

CHAPTER LI.

SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN.—THE CAROLINA MARCH.

Correspondence between Grant and Sherman.—The Idea of transporting Sherman's Army to Virginia by Sea abandoned.—Sherman's Preparations for a March through the Carolinas.—Civil Administration at Savannah.—Trade Regulations.—Sherman's Orders respecting Freedmen.—Regulations for the Government of Savannah.—Cotton taken as a Prize of War.—Howard's Movement on Pocotaligo.—A Flood in the Savannah River impedes Slocum's Operations.—Comparison of the Carolina March with that from Atlanta to Savannah.—Sherman's Acquaintance with the Country.—Feint Movement on Charleston.—Crossing of the Salkehatchie.—Destruction of the Railroad connecting Augusta with Charleston.—Crossing of the South Edisto.—Sherman declines Wheeler's Cotton Compromise.—Union of the two Wings south of the Congaree.—Capture of Columbia.—Explanation of the Burning of Columbia.—Occupation of Wainborough.—Crossing of the Catawba.—Sherman retaliates for the Murder of his Foragers.—Correspondence with Wheeler on this Subject.—Occupation of Cheraw.—Charleston Evacuated.—Affair between Kilpatrick and Wade Hampton.—Sherman's Army at Fayetteville, on the Cape Fear River.—Concentration of the Enemy's Forces under Johnston.—Sherman communicates with Terry and Schofield.—Crossing of the Cape Fear.—Battle of Averysborough.—Battle of Bentonville.—Sherman, re-enforced by Terry and Schofield, concentrates his Army at Goldsborough, and establishes Communications with Newbern and Morehead City.

WHEN General Sherman, after the capture of Fort McAllister, passed down the Ogeechee into Ossibaw Sound, and to the flag-ship of Admiral Dahlgren, he found two communications waiting him from Lieutenant General Grant. When these were written Sherman was still marching through Georgia, and had not "struck bottom." But they express no fear as to the ultimate success of the extraordinary campaign which Sherman had undertaken. The second of these communications, of date December 6th, indicated Grant's intention to transport Sherman's army, after it had established a base on the coast, to the James River, to co-operate in the campaign against Lee.¹

Sherman, although his original plan had contemplated a continuation of his march through the Carolinas to Virginia,² immediately set out to obey General Grant's instructions. In the delay incident to the transportation of his army he determined to capture Savannah. As we have seen, he ac-

¹ The following are copies of both these letters. The first, from City Point, Virginia, December 3, reads thus:

"The little information gleaned from the Southern press indicating no great obstacle to your progress, I have directed your mails, which previously had been collected in Baltimore by Colonel Markland, special agent of the Post-office Department, to be sent as far as the blockading squadron off Savannah, to be forwarded to you as soon as heard from on the coast. Not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain from congratulating you and those under your command until bottom has been struck. I have never had a fear, however, as to the result.

"Since you left Atlanta no great progress has been made here. The enemy has been closely watched, though, and prevented from detaching against you. I think not one man has gone from here except some 1200 or 1500 dismounted cavalry. Bragg has gone from Wilmington. I am trying to take advantage of his absence to get possession of that place. Owing to some preparations Admiral Porter and General Butler are making to blow up Fort Fisher, and which, while I hope for the best, do not believe a particle in, there is a delay in getting this expedition off. I hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that Bragg will not have started back by that time.

"In this letter I do not intend to give you any thing like directions for future action, but will state a general idea I have, and will get your views after you have established yourself on the sea-coast. With your veteran army I hope to get control of the only two through routes, from east to west, possessed by the enemy, before the fall of Atlanta. This condition will be filled by holding Savannah and Augusta, or by holding any other post to the east of Savannah and Branchville. If Wilmington falls, a force from there can co-operate with you.

"Thomas has got back into the defenses of Nashville, with Hood close upon him. Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads, except the main one leading to Chattanooga. I hope Hood will be badly crippled or destroyed. After all becomes quiet, and the roads up here are so bad that there is likely to be a week or two that nothing can be done, I will run down the coast and see you."

On the 6th he writes again:

"On reflection, since sending my letter by Lieutenant Dunn, I have concluded that the most important operation toward closing out the rebellion will be to close out Lee and his army. You have now destroyed the roads of the South so that it will probably take them months, without interruption, to establish a through line from east to west. In that time, I think, the job here will be effectually completed. My idea now is, that you establish a base on the coast, fortify, and leave in it all your artillery and cavalry, and enough infantry to protect them, and, at the same time, so threaten the interior that the militia of the South will have to be kept at home. With the balance of your command, come here with all dispatch. Select yourself the officer to leave in command, but you I want in person. Unless you see objections to this plan which I can not see, use every vessel going to you for the purpose of transportation."

"In reply to Grant's communications of the 3d and 6th, Sherman incidentally remarks that with his army he "had expected, after reducing Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina, thence to Raleigh," etc.

On the 18th he again writes to Grant, as a sort of postscript to a letter dealing with other matters: "I do sincerely believe that the whole United States, North and South, would rejoice to have this army turned loose on South Carolina, to devastate that state in the manner we have done in Georgia, and it would have a direct and immediate bearing on your campaign in Virginia."

Again, on the 22d, at the close of his letter announcing the capture of Savannah, he says: "I have now completed my first step, and should like to go on to you via Columbia and Raleigh, but will prepare to embark as soon as vessels come. Colonel Babcock will have told you all, and you know better than any body else how much better troops arrive by a land march than when carried by transports. . . . The capture of Savannah, with the incidental use of the rivers, gives us a magnificent position in this quarter, and if you can hold Lee, and if Thomas can continue as he did on the 18th, I could go on and smash South Carolina all to pieces, and also break up roads as far as the Roanoke. But, as I before remarked, I will now look to coming to you as soon as transports are ready."

complished that object on the 21st. The next day he announced his success to the lieutenant general.

In the mean time General Sherman had heard of Hood's defeat at Nashville, which was at once a vindication of his march and the indispensable seal of its success. The tidings of the capture of Savannah following close upon Hood's defeat illustrated to the outside world what had all along been present to the prophetic eye of Sherman—the tremendous significance of the March to the Sea. In a twinkling, the doubts of the loyal, and the rash confidence of the rebellious and of their sympathizers, were dispersed. It was to the Northern people the breaking of a glorious dawn after terribly dark hours of anxiety and apprehension. A period of suspense had passed, during which few opened their mouths to judge General Sherman or to predict the issue of a movement which was almost universally believed too bold to rank among the legitimate ventures of war; and now, suddenly, out of this ominous silence arose a universal shout at once of triumph and of praise to the victor, who had been no less signally crowned by his own success at Savannah than by that of his subordinate at Nashville, 657 miles away.¹ General Grant, even before the capture of Savannah, congratulated General Sherman and his army upon the successful termination of his "brilliant campaign." It is true, he had heard of Hood's defeat; but he says, "I never had a doubt of the result. When apprehensions for your safety were expressed by the President, I assured him, with the army you had, and you in command of it, there was no danger but you would strike bottom on salt water some place; that I would not feel the same security, in fact would not have intrusted the expedition to any other living commander." On the 26th, in answer to Sherman's note presenting him with Savannah as a Christmas gift, President Lincoln replied:

"MY DEAR GENERAL SHERMAN,—Many, many thanks for your Christmas gift. When you were about leaving Atlanta for the Atlantic coast, I was anxious, if not fearful; but, feeling that you were the better judge, and remembering that 'nothing risked, nothing gained,' I did not interfere. Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor is all yours; for I believe none of us went farther than to acquiesce. And, taking the work of General Thomas into the count, as it should be taken, it is indeed a great success. Not only does it afford the obvious and immediate military advantages, but, in showing the world that your army could be divided, putting the stronger part to an immediate new service, and yet leaving enough to vanquish the old opposing force of the whole—Hood's army—it brings those who sat in darkness to see a great light. But what next? I suppose it will be safer to leave General Grant and yourself to decide."²

General Grant, after Thomas's victory at Nashville, was shaken in his determination to transport Sherman's army by sea to the James River. It would be impossible to effect this in less than two months, and in that time Sherman could make the march by land, and in doing so strike the enemy a far heavier blow. He writes on the 18th of December: "If you capture the garrison of Savannah, it will certainly compel Lee to detach from Richmond, or give us nearly the whole South. My own opinion is, Lee is averse to going out of Virginia; and, if the cause of the South is lost, he wants Richmond to be the last place surrendered. If he has such views, it may be well to indulge him until we get every thing else in our hands." General Sherman was delighted at the modification of Grant's plan, as he would thus be permitted to carry out his original scheme of a march through the Carolinas.³

¹ That General Sherman looked upon the defeat of Hood by Thomas as necessary to justify his march is evident from the following letter, written by him to General J. D. Webster (at Nashville), December 23:

"Major Dixon arrived last night, bringing your letter of the 10th of December, for which I am very much obliged, as it gives me a clear and distinct view of the situation of affairs at Nashville up to that date. I have also from the War Department a copy of General Thomas's dispatch, giving an account of the attack on Hood on the 15th, which was successful, but not complete. I await farther accounts with anxiety, as Thomas's complete success is necessary to vindicate my plans for this campaign, and I have no doubt that my calculations that Thomas had in hand (including A. J. Smith's troops) a force large enough to whip Hood in fair fight were correct. I approve of Thomas's allowing Hood to come north far enough to enable him to concentrate his own men, though I would have preferred that Hood should have been checked about Columbia. Still, if Thomas followed up his success on the 15th, and gave Hood a good whaling, and is at this moment following him closely, the whole campaign in my division will be even more perfect than the Atlanta campaign, for at this end of the line I have realized all I had reason to hope for except in the release of our prisoners, which was simply an impossibility."

² General Sherman's reply to this is equally characteristic. Writing January 6th, he says: "I am gratified at the receipt of your letter of December 26th at the hands of General Logan, especially to observe that you appreciate the division I made of my army, and that each part was duly proportioned to its work."

"The motto, 'Nothing venture, nothing win,' which you refer to, is appropriate; and, should I venture too much and happen to lose, I shall bespeak your charitable inference."

"I am ready for the 'great next' as soon as I can complete certain preliminaries, and learn of General Grant his and your preferences of intermediate 'objectives.'"

³ He replies to General Grant, December 24: "I am gratified that you have modified your former orders, as I feared that the transportation by sea would very much disturb the unity and morale of my army, now so perfect."

"The occupation of Savannah . . . completes the first part of our game, and fulfills a great part of your instructions; and I am now engaged in dismantling the rebel forts which bear upon the sea and channels, and transporting the heavy ordnance and ammunition to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, where they can be more easily guarded than if left in the city."

"The rebel inner lines are well adapted to our purpose, and, with slight modifications, can be held by a comparatively small force, and in about ten days expect to be ready to sally forth again. I feel no doubt whatever as to our future plans. I have thought them over so long and well that they appear as clear as daylight. I left Augusta untouched on purpose, because the enemy will be in doubt as to my objective point after crossing the Savannah River, whether it be Augusta and Charleston, and will naturally divide his forces. I will then move either on Branchville or Columbia by any curved line that gives me the best supplies, breaking up in my course as much railroad as possible, then ignoring Charleston and Augusta both. I would occupy Columbia and Camden, pausing there long enough to observe the effect. I would then strike for the Charleston and Wilmington Railroad, somewhere between the Santee and Cape Fear Rivers, and, if possible, communicate with the fleet under Admiral Dahlgren (whom I find a most agreeable gentleman, in every way accommodating himself to our wishes and plans). Then I would favor Wilmington, in the belief that Porter and Butler will fail in their present undertaking. Charleston is now a mere desolated wreck, and is hardly worth the time it would take to starve it out. Still I am aware that historically and politically, much importance is attached to the place, and it may be that, apart from its military importance, both you and the administration would prefer I should give it more attention; and it would be well for you to give me some general idea on that subject, as otherwise I would treat it, as I have expressed, as a point of little importance, after all its railroads leading into the interior are destroyed or occupied by us. But on the hypothesis of ignoring

General Grant fully sanctioned Sherman's scheme before the close of 1864. There was nearly a month's delay at Savannah. This time was occupied in gathering supplies, in disposing of captured property, and in local administration. The march through Georgia had already led to some important political results in that state. In Liberty and Tatnall counties, south of Savannah, Union meetings were held by the citizens, and patriotic resolutions were adopted. Sherman recognized the movement, and promised his aid, encouragement, and defense to all citizens who would "stay quietly at home, and call back their sons and neighbors to resume their peaceful pursuits." He invited all such to bring their produce to Savannah, to be sold to the highest bidder or to his commissary. Merchants and attorneys in Savannah were required to acknowledge the national supremacy in order to the continuance of their avocations. But, in Sherman's judgment, all matters relating to reconstruction in Georgia were of secondary importance until the final victory of the nation should be secured.

Sherman caused a thorough examination to be made of the defenses of Savannah, which city was now to become an important *dépôt* of supplies. New lines of fortification were constructed, "embracing the city proper, Forts Jackson, Thunderbolt, and Pulaski, with slight modifications in their



PORT THUNDERBOLT, SAVANNAH.

armament and rear defenses." The other forts were dismantled, and their heavy ordnance transferred to Hilton Head. The obstructions in the river were with great difficulty removed, as also the torpedoes in the channels

Charleston and taking Wilmington, I would then favor a movement direct on Raleigh. The game is then up with Lee, unless he comes out of Richmond, avoids you and fights me, in which case I should reckon on your being on his heels.

"Now that Hood is used up by Thomas, I feel disposed to bring the matter to an issue as quick as possible. I feel confident that I can break up the whole railroad system of South Carolina and North Carolina, and be on the Roanoke, either at Raleigh or Weldon, by the time spring fairly opens; and if you feel confident that you can whip Lee outside of his intrenchments, I feel equally confident that I can handle him in the open country.

"One reason why I should ignore Charleston is this: That I believe they will reduce the garrison to a small force, with plenty of provisions, and I know that the neck back of Charleston can be made impregnable to assault, and we will hardly have time for siege operations.

"I will have to leave in Savannah a garrison, and, if Thomas can spare them, I would like to have all detachments, convalescents, etc., belonging to these four corps, sent forward at once. I don't want to cripple Thomas, because I regard his operations as all-important, and I have ordered him to pursue Hood down into Alabama, trusting to the country for supplies.

"I reviewed one of my corps to-day, and shall continue to review the whole army. I don't like to boast, but I believe this army has a confidence in itself that makes it almost invincible."

Grant replied on the 27th of December, giving Sherman permission to follow out his plan, and making some suggestions. He says:

"Your confidence in being able to march up and join this army pleases me, and I believe it can be done. The effect of such a campaign will be to disorganize the South, and prevent the organization of new armies from their broken fragments. Hood is now retreating, with his army broken and demoralized. His loss in men has probably not been far from 20,000, besides deserters. If time is given, the fragments may be collected together, and many of the deserters reassembled. If we can we should act to prevent this. Your spare army, as it were, moving as proposed, will do this.

"In addition to holding Savannah, it looks to me that an intrenched camp ought to be held on the railroad between Savannah and Charleston. Your movements toward Branchville will probably enable Foster to reach this with his own force. This will give us a position in the South from which we can threaten the interior without marching over long, narrow causeways, easily defended, as we have heretofore been compelled to do. Could not such a camp be established about Pocatigo or Coosawatchie?

"I have thought that, Hood being so completely wiped out for all present harm, I might bring A. J. Smith with from 10,000 to 15,000. With this increase I could hold my lines, and move out with greater force than Lee has. It would compel him to retain all his present force in the defenses of Richmond, or abandon them entirely. The latter contingency is probably the only danger to the easy success of your expedition. In the event you should meet Lee's army, you would be compelled to beat it or find the sea-coast. Of course I shall not let Lee's army escape if I can help it, and will not let it go without following it to the best of my ability.

"Without waiting farther directions, then, you may make preparations to start on your Northern expedition without delay. Break up the railroads in South and North Carolina, and join the armies operating against Richmond as soon as you can.

"I will leave out all suggestions about the route you should take, knowing that your information, gained daily in the progress of events, will be better than any that can be obtained now. It may not be possible for you to march to the rear of Petersburg; but, failing in this, you could strike either of the sea-coast ports in North Carolina held by us. From there you could easily take shipping. It would be decidedly preferable, however, if you could march the whole distance. From the best information I have, you will find no difficulty in supplying your army until you cross the Roanoke. From there here is but a few days' march, and supplies could be collected south of the river to bring you through. I shall establish communication with you there by steam-boat and gun-boat. By this means your wants can be partially supplied."

below the city. General Geary was assigned to the command of the city. His policy, just but conciliatory, had a good effect upon the citizens. Mayor R. D. Arnold, continued in the exercise of his functions, advised the citizens to yield a ready obedience to the Federal government and its military representative. A public meeting was held, in which the mayor's views were adopted, and Governor Brown was called upon to take measures for the restoration of Georgia to the Union. A national bank was established, and the city enjoyed undisturbed tranquillity. On the 14th of January, 1865, General Sherman issued orders regulating the internal trade of the state, inviting the citizens to bring their produce to Savannah, and to hold meetings for the discussion of their present situation, and promising them the protection of the national army.¹

Nor did General Sherman forget the freedmen. With the approval of Secretary Stanton, who visited Savannah shortly after its capture, he issued orders devoting the abandoned sea islands south of Charleston, and rice-fields along the rivers of Georgia for thirty miles back from the sea, to their exclusive use and management, subject only to the United States military authority and the acts of Congress.² He had, on the 26th of December, promulgated regulations for the military control of Savannah.³ In his or-

¹ The following is a copy of these orders:

"It being represented that the Confederate army and armed bands of robbers, acting professedly under the authority of the Confederate government, are harassing the people of Georgia and endeavoring to intimidate them in the efforts they are making to secure themselves provisions, clothing, security to life and property, and the restoration of law and good government in the state, it is hereby ordered and made public:

"I. That the farmers of Georgia may bring into Savannah, Fernandina or Jacksonville, Florida, marketing, such as beef, pork, mutton, vegetables of any kind, fish, etc., as well as cotton in small quantities, and sell the same in open market, except the cotton, which must be sold by or through the treasury agents, and may invest the proceeds in family stores, such as bacon and flour, in any reasonable quantities, groceries, shoes, and clothing, and articles not contraband of war, and carry the same back to their families. No trade-stores will be attempted in the interior, or stocks of goods sold for them, but families may club together for mutual assistance and protection in coming and going.

"II. The people are encouraged to meet together in peaceful assemblages to discuss measures looking to their safety and good government, and the restoration of state and national authority, and will be protected by the national army when so doing; and all peaceable inhabitants who satisfy the commanding officers that they are earnestly laboring to that end must not only be left undisturbed in property and person, but must be protected as far as possible consistent with the military operations. If any farmer or peaceable inhabitant is molested by the enemy, viz., the Confederate army of guerrillas, because of his friendship to the national government, the perpetrator, if caught, will be summarily punished, or his family made to suffer for the outrage; but if the crime can not be traced to the actual party, then retaliation will be made on the adherents to the cause of the rebellion. Should a Union man be murdered, then a rebel selected by lot will be shot; or if a Union family be persecuted on account of the cause, a rebel family will be banished to a foreign land. In aggravated cases, retaliation will extend as high as five for one. All commanding officers will act promptly in such cases, and report their action after the retaliation is done."

² The following are the orders:

"I. The islands from Charleston south, the abandoned rice-fields along the rivers for thirty miles back from the sea, and the country bordering the St. John's River, Florida, are reserved and set apart for the settlement of the negroes now made free by the acts of war and the proclamation of the President of the United States.

"II. At Beaufort, Hilton Head, Savannah, Fernandina, St. Augustine, and Jacksonville, the blacks may remain in their chosen or accustomed vocations; but on the islands, and in the settlements hereafter to be established, no white person whatever, unless military officers and soldiers detailed for duty, will be permitted to reside, and the sole and exclusive management of affairs will be left to the freed people themselves, subject only to the United States military authority and the acts of Congress. By the laws of war and orders of the President of the United States, the negro is free, and must be dealt with as such. He can not be subjected to conscription, or forced into military service, save by the written orders of the highest military authority of the department, under such regulations as the President or Congress may prescribe; domestic servants, blacksmiths, carpenters, and other mechanics will be free to select their own work and residence; but the young and able-bodied negroes must be encouraged to enlist as soldiers in the service of the United States, to contribute their share toward maintaining their own freedom, and securing their rights as citizens of the United States.

"Negroes so enlisted will be organized into companies, battalions, and regiments, under the orders of the United States military authorities, and will be paid, fed, and clothed according to law. The bounties paid on enlistment may, with the consent of the recruit, go to assist his family and settlement in procuring agricultural implements, seed, tools, boats, clothing, and other articles necessary for their livelihood.

"III. Whenever three respectable negroes, heads of families, shall desire to settle on lands, and shall have selected for that purpose an island or a locality clearly defined within the limits above designated, the inspector of settlements and plantations will himself, or by such subordinate officer as he may appoint, give them a license to settle such island or district, and afford them such assistance as he can to enable them to establish a peaceable agricultural settlement. The three parties named will subdivide the land, under the supervision of the inspector, among themselves and such others as may choose to settle near them, so that each family shall have a plot of not more than forty acres of tillable ground, and, when it borders on some water-channel, with not more than eight hundred feet water-front, in the possession of which land the military authorities will afford them protection until such time as they can protect themselves, or until Congress shall regulate their title.

"The quartermaster may, on the requisition of the inspector of settlements and plantations, place at the disposal of the inspector one or more of the captured steamers to ply between the settlements and one or more of the commercial points heretofore named in orders, to afford the settlers the opportunity to supply their necessary wants, and to sell the products of their land and labor.

"IV. Whenever a negro has enlisted in the military service of the United States, he may locate his family in any one of the settlements at pleasure, and acquire a homestead and all other rights and privileges of a settler as though present in person.

"In like manner, negroes may settle their families and engage on board the gun-boats, or in fishing, or in the navigation of the inland waters, without losing any claim to land or other advantages derived from this system. But no one, unless an actual settler as above defined, or unless absent on government service, will be entitled to claim any right to land or property in any settlement by virtue of these orders.

"V. In order to carry out this system of settlement, a general officer will be detailed as inspector of settlements and plantations, whose duty it shall be to visit the settlements to regulate their police and general management, and who will furnish personally to each head of a family, subject to the approval of the President of the United States, a possessory title in writing, giving, as near as possible, the description of boundaries, and who shall adjust all claims or conflicts that may arise under the same, subject to the like approval, treating such titles altogether as possessory. The same general officer will also be charged with the enlistment and organization of the negro recruits, and protecting their interests while absent from their settlements, and will be governed by the rules and regulations prescribed by the War Department for such purposes."

³ Of which the following is a copy:

"The city of Savannah and surrounding country will be held as a military post and adapted to future military uses, but, as it contains a population of some twenty thousand people who must be provided for, and as other citizens may come, it is proper to lay down certain general principles, that all within its military jurisdiction may understand their relative duties and obligations.

"I. During war, the military is superior to civil authority, and where interests clash the civil must give way; yet, where there is no conflict, every encouragement should be given to well-disposed and peaceable inhabitants to resume their usual pursuits. Families should be disturbed as little as possible in their residences, and tradesmen allowed the full use of their shops, tools, etc. Churches, schools, all places of amusement and recreation, should be encouraged, and streets and roads made perfectly safe to persons in their usual pursuits. Passes should not be exacted within the line of outer pickets; but if any person shall abuse these privileges by communicating with the enemy, or doing any act of hostility to the government of the United States, he or she will be punished with the utmost rigor of the law.

"Commerce with the outer world will be resumed to an extent commensurate with the wants of the citizens, governed by the restrictions and rules of the Treasury Department.

"II. The chief quartermaster and commissary of the army may give suitable employment to the people, white and black, or transport them to such points as they choose, where employment may

ders regulating trade he had excluded cotton from ordinary commerce, holding this staple to be a legitimate prize of war, and the property of the United States.¹ These trade regulations included within their scope the whole Department of the South, which, though still under the immediate command of General Foster, was now subordinate to General Sherman.

By the 19th of January Sherman was ready to move. Grover's division of the Nineteenth Corps had been withdrawn from Sheridan's Army of the Shenandoah to Savannah, relieving Geary's division, and forming thereafter a part of General Foster's command. General Schofield, with the Twenty-third Corps, had been transferred from the West to re-enforce General Terry

be had, and may extend temporary relief in the way of provisions and vacant houses to the worthy and needy, until such time as they can help themselves. They will select, first, the buildings for the necessary uses of the army; next, a sufficient number of stores to be turned over to the treasury agent for trade-stores. All vacant store-houses or dwellings, and all buildings belonging to absent rebels, will be construed and used as belonging to the United States until such times as their titles can be settled by the courts of the United States.

"III. The mayor and city council of Savannah will continue and exercise their functions as such, and will, in concert with the commanding officer of the post and chief quartermaster, see that the fire-companies are kept in organization, the streets cleaned and lighted, and keep up a good understanding between the citizens and soldiers. They will ascertain and report to the chief commissary of subsistence, as soon as possible, the names and number of worthy families that need assistance and support.

"The mayor will forthwith give public notice that the time has come when all must choose their course, namely, to remain within our lines and conduct themselves as good citizens, or depart in peace. He will ascertain the names of all who choose to leave Savannah, and report their names and residence to the chief quartermaster, that measures may be taken to transport them beyond the lines.

"IV. Not more than two newspapers will be published in Savannah, and their editors and proprietors will be held to the strictest accountability, and will be punished severely, in person and property, for any libelous publication, mischievous matter, premature news, exaggerated statements, or any comments whatever upon the acts of the constituted authorities: they will be held accountable even for such articles though copied from other papers."

¹ This led to some dissatisfaction on the part of the citizens of Savannah and of foreign consuls. On the 2d of January Sherman writes to Secretary Stanton in regard to this matter as follows:

"I have just received from Lieutenant General Grant a copy of that part of your telegram to him of 26th December relating to cotton, a copy of which has been immediately furnished to General Eaton, my chief quartermaster, who will be strictly governed by it.

"I had already been approached by all the consuls and half the people of Savannah on this cotton question, and my invariable answer has been that all the cotton in Savannah was prize of war, and belonged to the United States, and nobody should recover a bale of it with my consent; and that as cotton had been one of the chief causes of this war, it should help pay its expenses; that all cotton became tainted with treason from the hour the first act of hostility was committed against the United States, some time in December, 1860, and that no bill of sale subsequent to that date could convey title.

"My orders were that an officer of the quartermaster's department, United States army, might furnish the holder, agent, or attorney a mere certificate of the fact of seizure, with description of the bales, marks, etc.; the cotton then to be turned over to the agent of the Treasury Department, to be shipped to New York for sale. But since the receipt of your dispatch I have ordered General Eaton to make the shipment himself to the quartermaster at New York, where you can dispose of it at pleasure. I do not think the Treasury Department ought to bother itself with the prizes or captures of war.

