.

Second Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. HOWELL COBB.
2d Louisiana.
15th North Carolina.
16th Georgia.
24th "
Cobb's Georgia Legion.

Third Brigade.

Col. WM. BARKSDALE.
13th Mississippi.
17th "
18th "
21st "

Colonel S. D. LEE, Chief of Artillery (temporarily).

LONGSTREET'S DIVISION.*

NOTE.—At battles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, Va., Longstreet commanded the right wing and G. W. Smith the left wing, subsequent to which Smith's command appears to have been scattered among others.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. J. L. KEMPER.
1st Virginia.
7th "
11th "
17th "
24th "
Rogers' Battery.

Second Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. R. H. ANDERSON.
2d South Carolina.
4th "
5th "
6th "
Palmetto Sharpshooters.

Third Brigade.

(1) Brig.-Gen. PICKETT,
(2) Col. J. B. STRANGE,
Commanding.
8th Virginia.
18th "
19th "
28th "
56th "

Fourth Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. C. M. WILCOX.
8th Alabama.
9th "
10th "
11th "
Thomas' Artillery (Capt. Anderson).

Fifth Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. R. A. PRYOR.
3d Virginia.
2d Florida.
14th Alabama.
14th Louisiana.
Louisiana Zouaves.

Sixth Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. W. G. FETH-
ERSTON.
12th Mississippi.
19th "
2d Mississippi Battalion.

NOTE.—First Company Washington Artillery temporarily attached to S. D. Lee's Artillery in engagements of July 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th—Col. S. D. Lee, commanding artillery.

HUGER'S DIVISION.†

MAJOR-GENERAL B. HUGER, COMMANDING.

Second Brigade.‡

Brig.-Gen. R. RANSOM, Jr.
19th North Carolina.
24th "
25th "
26th "
35th "
48th "
49th "

Second Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. WM. MAHONE.
6th Virginia.
12th "
16th "
41st "
49th "
Grimes' Battery.

Third Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. A. R. WRIGHT.
1st Louisiana.
3d Georgia.
4th "
22d "
44th Alabama.
Huger's Battery.

Fourth Brigade.

Brig. Gen. L. A. ARMISTEAD.
9th Virginia.
14th "
38th "
53d "
57th "
5th " Battalion.
Turner's Battery.
Stribling's Battery.

* Called right wing at Seven Pines.

† This corresponds with return on file in Archive Office.

‡ Belongs to Department of North Carolina, temporarily attached to this Division.

THE PENINSULA.

WALKER'S BRIGADE.

Attached June 26th; detached June 27th. (See Holmes' command.)

LIGHT DIVISION.

MAJOR-GENERAL A. P. HILL, COMMANDING.

<i>First Brigade.</i>	<i>Second Brigade.</i>	<i>Third Brigade.</i>
Brig.-Gen. CHAS. W. FIELD.	Brig.-Gen. M. GREGG.	Brig.-Gen. J. R. ANDERSON.
40th Virginia.	1st South Carolina.	14th Georgia.
47th " "	12th " "	35th " "
55th " "	13th " "	45th " "
60th " "	14th " "	8d Louisiana Battalion.
Pegram's Battery.	1st " " Rifles.	Davidson's Battery.
	Pee Dee Artillery (Mc-Intosh's).	Letcher Art'y (Greenlee).
<i>Fourth Brigade.</i>	<i>Fifth Brigade.</i>	<i>Sixth Brigade.</i>
Brig.-Gen. L. O'B. BRANCH.	Brig.-Gen. J. J. ARCHER.	Brig.-Gen. W. D. PENDER.
7th North Carolina.	1st Tennessee.	16th North Carolina.
18th " "	7th " "	22d " "
28th " "	14th " "	34th " "
33d " "	2d Arkansas.	38th " "
37th " "	19th Georgia.	2d Arkansas Battalion.
Johnson's Battery.	5th Alabama Battalion.	Andrews' Battery.
		2d Virginia Artillery.
		Crenshaw's Battery.
		Masters' Battery.*
		— Virginia Battalion.

DEPARTMENT OF NORTH CAROLINA.

MAJOR-GENERAL T. H. HOLMES, COMMANDING.

<i>Ransom's Brigade.</i>	<i>Third Brigade.</i>	<i>Fourth Brigade.</i>
Temporarily attached to Huger's Division. (See Huger's Division.)	Brig.-Gen. J. DANIEL.	(1) Col. J. A. WALKER,
	43d North Carolina.	(2) Col. MANNING, Com'd'g
	45th " "	30th Virginia.
	50th " "	3d Arkansas.
	Brem's Battery.	27th North Carolina.
	Graham's Battery.	46th " "
	Burrough's Cavalry Battalion.	48th* " "
		57th Virginia.†
		2d Georgia Battalion.
		French's Battery.
		Branch's Battery.
		Goodwin's Cavalry.

WISE'S COMMAND.‡

BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. A. WISE, COMMANDING.

26th Virginia.	10th Virginia Cavalry.§
46th Virginia.	Andrews' Battery.
	Rive's Battery.

* Temporarily serving with the reserve artillery during this campaign.

† While this brigade was serving with General Huger the 48th North Carolina was substituted for the 57th Virginia.

‡ This corresponds with return on file in Archive Office.

§ Temporarily detached and serving with Stuart.

RESERVE ARTILLERY.

COLONEL JAMES DESHLER, CHIEF OF ARTILLERY.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. L. PENDLETON, COMMANDING.

Second Battalion.

Major RICHARDSON.
 Ancell's and Milledge's Batteries.
 Woolfolk's Battery.
 Davidson's and Masters* Batteries
 (temporarily).

Third Battalion.

Major Wm. NELSON.
 Huckstep's Battery.
 Kirkpatrick's "
 R. C. M. Page's Battery.

Sumter Battalion.

Lieut.-Col. CUTTS.
 Lane's Battery.
 Ross' "
 Price's "
 Blackshear's Battery.

Jones' Battalion.†

Major H. P. JONES.
 Clark's Battery.
 Peyton's "
 Rhett's "

FIRST REGIMENT.

COLONEL J. T. BROWN.

Virginia Artillery. Richmond Fayette Artillery.
 8d Howitzers (Smith's). (Lieut. Clopton's).
 Williamsburg Artillery (Captain Coke's).

CAVALRY CORPS.

HAMPTON'S BRIGADE.

1st North Carolina, Baker's.
 10th Virginia, Magruder (belonged to Wise's command).
 Georgia Legion, Young.
 Jeff. Davis Legion (Cavalry) and 4th Virginia, under Martin.
 1st Virginia, Fitz Lee.
 8d " Goode.
 5th " Rosser.
 Cobb's Georgia Legion.

NOTE.—From Confederate Military Reports, vol. iv., War Department, Washington, D. C.

* Masters' Battery belonged to A. P. Hill's Division.

† Temporarily attached to D. H. Hill's Division.

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