"Mr. Barclay, former consul at New York—representing Mr. Molyneux, former consul, but absent since a long time—called on me in person with reference to cotton claims by English subjects. He seemed amazed when I told him I should pay no respect to consular certificates, and that in no event would I treat an English subject with more favor than one of our own deluded citizens; and that, for my part, I was unwilling to fight for cotton for the benefit of Englishmen openly engaged in smuggling arms and munitions of war to kill us; that, on the contrary, it would afford me great satisfaction to conduct my army to Nassau and wipe out that nest of pirates. I explained to him, however, that I was not a diplomatic agent of the general government of the United States; but that my opinion, so frankly expressed, was that of a soldier, which it would be well for him to heed. It appeared also that he owned a plantation on the line of investment to Savannah, which, of course, is destroyed, and for which he expected me to give him some certificate entitling him to indemnification, which I declined emphatically.

"I have adopted in Savannah rules concerning property, severe but just, founded upon the laws of nations and the practice of civilized governments; and am clearly of opinion that we should claim all the belligerent rights over conquered countries, that the people may realize the truth that war is no child's play."



SLOCUM'S ARMY CROSSING THE SAVANNAH AT SISTER'S FERRY.

and Palmer, who were operating on the coast of North Carolina, and preparing the way for General Sherman's arrival. On the 24th of December an unsuccessful attack had been made on Fort Fisher, at the mouth of Cape Fear River, by Admiral Porter. The failure of the expedition was due to a want of proper management on the part of General Butler, the military commander. On the 15th of January the attack was renewed, General Butler being replaced by General Terry, and was successful. The remaining works of the enemy at the mouth of the Cape Fear soon followed the fate of Fort Fisher. This victory was auspicious for Sherman, who was then setting out upon his northward march.

General Howard was ordered to effect a lodgment on the Savannah and Charleston Railroad, at Pocotaligo. He embarked with the Seventeenth Corps at Thunderbolt, and proceeded to Beaufort, and there landing his troops, succeeded in reaching Pocotaligo Station. Leggett's division dislodged the enemy, and a secure dépôt for supplies was established at the mouth of Pocotaligo Creek, within easy communication by Broad River with Hilton Head. Three divisions of Logan's corps (the Fifteenth) followed Blair; but Corse's division was cut off by the freshets, and compelled to move with the left wing.

Slocum, with the left wing and Kilpatrick's cavalry, was ordered to move directly across the Savannah River up to Coosawatchie, on the Charleston Road, and to Robertsville, on the road to Columbia. He had established a good pontoon bridge across the river opposite the city, and the Union causeway, over which Hardee had retreated a month before, had been repaired and corduroyed; but before the time appointed for his march the heavy rains of January had swollen the river, swept away the bridge, and overflowed the whole bottom, so that the causeway was four feet under



POCOTALIGO DEPÔT.



MARCHING THROUGH THE SWAMPS.

water. Driven thus from the route originally determined upon, Slocum, on the 26th of January, ascended the river to Sister's Ferry. But even there the river was three miles wide, and his command was prevented from crossing until the 7th of February. Two divisions of the Twentieth Corps—Jackson's and Geary's—had crossed the river at Pureysburg, and, proceeding to Hardeeville, on the Charleston Road, secured communication with Howard at Pocotaligo.


Sherman, in the mean time, on the 22d, embarked for Hilton Head, where he conferred with Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster in regard to their co-operative movements. General Foster was to follow Sherman's army inland, and occupy in succession Charleston and such other points on the seacoast as would be of any military value. Thus Sherman's army was free to move directly upon Goldsborough.

In all its general features, the march through the Carolinas was a repetition of that through Georgia, already accomplished. No important stronghold of the enemy was attacked. As Sherman in the Georgia promenade had feigned on Macon and Augusta, and passed between without striking either, so now he purposed to demonstrate against Augusta and Charleston, avoiding both, and make the quickest possible march to Goldsborough. In boldness, his present scheme exceeded the one already executed. The country to be traversed was more difficult, and the enemy had been given time to concentrate his fragmentary forces in Sherman's front. But Sherman had

no doubts. "I think," he says,¹ "the time has come now when we should attempt the boldest moves, and my experience is that they are easier of execution than more timid ones, because the enemy is disconcerted by them."² He was as familiar with the country over which he was about to march as with Georgia. "I have hunted it over many a time," he says, "from Santee

¹ Letter to General Halleck, December 24th, 1864.


² He adds in the same letter: "I also doubt the wisdom of concentration beyond a certain point, as the roads of this country limit the amount of men that can be brought to bear in any one battle; and I don't believe that any one general can handle more than 60,000 men in battle. I think any campaign of the last month, as well as every step I take from this point northward, is as much a direct attack upon Lee's army as though I were operating within the sound of his artillery. . . . I attach more importance to these deep incursions into the enemy's country, because this war differs from European wars in this particular—we are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized armies. I know that this recent movement of mine through Georgia has had a wonderful effect in this respect. Thousands who had been deceived by their lying papers into the belief that we were being whipped all the time, realized the truth, and have no appetite for a repetition of the same experience. To be sure Jeff. Davis has his people under a pretty good shape of discipline, but I think faith in him is much shaken in Georgia, and I think before we are done South Carolina will not be so tempestuous. . . . I felt somewhat disappointed at Hardee's escape from me. . . . Still, I know that the men that were in Savannah will be lost, in a measure, to Jeff. Davis, for the Georgia troops, under G. W. Smith, declared they would not fight in South Carolina, and they have gone north *en route* for Augusta; and I have reason to believe the North Carolina troops have gone to Wilmington."



ENTERING BLACKVILLE, SOUTH CAROLINA.



CROSSING THE SOUTH EDISTO.



SHERMAN'S ARMY ENTERING COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA.

to Mount Pleasant." His army did not lack enthusiasm, and the prospect of a march through South Carolina was one which it relished exceedingly. The general feeling of the North toward Charleston may be inferred from General Halleck's suggestion to Sherman: "Should you capture Charleston, I hope that by some accident the place may be destroyed; and if a little salt should be sown upon its site, it may prevent the growth of future crops of nullification and secession."¹ Poor South Carolina! she was sandwiched between two states who looked upon her as the original source of their past madness and their present woes.

Perhaps if Sherman had had Johnston as an antagonist in his immediate front he would not have been so confident. He calculated on the same Confederate scheme for the defense of the Carolinas which he had baffled in Georgia. He knew that they would hold on to Augusta and Charleston as they had, six weeks before, to Augusta and Macon, leaving him the route between, molested only by Wheeler's cavalry and a mob of disorganized militia, which would be swept like chaff before his march.

General Sherman accompanied the right wing of his army. On the 25th of January, with a small force, he demonstrated against the Combahee Ferry and the railroad bridge across the Salkehatchie, which river the enemy had adopted as his line of defense covering Charleston. After amusing the enemy at this point for nearly a week, the real march of Howard's army began on the 1st of February. Still keeping up the feint on Charleston, the main body of the army moved westward up the Salkehatchie. All the roads northward had been held for weeks by Wheeler's cavalry; the bridges


had been burned and trees had been felled to obstruct Sherman's movements. But the pioneer battalions soon cleared the way and rebuilt the bridges. On the 2d the Fifteenth Corps was well advanced at Loper's Cross-roads, while the Seventeenth had reached River's Bridge, and was ready to cross the Salkehatchie.

Slocum's army in the mean time, as we have seen, was still struggling with the Savannah floods. Kilpatrick, however, and two of Williams's divisions, had crossed on pontoons. The latter were ordered to Beaufort's Bridge, and Kilpatrick to Blackville. Howard crossed the Salkehatchie in the face of the enemy at River's and Beaufort's bridges. The position of the enemy at River's Bridge was on the 3d carried by Mower's and G. A. Smith's divisions of the Seventeenth Corps, who crossed the swamp, nearly three miles wide, through water reaching from knee to shoulder, and in bitter cold weather, and making a lodgment below the bridge, turned on the Confederate brigade posted there, driving it in confusion toward Branchville. The Confederate killed and wounded, numbering eighty-eight, were sent back to Pocotaligo. The Fifteenth Corps, with less resistance, but with equal success, effected the crossing at Beaufort's Bridge, a short distance above.

The line of the Salkehatchie being broken, the enemy fell back behind the Edisto River to Branchville, and Sherman occupied the South Carolina Railroad connecting Augusta with Charleston. While waiting for the remainder of Slocum's army, this road was thoroughly destroyed from the Edisto to Blackville, Kilpatrick in the mean time being dispatched eastward to Aiken to threaten Augusta. Slocum reached Blackville on the 10th. The destruction of the railroad was continued to Windon. The whole army was on the 11th well concentrated about midway between Augusta and Charleston, thus dividing the forces of the enemy covering those two points.


Crossing the South Edisto, the right wing appeared in front of Orangeburg on the 12th, swept away a detachment of the enemy intrenched at that

¹ Sherman, in the letter already quoted, replies to this: "I will bear in mind your suggestion as to Charleston, and don't think 'salt' will be necessary. . . . The whole army is burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance on South Carolina. I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all that seems in store for her. Many and many a person in Georgia asked me why we did not go to South Carolina, and when I answered that I was *en route* for that state, the invariable reply was, 'Well, if you will make those people feel the severities of war, we will pardon you for your desolation of Georgia.'"



MAP OF SHERMAN'S CAROLINA MARCH.

point, and followed, pushing him across the north branch of the Edisto, where he took refuge behind a rampart, supported by a battery, and, having partially burned the bridge, threatened to dispute the crossing. From this position he was soon flanked, and Blair's corps, having crossed, began the de-



STATE CAPITOL AND PALMETTO MEMORIAL TO THE S. CAROLINA REG'TS IN THE MEXICAN WAR.

PLAN OF COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA.

struction of the railroad to Columbia. Slocum's army moved by roads farther to the west, covered by Kilpatrick on its left. On the morning of February 16th the advance of Sherman's army beheld Columbia from the south bank of the Congaree.


In the mean time Sherman had received a communication from Wheeler, in which the latter promised not to burn cotton if Sherman would not burn houses. Sherman replied, "I hope you will burn all the cotton and save us the trouble. We don't want it, and it has proved a curse to our country. All you don't burn I will. As to private houses occupied by peaceful families, my orders are not to molest or disturb them, and I think my orders are obeyed. Vacant houses, being of no use to any body, I care little about, as the owners have thought them of no use to themselves."

On the south bank of the Congaree the two wings of the army were again united, but forthwith began to diverge again. Slocum was ordered to cross the Saluda at Zion Church, above Columbia, and proceed direct to Winnsborough, destroying the bridges and railroads about Alston. Howard crossed at the same time a little below the point selected for Slocum, and, turning the enemy's position at Columbia, moved upon the town from the north. The next morning, February 17th, under cover of Stone's brigade of Wood's division (Logan's corps), a pontoon bridge was thrown across Broad River, and, while the remainder of the corps was crossing, the Mayor of Columbia rode out and formally surrendered the city to General Stone, who marched his brigade directly into the town. Sherman, crossing the pontoon bridge accompanied by General Howard, rode into the capital of South Carolina. They found perfect quiet in the city, the citizens and soldiers mingling together in the streets. General Wade Hampton, commanding the rear guard of the Confederate cavalry, had, before leaving, ordered all the cotton in the town to be burned. The bales had been piled in the streets, the ropes and bagging cut, and tufts of cotton were thrown about by the wind, which was blowing a perfect gale, lodging in the trees and upon the houses. As this threatened the destruction of the entire town, the soldiers assisted the citizens in putting out the flames. Sherman had ordered the destruction of the arsenals, of all public property not needed for the use of the army, and of the railroads, dépôts, and such machinery as could assist the enemy in carrying on war. But, before this order began to be executed, the smouldering fires of the morning had been rekindled by the wind and communicated to the surrounding buildings. By night they had spread into a conflagration that baffled the efforts of both citizens and soldiers to allay its fury. It was not until about 4 A.M. on the 18th that the fire was got under control. It was due to the assistance of Sherman's soldiers that any portion of the city was left standing. After this matter had been

attended to, during the 18th and 19th, Sherman's orders for the destruction of the arsenals, railroads, etc., were properly carried out.¹

¹ The origin of the destructive conflagration in Columbia has been the subject of much discussion, which we can not give here in full. The statements of General Sherman, Major G. W. Nichols, a member of Sherman's staff, General Wade Hampton, and James McCarter (a Confederate citizen who was in Columbia when the event took place), form the body of evidence so far as published. The statements made in Confederate journals at the time are of no value, except in their details as to the exact time the conflagration commenced, the direction of the wind, etc. In regard to the four principal authorities above mentioned, it is assumed that each is reliable so far as he states facts within the scope of his own personal observation.

Sherman, in his official report, says: "Without hesitation, I charge General Wade Hampton with having burned his own city of Columbia, not with a malicious intent, or as the manifestation of a silly 'Roman stoicism,' but from folly and want of sense in filling it with lint, cotton, and tinder. Our officers and men on duty worked well to extinguish the flames; but others not on duty, including the officers who had long been imprisoned there, rescued by us, may



WADE HAMPTON.



COLUMBIA ON FIRE.

Slocum reached Winnsborough on the 21st of February, and the Twentieth Corps crossed the Catawba River on the 23d, Kilpatrick following the

have assisted in spreading the fire after it once had begun, and have indulged in unconcealed joy to see the ruin of the capital of South Carolina." In regard to the origin and progress of the flames he says, "Before one single public building had been fired by [my] order, the smouldering fires set by Hampton's order were rekindled by the wind, and communicated to the buildings around. About dark they began to spread, and got beyond the control of the brigade on duty within the city. The whole of Wood's division was brought in, but it was found impossible to check the flames, which by midnight had become unmanageable, and raged until about 4 A.M., when, the wind subsiding, they were got under control. I was up nearly all night, and saw Generals Howard, Logan, and Wood, and others laboring to save the houses, and to protect families thus suddenly deprived of shelter, and of bedding and wearing apparel. I disclaim on the part of my army any agency in this fire, but, on the contrary, claim that we saved what of Columbia remains unconsumed." It must be remembered in this connection that the only soldiers of Sherman's army in Columbia were those of Wood's division.

General Wade Hampton, in a letter to Hon. Reverdy Johnson, of Georgia, says: "I pledge myself to prove . . . that he [General Sherman] promised protection to the city, and that, in spite of his solemn promise, he burned the city to the ground, deliberately, systematically, and atrociously." He also asserts in the same letter, "I gave a positive order, by direction of General Beauregard, that no cotton should be fired." Of course Hampton's testimony in regard to Sherman's conduct is unreliable, as he had no means of knowing that which he affirmed. We accept his statement that he gave the order against the destruction of cotton; but the only mode of reconciling this statement with the fact that his soldiers really *did* set the cotton on fire, is to suppose either that the order against the burning came too late, and subsequent to a former order directing the cotton to be burned, or that the burning was against orders.

Major Nichols came with Sherman into Columbia about noon on the 17th. He notices the prevalence of a strong wind, and that it came from the south. It was in the southern portion of the city that the cotton was burning. "It seemed to me," he says, "I had never experienced a more powerful gale of wind." Both he and Sherman testify that the air was filled with smoking tufts of cotton, catching in trees and falling on the shingled roofs of houses. Nichols admits that, apart from the fires occasioned by the burning cotton, "there were fires which must have started independent of the above-mentioned cause. The source of these is ascribed to the desire for revenge from some 200 of our prisoners who had escaped from the cars as they were being conveyed from this city to Charlotte. Again it is said that the soldiers who first entered the town, intoxicated with bad liquor, which was freely distributed among them by designing citizens, in an insanity of exhilaration, set fire to unoccupied houses." Nichols testifies to the efforts made by officers and soldiers to put out the fire which broke out in the afternoon. He says: "I saw Sherman, Howard, Logan, Woods, and other general officers, with their staffs, working with heart and hand to stay the progress of the flames. . . . During the progress of the fire, and afterward, while the army was in the city, every effort was made for the relief of the sufferers. They were furnished with bedding and food, and were quartered in the houses which had been deserted by their owners who had fled the city the day before. General Sherman gave up his own quarters to a family of ladies, with their children, who were fed from his table; I know from personal observation that he and the officers and men of his army could not have made greater exertions to alleviate the sufferings of these homeless ones if they had been their own kith and kin."

Mr. James McCarter entirely exonerates General Sherman from any responsibility for the conflagration, and states his belief that "Sherman intended to protect the persons and private property of the citizens." Still, he charges the burning and plundering of Columbia upon the soldiers of Sherman's army. He adduces as an argument leading to this conclusion that the wind was from the north. Here Mr. McCarter not only contradicts Major Nichols's testimony, but that of the *Columbia Daily Phoenix*, which asserts that the wind throughout the day "had steadily prevailed from southwest by west, and bore the flames eastward." This is the main argument adduced by McCarter to prove his sweeping assertion; and this, as we have seen, is based upon false premises. The only other argument presented by him is the fact that Wade Hampton's men left Columbia ten hours before the conflagration which so desolated the city. This is true; but it is also true that Sherman's soldiers, on entering the city, found the cotton burning, and assisted the soldiers in putting out the flames. But, as Sherman states in his report, the fire which had been subdued still smouldered in the cotton, and was rekindled by the wind in the afternoon, baffling every effort made by his army to resist its progress.

same night, and then demonstrating against Charlotte, in North Carolina, to which place Beauregard and the Confederate cavalry had retreated. There also might soon be expected Cheatham's corps, of Hood's old army, which had been cut off by Sherman's rapid movement on Columbia and Winnsborough. On the 26th the Twentieth Corps reached Hanging Rock, where it waited for the Fourteenth to cross the Catawba, now swollen by recent heavy rains. As soon as Davis came up with the Fourteenth Corps, Slocum moved direct to Cheraw, North Carolina, nearly 70 miles south of west from Charlotte.

On the 22d Kilpatrick reported to Sherman that 18 of his men had been murdered by Wade Hampton's cavalry, and left in the road with labels upon them threatening a similar fate to all foragers. Sherman replied that this conduct left Kilpatrick no alternative; he must retaliate man for man. "Let it be done at once," ordered Sherman. "We have a perfect war right to the products of the country we overrun, and may collect them by foragers or otherwise. Let the whole people know the war is now against them because their armies flee before us, and do not defend their country or frontier as they should. It is pretty nonsense for Wheeler and Beauregard, and such vain heroes, to talk of our warring against women

and children. If they claim to be men they should defend their women and children, and prevent us reaching their homes. Instead of maintaining their armies, let them turn their attention to their families, or we will follow them to the death; they should know that we will use the produce of the country as we please. I want the foragers to be regulated and systematized, so as not to degenerate into common robbers; but foragers, as such, to collect corn, bacon, beef, and such other products as we need, are as much entitled to our protection as skirmishers and flankers. . . . If our foragers commit excesses, punish them yourself, but never let an enemy judge between our men and the law."¹

The above is the testimony bearing upon the ease, from which it is clear,

First, that the burning of Columbia was due to two causes, the carelessness of Hampton's men in their manner of destroying the cotton, and the incendiarism of a number of prisoners burning with a desire to wreak vengeance upon the people whom they held responsible for the cruelties which they had experienced in confinement.

Secondly, that Sherman and his army proper not only had no agency in producing the conflagration, but worked heartily and persistently to subdue it, and made every exertion to alleviate the sufferings which followed it.

We have given this matter of the burning of Columbia so much space simply for the purpose of presenting the facts of the case before the reader. We are making no apology—that is not the business of the historian. It is worthy of note, however, that, though Sherman and his army *felt* that South Carolina deserved destruction, after they entered that state they marched through it like an army, and not like a mob of marauders and incendiaries. Although Sherman, in his letter of December 24th, 1864, had said to General Halleck, "I look upon Columbia as quite as bad as Charleston, and I doubt if we shall spare the public buildings there as we did at Milledgeville," still, upon entering Columbia, he found his pity larger than his wrath, and did his best to protect the citizens against a destruction of their property for which he was in no way responsible; just as at Savannah, notwithstanding his menace of punishment in case the city was not surrendered, when he entered the city he saved it from devastation by a mob of its own citizens.

¹ Sherman writes thus to Wade Hampton in regard to this matter, February 24:

"It is officially reported to me that our foraging parties are murdered after being captured, and labeled 'death to all foragers;' one instance of a lieutenant and seven men near Chesterfield, and another of twenty 'near a ravine eighty rods from the main road,' about three miles from Feasterville. I have ordered a similar number of prisoners in our hands to be disposed of in like manner.


"I hold about 1000 prisoners captured in various ways, and can stand it about as long as you, but I hardly think these murders are committed with your knowledge, and would suggest that you give notice to the people at large that every life taken by them results in the death of one of your confederates.

"Of course you can not question my right to 'forage on the country.' It is a war right as old as history. The manner of exercising it varies with circumstances, and if the civil authorities will supply my requisitions, I will forbid all foraging. But I find no civil authorities who can respond to calls for forage and provisions, therefore must collect directly from the people. I have no doubt this is the occasion of much misbehavior on the part of our men, but I can not permit an enemy to judge, and punish with wholesale murder.


"Personally I regret the bitter feelings engendered by this war, but they are to be expected, and I simply allege that those who struck the first blow and made war inevitable, ought not in



WINNSBOROUGH, SOUTH CAROLINA.



HANGING ROCK, SOUTH CAROLINA.



FORAGERS STARTING OUT.




FORAGERS RETURNING TO CAMP.


The right wing, after destroying the railroad to Winnsborough, crossed the Catawba at Peay's Ferry. Detachments were sent from the Fifteenth Corps to Camden to burn the bridge over the Wateree, a tributary of the Santee River, and to break up the railroad between Florence and Charleston. The latter object was not accomplished, as Captain Duncan, commanding the expedition, met Butler's division of Confederate cavalry, and was forced to return.

On the 3d of March Sherman's army had reached Cheraw. Charleston fairness to reproach us for the natural consequences. I merely assert our 'war right' to forage, and my resolve to protect my foragers to the extent of life for life."

had in the mean time been evacuated by the Confederates, and at Cheraw were found many of the guns which had been brought from that city. From this point the weather was unfavorable and the roads bad; but, crossing the Great Pedee, the Fourteenth and Seventeenth corps entered Fayetteville on the 11th. During the night of the 9th, Kilpatrick's three brigades guarding the roads east of the Pedee were divided. General Wade Hampton, detecting this, dashed in at daylight, got possession of the camp of Colonel Spencer's brigade, and the house in which Kilpatrick and Spencer had their quarters. Notwithstanding the completeness of the surprise and the temporary confusion which followed, Kilpatrick succeeded in rallying his



UNITED STATES ARSENAL AT FAYETTEVILLE



THE TUG-BOAT DONALDSON MOVING UP THE CAPE FEAR.

men, and by a prompt attack regained the artillery which he had lost and the camp from which he had been so suddenly ousted.

The 12th, 13th, and 14th of March were passed by Sherman's army at Fayetteville. The Arsenal and the machinery which had formerly belonged to the Harper's Ferry Arsenal were completely destroyed. "Every building was knocked down and burned," General Sherman reports, "and every piece of machinery utterly broken up and ruined."

Sherman's army was now on the Cape Fear River. Up to this point he had, by admirable strategy, succeeded in dividing the enemy's forces. But now Cheatham's corps had joined Beauregard, and Hardee had got across Cape Fear River in advance of Sherman; and these forces were all on their way to join the Confederate troops in North Carolina, and were under the command of General Joseph E. Johnston, Sherman's old antagonist. In cavalry Johnston's command had somewhat the advantage of Sherman's, and, taking into consideration the military genius of its leader, its artillery and infantry were sufficiently formidable to justify extreme caution on the part of the Federal commander. Before reaching Fayetteville, Sherman had dispatched from Laurel Hill to Wilmington—then in possession of the national troops—two of his best scouts. These men succeeded in their somewhat difficult adventure, and on the morning of the 12th of March Sherman beheld the army tug Donaldson approaching Fayetteville, "bringing me," he says, "full intelligence of the outer world." This tug-boat returned the same day, conveying to General Terry at Wilmington, and to General Schofield at Newbern, intelligence that on the 15th Sherman would move upon Goldsborough. Both Terry and Schofield were ordered to the same point.

In the mean time pontoon bridges had been thrown across the Cape Fear River. Kilpatrick was ordered to move to Averysborough and beyond, in advance of the left wing. Four of Slocum's divisions were to follow, while his two remaining divisions moved as an escort to the trains. Howard moved by a more eastward route to Goldsborough. The idea of this march was to feign on Raleigh and make Goldsborough. But four of Howard's divisions were to preserve communication with Slocum, ready to support the latter in the event of a battle. These movements commenced on the 15th of March. General Sherman went with Slocum's army.

Before reaching Averysborough, Slocum encountered General Hardee's force¹ on the 16th, at a point where the road branches off toward Goldsborough through Bentonville. The enemy must be dislodged both in order to gain the Goldsborough Road and to continue the feint on Raleigh. Hardee's position was difficult to carry, not by reason of its intrinsic strength, but on account of the difficult nature of the ground, which was so soft as to swamp the horses, and even the infantry could scarcely make its way over the pine barren. The Twentieth Corps had the lead, Ward's division in the advance. The latter was deployed, and a skirmish developed the position of a brigade of Charleston heavy artillery, armed as infantry, and commanded by Rhett, posted across the road behind a light parapet, enfilading the approach across a cleared field. Williams dispatched Casey's brigade to the left, turning this position, and Rhett's line was broken, and three guns were captured, with 217 prisoners. Besides these, 108 Confederate dead were afterward buried by Sherman's men.

Ward's division, advancing, developed a second and stronger line, and Jackson's came up on his right, and the Fourteenth Corps on his left, well toward Cape Fear River. Kilpatrick at the same time was ordered to mass his cavalry on the right, and to feel forward for the road to Goldsborough. A brigade of the cavalry gained this road, but was driven back by McLaws's Confederate division. Late in the afternoon the whole Federal line advanced, drove the enemy within his intrenchments, from which, during the stormy night of the 16th, he retreated over the wretched road in his rear. Ward's division followed the next day, beyond Averysborough, and found that Hardee had fallen back on Smithfield. General Slocum's loss in the action at Averysborough was 12 officers and 65 men killed, and 477 wounded.

The Goldsborough Road was now open to the left wing, which, on the night of the 18th, encamped five miles from Bentonville and 27 from Golds-

borough. Howard was two miles farther south, and as no farther resistance was expected from the enemy, was directed to move to Goldsborough via Tulling Creek Church. Sherman joined this wing of the army. But he had not got six miles away from Slocum when he heard artillery to the left. His apprehensions were aroused, but were soon quieted by information conveyed through Slocum's staff officers that the leading division (Carlin's) had encountered Dibrell's cavalry, which he was driving easily. Shortly after this pleasant intelligence, other staff officers from Slocum reported that the latter had developed the whole of Johnston's army near Bentonville.¹

Turning, therefore, to the left wing, we find that it has been attacked by the enemy, who has gained a temporary advantage, capturing three of Carlin's guns and driving back his two advanced brigades. General Williams, however, is aware of the danger which threatens him in its full extent, and promptly brings up his whole force, with which, behind hastily-constructed barricades, he assumes the defensive, knowing that Sherman will bring the whole right wing, if necessary, to his assistance.

While Hardee had been fighting Sherman near Averysborough, Johnston was concentrating his medley army at Smithfield, and immediately after that action moved forward with great rapidity, intending to strike and overwhelm Slocum's army before it could be relieved by re-enforcements from Howard. "But," says Sherman, "he 'reckoned without his host.' I had expected just such a movement all the way from Fayetteville, and was prepared for it." During the night of the 19th Slocum got up his wagon train, with the two divisions guarding it, and Hazen's division of the Fifteenth Corps, and made his position impregnable. Johnston could only effect his purpose by placing his whole army between Sherman's two wings, which would, under the circumstances, have proved his ruin. His cavalry, of course, was unable to cut off communication with Howard. Logan's corps, therefore, approached Bentonville without serious resistance, compelling Johnston to refuse his left flank and intrench. Thus the Confederate army was put upon the defensive on the 20th, having three corps of Sherman's army in his front, and unassailable. Johnston's flanks were well protected by swamps, and as it was not Sherman's purpose to fight a battle here, unless forced to do so, the Federal army simply continued to hold its position in the enemy's front. The next day, March 21st, Schofield entered Goldsborough with little opposition, and Terry connected with Blair's corps at Cox's Bridge, on the Neuse, so that, stretching from Goldsborough around to Bentonville, Sherman had now under his command an army of 100,000 men in an impregnable position. Johnston very sensibly, therefore, retreated to Smithfield before his retreat could be cut off by a portion of this immense army. The Federal loss at Bentonville amounted in the aggregate to 1646. Johnston's loss must have been at least 3000 men, including the prisoners which he left to be captured when he abandoned his intrenchments.

The objects of the Carolina campaign had been accomplished in the full possession of Goldsborough, with its two railroads leading to Beaufort and Wilmington. By the 25th of March Sherman's army was concentrated at Goldsborough, and his line of communication with Newbern and Morehead City was firmly established. The co-operative movements which had been conducted while Sherman was marching, by Generals Terry, Foster, and Schofield, next invite our attention.

¹ Johnston's army had not yet been joined by Hoke's command, some 9000 strong. The Confederate force at Bentonville consisted of Stewart's and Cheatham's corps from Hood's old army, together amounting to about 10,000 men; of Hardee's force from Charleston, 9000 strong, and of Wade Hampton's cavalry, numbering about 5000. This made up an army of about 24,000 men.



A. S. WILLIAMS.

¹ Sherman reports this force as 20,000, but this is an exaggeration.



CHAPTER LII.

RECOVERY OF THE ATLANTIC COAST.

I. WILMINGTON.

Capture of Plymouth.—Lieutenant Cushing's Expedition for the Destruction of the Albemarle.—Naval Actions in North Carolina Sounds.—Organization of the First Expedition for the Capture of Wilmington.—Delays.—Butler's Powder-boat Strategy.—His Connection with the Expedition.—Explosion of the Powder-boat.—Bombardment of Fort Fisher.—Re-enforcements received by the Enemy.—Landing of Butler's Forces.—Weitzel advises against an Assault.—Re-embarkation and Withdrawal of the Troops.—Causes of Failure.—Butler relieved of Command.—The Second Expedition.—Terry in Command.—Plan of Attack.—Assault and Capture of Fort Fisher.—Explosion of the Magazine.—Schofield comes East with the Twenty-third Corps.—Assumes command of the North Carolina Department.—Operations against Wilmington.—Capture of the City.

At the beginning of 1865 only three important positions on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts east of the Mississippi were retained by the Confederates—Wilmington, Charleston, and Mobile. Of these, Wilmington alone afforded an outlet for even a partial and restricted commerce with Europe.


On the last day of October, 1864, Plymouth, near the mouth of the Roanoke River—a town which had been captured from the Federals early in the year—had been surrendered. Though the possession of this place was of no vital importance, yet the gallant exploit of Lieutenant W. B. Cushing,




W. B. CUSHING.

which led to its surrender, is so memorable as an instance both of a heroism which has never been surpassed, and of a success which, gained as it was by a single hand, stands unparalleled in the annals of war, that it can not here be forgotten.

In the spring of 1864, the Federal forces had met with several reverses on the North Carolina coast. On the 1st of February, the Confederate General G. E. Pickett captured the Federal outpost at Bachelor's Creek, eight miles from Newbern, with a considerable number of prisoners. During the following night, a party of the enemy in barges captured the United States steamer Underwriter, lying in the Neuse River, and covering the Newbern fortifications. Surprising the garrison at Plymouth on the 17th of April, the Confederates, after a severe struggle, captured that town on the 20th. This was accompanied by the co-operation of the Confederate iron-clad ram Albemarle, which, descending the river, sunk the Federal gun-boat Southfield. The Miami, the only other national gun-boat off Plymouth, with-



THE CONFEDERATE RAM ALBEMARLE ATTACKING THE FEDERAL GUN-BOATS OFF PLYMOUTH.



THE SASSACUS RAMMING THE ALBEMARLE.

drew. General Wessels, thus cut off from communication with the fleet in Albemarle Sound, surrendered the town, with 1600 men and 25 guns, to General Hoke. Washington, at the head of Pamlico River, was evacuated by the Federals in the latter part of the same month, the town having been previously burned by some soldiers of the Seventeenth Massachusetts and Fifteenth Connecticut Regiments.


Albemarle Sound was still held by the national gun-boats. But besides the Albemarle, other Confederate rams were being prepared to recover the naval supremacy of the North Carolina sounds. Captain Melancthon Smith was accordingly sent to assume command in these sounds, with several double-enders. On the afternoon of May 5th the Albemarle came out of the Roanoke, followed by the Bombshell, a small armed tender, and engaged the national fleet collected together off the mouth of the river. A brisk little fight followed. The gun-boats succeeded in dodging the ram, but their guns made no impression. About five o'clock the Sassacus, watching her opportunity, struck the enemy behind her starboard beam, causing her to careen until her deck was washed by the waves. In this position the two vessels remained for some time, and prompt assistance on the part of one of the larger gun-boats might have accomplished the destruction of the Albemarle. Before this was effected the ram swung clear of the Sassacus, and, maintaining the fight until dark, retreated up the river, leaving her tender, the Bombshell, behind in the hands of the Federals. She appeared again on the 24th, but did not venture to renew the contest. The next day a bold attempt was made by a party of five volunteers from the gun-boat Wyalusing to destroy the Albemarle by means of a torpedo, but proved unsuccessful. Thus the affair rested, so far as the Albemarle was concerned, through the summer of 1864.

Notwithstanding the failure of the expedition to blow up the Albemarle in May, Lieutenant Cushing thought the thing practicable, and formed a scheme for accomplishing this object, which, having been submitted to Ad-


miral Lee, he was permitted to carry out. He had formed his plan in June, at which time he was commanding the Monticello. Proceeding to New York, he, in conjunction with Admiral Gregory, Captain Boggs, and Chief Engineer W. W. Wood, applied to one of the new steam pickets a torpedo arrangement, which had been invented by Wood, and then returned to the Sound. The Albemarle was lying off Plymouth at its moorings, and formed the defense of that town. On the night of October 27th, with a select crew of 13 men, six of whom were officers, he proceeded up the river with his engine of destruction. The distance to Plymouth was eight miles. Passing the Confederate picket stationed on the wreck of the Southfield, a mile below the town, without causing alarm, he found the ram protected with a boom of pine logs 30 feet from her side. As the party approached, it encountered a fire from the enemy's infantry on shore, to which the howitzer from Cushing's boat replied. Almost at the same moment the boat ran its bows against the logs guarding the ram. With his own hands Lieutenant Cushing fixed the torpedo in its proper position. "The torpedo boom," says Cushing, "was then lowered, and I succeeded in diving the torpedo under the overhang, and exploding it at the same time that the Albemarle's gun was fired. A shot seemed to go crashing through my boat, and a dense mass of water rushed in from the torpedo, filling the launch and completely disabling her. The enemy then continued his fire at 15 feet range, and demanded our surrender, which I twice refused, ordering the men to save themselves, and removing my overcoat and shoes. Springing into the river, I swam, with others, into the middle of the stream, the rebels failing to hit us." The ram had been destroyed by the torpedo, but the necessity of immediate flight had prevented Cushing from observing the extent and efficiency of his work. All but one of the party accompanying him met death or capture. Cushing escaped, with a bullet in his wrist, by floating down the river, hid himself among the woods on the bank, and finally found a skiff, in which, after eight hours paddling, he reached the Valley City on the



DESTRUCTION OF THE ALBEMARLE.



BLOCKADING FLEET OFF WILMINGTON—OLD INLET.



BLOCKADING FLEET OFF WILMINGTON—NEW INLET.

night of the 30th. The next day Plymouth was surrendered to the naval squadron.


The capture of Wilmington would have been undertaken in the earlier stages of the war if it could have been accomplished by a naval force alone. But military co-operation was indispensable, and the instant, ever-pressing need of the military forces on more important fields caused the expedition to be postponed until the autumn of 1864. In September—after the capture of Atlanta, and while the Federal army under Meade was besieging Petersburg, waiting its own opportunity and the accomplishment of Sherman's plans in the West—it was thought forces could be spared from Butler's Army of the James to co-operate with the Navy Department in the reduction of Fort Fisher and the capture of Wilmington.

The naval preparations were promptly made, and it was intended that Vice-Admiral Farragut, then operating on the Gulf Coast, should have command of this branch of the expedition. This was impossible on account of the impaired health of that distinguished officer, and the command was assigned to Rear Admiral Porter, who had been identified with the most important naval victories of the West. After considering the subject, Porter offered to take Fort Fisher in three days if he could have all the heaviest frigates, with 300 guns, and a co-operative military force of 13,000 men.¹ Upon consultation with Grant, the latter said he could not then detach so large a force, but could raise it within 24 hours after Porter had assembled his fleet. No definite time was fixed for the expedition, but it was expected to move by the middle of October. In the mean time Grant collected what information he could about Cape Fear River, with maps and charts, and placed this in the hands of General Weitzel, commanding the Eighteenth Corps, to whom, with General Butler's knowledge, the command of the military force was assigned. As the enemy had in some way been informed of the expedition, it was postponed, but the preparations for it were continued. The small force which Grant could detach rendered it necessary that the attack should be a surprise. The War Department had proposed General Gillmore as the military commander, but to this Grant objected on the ground that he had shown timidity on a former occasion, and appointed Weitzel.

General Butler took a great interest in this affair. It was to be carried out by his own troops, and within the limits of his own department. General Grant preferred that he should not participate in the expedition, but did not choose to interfere, though strict military propriety would have dictated Butler's remaining with the larger portion of his army instead of following a detachment which had been already assigned to an able commander. General Butler's chief interest in the affair was connected with a novel experiment which he had suggested for blowing up Fort Fisher by the explosion near it of 200 or 300 tons of powder. He had heard of the destruction caused by the explosion of a large quantity of gunpowder at Erith, England. The remarkable effect of this explosion for many miles around led him to speculate as to the possibility of destroying military fortifications by similar means. He had first proposed this matter to General Grant in connection with Charleston, which he wanted to blow up with a vessel loaded with 1000 tons of powder. But Grant was skeptical as to the effect of such an experiment. About the time the Fort Fisher expedition was ready to start, Butler again broached his gunpowder plot. Some high authorities had come to his support. Grant referred the matter to Colonel Comstock, of his staff, who reported that the explosion of 300 or 400 tons of powder out at sea would do no damage. General Delafield, Chief Engineer, said the explosion would have about the same effect on the fort that firing feathers from muskets would have on the enemy. The Navy Department and Admiral Porter looked upon the scheme with more favor. General Butler himself was perfectly confident of success. Grant therefore consented to the experiment, but would have no waiting for the powder-boat.

Sherman was at this time in the heart of Georgia, and the enemy, having nearly recovered from his apprehensions of an attack on Wilmington, had left a very small force at Fort Fisher in order to assist in impeding Sherman's march. This was the time to strike. Butler having determined to join the expedition to see that the powder-boat was properly exploded, General Grant ordered him to get off with 6500 men, General Weitzel to have the immediate command. Still Grant had no idea that Butler would go with the expedition until the latter passed his headquarters on the way to Fortress Monroe.² Of course, as a matter of military courtesy, all orders

for Weitzel had passed through General Butler. On the 4th of December Grant had telegraphed to the latter to get the expedition off without delay, with or without the powder-boat. Instead of moving directly, Butler opened a telegraphic correspondence with Porter about their "little experiment." He issued his orders for the movement to General Weitzel on the 6th. The next day thirteen of the transports were ready. Four—and those the largest—were yet to arrive. On the 10th Butler had reached Fortress Monroe, and telegraphed to General Grant that he was waiting for the navy. Porter was waiting at Norfolk for the powder-boat. He left Hampton Roads on the 13th. The powder-boat had on board 200 tons of powder, and was to receive 90 tons more at Beaufort. "She has delayed us a little," writes Porter to Butler before starting, "and our movements had to depend on her." Butler's transports arrived off Masonborough Inlet, eighteen miles from Fort Fisher, on the 15th. The next day Porter reached Beaufort, and off that point wrote to Butler that he would start for the rendezvous (twenty-five miles east of Cape Fear River) the next day, and, in case of fair weather, would be able to blow up the powder-boat on the night of the 18th. Butler was not ready to land, and the weather did not promise favorably; it was therefore agreed to postpone the explosion. In the mean time, Butler returned to Beaufort for a fresh supply of coal and provisions. Porter remained with the fleet at the appointed rendezvous, and rode out the gale, which was one of unusual violence. His vessels, however, seem to have got in sight of Fort Fisher, for on the 20th their presence was reported to General Hoke. But for the delay occasioned by the powder-boat, the three days of fine weather (the 16th, 17th, and 18th) would have been improved, the troops would have been landed without difficulty, the enemy surprised, and Fort Fisher captured.



THE POWDER-BOAT LOUISIANA.

Finally, the mountain gave birth to the mouse. On the night of the 23d the powder-boat was exploded at a distance from Fort Fisher of 830 yards. Not a Federal gun-boat or transport dared venture an approach nearer than to a point twelve miles from the scene, and even at a much greater distance the steam in the boilers was lowered to prevent disaster. But, after all, the effect was insignificant. It is true, the explosion was heard at the fort, but it was there supposed that some unfortunate gun-boat had got aground, and been blown up to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy. The Louisiana had been chosen for this experiment, and had on board, at the time of the explosion, 235 tons of powder. Commander A. C. Rhind had charge of the affair, and associated with him in this perilous service were Lieutenant Assistant Engineer A. T. Mullan, of the Agawam, Paul Boyden, acting master's mate, and seven men. Undoubtedly the effect of the explosion would have been very great if the powder had been properly confined, and if the fuses could have been so arranged that the ignition of the whole mass of powder would be instantaneous. As it was, there were four distinct explosions, and a large amount of the powder was blown away before it ignited.¹ But, in any case, the experiment ought to have been incidental; and Butler and Porter, in making it so prominent a matter, disregarded General Grant's instructions.

It was designed that the troops should be ready to land as soon as possible after the powder-boat explosion. But General Butler was delayed in collecting water, coals, and other supplies, and did not come up until the evening of the 24th, and then with only a few of his transports. Admiral Porter had that morning (11 30 A.M.) commenced the bombardment of Fort Fisher from a fleet of naval vessels, surpassing in numbers and equipments any which had assembled during the war.² The attack was made

¹ "I think it was about the 20th of September last that I was on my way to Cairo to resume my command of the Mississippi squadron. Secretary Welles sent me word to meet him that evening at Mr. Blair's. I had arranged to leave for the West the next morning. I went to Mr. Blair's, and found Secretary Welles and Assistant Secretary Fox, who had a number of charts of Cape Fear River, which were spread out for examination. Secretary Welles said that he thought it most important that some attempt should be made to get possession of Cape Fear River; that he had always been in favor of making the attempt, and had, time and time again, invited the co-operation of the army for that purpose, but had received no encouragement. He said he thought there was then a prospect of getting troops for that purpose, and asked me what was my opinion about the matter. I told him I had never seen Cape Fear River, and knew nothing about the defenses the rebels had erected there. He said he would put me in possession of all the papers he had from Admiral Farragut, Admiral Lee, and others who had investigated the subject, and then let me give my opinion about it. I read over carefully all the papers, and examined the charts. Admiral Lee decided most positively that the place could not be taken with 50,000 men, it was so strong; and Admiral Farragut decided that we had not ships in the navy to do any thing with it. Under these circumstances, I told the secretary that I should require time to consider this matter. I went back to the secretary the next morning, and told him that if he would give me the force I named, I would promise to take the fort in three days. That was encouraging to him, for his whole heart was bent upon the matter. . . . I told him I wanted 300 guns on board ship, and all the heaviest frigates . . . that it would require 13,000 men to land with intrenching tools."—Porter's *Testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: Fort Fisher*, p. 88.

² At City Point Butler met Grant, and explained his presence with the expedition. He said: "This expedition is a matter of very grave responsibility. (I had known Admiral Porter somewhat in the Mississippi River. General Weitzel and himself, I had understood, had some little difference upon the report as to the damage done by Admiral Porter's bombardment of Fort Jackson and St. Philip.) General Weitzel is a very able general, but a very young man. I am anxious to see this powder experiment go on and succeed, for it is a very grave one; and I think I had better go with the expedition, to take the responsibility off General Weitzel, being an older officer."

Butler before Committee, p. 11. This explanation would never have been given if Butler had not felt its necessity to account for his presence with the expedition. It is a conclusive corroboration of Grant's statement that he was surprised to see Butler on the way to Fort Fisher.

¹ See General Butler's and A. C. Rhind's testimony before the Committee.
² Porter's haste in exploding the powder vessel, and in commencing the bombardment on the morning of the 24th, before the land force was ready to co-operate, gave rise to considerable feeling. On the night of the 23d Butler sent his staff officer, Captain Clarke, to visit Porter, and inform the latter that the transports would arrive the next day. General Weitzel, in his testimony, says: "Captain Clarke returned just before we left the harbor, and reported that the admiral had said he would explode the powder vessel during the night of Friday, and commence the attack as soon thereafter as possible. It was a question of discussion between us, while sailing toward New Inlet, whether the admiral would commence the attack before we were there to co-operate with him. Several—I think General Butler among the number—doubted that he would do so. I did not doubt it, having been with the admiral on two or three previous expeditions. . . . I know the opinion expressed on board our vessel by several officers when it was found that the navy had made the attack as they did. There was one officer who particularly surprised me by expressing the opinion he did. He said that he believed Admiral Porter made the attack in the way he did because he believed he could knock the fort all to pieces, and would thus get all the credit of taking it to himself. This officer is generally very quiet in the way of expressing his opinions."



FORT FISHER.



THE IRON-CLAD MONITOR MONITOR.

with thirty-seven vessels, five of which were iron-clads; and, besides these, there was a reserve force of nineteen vessels.¹ The main attack was made with the iron-clads and seven other vessels on the land face of the fort. The fleet had upward of 500 guns.

Fort Fisher is situated on Federal Point, on the north bank and at the mouth of Cape Fear River, 20 miles below Wilmington. The original plan of the expedition, as proposed in September, 1864, contemplated the passage of the fleet by the fort up the Cape Fear River. This had been abandoned on account of its impracticability. The channel was intricate, and was commanded by strong forts. It was also full of torpedoes. It was extremely difficult to cross the bar except at high tide, and even when this was accomplished it was unsafe for the vessels to enter without good pilots, or until the channel had been buoyed and the torpedoes removed. The only way in which the fort could be reduced was to land troops north of the work, and then either assault or lay siege to it. It was an earth-work mounting over 40 guns, and though the latter might be dismounted or silenced, the work itself could not be materially injured by a bombardment.² This fort, probably the strongest which had been attacked during the war, was manned on the 18th of December by a garrison of 677 men, under General W. H. C. Whiting; Colonel Lamb, who had himself erected the greater portion of the work, being second in command. Within five miles of the fort, at Sugar Loaf, was a reserve force of 800 men.³ On the 20th the alarm had been given, and on the 22d the advance of General Hoke's division reached Wilmington, and re-enforcements were rapidly sent to Sugar Loaf. Thus, on the 23d, the garrison of the fort was increased to 1087 men.⁴

Very little damage was done to Fort Fisher by the bombardment on the 24th. Twenty-three of the garrison were wounded, all but three only slightly. Five gun-carriages were

The distance between Fort Fisher and Beaufort Harbor was about seventy miles. Porter's explanation of his prompt attack is this: "Captain Clarke said he could make fourteen miles an hour. This would bring him in five hours to Beaufort, with information to General Butler as to the precise time of the explosion of the powder-boat (1 30 A. M. on the 24th). Butler would therefore have plenty of time to reach Fort Fisher before the commencement of his attack, at 11 30 A. M." But it seems Butler, although starting from Beaufort when Clarke returned, did not reach the fleet until night. It is clear, therefore, that Admiral Porter took too much for granted. If he had waited till the night of the 24th for the explosion of the powder-boat, and given Butler prompt notice of this—as he could have done through Captain Clarke—then Butler would have been on hand with the transports, and the attack, taking place on the 25th, would have been a combined one of the navy and army. The reader, however, should understand that, as the affair turned out, this lack of combination on the 24th had nothing whatever to do with the failure of the expedition.


¹ The five iron-clads were the New Ironsides, Canonicus, Monadnock, Saugus, and Mahopac. The four last were turreted monitors.


² The following description of the fort is given by General Grant's engineer, Colonel Comstock:

"The land front consists of a half bastion on the left or Cape Fear River side, connected by a curtain with a bastion on the ocean side. The parapet is 25 feet thick, averages 20 feet in height, with traverses rising 10 feet above it and running back on their tops, which are from 8 to 12 feet in thickness, to a distance of from 30 to 40 feet from the interior crest. The traverses on the left half bastion are about 25 feet in length on top. The earth for this heavy parapet and the enormous traverses at their inner ends, more than 30 feet in height, was obtained partly from a shallow exterior ditch, but mainly from the interior of the work. Between each pair of traverses there was one or two guns. The traverses on the right of this front were only partially completed. A palisade, which is loop-holed and has a banquette, runs in front of this face, at a distance of 50 feet in front of the exterior slope, from the Cape Fear River to the ocean, with a position for a gun between the left of the front and the river, and another between the right of the front and the ocean. Through the middle traverse on the curtain is a bomb-proof postern, whose exterior opening is covered by a small redan for two field-pieces, to give flank-fire along the curtain. The traverses are generally bomb-proofed for men or magazines. The slopes of the work appear to have been reveted with marsh sods or covered with grass, and have an inclination of 45 degrees or a little less. . . . There were originally on this front 21 guns and three mortars. . . . The sea front consists of a series of batteries, mounting in all 24 guns, the different batteries being connected by a strong infantry parapet, so as to form a continuous line. The same system of heavy traverses for the protection of guns is used as on the land front, and these traverses are also generally bomb-proofed."


³ The Confederate Department of North Carolina was under the command of General Bragg, as it had been since October.

⁴ These facts were stated by General Whiting after his capture.





TRANSPORT FLEET OFF FEDERAL POINT.



THE MONITORS IN A GALE.

disabled, but this and every other injury done to the work was repaired during the night.

The next day, the 25th, was at once Sabbath and Christmas. The bombardment was renewed in the morning, and was more effective. The casualties in the fort were 46, three men being killed and nine mortally wounded. Four gun-carriages and one 10-inch gun were disabled. While the bombardment was going on, and under cover of the fleet, the landing of the troops began about noon. About this time Admiral Porter's flag-ship came alongside, Butler's. After an exchanged greeting, the admiral hallooed through his speaking-trumpet, "There is not a rebel within five miles of the fort. You have nothing to do but to land and take possession of it."


The military force was 6500 strong, consisting of General Ames's division of the Twenty-fourth Corps, and General Paine's division of the Twenty-fifth. Paine's division consisted of colored troops. Between 2100 and 2300 men were landed. General Weitzel went with the first 500 (General Curtis's brigade of Ames's division) to reconnoitre. In advancing upon the fort about 300 prisoners were captured by the reconnoitring column. The skirmishers were pushed up by General Curtis to within 150 yards of the fort. Weitzel mounted an artificial knoll, and took a view of the fort. As a defensive work, it did not appear to be injured by the terrific bombardment which it had sustained, and which was still going on. He counted 16 guns, all in proper position, on the land face. Even the grass slopes of the traverses and parapet remained unbroken, and their regular shapes undisturbed. The row of palisades in front of the ditch presented no opening. "It was a stronger work," he says, "than I had ever seen or heard of being assailed during this war." Weitzel remembered Fort Wagner; he recalled his experience in regard to assaults upon works not nearly so strong as this, and which had all proved failures; he remembered, also, that he had been appointed by General Grant to command the expedition instead of Gillmore on the ground that the latter had once shown timidity; that he himself had just been appointed to a major generalship, and that his confirmation depended largely upon his present conduct. He had every possible motive for boldness. Yet he considered that it would be murder to assail the fort, which, if skillfully defended (as he must assume it would be, knowing nothing to the contrary), ought to repulse any attack which he could make; and he advised General Butler against an assault. In the mean time another brigade had landed, and Curtis's skirmishers advanced boldly up to the par-



ADELBERT AMES.

apet. One man crept through the palisade and brought off the flag of the fort, which had been shot down and fallen outside the parapet. But this exploit did not change Weitzel's opinion. He knew that a portion of an assaulting column might even enter a fort, and yet the main body be repulsed. Curtis's advance had not been resisted, but this might be due either to the severity of the bombardment or to a deliberate design on the part of the garrison to tempt an assault. Even if it was due to the bombardment, the latter must cease at the moment of assault, and the garrison would spring again to its guns. General Curtis thought that, if allowed to advance, he could capture the fort. But as there was no well understood and skillfully arranged plan of attack, and no feint to cover his operations, it is very

General Butler thereupon proceeded to re-embark his troops. He gives two reasons for taking this step. In the first place, a storm was approaching, and he feared that it would be impossible to supply his troops on the shore. In the second place, a considerable force of the enemy was on his right flank at Sugar Loaf, and he thought that, under these circumstances, the position was untenable. There was nothing in the way of his landing the remainder of his force, and nothing prevented the landing of supplies until midnight.¹ The fleet would probably outride the gale, and would see to it that his force was supplied and protected against attack. Besides, General Butler had been ordered by General Grant to remain if he effected a landing. The question of immediate assault was left to his discretion; but,



MAP OF FORT FISHER.

probable that, if General Curtis's force had even entered the fort, every man of it would have been captured.¹

¹ The statement made by General Whiting, who was captured in the second attack on Fort Fisher, certainly confirms the wisdom of General Weitzel's opinion. He says that "the garrison was in no instance driven from its guns, and fired in return, according to orders, slowly and deliberately, 662 shot and shells;" that on the land front 19 guns were in position, and the palisade was in perfect order; and that, while it was possible that 3000 or 6000 men might have carried the work by assault, such an event was not probable. "The work," he adds, "was very strong, the garrison in good spirits, and ready; and the fire on the approaches (the assaulting column having no cover) would have been extraordinarily heavy. In addition to the heavy guns, I had a battery of Napoleons, on which I placed great reliance. The palisade alone would have been a most formidable obstacle."

In his official report he says: "During the day [the 25th] the enemy landed a large force, and at half past four advanced a line of skirmishers on the left flank of the second curtain, the fleet at the

giving due weight to the reasons alleged by Butler for the re-embarkation of his troops, it was clearly a disobedience of orders. It is a curious fact that, although Weitzel was understood to have the immediate command of the expedition, he never saw the orders issued by General Grant for its conduct, and was not aware, until some time afterward, of Grant's intention that the land force should maintain its position after landing.²


same time making a concentrated and tremendous enfilading fire upon the curtain. The garrison, however, at the proper moment, when the fire slackened to allow the approach of the enemy's land force, drove them off with grape and musketry; at dark the enemy withdrew."

¹ See Captain Alden's testimony.—*Committee Report*, p. 60.

² See General Weitzel's testimony. He says (*Committee Report*, p. 79): "The order of General Grant to General Butler, which I saw published in the papers—I never saw the original of the



DAVID D. PORTER.



BENJAMIN H. PORTER.



SAMUEL W. PRESTON.



LANDING OF TROOPS ABOVE FORT FISHER.

Thus the expedition failed, and the failure was due to mismanagement. It had been delayed, in the first place, until the enemy had gained time for re-enforcement. There was no well-arranged plan of attack. And there was no attempt made to maintain the position secured by the military force on Federal Point.¹ The loss in life, however, had been slight. Upward of forty casualties occurred in the navy from the bursting of 100-lb. Parrott guns on several of the vessels. The loss thus caused was greater than that inflicted by the enemy.

The popular disappointment which followed the failure of an expedition from which, chiefly on account of the extent of the naval force, so much had been expected, was diversified with the mutual recriminations between the army and navy commanders. But these find no proper place in history. The Committee on the Conduct of the War (Benjamin F. Wade, chairman) investigated the affair, and acquitted General Butler of blame. But General

order—stated that in certain cases he was to intrench and hold his position, and co-operate with the navy in the reduction of the fort. General Grant said to me the other night that when he ordered the expedition to sail he knew that Wilmington and the works there were nearly devoid of troops, and he thought if we moved down there and landed quickly, the mere effect of landing the troops, together with the presence of such a fleet, would be to compel them to surrender. But in consequence of the delay the enemy got troops down there. But he said that his intention was, after we had made a landing there, finding that it was not possible to assault, that General Butler should intrench there."

Question. "What was there to prevent compliance with such an order?"

Answer. "There was nothing to prevent a compliance with it. There would have been difficulties to contend with at that season of the year. The landing of supplies would have been one difficulty; the annoyance from the rebel gun-boats in the river would have been another. But they might, and probably would have been driven off by our artillery. . . . If I had had the instructions that General Grant gave to General Butler . . . I would have intrenched and remained there. . . . No matter what the difficulties were, that order would have covered him from any consequences."

General Grant testifies (*ibidem*, p. 54): "There is no question that General Butler could have remained, in obedience to my instructions; but I do not think he was guided by them; I do not think he paid any particular attention to them."

¹ The following correspondence passed between General Butler and Admiral Porter just after the re-embarkation:

General Butler writes: "Upon landing the troops and making a thorough reconnoissance of Fort Fisher, both General Weitzel and myself are fully of the opinion that the place could not be carried by assault, as it was left substantially uninjured as a defensive work by the navy fire. We found seventeen guns protected by traverses, two only of which were dismounted, bearing up the beach and covering a strip of land, the only practicable route, not more than wide enough for a thousand men in line of battle."

"Having captured Flag-pond Hill Battery, the garrison of which, sixty-five men and two commissioned officers, were taken off by the navy, we also captured Half-moon Battery and seven officers and 218 men of the Third North Carolina Junior Reserves, including its commander, from whom I learned that a portion of Hoke's division, consisting of Kirkland's and Haygood's brigades, had been sent from the lines before Richmond on Tuesday last, arriving at Wilmington Friday night."

General Weitzel advanced his skirmish line within fifty yards of the fort, while the garrison was kept in their bomb-proofs by the fire of the navy, and so closely that three or four of the men of the picket line ventured upon the parapet and through the sally-port of the work, capturing a horse, which they brought off, killing the orderly, who was the bearer of a dispatch from the chief of artillery of General Whiting to bring a light battery within the fort, and also brought away from the parapet the flag of the fort."

"This was done while the shells of the navy were falling about the heads of the daring men who entered the work, and it was evident, as soon as the fire of the navy ceased because of the darkness, that the fort was fully manned again, and opened with grape and canister upon our picket line."

"Finding that nothing but the operations of a regular siege, which did not come within my instructions, would reduce the fort, and in view of the threatening aspect of the weather, wind rising from the southeast, rendering it impossible to make farther landing through the surf, I caused the troops, with their prisoners, to re-embark, and see nothing farther that can be done by the land forces. I shall therefore sail for Hampton Roads as soon as the transport fleet can be got in order."

"My engineers and officers report Fort Fisher to me as substantially uninjured as a defensive work."

To this Porter replies:

"I beg leave to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date, the substance of which was communicated to me by General Weitzel last night."

"I have ordered the largest vessels to proceed off Beaufort and fill up with ammunition, to be ready for another attack, in case it is decided to proceed with this matter by making other arrangements."

"We have not commenced firing rapidly yet, and could keep any rebels inside from showing their heads until an assaulting column was within twenty yards of the works."

"I wish some more of your gallant fellows had followed the officer who took the flag from the parapet, and the brave fellow who brought the horse out from the fort. I think they would have found it an easier conquest than is supposed."

"I do not, however, pretend to place my opinion in opposition to General Weitzel, whom I know to be an accomplished soldier and engineer, and whose opinion has great weight with me."

"I will look out that the troops are all off in safety. We will have a west wind presently, and a smooth beach about three o'clock, when sufficient boats will be sent for them."

"The prisoners now on board the Santiago de Cuba will be delivered to the provost-marshal at Fortress Monroe, unless you wish to take them on board one of the transports, which would be inconvenient just now."

Grant gave his own decision in another way by relieving General Butler of his command of the Army of the James.

Admiral Porter determined to remain until a more efficient military commander should be sent to co-operate with him. He even proposed to take the fort with his sailors.

While the altercation occasioned by the first attack on Fort Fisher was going on, a second expedition was organized, in which the command of the military force was assigned to Major General Alfred H. Terry, who, after the death of General D. B. Birney, stood next to Weitzel in the Army of the James. His command was the same as that with which Butler had sailed, with a single brigade added, bringing its number up to about 8000 men. General Terry, though not a graduate of West Point, had carefully studied the art of war theoretically and practically.

Porter, after experimenting on Fort Fisher for two or three days subsequent to Butler's departure, had returned to Fortress Monroe, where he was joined by Terry before the middle of January. On the 12th of that month the combined expedition reached New Inlet, and the next day the troops were landed. General Whiting and Colonel Lamb still commanded the garrison, which now numbered 2500 men, more than double the force which had confronted Butler. At 2 P.M. on the 13th the debarkation was completed, and the bombardment commenced again, and was more precise and effective than in the first attack. The garrison were driven from their guns, which were soon silenced, and many of them disabled. All night the bom-



ALFRED H. TERRY.

bardment went on, giving the enemy no opportunity to repair injuries. On the 14th the fleet continued the battle with the silent fort, its efforts being chiefly directed to dismount the guns. In the mean time preparations were made for the assault, which was to take place on the afternoon of the 15th. Up to this time shot and shell from 500 guns had been beating upon the earth-work, doing the work itself little damage, but breaking the palisade and dismounting its guns. About 1400 sailors and marines had landed, and were to participate in the assault, the plan of which had been most skillfully arranged. The marines and sailors were to attack the sea-face of the fort, while Terry's three brigades should carry the land front. The assault by the sailors was to be covered by an intrenched party on the beach. A perfect system of signals was agreed upon between the military commander and the admiral. No precaution was neglected, no measure overlooked which would assist in securing success.

At 3 P.M. the preconcerted signal was given for the commencement of the assault, and the admiral turned his guns from the parapet and against the upper batteries (on the centre mound). The attack by the marines appears to have been mistaken by the garrison for the main assault. The intrenched party of sharpshooters did not well cover the advance of the sailors, and the latter were repulsed, losing Lieutenants Preston and Porter, who were bravest among the brave.¹ In the mean while the soldiers had gained the northeastern rampart. The guns of the fleet were turned upon the traverses, while the brave men of Terry's command fought their way from traverse to traverse,² overpowering the garrison, and driving it back to the Mound Battery. Both Generals Whiting and Lamb had been wounded. Dispirited by the loss of their leaders, the Confederates were easily driven from their last refuge, and the entire command surrendered, with 75 guns. The fighting had been desperate, and had lasted from 3 o'clock till 10 P.M. The

¹ K. R. Breese thus alludes to the death of these gallant officers in a special report:

"North Atlantic Squadron, U. S. Flag Ship Malvern, off Fort Fisher, January 18, 1865.
"ADMIRAL.—In my report of the assault on Fort Fisher I have scarcely mentioned the names and services of Lieutenant S. W. Preston, your flag-lieutenant, and Lieutenant B. H. Porter, your flag-captain, thinking that by a little delay I might the more do justice, yet I seem to feel that impossible in me. Preston, after accomplishing most splendidly the work assigned him by you, which was both dangerous and laborious, under constant fire, came to me, as my aid, for orders, showing no flagging of spirit or body, and returning from the rear, whither he had been sent, fell among the foremost at the front, as he had lived the thorough embodiment of a United States naval officer. Porter, conspicuous by his figure and uniform, as well as by his great gallantry, claimed the right to lead the headmost column with the Malvern's men he had taken with him, carrying your flag, and fell at its very head. Two more noble spirits the world never saw, nor had the navy ever two more intrepid men. Young, talented, and handsome, the bravest of the brave, pure in their lives, surely their names deserve something more than a passing mention, and are worthy to be handed down to posterity with the greatest and best of naval heroes.

"Were you not so well acquainted with their characters I should deem it my duty to speak of their high merits; but as chief of your staff, to which they belonged, I must speak of their wonderful singleness of purpose to do their whole duty; always most cheerful and willing, desirous of undertaking any thing which might redound to the credit of the service, giving me at all times the most ready assistance in my duties, combining with their intelligence a ready perception as to the best mode of accomplishing their orders, the country has lost two such servants as could ill be spared, and your staff its brightest ornaments.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

K. R. BREESE,

"Fleet Captain, North Atlantic Squadron.

"Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER, Commanding North Atlantic Squadron."

² "These traverses," says Admiral Porter, "are immense bomb-proofs, about sixty feet long, fifty feet wide, and twenty feet high—seventeen of them in all, being on the northeast face. Between each traverse, or bomb-proof, are one or two heavy guns. The fighting lasted until ten o'clock at night, the *Ironsides* and *Monitors* firing through the traverses in advance of our troops, and the level strip of land called Federal Point being enfiladed by the ships to prevent re-enforcements reaching the rebels."

Federal loss in Terry's command was 110 killed and 536 wounded, including among the latter all three of the brigade commanders engaged in the assault—Generals Curtis, Bell, and Pennybacker. The casualties in the fleet amounted to 309, making a total loss of nearly 1000 men.

In a great degree this success had been due to surprise, or rather to an attack made in an unexpected quarter with the main column. This column, advancing out of the woods, suddenly approached the western extremity of the land front, and one brigade (Bell's) charged along a narrow causeway in the face of four guns.¹ Nothing, however, was accomplished by the second expedition which might not, under good management, have been as well accomplished by the first.

The next morning a sad event occurred, which to some extent marred the cheer of victory. By some culpable negligence, the soldiers were allowed to approach the magazine with lighted candles. In this way an explosion was occasioned, resulting in the loss of about 200 men. Among the severely wounded was Colonel Alonzo Alden, of the One Hundred and Sixty-ninth New York regiment.

As a result of the fall of Fort Fisher, the surrounding work—Fort Caswell, a large work at the West Inlet, mounting 29 guns, all the works on Smith's Island, those between Caswell and Smithville up to the battery on Reeves's Point, on the west side of the river, were abandoned. Including the guns taken at Fort Fisher, 169 were captured in all.

The same day that Fort Fisher was assaulted and carried by Terry's troops, Major General Schofield, with the Twenty-third Corps, 21,000 strong, left Thomas's army for the East. In February Schofield was appointed commander of the Department of North Carolina, just created. He then commenced a campaign, the ultimate object of which was the occupation of Goldsborough, in order to prepare for the arrival of Sherman's army by opening railway communication from that point with the sea-coast, and accumulating supplies. Wilmington was to be captured first, because it would be a valuable auxiliary base to Morehead City if Sherman should reach Goldsborough, and absolutely necessary in the event of Sherman's concentrating his army farther south.

Schofield, with the Third division (J. D. Cox's) of his corps, reached the mouth of Cape Fear River on the 9th of February, landing near Fort Fisher. Terry and Porter had already made the port of Wilmington useless to blockade runners. The former, still retaining his command, and having the co-operation of the North Atlantic Squadron, held a line across the peninsula two miles above Fort Fisher, and occupied Smithville and Fort Caswell. The Cape Fear had been entered by a portion of the fleet, so that both of Terry's flanks were secure. The enemy, under General Hoke, still covered Fort Anderson on the west bank, and the immediate defenses of Wilmington, in position impregnable against a direct attack. The Confederate line must be turned either on its left by the fleet passing above Masonborough Inlet, or by a march of the army around the swamp covering its right. The


¹ Admiral Porter says in his report:

"I have since visited Fort Fisher and its adjoining works, and find their strength greatly beyond what I had conceived. An engineer might be excusable in saying they could not be captured except by regular siege. I wonder even now how it was done. The work, as I said before, is really stronger than the Malakoff Tower, which defied so long the combined powers of France and England; and yet it is captured by a handful of men, under the fire of the guns of the fleet, and in seven hours after the attack commenced in earnest."



PORTER'S FLEET CELEBRATING THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER.

latter movement was adopted. The result was successful. On the 19th of February Fort Anderson was abandoned, and the enemy retreated behind Town Creek, where he again intrenched. Terry meanwhile occupied the force on the peninsula. The next day, the 20th, General Cox crossed Town Creek, gained the enemy's flank, attacked and routed him, taking two guns and 375 prisoners. Cox continued his advance, and threatened to cross the Cape Fear above Wilmington. General Hoke then gave up the struggle, set fire to his steamers, cotton, and other stores, and abandoned Wilmington on the night of the 21st. The next morning Cox entered the town without opposition. In these operations the Federal loss was very slight, amounting to about 200 in killed and wounded. That of the enemy is estimated at 1000 men, besides 30 guns. Goldsborough was occupied by General Schofield on the 21st of March, where he effected a junction with Sherman's army.



FORT SUMTER.

CHAPTER LIII.

RECOVERY OF THE ATLANTIC COAST.

II. CHARLESTON.

Defenses of Charleston.—Its Approaches.—The Department of the South.—Hunter's Operations against Charleston.—Federal Repulse at Secessionville, May, 1862.—Attack on the Blockading Fleet by the Palmetto State and Chicora.—Beauregard's *Ruse de Guerre*.—Admiral Dupont's Bombardment, April, 1863.—The Obstructions in the Harbor defeat the Undertaking.—Results of the Bombardment.—Sinking of the Keokuk.—How the Monitors came out of the Fight.—Dupont succeeded by Dahlgren, and Hunter by Gillmore.—The Situation when Gillmore assumed Command.—Capture of Morris's Island.—Terry's co-operative Movement on James's Island.—The First Assault on Fort Wagner.—Second Assault.—Death of Strong and Shaw.—Siege of the Fort.—Operations of the Fleet.—The "Swamp Angel."—Correspondence between Gillmore and Beauregard.—Demolition of Fort Sumter.—Dahlgren's Error in not immediately advancing upon Charleston.—Fort Johnson strengthened by the Confederates during the delay.—Confederate Evacuation of Forts Wagner and Gregg.—Williams's Night Attack on Fort Sumter.—Result of the Conquest of Morris's Island.—General Foster's Operations in 1865.—He is relieved by Gillmore.—Charleston is turned by Sherman's Movement.—Capture of the City by Gillmore.—Raising of the old Flag over Fort Sumter.

FORT Sumter was captured by the Confederates on the 13th of April, 1861. The defenses of Charleston at that time consisted of the following works, which had been constructed by the United States government:

1. Fort Sumter, a strong casemated brick work of five faces, with three tiers of guns, two in embrasure and one *en barbette*. This fort is distant a little more than three miles from the city, and is on the south side of the channel, about midway between Morris's Island on the south, and Sullivan's Island on the north. Its full armament would comprise 135 guns. At the time of its capture by the Confederates the fort mounted 78 guns.

2. Fort Moultrie, 1700 yards from Fort Sumter, on Sullivan's Island. This also is a brick work, with one tier of guns *en barbette*. In 1860 it mounted 52 guns.

3. Castle Pinckney, a brick work on Shute's Folly Island, distant one mile east of the lower end of the city, and mounting, at the beginning of the war, 28 guns.

The city of Charleston is situated at the head of Charleston Harbor, on the point of the narrow peninsula formed by Ashley and Cooper Rivers. Across the entrance of the harbor—between Sullivan's and Morris's Islands—stretches a bar, seven miles below the city. The islands on either side are each about three and a half miles in length, low, narrow, and sandy, and separated from the main land by deep and impenetrable marshes, which are submerged by the spring tides. The distance from their nearest point to Charleston is between three and four miles. Charleston Harbor itself is bounded by James's Island on the south, and on the north by the main land. Its entrance is 2700 yards in width. James's Island, south of the city, is limited on the west by Stono River, which separates it from John's Island. Stono River is connected with the Ashley, south of Charleston, by Wappoo Creek. South of James's Island is Cole's Island, which is for the most part marsh, with Folly River on the south separating it from Folly Island. Light-house Inlet, at its mouth, separates Morris's and Folly Islands. The formation of all these islands is thin quartz sand.

The fortifications of Charleston at the opening of the war were only adapted to resist a naval attack. To these, other works were rapidly added. On Sullivan's Island were erected, in addition to Fort Moultrie, the following works: Marion, Beauregard, Marshall, and Battery Bee. On Morris's

Island a battery had been constructed at Cummings's Point, and a mile farther south Fort Wagner. Forts Sumter and Moultrie were strengthened, and their armament increased. Old Fort Johnson, on James's Island, was rebuilt and armed with heavy guns, and north of it was constructed Fort Ripley. The preparations against a land attack were formidable. On the James a line of works was built fronting Stone River, with Fort Pemberton near its northern extremity. An inclosed work on Cole's Island covered the Stono Inlet and harbor. Heavy guns were mounted on the wharves of Charleston, and in the rear of the city formidable works were erected. Such and so extensive were the defenses of Charleston under the command of the Confederate General Beauregard.

On the 15th of March, 1862, the Department of the South was created, embracing South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, and was assigned to General Hunter. Port Royal had been occupied by a military force under General T. W. Sherman and Dupont's squadron late in 1861. Edisto Island, farther north, was taken possession of by Sherman in February, 1862. The expeditionary force commanded by General Sherman in March became subject to General Hunter's control. During the month which followed, General Q. A. Gillmore captured Fort Pulaski.

In December, 1861, a Federal fleet of sixteen vessels, heavily laden with granite, was sunk on the bar in Charleston Harbor to obstruct the channel and obviate the necessity of a blockade. This operation excited a great degree of indignation on the part of foreign governments. The elements of nature expressed their dissent in a more quiet way, but with much more effect. In a few weeks the Ashley and Cooper Rivers made for themselves a new channel, better than the previous one.

Shortly after General Hunter assumed command of the Department of the South, operations were commenced against Charleston by way of Stono River and James's Island. The Confederates had made a great mistake in abandoning Cole's Island, which commanded the entrance of the Stono. Admiral Dupont, with three gun-boats—the Unadilla, Pembina, and Ottawa—entered the river on the 29th of May, 1862. At the approach of the gun-boats all the works of the enemy along the Stono up to the Wappoo were abandoned. Early in June Generals Hunter and Benham arrived with a considerable detachment of troops—too weak, however, for operations on James's Island, where the enemy was not only strongly intrenched from Secessionville to Fort Johnson, but had an easy and open communication with the rear, and could bring up re-enforcements at his pleasure. On the 16th of June an attack was made on Secessionville by General I. I. Stevens's and General H. G. Wright's divisions of General Benham's command—some 6000 strong—but was repulsed by the enemy, the Federal loss amounting to over 500 men.

After this action for nearly a year the operations against Charleston were suspended. The Charleston campaign from the beginning of 1863 till the close of the war may be treated under three heads:

I. Admiral Dupont's bombardment, April 7, 1863.


II. General Gillmore's operations on Morris's Island during the summer of 1863.

III. General Foster's and Gillmore's movements co-operative with Sherman's Carolina campaign, resulting in the occupation of Charleston, February 21, 1865.

I. Admiral Dupont's expedition was an experiment, in which the offensive and defensive power of monitors was to be put to the severest test. The original Monitor—whose name came to be applied to all iron-clads of similar construction—had been lost on her way to join Dupont's squadron (the South Atlantic) in the autumn of 1862.¹ The popular expectation as to the omnipotence of the monitors was extravagant and unfounded. The Merrimac had been beaten by the original Monitor, and the Nashville had been sunk by another vessel of the same class. Fort Pulaski had fallen, not before the gun-boats of Dupont's fleet, but from the effect of batteries on shore.² It is true, Dupont had at that time no monitors, but the presence of these could scarcely have affected the result. The monitors, however, had undergone a pretty fair trial in the attack on Fort McAllister. The only vessel of this class engaged in the assault was the Montauk. The result seemed to prove the invulnerability of the monitor, but its offensive power as

¹ See Chapter XIII., p. 258.

² Gillmore's Operations against Charleston, p. 240.



CITY OF CHARLESTON.




SAMUEL F. DUPONT.

against forts was not so well established. A visible impression was made upon McAllister, but not of such a character as to destroy either its offensive or defensive power. It was still a question whether a large number of monitors might not do what one alone had failed to accomplish. Indeed, it was confidently expected that the monitor fleet which Dupont commanded in April, 1863, would batter down Fort Fisher and ride up to Charleston, while a military force about 10,000 strong, under General Hunter, would occupy and hold that city under the guns of the fleet.

Previous to the attack on Charleston an event occurred which showed the insufficiency of blockading vessels against rams. Early on the morning of January 29th, 1863, the *Princess Royal* was captured while attempting to pass through the blockading squadron into Charleston Harbor. Her cargo would have been of great value to the enemy, consisting of two engines intended for iron-clads, with rifled guns, arms, ammunition, and medicines. Her loss was a severe blow to the Confederates, who, ascertaining that she was still at anchor off the harbor, organized an expedition for her recapture. Before light on the morning of the 31st two Confederate iron-clad steam rams—the *Palmetto State*, commanded by Lieutenant Rutledge, and the *Chicora*, Commander Tucker—ran out by the main ship channel from Charleston, and attacked the blockading squadron with great vigor. The latter consisted of 10 vessels—the *Housatonic*, *Mercedita*, *Ottawa*, *Unadilla*,

Keystone State, *Quaker City*, *Memphis*, *Augusta*, *Stettin*, and *Flag*—most of them being light vessels, and incompetent to resist such an onslaught. The iron-clads and two of the heaviest men of war, the *Powhatan* and *Candaigua*, were off at Port Royal. The *Palmetto State*, with Flag-officer D. N. Ingraham on board, almost immediately disabled the *Mercedita* with a 7-inch shell, which entered her side, exploded in one of her boilers, and in its exit killed and wounded several men. One blow from the ram settled the case of this ship, which, as it seemed to be sinking, was surrendered. Both the *Palmetto* and *Chicora* then attacked the *Keystone State*. The latter bore down rapidly upon the *Palmetto*, intending to sink her. But a shot from the ram passed through both her steam chests; 10 rifle shells struck her near and below water mark, and almost simultaneously a fire broke out in her forehold. Commander Le Roy hauled down his flag. The enemy still continued to fire, and the flag was again hoisted and the battle renewed. The *Augusta*, *Memphis*, and *Quaker City* came up and relieved the suffering vessel, one fourth of whose crew had been killed or wounded. Together with the *Mercedita*, whose leak had been stopped and who had not been secured by the enemy, the *Keystone State* went to Port Royal. The other vessels of the squadron kept at a prudent distance from the rams. Soon, however, the *Housatonic* came up, and the rams, refusing battle, fled back into the harbor.



CONFEDERATE RAMS ENGAGING THE BLOCKADING FLEET OFF CHARLESTON.



DEPARTURE OF SUMNER'S EXPEDITION FROM BEAUFORT.



BOMBARDMENT OF FORT SUMTER.

Upon the return of his rams a bright idea occurred to Beauregard. He knew that the reports of Admiral Dupont could not reach the North for some three days at least. His own communication by telegraph with Richmond was uninterrupted, and the Richmond papers soon found their way to New York. Here, then, was a splendid opportunity for a *ruse de guerre*, which, if it involved considerable lying, might—so thought the chivalrous, honor-loving general—be excused on the maxim that “all is fair in war.” Accordingly, over his own signature and that of Flag-officer Ingraham, he dispatched to Richmond an official proclamation, stating that the Confederate naval force at Charleston had attacked the blockading fleet off the harbor, and had sunk, dispersed, and drove off the same, and declaring the blockade of Charleston to be raised from and after the 31st of January, 1863. This proclamation, with Beauregard’s account of the affair, asserting that, as a result of the naval engagement on the 31st, two Federal vessels were sunk, four set on fire, and the rest driven away, was published in the Richmond papers of February 2d. As if this were not enough in the way of falsification, another dispatch was added, declaring that on the afternoon of the 31st the British consul, on board the British war steamer *Petrel*, had gone five miles beyond the usual anchorage of the blockaders, and could see nothing of them with glasses.

Now, without characterizing these declarations by the plain English term that is applicable to them, it is sufficient to say that they are false in every particular. And they were recognized as false by every European government. The raid with the rams had not succeeded in the object for which it was undertaken—the recovery of the *Princess Royal*; they had retreated on the appearance of the *Housatonic*, and did not venture out again. Not a single Federal steamer was sunk, not one was burned, and only two were in any way disabled. The position of the blockading squadron was not shifted, and no vessel advanced from Charleston, after the affair, beyond the bar of the harbor.¹

By the 7th of April the preparations for the bombardment of Fort Sumter were completed. At noon of that day the vessels of Dupont’s fleet, having crossed the bar by the new channel formed since the sinking of the stone fleet, proceeded to the attack. The attacking fleet consisted of nine vessels, all of which were monitors except the *New Ironsides* and *Keokuk*, which were iron-clad and turreted. The five strongest vessels of the blockading squadron were held in reserve.² The orders issued by the admiral were that the fleet should pass up the main ship channel, open fire upon Fort Sumter when within range of that work, disregarding the batteries on Morris’s Island, advance to a position northwest of Sumter in order to attack its weakest face, fire upon the work with precision rather than rapidity, and, having reduced the fort, turn against the Morris’s Island batteries. The advance had been delayed till noon, waiting for the tide, and from the fleet, in the mean while, could be seen the steeples and roofs of Charleston crowded with spectators, just as they had been two years before, when Fort Sumter was attacked by its present defender. It is a novel conflict whose spectacle is now anxiously awaited—that of a fleet mounting 32 guns arrayed against forts which mount 300. The forts know little of the monitors, but stand defiant. The monitors know little of the forts, or the obstructions to their progress, but defiantly they advance.

The reserve fleet lies outside the bar, while the monitors approach Sumter. The *Weehawken* has the lead, and as she advances, a raft attached to her prow looks out for torpedoes. Scarcely has she started, however, before the grappling irons attached to this raft become fouled in the anchor cable, and an hour’s delay is occasioned. Then the movement is resumed. The entire fleet passes Morris’s Island, but no gun opens upon her. Now (3 P.M.) she rounds to enter the harbor, and comes within range of Fort Sumter and the batteries on Sullivan’s Island. A broadside from the upper tier of guns (*en barbette*) greets the *Weehawken*, who is seeking, according to orders, to reach the left face of the fort. Suddenly she halts midway between Sumter and Moultrie. Her progress has been stopped by an unforeseen obstacle—a stout hawser stretches between the two forts, strung with torpedoes. The fleet has been proceeding along the right channel thus far, and, meeting this obstruction in the way of reaching its desired position, it changes its course,

and tries the left channel, between Fort Sumter and Cummings’s Point. This also is blockaded, and more effectually than the other, by a row of piles stretching across the channel. Beyond is seen another row extending between Forts Johnson and Ripley, and more careful scrutiny discloses a third row, beyond which lie three Confederate rams.

Thus the original design of reaching Fort Sumter’s weakest face is frustrated at the outset. And there is no help for it. The fort could probably be reduced but for these obstructions which cover its weakness: the obstructions might be removed but for the thundering guns of the fort.

To make matters worse, the *New Ironsides*—the flag-ship—caught by the tide, refuses to obey her rudder, and becomes unmanageable. The *Catskill* and the *Nantucket* fall foul of her, and thus remain a full quarter of an hour. While, in the midst of these difficulties, the vessels are taking such positions as they can gain, they are in a circle of fire, which concentrates upon them from Cummings’s Point Battery, Battery Bee, and Forts Beauregard, Moultrie, and Sumter. The range is less than 800 yards, and the fire is from guns of the heaviest calibre that could be obtained from the Tredegar works of Richmond or from the armories of Europe. This fire has been going on from the time of its first opening by Sumter; but now for thirty minutes it pours upon the fleet the white heat of its fury. One hundred and sixty shots are counted in a single minute; they strike the iron plates of the monitors as rapidly as the ticking of a watch. It is estimated that from all the forts, in this brief engagement, not less than 3500 rounds have been fired. In reply, only 139 shots have been delivered by the fleet.

And what is the result to the fort? What to the fleet? A few marks are visible on Fort Sumter, and the parapet near the eastern angle shows a huge crater.¹ If the monitors could remain where they are, time would solve the problem of the reduction of the fort. But they can not. Apart from the embarrassments under which they are working as regards effective offense—their confined space; their tendency to drift against the obstructions or upon submerged batteries; and the clouds of smoke which hang over the water, obscuring their range—they have sustained injuries which compel their withdrawal, and at 5 P.M. the signal is given for their retreat. Already the *Keokuk*, which advanced to within 570 yards of Fort Sumter, has left the field in a sinking condition, having been completely riddled with shots. It is her last fight. The *Ironsides* also has lost one of her port-shutters, her gun-deck is thus exposed, and her bows have been penetrated with red-hot shot. But these are not monitors. How is it with the latter? The *Nahant* has received thirty wounds, her turret has been jammed so that it will not turn, and her pilot-house is in such a rickety condition that every bolt in it flies about when it is struck, killing and wounding its tenants. The turret of the *Passaic* is broken and unmanageable. The *Nantucket*’s turret is jarred so that the cover of the port can not be opened, and consequently her 15-inch gun can not be used. The other four monitors are essentially uninjured.²

After the withdrawal of the fleet, Admiral Dupont having been informed as to the conditions of his vessels, decided not to renew the conflict, and the next day returned to Port Royal. The *Keokuk* sank on the morning of the 8th abreast of Morris’s Island, and her armament was thus left in the hands of the enemy. In the action of the 7th only one man was mortally wounded. The entire casualties were twenty-six.

Within the short space of about two hours had been decided the question of monitors against forts. The result was decisive on two points: first, that the defensive powers of these vessels was not sufficient to withstand the concentrated fire of half a dozen forts heavily armed; and, secondly, that while the reduction of brick forts might result from a long-continued bombardment, yet the limits of endurance on the part of the monitors were such as to render this impracticable.³

II. The War Department was not satisfied with the result of the experiment, and determined to renew the attack, but upon a somewhat different plan. Admiral Dupont was relieved of the command, and would have been succeeded by Admiral Foote but for the death of the latter on the way to Port Royal. The command of the South Atlantic squadron was therefore, on the

¹ Mr. William Swinton gives the following graphic description of the inside of a monitor during the engagement:

“Could you look through the smoke, and through the flame-lit ports, into one of those revolving towers, a spectacle would meet your eye such as Vulcan’s stithy might present. Here are the two huge guns which form the armament of each monitor—the one eleven, and the other fifteen inches in diameter of bore. The gunners, begrimed with powder and stripped to the waist, are loading the gun. The charge of powder—thirty-five pounds to each charge—is passed up rapidly from below; the shot, weighing four hundred and twenty pounds, is hoisted up by mechanical appliances to the muzzle of the gun, and rammed home, the gun is run out to the port, and tightly “compressed;” the port is open for an instant, the captain of the gun stands behind, lanyard in hand—“Ready, fire!” and the enormous projectile rushes through its huge parabola, with the weight of 10,000 tons, home to its mark.”

² The following estimate was made of the shots received by each vessel:

<i>New Ironsides</i>	65	<i>Nantucket</i>	51
<i>Keokuk</i>	90	<i>Catskill</i>	51
<i>Weehawken</i>	60	<i>Patapsco</i>	45
<i>Montauk</i>	20	<i>Nahant</i>	80
<i>Passaic</i>	53	Total.....	515

³ A year after the attack on Charleston Admiral Dupont thus alludes to the affair: “I am well aware,” he says, “that the results at Charleston were not all that were wished for, and I quite agree with the department that there was, nevertheless, much in them that was gratifying, particularly that the loss of life was so small, and that the capacity of the iron-clads for enduring the hot and heavy fire brought to bear upon them, which would have destroyed any vessels of wood heretofore used in warfare, was made so evident. But I must take leave to remind the department that ability to endure is not a sufficient element wherewith to gain victories; that endurance must be accompanied with a corresponding power to inflict injury on the enemy, and I will improve the present occasion to repeat the expression of a conviction which I have already conveyed to the department in former letters, that the weakness of the monitor class of vessels, in this important particular, is fatal to their attempts against fortifications having outlying obstructions, as at the Ogeechee and at Charleston, or against other fortifications upon elevations, as at Fort Darling, or against any modern fortifications before which they must anchor or lie at rest, and receive much more than they can return. With even their dismantled surface they are not invulnerable, and their various mechanical contrivances for working their turrets and guns are so liable to immediate derangement, that, in the brief though fierce engagement at Charleston, five out of eight were disabled, and, as I mentioned in my detailed report to the department, half an hour more fighting would, in my judgment, have placed them all *hors de combat*.”


¹ Beauregard’s statements are fully refuted by that subsequently made by Admiral Dupont, and signed by nearly all the commanding officers of the fleet lying off Charleston Harbor on the 31st. We make the following extract from this statement:

“We deem it our duty to state that the so-called results are false in every particular—no vessels were sunk, none were set on fire seriously. . . . So hasty was the retreat of the rams that, although they might have perceived that the *Keystone State* had received serious damage, no attempt was ever made to approach her. The *Stettin* and *Ottawa*, at the extreme end of the line, did not get under way from their position till after the firing had ceased, and the *Stettin* merely saw the black smoke as the rams disappeared over the bar. The rams withdrew hastily toward the harbor, and on their way were fired at by the *Housatonic* and *Augusta* until both had got beyond reach of their guns. They anchored under the protection of their forts, and remained there. No vessel, iron-clad or other, passed out over the bar after the return of the rams inshore. The *Unadilla* was not aware of the attack until the *Housatonic* commenced firing, when she moved out toward that vessel from her anchorage. The *Housatonic* was never beyond the usual line of the blockade. We do not hesitate to state that no vessel came out beyond the bar after the return of the rams, at between 7 and 8 A.M., to the cover of the forts. We believe the statement that any vessel came any where near the usual anchorage of any of the blockaders, or up to the bar, after the withdrawal of the rams, to be deliberately and knowingly false. If the statement from the papers, as now before us, has the sanction of the captain of the *Petrel* and the foreign consuls, we can only deplore that foreign officers can lend their official positions to the spreading before the world, for unworthy objects, untruths patent to every officer of this squadron.”

² The vessels of the monitor fleet, including the *New Ironsides* and *Keokuk*, advanced in the following order:

1. *Weehawken*, Captain John Rodgers.
2. *Passaic*, Captain Percival Drayton.
3. *Montauk*, Commander John L. Worden.
4. *Patapsco*, Commander Daniel Ammen.
5. *New Ironsides*, Commodore Thomas Turner.
6. *Catskill*, Commander George W. Rodgers.
7. *Nantucket*, Commander Daniel McN. Fairfax.
8. *Nahant*, Commander John Downes.
9. *Keokuk*, Lieutenant Commander A. C. Rhind.

The reserve squadron consisted of the *Canandaigua*, *Unadilla*, *Housatonic*, *Wissahickon*, and *Huron*, under the command of Captain Joseph H. Green.



SINKING OF THE KROKUK.

6th of July, assigned to Admiral Dahlgren, and General Q. A. Gillmore succeeded Hunter in the command of the Department of the South. Toward the close of May, 1863, Gillmore had received orders to repair to Washington, to consult with General Halleck and Secretary Welles as to future operations against Charleston. No more troops could be spared for the Department of the South. Gillmore did not ask for more, although he knew that his operations must, on account of his small military force, be restricted to Morris's Island. With this force he proposed to occupy that island, capture Forts Wagner and Gregg, and demolish Fort Sumter by means of shore batteries. The way would thus be open for Dahlgren to advance with his fleet, remove the obstructions in the harbor, and command Charleston. Even if the city was not captured, the full possession of Morris's Island would effectually blockade the harbor.

General Gillmore assumed command of the department on the 12th of June. At that time the coast from Light-house Inlet to St. Augustine, Florida—a distance of 250 miles—was in possession of the national forces. The positions actually occupied by troops were Folly Island, Seabrook Island, on the North Edisto, St. Helena Island, Port Royal Island, Hilton Head Island, the Tybee Islands, Fort Pulaski, Ossibaw Island, Fort Clinch and Amelia Island, and the city of St. Augustine. Off or inside the principal inlets lay the blockading squadron.¹

Folly Island was occupied by a brigade under General Vogdes, strongly intrenched, with heavy guns mounted on the south end of the island to control the entrance of the Stono River. Vogdes had also constructed a road, practicable for artillery, and affording a means of concealed communication between the several parts of the island. In Stono and Folly Rivers a naval force was stationed, consisting of two gun-boats and a mortar schooner, to secure Folly Island against attack, and to hold the Stono against the light-draught gun-boats of the enemy. Folly Island was necessarily the base of operations against Morris's Island.² The dense undergrowth with which it

was covered afforded cover for batteries on the north end, within musket range of the enemy's picket on the opposite side of Light-house Inlet.

The forces in Ossibaw Sound and on the North Edisto were withdrawn. Gillmore's entire command available for offensive operations then consisted of 11,500 men and 66 guns, besides about 30 mortars.

The descent upon Morris's Island was made July 10th, 1863. It was an operation which required boldness and great skill, as it involved the storming of a fortified position, not by the regular approaches of a siege, but by an advance covered by a few batteries, and made in small boats exposed to the enemy's fire. There were two co-operative expeditions—one conducted by General A. H. Terry, with 3800 men, on James's Island, which was eminently successful, diverting a portion of the garrison from Morris's Island; and a second, sent from General Saxton's command at Beaufort to cut the Charleston and Savannah Railroad at Jacksborough, in order to delay reinforcements from Savannah. This latter expedition proved a signal failure, involving the loss of two guns and a small steamer, which was burned to prevent its capture.

The main column engaged in the attack on Morris's Island—about 2000 men of General Strong's brigade—was embarked in Folly River, and passed by night during high tide through the shallow creeks into Light-house Inlet. This movement was first fixed for the night of the 8th of July, but had been postponed until the night of the 9th. At daybreak on the 10th the column halted, having reached Light-house Inlet, the boats keeping close to the east shore of the creek, where they were screened by the marsh grass from hostile observation. Shortly after daybreak the batteries on the north end of Folly Island—10 in number, and mounting 47 guns—opened against the opposite shore, the undergrowth having been previously cleared away in their front to give them an unobstructed view. Four monitors joined their fire to that of the batteries. For two hours this bombardment continued, and then Strong's brigade moved across the inlet to the assault.


The movement had been planned with much skill and secrecy, and was a surprise to the enemy. At Oyster Point, and on the firm land lower down, the Federal troops were landed under a hot fire of musketry and artillery. But the column never faltered, and by 9 o'clock A.M. all the hostile batteries south of Fort Wagner were overrun and captured. This success closed the operations of that day. The troops were within musket range of Fort Wagner, and were exhausted by the intense heat and three hours' hard fighting. Throughout the day the bombardment from the monitors was kept up, directed chiefly at Fort Wagner.

On the morning of the 11th an assault was made upon Fort Wagner. The advance, led by General Strong in person, reached and gained the parapet of the fort. But the supports could not be brought up in face of a fire from which they had no protection, and the attack failed. In the actions

¹ Gillmore's Operations against Charleston, p. 42.

² "The question has been asked why the route across James's Island from Stono River, the same that Brigadier General Benham attempted, was not selected to operate upon.

"The answer is simple. The enemy had more troops available for the defense of Charleston than we had for the attack. The general-in-chief, in the preliminary discussions of the project, had mentioned 10,000 men as the approximate number that could be collected in the Department of the South for this operation. The force actually got together there did not vary much from 11,500 men, including engineers and artillerymen. Upon Morris's Island, on account of its narrowness, this force was ample, and it was not until the command had been reduced one third by sickness and casualties that re-enforcements were asked for. But James's Island presents a different case. There our progress would soon have been arrested by the concentration of a superior force in our front. Upon Morris's Island both parties had all the force that could be applied with advantage. Our superiority in artillery, ashore and afloat—particularly in the use of mortars in the trenches—the successful application of new devices, the energy and skill of our engineers, and a strictly maintained initiative, gave us the controlling elements of success. Moreover, according to the programme of joint operations, the demolition of Fort Sumter was what the land forces had to accomplish, and that could be done with more ease and certainty from Morris's Island than from any other position. James's Island was too wide to operate upon, with a fair promise of success, with our small force."—Gillmore's Operations, p. 22.



1. Charleston and Savannah Railroad.—2. Ashley River.—3. Charleston.—4. Cooper River.—5. Wando River.—6. Castle Pinckney.—7. Fort Mifflin.—8. Fort Johnson (James' Island).—9. Stono River.—10. Fort Sumter.—11. Fort Moultrie.—12. Battery Green (Cunningham's Point).—13. Fort Wagner.—14. General Gillmore's Advanced Batteries.—15. Captured Works (Morris' Island).—16. Light-house Inlet.—17. Fort Johnson (James' Island).—18. Iron clads and Wooden Ships.—19. Fleet.—20. Sullivan's Island and Rebel Batteries.—21. Mount Pleasant.—22. Mount Pleasant.—23. Breach Inlet.—24. Shinn Creek.—25. Rebel Batteries on James' Island.

CHARLESTON AND ITS ENVIRONS.



Q. A. GILLMORE.

on the 10th and 11th the Federal loss was about 150. General Beauregard admits a loss of 300, including 16 commissioned officers.¹ He had also lost 11 heavy guns.

In the mean time, General Terry, on James's Island, had followed the route taken by Benham's two divisions on the 16th of June, and demonstrated against Secessionville. On the 16th of July he was attacked by a largely superior force of the enemy; but with the assistance of the gun-boat Pawnee in the Stono, and two smaller vessels, the attack was easily repulsed. Terry's command was the next day withdrawn from James's Island.

On the 18th, just one week after the failure of the first assault on Fort Wagner, a second was undertaken. In the interim, four batteries—Reynolds, Weed, Hays, and O'Rourke—mounting twenty-nine guns and fourteen mortars, had been erected on Morris's Island bearing upon Fort Wagner, and at a distance from that work of from 1330 to 1920 yards. In addition to the four monitors (the Catskill, Montauk, Nahant, and Weehawken), which

¹ Gillmore's Operations, p. 75.



GEORGE C. STRONG.



ROBERT G. SHAW.

were across the bar on the 10th, two other vessels—the Patapsco and the New Ironsides—now lay abreast of Morris's Island. The guns of this fleet and of the shore batteries bombarded the fort all day. At twilight, in the midst of a thunder-storm, the assaulting columns, commanded by Brigadier General T. Seymour, advanced. Strong's brigade—consisting of Colonel Shaw's Fifty-fourth Massachusetts (colored) Regiment; the Sixth Connecticut, Colonel Chatfield; a battalion of the Seventh Connecticut; the Forty-eighth New York, Colonel Barton; the Third New Hampshire, Colonel Jackson; the Ninth Maine, Colonel Emery; and the Seventy-sixth Pennsylvania, Colonel Strawbridge—was in the advance, and was supported by Colonel H.S. Putnam's brigade. The whole force engaged in the attack numbered about 6000 men. The approach of darkness, hastened by the storm, made it impossible for the fleet to discern friend from foe, so that the advance was exposed to the fire of Forts Wagner, Gregg (on Cummings's Point), and Sumter, assisted by the works on James's and Sullivan's Island. Never, during the war, was an assault made in the face of such opposition. As soon as the columns approached the fort, and the Federal guns in the batteries and on the monitors were silent, the garrison of Wagner, 1000 strong, sprang to its guns and muskets. Notwithstanding this tremendous fire from four different quarters, and although the leading regiment was thrown into such disorder that Putnam's supporting brigade had to be sent in, still the troops went forward, and the southeast bastion of Fort Wagner was gained and held for nearly three hours. The darkness was so great an advantage to the garrison that it more than compensated for the partial success of the assailants, and a retreat was ordered. The Federal loss was very



RUINS OF LIGHT-HOUSE ON MORRIS'S ISLAND.

severe, especially in officers. General Strong, and Colonels Chatfield, Putnam, and Shaw, were either killed on the spot, or died subsequently of their wounds. Colonel Shaw was killed upon the parapet of the fort. If, as was reported at the time, he was buried with the fallen negroes of his gallant regiment, it can only be said that what was intended for a disgrace will in the light of history be regarded as a monumental honor. General Seymour and several regimental commanders were severely wounded. The entire loss sustained in the assault must have amounted to 1200 killed and wounded.

This repulse revived the faltering hopes of the citizens of Charleston, who regarded Fort Wagner as the key to the city. They had looked upon the conflict with anxiety and doubt. They remembered that this same General Gillmore had once demolished Fort Pulaski—which they considered in impregnability next to Sumter—as easily as if it had been a house built of cards.¹ They had trembled, therefore, for the fate of Wagner and Sumter, but now they breathed more freely.

But General Gillmore had as yet scarcely commenced operations. His principal object was the demolition of Fort Sumter, in order to allow the iron-clads an entrance to the harbor. Failing in this, there was still left a secondary object to be accomplished—namely, to secure a perfect blockade of the port. This could be effected by the reduction of Forts Wagner and Gregg.

Fort Wagner was an inclosed work, one fourth of a mile in width, extending from high-water mark on the east, to Vincent's Creek and the impassable marshes on the west. It had an excellent garrison, and was constructed of sand, upon which the heaviest bombardment could make little impression, with a ditch in front. Its bomb-proof shelter was capacious and secure, and its armament consisted of between fifteen and twenty guns, covering the solitary approach to it on the south. This approach was in many places scarcely half a company front in width, and was swept by Fort Sumter, the batteries on James's Island, and that at Cummings's Point. Its communication with the rear was secure, thus giving opportunity for the increase of its armament or garrison.²

¹ See the *Augusta Sentinel* of July 15, 1863.

² Gillmore's Operations, p. 105.



SHARPshooters BEFORE WAGNER.

Fort Wagner was neared by regular approaches. Immediately after the repulse of the 18th, the first parallel was established about 1300 yards from Fort Wagner.¹ On the night of the 23d the second parallel was established 600 yards in advance of the first, on a line running diagonally across the island northwest and southeast. In the creek on the left two booms of floating timber were stretched across, to resist the approach of the enemy's boats. It must be remembered that these approaches to Fort Wagner were chiefly *defensive* as to that work, and were preliminary to offensive operations against Fort Sumter. The third parallel was established within less than 400 yards of Fort Wagner. The fire from the fort now became so severe that it was determined to operate against Sumter before another advance.

Breaching batteries had been constructed for this purpose in rear of the several parallels. By the 11th of August 12 of these batteries were ready

¹ "A row of inclined palisading, reaching entirely across the island, was planted about 200 yards in advance of the line, with a return of fifty yards on the right. This return was well flanked by two guns on the right of the parallel. The parallel was arranged for infantry defense; a bomb-proof magazine was constructed, and the armament of the line modified and increased, so that the parallel contained eight siege and field guns, ten siege mortars, and three Requa rifle batteries."—Gillmore's Operations, p. 114.



THE "SWAMP ANGEL."



PORTION OF CHARLESTON EXPOSED TO THE FIRE OF THE FEDERAL FLEET.

for operation, mounting 28 heavy guns and 12 mortars. Their distance from Fort Sumter ranged from 3516 to 4290 yards. The bombardment commenced on the morning of the 17th, and the guns were served steadily and deliberately for several days, until Fort Sumter was literally knocked out of all shape and deprived of its offensive power. During this time the fleet also bombarded Fort Wagner, whose fire, unless silenced, would interfere with the operations of the batteries on shore.

On the 21st of August a demand was made upon General Beauregard for the surrender of Morris's Island and Fort Sumter, accompanied by the assurance that, if the demand was not complied with during the four hours following its delivery, fire would be opened upon Charleston from batteries already established within range of the city. For three weeks Gillmore had been locating a battery, commonly known among the troops as the "Swamp Angel," mounted with an 8-inch Parrott rifle, and within range of Charleston, on the marsh between Morris's and James's Islands. He waited ten hours beyond the time specified in his notice to the Confederate general, and, receiving no reply, opened fire on the city.¹

¹ The following is a copy of the correspondence which passed between Generals Gillmore and Beauregard:

No. 1.

"Headquarters Department of the South, Morris's Island, S. C., August 21, 1863.

"General G. T. BEAUREGARD, Commanding Confederate Forces about Charleston, S. C.:

"GENERAL,—I have the honor to demand of you the immediate evacuation of Morris's Island and Fort Sumter by the Confederate forces.

"The present condition of Fort Sumter, and the rapid and progressive destruction which it is undergoing from my batteries, seem to render its complete demolition within a few hours a matter of certainty. All my heaviest guns have not yet opened. Should you refuse compliance with that demand, or should I receive no reply thereto within four hours after it is delivered into the hands of your subordinate at Fort Wagner for transmission, I shall open fire on the city of Charleston from batteries already established within easy and effective range of the heart of the city.

"I am, general, your obedient servant,

"Q. A. GILLMORE, Brigadier General Commanding."

No. 2.

"Headquarters South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, Charleston, S. C., August 22, 1863.

"SIR,—Last night, at 15 minutes before 11 o'clock, during my absence on a reconnaissance of my fortifications, a communication was received at these headquarters, dated 'Headquarters Department of the South, Morris's Island, S. C., August 21, 1863,' demanding the immediate evacuation of Morris's Island and Fort Sumter by the Confederate forces on the alleged ground that 'the present condition of Fort Sumter, and the rapid and progressive destruction which it is undergoing from my batteries, seem to render its complete demolition within a few hours a matter of certainty,' and if this letter was not complied with, or no reply was received within four hours after it was delivered into the hands of my subordinate commander at Fort Wagner for transmission, a fire would be opened on the city of Charleston from batteries already established within easy and effective range of the heart of the city. This communication to my address was without signature, and, of course, returned. About half past one o'clock one of your batteries did actually open fire and throw a number of heavy shells into the city, the inhabitants of which, of course, were asleep and unwarned.

"About 9 o'clock the next morning the communication alluded to was returned to these headquarters, bearing your recognized official signature, and it can now be noticed as your deliberate official act. Among nations not barbarous, the usages of war prescribe that where a city is about to be attacked, timely notice shall be given by the attacking commander, in order that non-combatants shall have an opportunity of withdrawing beyond its limits. Generally the time allowed is from one to three days; that is, time for the withdrawal in good faith of at least the women and children. You, sir, gave only four hours, knowing that your notice, under existing circumstances, could not reach me in less than two hours, and not less than that time would be required for an answer to be conveyed from this city to Battery Wagner.

"With this knowledge you threaten to open fire on this city, not to oblige its surrender, but to force me to evacuate those works which you, assisted by a great naval force, have been attacking in vain for more than 40 days. Batteries Wagner and Gregg and Fort Sumter are nearly due north from your batteries on Morris's Island, and in distance therefrom ranging from half a mile to two and a quarter miles. This city, on the other hand, is to the northwest, and quite five miles distant from the battery which opened against it this morning. It would appear, sir, that, despairing of reducing these works, you now resort to the novel measure of turning your guns against the old men, women, and the hospitals of a sleeping city—an act of inexorable barbarity, from your own confessed point of sight, inasmuch as you allege that the complete demolition of Fort Sumter within a few hours by your guns seems a matter of certainty. Your omission to attach your signature to such a grave paper must show the recklessness of the course upon which you have adventured. While the facts that you knowingly fixed a limit for receiving an answer to your demand, which made it almost beyond the possibility of receiving any reply within that time, and that you actually did open one, and threw a number of the most destructive missiles ever used in war into the midst of a city taken unawares and filled with sleeping women and children, will give you a bad eminence in history—even in the history of this war. I am only surprised, sir, at the limits you have set to your demand. If, in order to obtain the abandonment of Morris's Island and Fort Sumter, you feel authorized to fire on this city, why did you not include the works on Sullivan's and James's Islands, nay, even the city of Charleston, in the same demand? Since you have felt warranted in inaugurating this method of reducing batteries in your immediate front which were otherwise found to be impregnable, and a mode of warfare which I confidently declare to be atrocious and unworthy of a soldier, I now solemnly warn you that, if you fire again on the city from your Morris's Island batteries, without giving a somewhat more reasonable time to remove the non-combatants, I shall feel impelled to employ such stringent means of retaliation as may be available during the continuance of this attack. Finally, I reply that neither the works on Morris's Island nor Fort Sumter will be evacuated on the demand you have been pleased to make. Already, however, I am taking measures to remove all non-combatants, who are now fully aware and alive to what they may expect at your hands.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General Commanding."

"To Brigadier General Q. A. GILLMORE, Commanding U. S. Forces, Morris's Island."

No. 3.

"Headquarters Department of the South, Morris's Island, S. C., August 22, 1864—9 P. M.

"General G. T. BEAUREGARD, Commanding Confederate Forces, Charleston, S. C.:

"SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, complaining that one of my batteries has opened upon the city of Charleston, and thrown 'a number of heavy rifled shells into the city, the inhabitants of which, of course, were asleep and unwarned.'

"My letter to you demanding the surrender of Fort Sumter and Morris's Island, and threatening, in default thereof, to open fire upon Charleston, was delivered near Fort Wagner at 11 15 o'clock A. M. on the 28th instant, and should have arrived at your headquarters in time to have permitted your answer to reach me within the limit assigned, viz., four hours. The fact that you were absent from your headquarters at the time of its arrival may be regarded as an unfortunate cir-

On the 24th of August the military force operating against Charleston had accomplished its primary object—the elimination of Fort Sumter. This fort was not obliterated, and its offensive power was only temporarily removed.¹ For at least ten or fifteen days it could oppose to the monitors no serious resistance. Fort Wagner still remained in the hands of the enemy, but could be easily avoided by the fleet. But Admiral Dahlgren did not embrace the opportunity, and in the mean time the enemy strengthened Fort Johnson, converting it into an earth-work. This work is on the north end of James's Island, and commands the channel.

Gillmore continued his parallel approaches up to within 150 yards of Fort Wagner, and on the 5th of September commenced a bombardment of that work, which was continued for forty-two consecutive hours. Seventeen siege and Coehorn mortars dropped their shells into the work, thirteen heavy Parrott rifles pounded away at the southwest angle of the bomb-proof, while by day the New Ironsides poured an uninterrupted stream of eleven-inch shells from her eight-gun broadside against the parapet. An assault would have been made on the morning of the 7th upon the now silent fort; but during the night of the 6th the Confederates, convinced of their inability to maintain their position on Morris's Island, slipped away from Forts Wagner and Gregg, and all but seventy men effected their escape. Eighteen guns were captured in Fort Wagner, and seven in Fort Gregg.

This success concluded General Gillmore's work. From Cummings's Point an irregular bombardment was commenced upon the city, and continued till the evacuation of the latter in 1865. The "Swamp Angel" battery had long discontinued its fire upon Charleston. At the thirty-sixth round its gun—a 100-lb. Parrott—had exploded, and the guns mounted afterward were directed against the James's Island batteries.

Admiral Dahlgren was unwilling to attempt the entrance to the harbor until Fort Sumter was in possession of the national forces. This possession could only be effected by an open assault, involving great sacrifice of life; and after the acquisition of the fort, Gillmore could not expect to hold it against the formidable works of the enemy which bore upon its weakest points. Gillmore, on the 27th of September, offered to remove the obstruc-

cumstance for the city of Charleston, but one for which I clearly am not responsible. This letter bore date at my headquarters, and was officially delivered by an officer of my staff.

"The inadvertent omission of my signature doubtless affords ground for special pleading, but is not the argument of a commander solicitous only for the safety of sleeping women and children, and unarmed men. Your threats of retaliation for acts of mine, which you do not allege to be in violation of the usages of civilized warfare except as regards the length of time allowed as notice of my intentions, are passed by without comment. I will, however, call your attention to the well-established principle, that the commander of a place attacked, but not invested, having its avenues of escape open and practicable, has no right to expect any notice of an intended bombardment other than that which is given by the threatening attitude of his adversary. Even had this letter not been written, the city of Charleston has had, according to your own computation, forty days' notice of her danger.

"During that time my attack on her defenses has steadily progressed; the ultimate object of that attack has at no time been doubtful. If, under the circumstances, the life of a single non-combatant is exposed to peril by the bombardment of the city, the responsibility rests with those who have first failed to remove the non-combatants or secure the safety of the city, after having held control of all its approaches for a period of nearly two years and a half, in the presence of a threatening force, and who afterward refused to accept the terms upon which the bombardment might have been postponed.

"From various sources, official and otherwise, I am led to believe that most of the women and children of Charleston were long since removed from the city; but upon your assurance that the city is still 'full' of them, I shall suspend the bombardment until 11 o'clock P. M. to-morrow, thus giving you two days from the time you acknowledge to have received my communication on the 21st instant.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,


"Q. A. GILLMORE, Brigadier General Commanding."

¹ "The barbette fire of the work was entirely destroyed. [It was this plunging fire from the barbette tier from which the monitors had most to fear.] A few unserviceable guns still remaining on their carriages were dismantled a week later. The casemates of the channel fronts were more or less thoroughly searched by our fire, and we had trustworthy information that but one serviceable gun remained in the work, and that pointed up the harbor toward the city. The fort was reduced to the condition of a mere infantry outpost, alike incapable of annoying our approaches to Fort Wagner, or of inflicting injury upon the iron-clads.

"The enemy soon after commenced removing the dismantled guns by night, and not many weeks elapsed before several of them were mounted in other parts of the harbor. The period during which the weakness of the enemy's interior defenses was most palpable was during the ten or fifteen days subsequent to the 23d of August, and that was the time when success could have been most easily achieved by the fleet. The concurrent testimony of prisoners, refugees, and deserters represented the obstacles in the way as by no means insurmountable."—Gillmore's Operations, p. 149, 150.

General Gillmore gives the following tabular statement of the firing from seven of his batteries on Fort Sumter, August 17–23:

NAME OF BATTERY.	No. and Calibre of Parrott Rifles.	Distance from Battery to centre of Fort Wall in yards.	Whole No. of Projectiles thrown.	Total Weight of Metal thrown.	No. of Projectiles which struck Fort.	No. which struck above and below the Fort.	Weight of Metal which formed breach.
Strong	One 300-pr.	4290	76	19,142	46	22	5,500
Brown	Two 200-prs.	3516	542	82,070	299	198	32,670
Hays	One 200-pr.	4172	531	86,129	225	196	33,320
Reno	One 200-pr.	4272	333	115,171	480	316	38,940
	Two 100-prs.	4272	754				
Rosecrans	Three 100-prs.	3447	1173	105,807	587	392	37,240
Meade	Two 100-prs.	3428	1004	98,282	502	336	98,392
Stevens	Two 100-prs.	4278	566	46,082	340	208	43,924
Total			5009	552,683	2479	1668	289,986



CONFEDERATE EVACUATION OF MORRIS'S ISLAND.



E. R. S. CANBY.

tion with his soldiers, but Dahlgren would not agree to this, considering it his own "proper work." He promised to proceed as soon as his monitors were repaired, if the musketry fire from Fort Sumter should be completely silenced. Delays followed, and finally the attempt was abandoned.

The same day that Gillmore occupied the forts on the north end of Morris's Island, an expedition more gallant than judicious was undertaken by a hundred marines under Lieutenant Commander Williams. This force approached Fort Sumter in 30 boats, but was driven back before a fire of musketry and hand-grenades, which killed or wounded about 50 men.

III. No serious attack was made on the defenses of Charleston by sea. New fortifications were built on Morris's Island, and named after the brave men who had fallen in the second assault on Fort Wagner. The capture of Morris's Island secured a more perfect blockade of the port, but proved of no great value from any other point of view. After all the labor and cost involved in the defense of Charleston by the Confederates, and in offensive operations against it by the national forces—naval and military—the city was finally captured without a battle. As soon as General Sherman had reached Branchville in his march through South Carolina, and had, by his destruction of the railroad in that neighborhood, left General Hardee only a single line of retreat, the latter determined to evacuate Charleston. Beauregard, who had been in command at Charleston, was at this time on the North Carolina border, collecting forces, and awaiting Hill's troops from Augusta, and the remnants of Hood's army from the West.

General Foster had been relieved by General Gillmore shortly after Sherman's departure from Savannah. The available forces in the Department of the South had been making demonstrations against Charleston from James's Island on the south, and Bull's Bay on the north. On the 10th of February General Schemmelfennig effected a lodgment on James's Island, and, covered by a naval force on the Stono, advanced and carried the works of the enemy with a loss of 70 or 80 men. The movement from Bull's Bay was under the immediate command of General Potter, Admiral Dahlgren co-operating. Hardee evacuated Charleston on the night of the 17th of February, and moved northward so rapidly that he managed to join Johnston's forces in North Carolina before he could be intercepted by General Sherman.

The plan of defense against Sherman's march was extremely novel. Wilmington, Augusta, and Charleston were held until the latest moment. These points ought all to have been abandoned the moment General Sherman entered South Carolina, and, with the forces from the West, been concentrated in his front.

On the morning of the 21st General Gillmore's army entered Charleston. Lieutenant Colonel A. G. Bennett, with two companies of the Fifty-second Pennsylvania regiment, and about 30 men of the Third Rhode Island Artillery, had entered the city on the 18th. Fort Sumter and the works on Sullivan's Island had been abandoned, and that morning Lieutenant Colonel Bennett had hoisted over Fort Sumter the United States flag. He then

moved toward the city, having then with him only 22 men, replacing the national colors on Fort Ripley and Castle Pinckney in his progress, and at 10 A.M. landed at Mills's Wharf, Charleston, where he learned that a part of the Confederate troops yet remained in the city, and that mounted patrols "were out in every direction, applying the torch and driving the inhabitants before them." He addressed a communication to Mayor Macbeth, demanding the surrender of Charleston in the name of the United States, and then awaited re-enforcements. Mayor Macbeth, probably astonished at the audacity of this meagre force, replied, addressing "the general commanding the army of the United States at Morris's Island," that the Confederate military authorities had evacuated the city, and that he himself remained to enforce order until the national forces took possession. Bennett replied, offering to move into the city with his command and assist in extinguishing the fires. Having received re-enforcements, he landed, and took measures for putting out the fires, and for the preservation of the United States Arsenal and the railroad dépôts. With Charleston were captured 450 guns. These guns, and the importance which had been attached to Charleston on account of its historic connection with the origin of the rebellion, were the only considerations which made its possession valuable to the captors.

On the 14th of April, 1865—just four years after the evacuation of Fort Sumter by Major Anderson—the old flag which had once been hauled down at the bidding of rebels was again raised above the fort by the hands of Major Anderson. On this occasion the Reverend Henry Ward Beecher delivered an oration which will be recognized by posterity as the ablest production of that orator, and worthy to hold a place by the side of the most brilliant efforts of Burke or Demosthenes.

CHAPTER LIV.

THE MOBILE CAMPAIGN.

Situation and Defenses of Mobile.—Canby assumes command of the Mississippi Department, May 11, 1864.—The proposed Campaign against Mobile frustrated by the failure of the Red River Expedition.—Attack on Fort Gaines, in Mobile Bay.—Fort Powell evacuated.—Farragut passes Forts Morgan and Gaines.—Sinking of the *Tecumseh*.—Naval Engagement in Mobile Bay.—Capture of the *Tennessee*.—Surrender of Forts Gaines and Morgan.—Suspension of Operations against Mobile.—Opening of a new Campaign in March, 1865.—The Situation.—Military and Naval Forces.—Investment of Spanish Fort.—Bombardment of April 8th.—The Enemy evacuates.—Steele's Movement against Montgomery.—Evacuation of Forts Huger and Tracy.—The Fleet again moves up in front of Mobile.—Capture of Fort Blakely.—Surrender of Mobile.—Losses.

MOBILE—the last surrendered of the Confederate strong-holds—is the chief city and port of Alabama. It is situated on low ground at the mouth of Mobile River, and on the western shore of Mobile Bay. At the outset, the city was not in favor of secession; but the false prediction of Yancey, which promised such an extraordinary development of its com-

CHAPTER LVIII.

JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER.

Sherman's Preparations for an advance on Raleigh.—Contemporaneous Events.—Change of Plan after the Capture of Richmond.—Johnston retreats Westward.—Sherman enters Raleigh.—Johnston puzzled.—He inquires of Sherman as to Terms of Surrender.—The Reply.—Sherman's Letters to Grant.—Conference with Johnston, April 17th.—The latter explains his Situation.—He offers, on favorable Terms, to surrender all the remaining Confederate Armies.—Conference renewed on the 18th.—Semi-political Nature of the Conversation.—Breckinridge admitted to the Conference.—Reagan's Memorandum ruled out.—Sherman pens one of his own.—"Glittering Generalities."—Substance of the Memorandum.—Sherman's Position in the Matter.—Letters to Washington.—The Cabinet Meeting.—Rejection of the Memorandum.—Grant goes to Morehead City.—His Consideration for Sherman.—Johnston's Surrender.—Secretary Stanton's Telegrams.—Injustice to Sherman.—Halleck's Interference.—Sherman's Indignation.—Surrender of Taylor and Kirby Smith.—The End of the War.

AT the close of March, 1865, Sherman's army was being reorganized at Goldsborough, and awaiting the repair of railroads and the accumulation of supplies and clothing preliminary to an advance against General Johnston, who then covered Raleigh with an army of over 40,000 men. The Twenty-third and Tenth corps were united under the designation of the Army of the Ohio. Slocum's command was now styled the Army of Georgia, while Howard's retained its former title. Wilson's and Stoneman's expeditions were in full and successful operation, and General Canby was investing the defenses of Mobile.

Sherman's preparations could not be completed before the 10th of April. In the mean time Mobile had fallen; Selma had been occupied by Wilson, who was fast approaching Montgomery; Stoneman had broken up the railroad west of Lynchburg, and had pushed down to the Catawba River, in North Carolina, destroying the railroad through Greensborough and Salisbury; Richmond and Petersburg had been abandoned, and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia had been routed and captured.

Tidings of the battles about Petersburg reached Sherman on the 6th. Up to this time Sherman's plan was to make a feint on Raleigh, cross the Roanoke, and, securing by the Chowan River communication with Norfolk as a base of supplies, to strike for Burkesville, interposing between Johnston and Lee. But the Army of the Potomac, under General Grant's leadership, had eliminated Lee's army from the problem to be solved. This led General Sherman to change his plan. On the 5th Grant warned him that Lee would attempt to reach Danville, and urged an immediate movement against Johnston. "Rebel armies now," he writes, "are the only strategic points to strike at." Instead of making a feint on Raleigh, Sherman, on the 11th, made a real movement on that place. Hearing of Lee's surrender in the mean time, Johnston had retreated westward, and on the morning of the 13th Sherman's army entered the capital of North Carolina.

Johnston had but a single line of retreat left—that by Greensborough and Charlotte. Of course it was folly for him to venture a battle with Sherman. He could not retreat as an organized army. He had therefore to choose between the surrender and the disbandment of his forces. The consequence of the latter step would be to let loose upon the citizens of North Carolina 40,000 men with arms in their hands, who would inaugurate a reign of terror. Johnston looked upon farther opposition as criminal. But how to dispose of his army was a perplexing problem. Lee's army had been defeated on the field of battle—in effect, it had been actually surrounded and captured, and in this case no such considerations had been involved as now presented themselves to Johnston. To the army of the latter escape was possible by disorganization; it had not been defeated or surrounded. The same considerations applied with equal force to Dick Taylor's and Kirby Smith's armies. As soon as it was fully realized that farther resistance was hopeless, immediate disorganization would follow, and the Confederate armies would resolve themselves into armed bands of lawless, irresponsible marauders, scattered over the entire South, unless some motive was offered sufficient to hold these armies until they could be paroled and disarmed.

Sherman had taken measures to cut off Johnston's retreat southward when, on the 14th, he received by flag of truce a letter from the Confederate commander, asking an armistice, and information as to the best terms on which he would be permitted to surrender his army. Sherman replied that he was willing to confer with him as to the terms of surrender, and added: "That a basis of action may be had, I undertake to abide by the same terms and conditions entered into by Generals Grant and Lee at Appomattox Court-house, Virginia, on the 9th instant." Arrangements were made for a conference on the 17th.

Up to this time Sherman had entertained no other terms of surrender than those proposed by Grant in the case of Lee's army. After Lee's surrender, he wrote to the lieutenant general: "The terms you have given Lee are magnanimous and liberal. Should Johnston follow Lee's example, I shall, of course, grant the same." The very day after he had agreed to meet and confer with Johnston, he again wrote: "I will grant the same terms as General Grant gave General Lee, and be careful not to complicate any points of civil policy."

During the interval between the first correspondence between Sherman and Johnston and their meeting on the 17th, no movement was made by either army.¹ At noon of the day appointed, the two generals met at a house five miles from Durham Station under a flag of truce. They had never met before in person, though for two years they confronted each other on

many battle-fields. The interview, says Sherman, was frank and soldier-like. Johnston freely acknowledged that the war was at an end, and that every sacrifice of life after Lee's surrender was simply murder. He admitted that the terms conceded to Lee were magnanimous. He had no right to ask any better conditions for himself. But the situation of his army was peculiar. The sudden revelation of the hopelessness of farther resistance was likely to operate on the fears and anxieties of his soldiers. The consequence would be to relax military restraint. He therefore asked that some general concessions might be made which would enable him to maintain his control over his troops until they could be got back to the neighborhood of their homes. He suggested, also, that the proposition agreed upon should extend to all the Confederate armies then existing. Sherman asked Johnston what authority he had as to the armies beyond his own command. Johnston admitted he had no such power, but thought he could obtain it. He did not know where Davis was, but he could find Breckinridge—the Confederate Secretary of War—whose orders would be every where respected. It was then agreed to postpone the farther consideration of the subject till noon on the next day.

Sherman returned to Raleigh and conferred with his general officers, every one of whom pronounced in favor of a conclusion of the war upon terms which seemed so favorable, and which involved no sacrifice of the national honor.

The conference with Johnston was renewed on the 18th. The territory within the immediate command of Johnston comprised the states of North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. He was now able to satisfy Sherman of his power to disband also the armies in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. He then asked Sherman what he was willing to do. Sherman replied that he could only deal with belligerents—that no military man could go beyond that. He was willing to make terms for the Confederate soldiers in accordance with President Lincoln's amnesty proclamation; that is, all of the rank of colonel and under should have pardon upon condition of taking the oath of allegiance to the United States. He was also willing to go farther than this—he would grant what had been conceded to Lee's army, that every officer and soldier who would return home, observe his parole and obey the laws, should be free from disturbance by United States authority. But Johnston did not seem to be quite satisfied. He expressed great solicitude lest the Southern States should be dismembered, and denied representation in Congress or any separate political existence; also, lest the absolute disarming of his men might leave the South powerless, and exposed to the depredations of assassins and robbers. Sherman listened with great courtesy to all this, which both commanders equally well knew lay outside the scope of a military surrender. In reply, he simply expressed his own personal assurance that if the Southern people submitted to the lawful authority of the nation, as defined by the Constitution, the courts, and the authorities of the United States, supported by the courts, there would be no occasion for solicitude; they would "regain their position as citizens of the United States, free and equal in all respects."

While the conversation was thus drifting off from the main question, Johnston suggested that Breckinridge be allowed to come in. Sherman was never fond of politicians, and had very good reasons for not being partial to this one in particular. He reminded Johnston that it had been agreed that the negotiation must be confined to belligerents. Johnston replied that he understood that perfectly. "But," said he, "Breckinridge, whom you do not know, save by public rumor, as the secretary of state, is, in fact, a major general. Have you any objection to his being present as a major general?" Sherman then consented, and Breckinridge came in; and though it was understood that he was only present as a part of Johnston's personal staff, he joined in the conversation. Soon a courier entered and handed Johnston a package of papers, over which he and Breckinridge held a conversation, and then put the papers in their pockets. One of these was a memorandum, written, as Johnston told Sherman, by the Confederate Post-master General Reagan. It was preceded by a preamble, and concluded with some general terms. Sherman read it, and, being the court in this case, ruled it out.

The conversation then became general, touching upon slavery, which was acknowledged "to be as dead as any thing can be," and upon reconstruction. Then it occurred to General Sherman—possibly it may have been suggested by Reagan's document—to write out a memorandum consisting of some general propositions, meaning little or much, according to the construction of parties, and send them to Washington for the assent or rejection of the government. No delay would result from this, as he would be obliged to communicate with his government in any case, in order to obtain authority by which he could receive the surrender of armies beyond the limits of his proper department.

These propositions Sherman himself calls "glittering generalities." The following is the substance of the memorandum:

The contending armies were to remain as they then were, but the armistice would cease forty-eight hours after a notice to that effect should be given by either commander to the other. All the Confederate armies were to be disbanded and conducted to their several state capitals, where their arms were to be deposited in the state arsenal, subject to the control of the general government. There, also, each officer and man was to be paroled. The several state governments of the South were to be recognized by the President on their officers and Legislatures taking the oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United States. The people of these states were to be guaranteed their political rights and franchise, and their rights of person and property, as defined by federal and state Constitutions. They were not to be disturbed so long as they lived peaceably and obeyed the laws. The war was to cease, and a general amnesty to be granted, on condition of the

¹ "I was both willing and anxious thus to consume a few days, as it would enable Colonel Wright to finish our railroad to Raleigh. Two bridges had to be built, and 12 miles of new road made. We had no iron except by taking up that on the branch from Goldsborough to Weldon. Instead of losing time, I gained in every way, for every hour of delay possible was required to reconstruct the railroad to our rear, and improve the condition of our wagon roads to the front, so desirable in case the negotiations failed, and we be forced to make the race of near 200 miles to head off or catch Johnston, then retreating toward Charlotte."—Sherman's Report.

disbandment and disarmament of the Confederate armies, and the resumption by the soldiers of their peaceful pursuits.

This memorandum was signed by Generals Johnston and Sherman, who, recognizing their want of authority to carry its terms into effect, pledged themselves to promptly obtain such authority, and to endeavor to carry out the programme indicated.¹

So far as Sherman allowed himself to take a political view of the crisis then upon the nation, this memorandum doubtless expressed, though somewhat crudely, his real sentiments. He said, some time afterward, "I stand by the memorandum." He put his signature to the document meaning thereby to give to its propositions all the sanction he could. He had hastily penned the memorandum. The act was wholly due to the suggestion of a moment; it had not been the subject of an hour's deliberation. From the beginning of the conference he had steadily resisted the encroachment of politics upon the negotiation for surrender. He would have persisted in this resistance if Johnston's army alone had been concerned. But Johnston had made a proposition for the surrender of all the Confederate armies from the Roanoke to the Rio Grande. This proposition Sherman would have rejected at once if it had not been backed by authority which seemed to him sufficient, or if it could possibly have been intended as a ruse on the part of the enemy to gain time. He had neither motive for its rejection. He was confident that the authority supporting the proposition would be respected by every Confederate soldier, and he was equally confident of its sincerity. It was, moreover, a proposition which, from its very terms, was not made to him, but through him to the United States government. Its rejection by him without reference to the government, and without a sufficient military motive, would have been as clearly a usurpation of authority as its acceptance would have been without such reference.

But why not submit the proposition to the government in the simplest terms and unaccompanied by the memorandum? Simply because the proposition was not thus submitted to him. Johnston had admitted that the terms granted to Lee's army were sufficiently magnanimous, but had begged that some official assurance might be given by the general government in regard to its future treatment of Southern citizens. Some general concessions were asked which might prevent the Confederate soldiers from resorting to a species of guerrilla warfare, from which the people of the South must suffer heavily. It must be remembered, also, that from Kentucky almost to Virginia, General Sherman was the military commander of the South, and that from the first the regulation of civil affairs had, in a large measure, been committed to military commanders within their several departments. The consideration of civil affairs—the regulation of trade, of the affairs of freedmen, of municipal government—was a part of the manifold duties of department commanders. On two previous occasions—in a letter to the mayor of Atlanta, and subsequently in a communication addressed to a citizen of Savannah—General Sherman had expressed his sentiments as to the policy which would be adopted by the government upon the return of the South to its allegiance. "Both these letters," says Sherman, "asserted my belief that, according to Mr. Lincoln's proclamations and messages, when the people of the South had laid down their arms and submitted to the lawful power of the United States, *ipso facto*, the war was over as to them; and furthermore, that if any state in rebellion would conform to the Constitution of the United States, 'cease war,' elect senators and representatives to Congress, if admitted (of which each house of Congress alone is the judge), that state becomes *instantly* as much in the Union as New York or Ohio. Nor was I rebuked for these expressions, though it was universally known and commented on at the time. And again, Mr. Stanton in person, at Savannah, speaking of the terrific expense of the war, and difficulty of realizing the money necessary for the daily wants of the government, impressed me most forcibly with the necessity of bringing the war to a close as soon as possible for *financial reasons*."

Some memorandum must accompany the submission of Johnston's proposition, in order that the government might understand what concessions were expected: once before the government, this basis might be modified,

¹ The following is a copy of the memorandum in full:

"Memorandum, or Basis of Agreement, made this, the 18th day of April, A. D. 1865, near Durham's Station, in the State of North Carolina, by and between General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confederate Army, and Major General W. T. Sherman, commanding the Army of the United States, both present.

"I. The contending armies now in the field to maintain the *status quo* until notice is given by the commanding general of any one to his opponent, and reasonable time, say forty-eight hours, allowed.

"II. The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded and conducted to their several state capitals, there to deposit their arms and public property in the state arsenal; and each officer and man to execute and file an agreement to cease from acts of war, and to abide the action of both state and federal authorities. The number of arms and munitions of war to be reported to the chief of ordnance at Washington City, subject to the future action of the Congress of the United States, and in the mean time to be used solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the states respectively.

"III. The recognition by the executive of the United States of the several state governments, on their officers and Legislatures taking the oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United States; and where conflicting state governments have resulted from the war, the legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States.

"IV. The re-establishment of all federal courts in the several states, with powers as defined by the Constitution and laws of Congress.

"V. The people and inhabitants of all states to be guaranteed, so far as the executive can, their political rights and franchise, as well as their rights of person and property, as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of the states respectively.

"VI. The executive authority or government of the United States not to disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so long as they live in peace and quiet, and abstain from acts of armed hostility, and obey the laws in existence at the place of their residence.

"VII. In general terms, it is announced that the war is to cease; a general amnesty, so far as the executive of the United States can command, on condition of the disbandment of the Confederate armies, the distribution of arms, and the resumption of peaceful pursuits by officers and men hitherto composing said armies.

"Not being fully empowered by our respective principals to fulfill these terms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves to promptly obtain authority, and will endeavor to carry out the above programme."

entirely changed, or rejected altogether. There was nothing final, nothing in the nature of an *ultimatum* about the memorandum.

In the midst of the negotiations with Johnston, Sherman had heard of the murder of the President, but saw in that event no reason to modify these negotiations. In that respect it probably had no more influence over him than did the information received from General Halleck that a man by the name of Clark had been detailed for his own assassination.¹

Major Hitchcock, an officer on Sherman's staff, proceeded to Washington to lay the memorandum before President Johnson. No moment could have been more unfavorable for the consideration of concessions to be granted to rebels than that which witnessed Major Hitchcock's arrival at Washington. The country was buried in a sea of sorrow—a sea which, while it moaned in hopeless regret for one lost, whose need was now felt more than ever before, boiled also with indignation against the spirit of treason which had impelled the assassin's blow. It was, perhaps, too much to be expected of our poor human nature that President Johnson and his cabinet, meeting under these circumstances, would consider fairly and calmly the propositions submitted by Sherman. The document was read, and every word was listened to very much as if it had been a proclamation of pardon to Booth and his fellow-conspirators. Sherman, the scourge, with the fire and the sword, was the man for that moment, not Sherman, the liberal-minded soldier, who disdained to strike a fallen foe. No one seemed able to preserve calmness save Lieutenant General Grant, who was present at the meeting, and who, while he disapproved of the propositions submitted, was not willing to denounce his brother commander.

General Grant offered to go in person to Raleigh, and notify Sherman of the disapproval of the memorandum by the government. He arrived at Morehead City on the evening of the 23d, and from that point communicated with General Sherman. The latter gave Johnston notice of the close of the armistice, informed him of the fate of their agreement, and demanded the surrender of his army on the same terms which had been granted to General Lee. On the 26th Johnston complied with this demand.² So great confidence had General Grant in Sherman's ability to manage his own command, that, during these final negotiations, Johnston was not aware of his presence at Raleigh.

¹ The following letters were written by General Sherman on the 18th to Washington—the first to accompany the memorandum, and the second having reference to President Lincoln's assassination:

No. 1.

"Headquarters Middle Department of the Mississippi, in the Field, Raleigh, N. C., April 18, 1865.

"To Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT, or Major General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:

"GENERAL,—I inclose herewith a copy of an agreement made this day between General Joseph E. Johnston and myself, which, if approved by the President of the United States, will produce peace from the Potomac to the Rio Grande. Mr. Breckinridge was present at the conference in the capacity of a major general, and satisfied me of the ability of General Johnston to carry out to the full extent the terms of this agreement; and if you will get the President to simply indorse the copy, and commission me to carry out the terms, I will follow them to the conclusion. You will observe that it is an absolute submission of the enemy to the lawful authorities of the United States, and disperses his armies absolutely; and the point to which I attach most importance is, that the disposition and dispersment of the armies is done in such a manner as to prevent them breaking up into a guerrilla crew. On the other hand, we can retain just as much of an army as we please. I agree to the mode and manner of the surrender of armies set forth, as it gives the states the means of suppressing guerrillas, which we could not expect them to do if we strip them of all arms.

"Both Generals Johnston and Breckinridge admitted that slavery was dead, and I could not insist on embracing it in such a paper, because it can be made with the states in detail. I know that all the men of substance South sincerely want peace, and I do not believe they will resort to war again during this century. I have no doubt but that they will in the future be perfectly subordinate to the laws of the United States. The moment my action in this matter is approved, I can spare five corps, and will ask for and leave General Schofield here with the Tenth Corps, and go myself with the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-third Corps, *via* Burkeville and Gordonsville, to Frederick or Hagerstown, there to be paid and mustered out.

"The question of finance is now the chief one, and every soldier and officer not needed ought to go home at once. I would like to be able to begin the march north by May 1st.

"I urge on the part of the President speedy action, as it is important to get the Confederate armies to their homes, as well as our own. I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major General Commanding."

No. 2.

"Headquarters Military Department of the Mississippi, in the Field, Raleigh, N. C., April 18, 1865.

"General H. W. HALLECK, Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.:

"GENERAL,—I received your dispatch describing the man Clark detailed to assassinate me. He had better be in a hurry or he will be too late. The news of Mr. Lincoln's death produced a most intense effect on our troops. At first I feared it would lead to excesses, but now it has softened down, and can easily be quieted. None evince more feeling than General Johnston, who admitted that the act was calculated to stain his cause with a dark hue; and he contended that the loss was most severe on the South, who had begun to realize that Mr. Lincoln was the best friend the South had.

"I can not believe that even Mr. Davis was privy to the diabolical plot, but think it the emanation of a lot of young men of the South, who are very devils. I want to throw upon the South the care of this class of men, who will soon be as obnoxious to their industrious class as to us.

"Had I pushed Johnston's army to an extremity, it would have dispersed and done infinite mischief. Johnston informed me that General Stoneman had been at Salisbury, and was now about Statesville. I have sent him orders to come to me.

"General Johnston also informed me that General Wilson was at Columbus, Ga., and he wanted me to arrest his progress. I leave that to you. Indeed, if the President sanctions my agreement with Johnston, our interest is to cease all destruction. Please give all orders necessary, according to the views the executive may take, and inform him, if possible, not to vary the terms at all, for I have considered every thing, and believe that the Confederate armies are dispersed. We can adjust all else fairly and well.

I am yours, etc.,

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major General Commanding."

² "Terms of a Military Convention entered into this twenty-sixth (26th) day of April, 1865, at Bennett's House, near Durham's Station, North Carolina, between General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confederate Army, and Major General W. T. Sherman, commanding the United States Army in North Carolina.

"All acts of war on the part of the troops under General Johnston's command to cease from this date. All arms and public property to be deposited at Greensborough, and delivered to an ordnance officer of the United States army. Rolls of all officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be retained by the commander of the troops, and the other to be given to an officer to be designated by General Sherman. Each officer and man to give his individual obligation in writing not to take up arms against the government of the United States until properly released from this obligation. The side-arms of officers, and their private horses and baggage, to be retained by them.

"This being done, all the officers and men will be permitted to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by the United States authorities so long as they observe their obligations and the laws in force where they may reside.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major General Commanding the Army of the United States in North Carolina.

"J. E. JOHNSTON, General Commanding Confederate States Army in North Carolina.

"Approved: U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.

"Raleigh, N. C., April 26, 1865."



JAMES BENNETT'S HOUSE, WHERE JOHNSTON SURRENDERED.

The fact that only about 30,000 men and some 10,000 small-arms were included in the surrender shows that Johnston's apprehensions as to the scattering of his command were well founded.

The conduct of the lieutenant general in this affair between the government and Sherman was noble and characteristic. Unfortunately, some of the officers in the cabinet, in their treatment of General Sherman in this connection, were neither just nor generous. It was perfectly proper for the government to reject the basis of agreement between Sherman and Johnston. But the very reasons given for this repudiation, and which must have been published by official authority, the terms of the memorandum not having yet been made public, cast reflections upon General Sherman's patriotism. These reasons were thus reported in the newspapers of April 22d:

"1st. It was an exercise of authority not vested in General Sherman, and on its face shows that both he and Johnston knew that General Sherman had no authority to enter into any such arrangement.

"2d. It was an acknowledgment of the rebel government.

"3d. It is understood to re-establish rebel state governments that had been overthrown at the sacrifice of many thousands of loyal lives and immense treasure, and placed arms and munitions of war in the hands of rebels, at their respective capitals, which might be used as soon as the armies of the United States were disbanded, and used to conquer and subdue loyal states.

"4th. By the restoration of the rebel authority in their respective states, they would be enabled to re-establish slavery.

"5th. It might furnish a ground of responsibility, by the federal government, to pay the rebel debt, and certainly subjects loyal citizens of the rebel states to debts contracted by rebels in the name of the states.

"6th. It put in dispute the existence of loyal state governments, and the new State of Western Virginia, which had been recognized by every department of the United States government.

"7th. It practically abolished the confiscation laws, and relieved rebels of every degree who had slaughtered our people from all pains and penalties for their crimes.

"8th. It gave terms that had been deliberately, repeatedly, and solemnly rejected by President Lincoln, and better terms than the rebels had ever asked in their most prosperous condition.

"9th. It formed no basis of true and lasting peace, but relieved the rebels from the pressure of our victories, and left them in condition to renew their effort to overthrow the United States government, and subdue the loyal states, whenever their strength was recruited, and any opportunity should offer."

In the first place, the people were led to suppose that Sherman had actually usurped authority, which was not the case. The assertion that the memorandum in any way recognized the Confederate government was entirely without foundation. Nor did the memorandum re-establish Confederate state governments except in the same way that President Lincoln had re-established the state government of Virginia.¹ Indeed, Sherman had in-

troducted this feature into his memorandum on the basis of President Lincoln's action in the case of Virginia. It was not until after the rejection of his own scheme that he heard that the invitation accorded to the Virginia Legislature had been retracted.

Again, the arms to be deposited in the state capitals were subject to the control of the United States, and it could only be through the fault of the government that they could be used in another rebellion.

There was not a word or phrase in the memorandum that indicated by the remotest suggestion the liability of the United States for the Confederate debt, or any thing which might be a basis for such liability. Nor did it acknowledge the legitimacy of the obligations of that debt as binding upon the citizens of the states which had incurred it. The recognition of the state governments in no way legalized their contracts made during the rebellion any more than it sanctioned their repudiation of debts due to Northern citizens.

Instead of putting in dispute the existence of West Virginia, the memorandum left that matter to be settled by proper authority. Nor was the Confiscation Bill passed by Congress in any way touched by the guarantee of the rights of person and property to Southern citizens, so far as such guarantee could be given by the executive, for the President is bound to execute the laws of Congress. It relieved no one of the penalty of their crimes any farther than Grant's terms with Lee had done.

The assertion that the memorandum was contrary to the policy of President Lincoln was so far from being true, that it was exactly false in every particular. And President Johnston's subsequent policy of reconstruction is a curious comment on his rejection of Sherman's memorandum.

The final reason given is simply absurd. If the memorandum left the Confederate armies in a favorable situation for a renewal of the war, pray where did it find those armies? It certainly did not increase their efficiency

they attempt it, give them permission and protection, until, if at all, they attempt some action hostile to the United States, in which case you will notify them, give them reasonable time to leave, and at the end of which time arrest any who remain. Allow Judge Campbell to see this, but do not make it public."

Thus authorized, General Weitzel approved a call for the meeting of the Virginia Legislature. This was after Lee's surrender. The call approved by General Weitzel read thus:

"The undersigned, members of the Legislature of the State of Virginia, in connection with a number of citizens of the state, whose names are attached to this paper, in view of the evacuation of the city of Richmond by the Confederate government and its occupation by the military authorities of the United States, the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, and the suspension of the jurisdiction of the civil power of the state, are of the opinion that an immediate meeting of the General Assembly of the state is called for by the exigencies of the situation. The consent of the military authorities of the United States to a session of the Legislature of Richmond, in connection with the governor and lieutenant governor, to their free deliberation upon the public affairs, and to the ingress and departure of all its members under safe-conduct, has been obtained.

"The United States authorities will afford transportation from any point under their control to any of the persons before mentioned.


"The matters to be submitted to the Legislature are the restoration of peace to the State of Virginia, and the adjustment of the questions involving life, liberty, and property, that have arisen in the state as a consequence of war.

"We therefore earnestly request the governor, lieutenant governor, and members of the Legislature to repair to this city by the 25th of April, instant.

"We understand that full protection to persons and property will be afforded in the state, and we recommend to peaceful citizens to remain at their homes and pursue their usual avocations with confidence that they will not be interrupted.

"We earnestly solicit the attendance in Richmond, on or before the 25th of April, instant, of the following persons, citizens of Virginia, to confer with us as to the best means of restoring peace to the State of Virginia. We have secured safe-conduct from the military authorities of the United States for them to enter the city and depart without molestation."

¹ On the 6th of April (three days before Lee's surrender), President Lincoln wrote to General Weitzel: "It has been intimated to me that the gentlemen who have acted as the Legislature of Virginia in support of the rebellion, may now desire to assemble at Richmond and take measures to withdraw the Virginia troops and other support from resistance to the general government. If



JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER.

by disbanding them, sending them home, and rendering their arms subject to the disposition of the United States.

The memorandum ought to have been rejected, on the ground that the subject of reconstruction could not be settled except by the deliberate action of the executive and Congress, and should not, therefore, be introduced in connection with the surrender of the Confederate armies. But the reasons for its rejection which were published then by official sanction not only had no validity, but almost seem to have been chosen for publication because of their reflections upon General Sherman.

On the same day that these reasons were published, Secretary Stanton telegraphed to General Dix:

"Yesterday evening a bearer of dispatches arrived here from General Sherman. An agreement for a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum of what is called 'a basis of peace,' had been entered into on the 18th instant by General Sherman with the rebel General Johnston, the rebel General Breckinridge being present at the conference.

"A cabinet meeting was held at 8 o'clock in the evening, at which the action of General Sherman was disapproved by the President, by the Secretary of War, by General Grant, and by every member of the cabinet. General Sherman was ordered to resume hostilities immediately, and he was directed that the instructions given by the late president, in the following telegram, which was penned by Mr. Lincoln himself, at the Capitol, on the night of the 3d of March, were approved by President Andrew Johnson, and were reiterated to govern the action of military commanders.

"On the night of the 3d of March, while President Lincoln and his cabinet were at the Capitol, a telegram from General Grant was brought to the Secretary of War, informing him that General Lee had asked for a conference to make arrangements for terms of peace. The letter of General Lee was published in a message of Davis to the rebel Congress. General Grant's telegram was submitted to Mr. Lincoln, who, after pondering a few minutes, took up his pen, and wrote with his own hand the following reply, which he submitted to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War. It was then dated, addressed, and signed by the Secretary of War, and telegraphed to General Grant:

"Washington, March 3, 1865, 12 30 P.M.

"Lieutenant General GRANT:

"The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to have no conference with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulation of General Lee's army, or some minor and purely military matters. He instructs me to say you are not to decide or confer upon any political questions. Such questions the President holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military conference or conditions. Meantime you are to press to the utmost your military advantages. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War."

"The orders of General Sherman to General Stoneman to withdraw from Salisbury and join him, will probably open the way for Davis to escape to Mexico or Europe with his plunder, which is reported to be very large, including not only the plunder of the Richmond banks, but previous accumulations. A dispatch received by this department from Richmond says:

"It is stated here by respectable parties that the amount of specie taken south by Jefferson Davis and his partisans is very large, including not only the plunder of the Richmond banks, but previous accumulations. They hope, it is said, to make terms with Sherman, or some other Southern commander, by which they will be permitted, with their effects, including the gold plunder, to go to Mexico or Europe. Johnston's negotiations look to this end."

"After the cabinet meeting last night, General Grant started for North Carolina, to direct future operations against Johnston's army."

This telegram was sent to General Dix for the purpose of publication. It would have been courteous in the secretary to have withheld this report until the circumstances under which Sherman had acted were more fully known. In the first place, it was implied, though not stated, that the same instructions had been received by Sherman which, on the 3d of March, had been addressed to the lieutenant general. This would naturally be inferred from the date of those instructions. Thus Sherman was somewhat cruelly

exposed, for a time at least, to a suspicion of disobedience of orders. But Sherman had not received these instructions. The statement that Grant had gone to North Carolina to direct future operations against Johnston's army was also likely to be misunderstood. Grant had gone to Raleigh to communicate to General Sherman the action of the government in regard to the memorandum. Of course, if more than that was necessary, Grant would do more. As lieutenant general, he directed the operations of all the national armies. Any instructions from Secretary Stanton could give him no power which he had not before. But he never for a moment contemplated the necessity of interference with, or personal direction of, Sherman's movements—and, in fact, did not interfere or direct. Unfortunately, Stanton's dispatch implied, and was popularly understood to imply, that Grant's presence at Raleigh was necessary.

But the matter did not end here. On the 26th of April, General Halleck, then at Richmond in command of the Military Division of the James, dispatched to Secretary Stanton that he had ordered Generals Meade, Sheridan, and Wright to move into Sherman's proper department, and pay no regard to either the orders or truce of the latter. He also advised that Sherman's own subordinates should receive similar orders. The pretext given for moving into Sherman's department was "to cut off Johnston's retreat." Now Johnston was not retreating, and could not retreat if he would, on account of the disposition which Sherman had already made of his forces.

This dispatch also was sent by Stanton to Dix for publication. A few hours later the public was informed through the same channel that the Secretary of War had instructed General Thomas, and, through him, his subcommanders, to disregard Sherman's orders. These bulletins, succeeding each other with such rapidity, excited at once serious apprehension and a tumult of indignation. Every body read and wondered. What had Sherman been doing? Had he allied himself with traitors? Could he no longer be trusted? For a time some terrible danger was supposed to hang like the sword of Damocles over the republic. It did not seem possible that the government could itself thus excite popular apprehension without good reason. Where orders were given to violate a truce—an act punishable with death by the laws of war—certainly there must be some peril impending which could only thus be averted. For a brief period a storm of denunciation was directed against General Sherman. And while all this was going on in the North, it must be remembered that Sherman was accepting Johnston's surrender, and that not one word had been said or written to him indicating the displeasure of the government.¹ He received the announcement of the rejection of the memorandum with entire good feeling. He wrote to Stanton on the 25th admitting his "folly in embracing in a military convention any civil matters." He adds: "I had flattered myself that, by four years of patient, unremitting, and successful labor, I deserved no reminder such as is contained in the last paragraph of your letter to General Grant."² It was not until several days afterward that Sherman saw Stanton's bulletins; and then his indignation was aroused, especially against Halleck, with whom he refused to have any friendly intercourse.³

¹ The following were the instructions which Grant received from Stanton when he started for Raleigh, and which were there shown to General Sherman:

"GENERAL.—The memorandum or basis agreed upon between General Sherman and General Johnston having been submitted to the President, they are disapproved. You will give notice of the disapproval to General Sherman, and direct him to resume hostilities at the earliest moment.

"The instructions given to you by the late President, Abraham Lincoln, on the 3d of March, by my telegram of that date addressed to you, express substantially the views of President Andrew Johnson, and will be observed by General Sherman. A copy is herewith appended.

"The President desires that you proceed immediately to the headquarters of General Sherman, and direct operations against the enemy."

² See previous note.

³ The following extract from General Sherman's report shows the manner in which he regarded the treatment which he had received:

"On the evening of the 2d of May I returned to Hilton Head, and there, for the first time, received the New York papers of April 28th, containing Secretary Stanton's dispatch of 9 A.M. of the 27th of April to General Dix, including General Halleck's, from Richmond, of 9 P.M. of the night before, which seems to have been rushed with extreme haste before an excited public, namely, morning of the 28th. You will observe from the dates that these dispatches were running back and forth from Richmond and Washington to New York, and there published, while General Grant and I were together in Raleigh, North Carolina, adjusting, to the best of our ability, the terms of surrender of the only remaining formidable rebel army in existence at the time east of the Mississippi River. Not one word of intimation had been sent to me of the displeasure of the government with my official conduct, but only the naked disapproval of a skeleton memorandum sent properly for the action of the President of the United States.

"The most objectionable features of my memorandum had already (April 24th) been published to the world in violation of official usage, and the contents of my accompanying letters to General Halleck, General Grant, and Mr. Stanton, of even date, though at hand, were suppressed.

"In all these letters I had stated clearly and distinctly that Johnston's army would not fight, but, if pushed, would 'disband' and 'scatter' into small and dangerous guerrilla parties, as injurious to the interests of the United States as to the rebels themselves; that all parties admitted that the rebel cause of the South was abandoned, that the negro was free, and that the temper of all was most favorable to a lasting peace. I say all these opinions of mine were withheld from the public with a seeming purpose; and I do contend that my official experience and former services, as well as my past life and familiarity with the people and geography of the South, entitled my opinions to at least a decent respect.

"Although this dispatch (Mr. Stanton's of April 27th) was printed 'official,' it had come to me only in the questionable newspaper paragraph headed 'Sherman's Truce Disregarded.'

"I had already done what General Wilson wanted me to do, namely, had sent him supplies of clothing and food, with clear and distinct orders and instructions how to carry out in Western Georgia the terms for the surrender of arms and paroling of prisoners made by General Johnston's capitulation of April 26th, and had properly and most opportunely ordered General Gillmore to occupy Orangeburg and Augusta, strategic points of great value at all times, in peace or war; but, as the secretary had taken upon himself to order my subordinate generals to disobey my 'orders,' I explained to General Gillmore that I would no longer confuse him or General Wilson with 'orders' that might conflict with those of the secretary, which, as reported, were sent, not through me, but in open disregard of me and of my lawful authority.

"It now becomes my duty to paint in justly severe character the still more offensive and dangerous matter of General Halleck's dispatch of April 26th to the Secretary of War, embodied in his to General Dix of April 27th.

"General Halleck had been chief of staff of the army at Washington, in which capacity he must have received my official letter of April 18th, wherein I wrote clearly that if Johnston's army about Greensborough were 'pushed,' it would 'disperse,' an event I wished to prevent. About that time he seems to have been sent from Washington to Richmond to command the new Military Division of the James, in assuming charge of which, on the 22d, he defines the limits of his authority to be the 'Department of Virginia, the Army of the Potomac, and such part of North Carolina as may not be occupied by the command of Major General Sherman.' (See his General Orders, No. 1.) Four days later, April 26th, he reports to the secretary that he has ordered Generals Meade, Sheridan, and Wright to invade that part of North Carolina which was occupied by my command, and pay 'no regard to any truce or orders of mine.' They were ordered to 'push forward, regardless of

CHAPTER LXI.

CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

Grand Review at Washington.—Mustering out of the Troops.—The two Periods of the War.—Our Generals.—Connection of Negroes with the War.—The Foreign Element in our Armies.—Confederate Conscription.—The War Department and Secretary Stanton.—The Question of Supplies with the Confederates.—Sanitary Commissions.—Treatment of Prisoners.—Irregular Warfare.—Confederate Agents in Canada.—The War upon the Sea.—Anglo-Confederate Cruisers.—The Alabama Claims.—Withdrawal of the French from Mexico.—The Political Situation at the Close of the War.

UPON the surrender of the Confederate armies the war for the Union was concluded. The battles had been all fought, and the nation was victorious. It was, by reason of its victory, secure against traitors in arms. Treason might still remain, but it was a disarmed prisoner. The reward of four years of bitter strife had been grasped by a patriotic people. Peace had come, not through conciliation or compromise, but as a conquest. For a brief period the popular enthusiasm knew no bounds, until too soon it was tempered by the death of Lincoln. No one talked of political theories; all felt that such theories had no share in the glory of this triumph. The battle had been won by blood and sacrifice. With one accord the nation turned toward its armies, and showered its blessings upon them. The successful generals, the brave soldiers—these were the heroes of that time. Four years before, regiment after regiment had marched through our cities, with new banners, bright arms, and fresh, youthful faces. They were followed by hopes and prayers. Two soldiers—Ladd and Whitney—in the van of this southward march, had been slain in the streets of Baltimore, and their death so impressed the people that they received a monument, and passed into history sacredly, and by the association of time, linked with the revolutionary heroes of Lexington. These were the first victims of the war. They led that glorious march of the dead which, ere the end, numbered among its ranks over a quarter of a million of just such heroes as they, victims, by disease or mortal wounds, of this protracted struggle for a nation's life. Closing up the rear of this procession, thousands were still gathering from many hospitals.¹ But, though so large a number had disappeared by discharge, death, or wounds, their places had been filled by others. All together a million and a half of men had entered the United States service, and at the close of the war a million still remained,² of whom 650,000 were available for active duty. There were as many effective soldiers in the army when the Confederate forces surrendered as when, in May, 1864, Grant and Sherman entered upon their final campaigns.

Now the record of blood was all written, and the scene of four years ago was reversed. The soldiers were returning to their homes, and as they passed through our streets were welcomed back with grateful shouts. Their banners now were tattered, and their arms and uniform battle-soiled; many an absent one was mourned; and the fresh faces which went forth from us returned worn with the hardships of war. But they had served their country, and their step was proud and triumphant.

The armies of Grant and Sherman, who had shared in the latest struggle, as they passed through Washington, were marshaled in review. Over two hundred thousand soldiers made up the grand spectacle. They were assembled in one body for the first time. They were gathered together from every battle-field of the war—from the Ohio to New Orleans, from New Orleans to Olustee, and from Olustee to the Potomac. Those who looked upon that spectacle were reminded of that first stage of the war when the national capital was threatened, and when the first recruits rushed to its rescue. They looked upon a living, moving demonstration of the fact that treason in a republic *could* be subdued, though every rebel leader, from Davis and Stephens down to the most petty demagogue of the South, had prophesied to the contrary. There were some things to mar the triumph. A general who had marched and fought his army from Chattanooga through the fortifications of Atlanta to the sea, and thence to Goldsborough and Washington, still felt the wrong which had been studiously thrust upon him by

¹ It is estimated that during the war 56,000 national soldiers were killed in battle, while about 35,000 died in hospital of wounds, and 184,000 by disease. The mortal casualties of the war, if we include those dying subsequent to their discharge, probably did not fall short of 300,000. The Confederates lost less in battle, owing to the defensive character of the struggle on their part; but they lost more from wounds and disease, on account of their inferior sanitary arrangements. The total loss of life caused by the rebellion must have been over half a million, while nearly as many more were disabled.

² The calls made during the war amount to nearly three millions of men. The following table shows the date of the several demands, the length of the period of service required, and the number obtained:

Date of Call.	Number called for.	Period of Service.	Number obtained.	Date of Call.	Number called for.	Period of Service.	Number obtained.
April 15, 1861.....	75,000	3 mos.	93,326	October 17, 1863....	300,000	3 yrs. }	374,807
May and July, 1861..	582,745	3 yrs.	714,231	February 1, 1864....	200,000	3 yrs. }	284,091
May and June, 1862..	300,000	3 mos.	15,007	March 14, 1864.....	200,000	3 yrs.	83,652
July 2, 1862.....	300,000	3 yrs.	431,953	April 23, 1864.....	85,000	100 days.	384,882
August 4, 1862.....	300,000	9 mos.	87,588	July 18, 1864.....	500,000	1, 2, & 3 yrs.	204,568
June 15, 1863.....	100,000	6 mos.	16,361	December 19, 1864..	300,000	1, 2, & 3 yrs.	
				Total.....	2,942,748		2,690,401

The following table shows the number of men furnished by the several states, in the aggregate, and reduced to three years' standard:


States.	Aggregate.	Aggregate reduced to Three Years' Standard.	States.	Aggregate.	Aggregate reduced to Three Years' Standard.
Maine.....	71,745	56,595	District of Columbia....	16,872	11,506
New Hampshire.....	34,605	30,827	Ohio.....	317,133	239,976
Vermont.....	35,256	29,052	Indiana.....	195,147	152,282
Massachusetts.....	151,785	123,844	Illinois.....	258,217	212,694
Rhode Island.....	23,711	17,878	Michigan.....	90,119	80,865
Connecticut.....	57,270	50,514	Wisconsin.....	96,118	78,985
New York.....	455,568	380,980	Minnesota.....	75,860	68,182
New Jersey.....	79,511	55,785	Iowa.....	108,773	86,192
Pennsylvania.....	366,326	267,558	Missouri.....	78,540	70,348
Delaware.....	13,651	10,303	Kentucky.....	20,097	18,654
West Virginia.....	30,003	27,653	Kansas.....		
Maryland.....	49,730	40,692	Total.....	2,653,062	2,129,041

It is impossible to give an exact estimate of the number of *different* men who entered the service. It is generally conceded, however, to have been about a million and a half. Scarcely less than three quarters of a million different men entered the Confederate armies, not including state militia. So that the number of men withdrawn from industrial pursuits by the war was over two millions.

some officers of the government. Sherman could not take Halleck by the hand. The soldiers also grievously missed the presence of Lincoln, who had called them to the conflict, and to whom they had always looked as father and friend. But may we not suppose that Lincoln, though withdrawn from the earth, looked down upon the sublime spectacle? Did he not, as one of our poets has imagined, marshal another host, composed of those who, like him, had been victims of this civil war, and who now participated in this grand review?¹

¹ Henry Howard Brownell, in a poem originally published in the *Atlantic Monthly*—a poem which is certainly the greatest of the many called forth by the war—thus expresses this imagination:

“So, from the fields they win,
Our men are marching home—
A million are marching home!
To the cannon's thundering din,
And banners on mast and dome;
And the ships come sailing in
With all their ensigns dight,
As erst for a great sea-fight.
“Let every color fly,
Every pennon flaunt in pride;
Wave, Starry Flag, on high!
Float in the sunny sky,
Stream o'er the stormy tide!
For every stripe of stainless hue,
And every star in the field of blue,
Ten thousand of the brave and true
Have laid them down and died.
“And in all our pride to-day
We think, with a tender pain,
Of those so far away
They will not come home again.
“And our boys had fondly thought,
To-day, in marching by,
From the ground so dearly bought,
And the fields so bravely fought,
To have met their Father's eye.
“But they may not see him in place,
Nor their ranks be seen of him;
We look for the well-known face,
And the splendor is strangely dim.
“Perished?—who was it said
Our Leader had passed away?
Dead? Our President dead?
He has not died for a day!
“We mourn for a little breath
Such as, late or soon, dust yields;
But the dark flower of death
Blooms in the fadeless fields.
“We looked on a cold, still brow,
But Lincoln could yet survive;
He never was more alive,
Never nearer than now.
“For the pleasant season found him,
Guarded by faithful hands,
In the fairest of Summer lands;
With his own brave staff around him,
There our President stands.
“There they are all at his side,
The noble hearts and true,
That did all men might do—
Then slept, with their swords, and died.
“Of little the storm has left us
But the brave and kindly clay—
('Tis but dust where Lander left us,
And but turf where Lyon lay).
“There's Winthrop, true to the end,
And Ellsworth of long ago
(First fair young head laid low!),
There's Baker, the brave old friend,
And Douglas, the friendly foe.
“(Baker, that still stood up
When 'twas death on either hand:
'Tis a soldier's part to stoop,
But the senator must stand.)
“The heroes gather and form—
There's Cameron, with his scars,
Sedgwick, of siege and storm,
And Mitchell, that joined his stars.
“Winthrop, of sword and pen,
Wadsworth, with silver hair,
Mansfield, ruler of men,
And brave McPherson are there.
“Birney, who led so long,
Abbott, born to command,
Elliott the bold, and Strong,
Who fell on the hard-fought strand.
“Lytle, soldier and bard,
And the Ellets, sire and son;
Ransom, all grandly scarred,
And Redfield, no more on guard
(But Allatoun is won!).
“Reno, of pure desert,
Kearney, with heart of flame,
And Russell, that hid his hurt
Till the final death-bolt came;
“Terrill, dead where he fought,
Wallace, that would not yield,
And Sumner, who vainly sought
A grave on the foughten field
“(But died ere the end he saw,
With years and battles outworn).
There's Harker of Kenesaw,
And Urie Dahlgren, and Shaw,
That slept with his hope forlorn.
“Bayard, that knew not fear
(True as the knight of yore),
And Putnam, and Paul Kevera,
Worthy the names they bore.
“Allen, who died for others,
Bryan, of gentle fame,
And the brave New England brothers
That have left us Lowell's name.
“Home, at last, from the wars—
Steadman, the stanch and mild,
And Janeway, our hero-child,
Home, with his fifteen scars!
“There's Porter, ever in front,
True son of a sea-king sire,
And Christian Foote, and Dupont
(Dupont, who led his ships
founding the first ellipse
Of thunder and of fire).
“There's Ward, with his brave death-wounds,
And Cummings, of spotless name,
And Smith, who hurled his rounds
When deck and hatch were aflame;
“Wainwright, steadfast and true,
Rodgers, of brave sea-blood,
And Craven, with ship and crew
Sunk in the salt sea flood.
“And, a little later to part,
Our captain, noble and dear—
(Did they deem thee, then, austere?
Drayton! O pure and kindly heart!
Thine is the seaman's tear).
“All such, and many another
(Ah, list how long to name!),
That stood like brother by brother,
And died on the field of fame.
“And around—for there can cease
This earthly trouble—they throng,
The friends that had passed in peace,
The foes that have seen their wrong.
“(But, a little from the rest,
With sad eyes looking down,
And brows of softened frown,
With stern arms on the chest,
Are two, standing abreast—
Stonewall and Old John Brown.)
“But the stainless and the true,
These by their President stand,
To look on his last review,
Or march with the old command.
“And lo, from a thousand fields,
From all the old battle-grounds,
A greater army than Sherman wielded,
A grander review than Grant's!
“Gathered home from the grave,
Risen from sun and rain—
Rescued from wind and wave
Out of the stormy main—
The legions of our brave
Are all in their lines again!
“Many a stout corps that went,
Full-ranked, from camp and tent,
And brought back a brigade;
Many a brave regiment,
That mustered only a squad.
“The lost battalions,
That, when the fight went wrong,
Stood and died at their guns—
The stormers steady and strong,
“With their best blood that bought
Scarp, and ravelin, and wall—
The companies that fought
Till a corporal's guard was all.
“Many a valiant crew,
That passed in battle and wreck—
Ah, so faithful and true!
They died on the bloody deck,
They sank in the soundless blue.
“All the loyal and bold
That lay on a soldier's bier—
The stretchers borne to the rear,
The hammocks lowered to the hold.
“The shattered wreck we hurried,
In death-fight, from deck and port—
The Blacks that Wagner buried—
That died in the Bloody Fort!
“Comrades of camp and mess,
Left, as they lay, to die,
In the battle's sorest stress,
When the storm of fight swept by;
They lay in the Wilderness—
Ah! where did they not lie?
“In the tangled swamp they lay,
They lay so still on the sward!—
They rolled in the sick-bay,
Moaning their lives away—
They flushed in the fevered ward.
“They rotted in Libby's yonder,
They starved in the foul stockade—
Hearing afar the thunder
Of the Union cannonade!
“But the old wounds all are healed,
And the dunced limbs are free—
The Blue Frocks rise from the field,
The Blue Jackets out of the sea.
“They've 'scaped from the torture-den,
They've broken the bloody sod,
They're all come to life again!
The third of a million men
That died for thee and for God!
“A tenderer green than May
The Eternal Season wears—
The blue of our summer's day
Is dim and pallid to theirs—
The horror faded away,
And 'twas heaven all unawares!
“Tents on the Infinite Shore!
Flags in the azure sky,
Sails on the seas once more!
To-day, in the heaven on high,
All under arms once more!
“The troops are all in their lines,
The guidons flutter and play;
But every bayonet shines,
For all must march to-day.
“What lofty pennons flaunt?
What mighty echoes haunt,
As of great guns, o'er the main?
Hark to the sound again—
The Congress is all afloat!
The Cumberland's manned again!
“All the ships and their men
Are in line of battle to-day—
All at quarters, as when
Their last roll thundered away—
All at their guns, as then,
For the fleet salutes to-day.
“The armies have broken camp
On the vast and sunny plain,
The drums are rolling again;
With steady, measured tramp,
They're marching all again.
“With alignment firm and solemn,
Once again they form
In mighty square and column—
But never for charge and storm.
“The old flag they died under
Floats above them on the shore,
And on the great ships yonder
The ensigns dip once more—
And once again the thunder
Of the thirty guns and four!
“In solid platoons of steel,
Under heaven's triumphal arch,
The long lines break and wheel,
And the word is 'Forward, march!'
“The colors ripple o'erhead,
The drums roll up to the sky,
And with martial time and tread
The regiments all pass by—
The ranks of our faithful Dead,
Meeting their President's eye.
“With a soldier's quiet pride
They smile o'er the perished pain,
For their anguish was not vain—
'For thee, O Father, we died!
And we did not die in vain.'
“March on, your last brave mile!
Salute him, Star and Lance!
Form round him, rank and file,
And look on the kind, rough face;
But the quaint and homely smile
Has a glory and a grace
It never had known erewhile—
Never, in time and space.
“Close round him, hearts of pride!
Press near him, side by side—
Our Father is not alone!
For the Holy Right ye died,
And Christ, the Crucified,
Waits to welcome his own.”



GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON. — SHERMAN'S VETERANS MARCHING THROUGH PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE.

Immediately after Lee's surrender the government began to return to a peace establishment. Four days after this surrender Secretary Stanton issued orders stopping all drafting and recruiting, curtailing purchases of arms and supplies, and reducing the number of general and staff officers. Before the close of April, 1865, preparations were made for mustering out the volunteers. On November 15th, 900,000 soldiers had been discharged.¹ The stability of the republic was not more surely demonstrated by the success of the war for the Union than by the speedy and quiet return of its defenders to civil pursuits after the suspension of hostilities.

The course of the war has been traced in the pages of this history. Of the minor actions, many have been omitted because they had no bearing upon the result; but the principal campaigns have been developed as accurately and elaborately as has been possible. We who have written, while aware of the fact that many events might have been more fully developed and illustrated by private and unofficial intelligence, still feel confident that the general outlines of the war, as we have delineated them, will thus remain forever. It is unnecessary for us here to enter into a minute review of the contest. Two eras of the war are distinctly marked. The first ended in the summer of 1863, in the victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. In this first period no distinction can be made between the martial enthusiasm or military skill displayed on the two sides of the struggle. In the peninsular campaign of 1862, it is difficult to say which general committed the most serious blunders—Lee or McClellan. At Shiloh we are no more astonished by Grant's negligence as to any preparation for the conflict which he knew was sure to come, than by the panic which two gun-boats created among the Confederates, depriving them of the victory of which they were already assured by their preponderance of numbers. If we wonder why Hooker, at Chancellorsville, outnumbering the enemy almost two to one, was compelled to recross the Rappahannock, we are not less surprised that Johnston and Pemberton did not prevent Grant from reaching the rear of Vicksburg after the latter general had placed his army at the mercy of his antagonists. But after the defeat of the Confederates at Gettysburg, involving severe losses on their side, and after the surrender of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, involving a loss of nearly 50,000 more, we find the conflict not only contracted to smaller proportions, but proceeding upon far more favorable conditions for the national armies. After this time the Confederate forces dwindle away by discouragement and desertion, and never again reach their former numbers. The decisive victories won by Grant at Missionary Ridge and Look-out Mountain, in November, 1863, began to illustrate the new conditions of this second era of the war. At the same time, Meade was hesitating in the East; but in May, 1864, Grant was at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Then simultaneously began the campaigns against Richmond and Atlanta, and in both the Union armies were twice as large as those which confronted them. The exhaustion of the enemy now went on rapidly, and the memorable blunder of Hood's invasion hastened the final crisis. Sherman proceeded upon his two bold marches, and in the spring of 1865 the war was terminated in Virginia and North Carolina. The crushing political defeat of the peace party in the North, while it did not create military victories, insured the ultimate success of our armies, and took away from the insurgents their last hope.

Upon a careful study of the campaigns of this war, and comparing them with those of the Old World in other times, although we find much that excites admiration, we do not find upon either side a general who could rank with the first-class generals of the world. The comparison of Lee, or Johnston, or Grant, or even of Sherman, with Napoleon or Frederick, is unwarranted, while either of the American generals named might be fitly matched with the Duke of Wellington. Republics do not, in the ordinary course of events, naturally beget Cæsars, Napoleons, nor Fredericks. Few of our generals entered the war to satisfy a personal ambition, and those who did failed utterly. Whatever success was attained was the result of a desire to faithfully serve the country. It is fortunate, on the whole, that such was the case, and that the people might claim for themselves the victory.

The fact that over one eighth of the population of the country consisted of slaves, and the relation of this servile race to the war, demands our attention. The negroes of the South expected that the war would result in their emancipation, and they were not surprised when the government broke their fetters. They waited for their freedom, but not one blow of their own motion did they strike for it. When they came within our lines, their poverty and dependence made them willing conscripts. Their sympathy with the national cause is evident from the many instances in which they furnished valuable information to our officers, and assisted our fugitive prisoners in escaping northward. Their assistance, however valuable, was not absolutely necessary, and had no important bearing upon the final result of the war. About 175,000 negroes entered the United States service, and a large portion of these were employed in garrison duty. It is a very suggestive fact, and speaks well for the peaceful disposition of the Southern negro, that while thousands of opportunities were afforded, no case of servile insurrection occurred during the war. In the early part of 1865, when every other resource had apparently been exhausted, the question of enrolling the negro as a soldier, and giving him his freedom, was quite generally discussed in the South, but it did not meet with the favor of the Confederate President. If this measure had been adopted by the Confederate government at an early stage of the war, there is no reason to doubt that the slaves would have fought for the enemies of the national government as willingly

as they built their fortifications or performed other offices. The disposition by the nation of the emancipated slave after the war closed did not rest so much upon the basis of gratitude as upon general considerations affecting the common welfare.

It has been frequently asserted that the foreign element of our population was indispensable to victory, but this assertion is contradicted by the fact that over nine tenths of our soldiers were native-born citizens. The triumph of the nation would have been certain if neither foreigners nor slaves had engaged in the contest. But this fact ought not to diminish the nation's gratitude toward the negroes and foreigners who fought in its behalf, and who acquitted themselves well on the field of battle.

The two ideas upon which the Confederacy rested were those of state sovereignty and the untrammelled development of negro slavery. Scarcely, however, had the Southern States been, for these purposes, launched upon their novel voyage—scarcely had they entered upon the conflict for independence, when the necessities of war threatened the ruin of both state sovereignty and slavery. The concentration of power in the Confederate executive—more formidable and despotic than had ever before been exercised over the states of the republic—left scarcely a vestige of liberty either to states or individuals. And, on the other hand, the progress of the national arms—slow, but steady and sure—threatened the destruction of slavery. The people of the South, therefore, could not, without apprehension, look forward to either success or defeat. They had espoused a cause which, if won, placed them at the mercy of the despotism to which they had committed themselves, and the loss of which would lay them prostrate at the feet of a power whose just claim to their allegiance they had defied and resisted. To one of these evils they had committed themselves so absolutely that no release from that lay within their power; to the other evil they *would* not yield but by compulsion. They were embarked upon a ship whose pilots would surely deliver it into the jaws of Scylla, unless Fate should deliver it over to the opposite Charybdis. Fate was rapidly deciding in favor of Charybdis; but, in the mean time, they, without heart, and in their desperation, shouted their pilots on Scylla-ward. It was a pitiable situation, but they had brought it upon themselves by weakly yielding their property and their lives at the bidding of ambitious traitors. In a moment of enthusiasm, believing that no power could withstand "Southern chivalry," and that Northern enterprise, industry, and intelligence were but synonyms for cowardice, and would easily be driven from every battle-field by an effete slave aristocracy, they had dared every thing, had invoked war by an outrage upon the national flag, had pledged their estates, their honor, and their lives to treason. A few months of war exposed their mistake, both as to the character of their leaders and of the struggle in which they were engaged; but then there was no escape for a people already demoralized by rebellion.

It was only by the most arbitrary exercise of power that the Confederate armies were recruited after the first year of the war. Those who volunteered at the beginning were forcibly retained after the expiration of their terms of service. On the 16th of April, 1862, a Conscription Bill passed the Confederate Congress which placed in the service for three years all white men between the ages of 18 and 35 not legally exempted. On the 15th of July, 1863, Davis issued a proclamation which included in the service all between 18 and 45. But even this act was not sufficient. The Confederate armies did not reach their former standard. This was due largely to desertion. In February, 1864, a Conscription Bill was passed by the Confederate Congress declaring all white men between the ages of 17 and 50 "in the military service for the war." By this law, the exemption of those who had furnished substitutes was revoked. The only persons exempted were ministers of the Gospel who were in the actual performance of their duties; superintendents of deaf, dumb, and blind or insane asylums; one editor for each newspaper, and such employes as he might upon oath declare indispensable; public printers and their necessary assistants; one apothecary to each drug-store; physicians over 30 years of age of seven years' practice; presidents and teachers of colleges, academies, and schools, who had 30 or more pupils; the superintendents of public hospitals, with such physicians and nurses as were indispensable for the management of the same; and one agriculturist on each farm where there was no white male adult not liable to military duty, and which employed 15 able-bodied slaves. This act left no resource untouched. Only those were excluded from service who were absolutely necessary to the production of supplies and for the execution of the functions of government. According to an estimate published at Richmond at the close of 1864, there were in the Confederacy in 1860, between the ages of 17 and 50, 1,299,700 white men. Since that time it was estimated that 331,650 had arrived at the age of 17. And this addition would probably be balanced by the ordinary mortality added to the number of those who had advanced beyond the age of 50. But, deducting the population within the Federal lines, the losses in battle and by unusual disease, exemptions for disability, prisoners held by the Federals, and those who had left the country, there were less than half a million of soldiers left to the Confederacy, and of these full 250,000 were already in the Confederate armies. From this estimate it appears that by the close of 1864 the Confederacy was nearly exhausted of its fighting men.

The Conscription Act passed by the United States Congress did not directly increase the army to any considerable extent. But the number of substitutes obtained, and the high bounties offered under the influence of the act, increased the Federal armies to the full measure required.

It would be unjust to leave unnoticed Secretary Stanton's admirable and efficient administration of the War Department. By this department a million of men were fed, clothed, armed, and supplied with ammunition, and with all the war material necessary to organized armies; an immense

¹ Troops mustered out to August 7... 640,806 Troops mustered out to October 15... 785,205
 " " August 22... 719,338 " " November 15 800,963
 " " Sept. 14.... 741,107

fleet of transports moved at its bidding, laden with supplies; and under its orders thousands of miles of railroad were constructed and put in operation. Upon its prompt and efficient efforts our armies depended not only for subsistence, but also, to a great degree, for the successful issue of their marches and battles. At the head of this vast organization stood the secretary, untiring, conscientious, kind-hearted, but often brusque, as men are apt to be upon whom rest weighty responsibilities. His character was irreproachable, and his management was characterized by scrupulous economy. He had his failings, doubtless, and made many enemies; but no man probably could have been more wisely selected to move, adjust, and keep in harmonious operation the intricate machinery of a great war.

The task of supplying the national armies involved only a financial problem; with the Confederates it was a question of possibilities, and in 1863 it became a difficult and embarrassing question. The Confederate currency had depreciated until a dollar in paper was only worth six cents in coin. There were not in the South, as in the North, large capitalists to buy up the government bonds, and the banks were rapidly exhausted. The agriculturists were willing to sell their produce only at the highest market price in currency, and many refused to sell at all. The most fertile portion of the soil was devoted to the production of cotton, tobacco, and rice, and the substitution of other crops was a measure very reluctantly adopted. To add to the embarrassment of the situation, the year 1863 was remarkable for scarcity in every crop. The possession of the Mississippi cut off all supplies from the fertile states west of that river, and the occupation of East Tennessee deprived the Confederate armies of bacon. The stringency of the blockade made any extensive importation of supplies or exportation of cotton impossible; and an important consequence was the absorption of a large proportion of labor in the production of war material. The conscription of all the able-bodied men in the Confederacy between 18 and 45 left a small laboring population, if we except women, children, and slaves. It is easily seen, therefore, that the slaves of the South were already become an indispensable support of a war for the perpetuation of their own bondage. If at this crisis the Confederate government had proclaimed the emancipation of slaves, it would have stood on a high vantage-ground both as regarded foreign powers and the conduct of its struggle for independence. But such an act was, under the circumstances, a moral impossibility.

The Confederate government met the difficulty of obtaining supplies just as it had met that of obtaining soldiers. As it had forced the latter by conscription, so now it began to impress the former. If its despotic will could demand the lives of men, it could certainly demand their property. Thus the government obtained supplies at its own price. But this action created great popular discontent and much distress. The natural desire on the part of agriculturists to evade impressment led them to refuse their products to the public markets. Besides this, the extent to which impressment was carried on in the vicinity of the principal depôts left a scanty supply of provisions for the people, and especially for women and children whose natural protectors were in the army. Famine cursed the large cities, and the instances were not a few in which women marched through the streets with arms in their hands, and compelled the satisfaction of their hunger which they had no money to appease.

What food there was in the Confederacy was not made fully available for the supply of the army or of the principal towns. The railroads were giving way, and there were no means at hand for their repair. The wooden ties rotted, the machinery was almost exhausted, the rails were worn out, and thus the speed and capacity of the trains were greatly reduced. This embarrassment in regard to supplies weakened and discouraged the Confederate armies, and produced disaffection among the people.

In another respect a great contrast is presented upon a comparison of the National and Confederate armies. We allude to sanitary arrangements. No nation ever took such care of its armies in the field as did the United States in this war. Scarcely had the President issued his first call for 75,000 men before, in our cities and rural districts, hundreds of soldiers and societies sprang up to furnish lint, bandages, hospital clothing, nurses, and delicacies for the sick and the wounded. It was at this time that the Women's American Association of Relief was organized in New York City. Associated with this organization were a number of eminent medical men, prominent among whom was Rev. Henry W. Bellows, D.D. This society united with the advisory committee of the Board of Physicians and Surgeons of New York, and the New York Medical Association for furnishing supplies in aid of the army, in sending a delegation to Washington to offer their co-operation with the medical bureau of the government. Accordingly, H. W. Bellows, and Drs. W. H. Van Buren, Elisha Harris, and Jacob Harsen, on the 18th of May, 1861, addressed a communication to the Secretary of War recommending the organization of a commission of civilians, medical men, and military officers, having for its object the regulation and development of the active benevolence of the people toward the army. With some reluctance the organization was permitted to exist under the name of a "Commission of Inquiry and Advice in respect of the Sanitary Interests of the United States Forces." Subsequently it was styled simply the United States Sanitary Commission.¹ From duties which at first were simply advisory, the commission soon advanced to such as were executive. Its representatives were found upon every transport, at every camp and

every fort, in every hospital and on every battle-field. It carefully investigated the character of the original *material* of the army from a sanitary point of view. The diet and clothing of the recruits, the cleanliness of their persons, their camping-grounds, were all subjects of its care. Disease was thus, to a great degree, prevented in the incipient stages of the soldier's career. Every provision was made for the relief of the sick and the wounded. The ambulances of the commission followed the army into battle, took the soldier almost as he fell, and prompt and sufficient relief was applied where relief was possible, and the most tender care taken of the dead. When the soldiers of the hostile army fell into our hands, they also shared in these beneficent provisions.

The officers and agents of the commission received no compensation for their labors. The people generously supplied them with the necessary means for carrying out their designs, both by the contribution of money and supplies. There were other organizations formed for similar objects, prominent among which were the Christian and the Western Sanitary Commissions. It is estimated that through these channels, and other means used for the benefit of the soldier, not less than \$500,000,000 were expended. At a single fair in New York City over a million of dollars was realized by the United States Sanitary Commission.

It must not be supposed that the Confederates at home did not make sacrifices for their soldiers in the field, but from the lack of extensive and well-regulated organizations like those which we have described, their armies suffered far heavier losses both from diseases in the camp, which might have been largely prevented, and from casualties in the field, which proved fatal for want of prompt relief.

In this general review of the war there is one page upon which the historian is loth to enter. Whatever instances of barbarity may have occurred in the heat of battle or in the excitement of the march on either side, and although in some sections of the West there was a prevailing disregard of the usages of civilized war, still, to the soldiers of both armies, history must yield the honor always due to bravery. But the treatment of national prisoners by the Confederate government, especially in the later stages of the war, is a disgrace which the conscientious historian can neither palliate nor gloss over, though his cheek burn with shame for his own countrymen.

The question of the exchange of prisoners was at the outset one beset with a legal difficulty. At first the prevailing opinion was in favor of hanging as traitors every prisoner captured by the government. The rebellion was regarded as an insurrection which could soon be put down by energy and severity, and it seemed derogatory to the national dignity to recognize the belligerent rights of rebels by negotiations with them of any sort. But it was soon found necessary to adopt a different view of the whole question.

The first prisoners captured by the government were the captain and crew of the privateer Savannah, who fell into the hands of the United States brig Perry on the 3d of June, 1861. These men were tried as pirates; but, while their trial was pending, the Confederate government threatened to visit upon the prisoners captured at Bull Run the precise punishment which should be inflicted upon the privateersmen. By this threat of retaliation, the national government was induced to abandon its position. There still remained an unwillingness on its part to directly sanction exchanges, and the whole matter was for a time submitted to the various commanders, to be arranged under flags of truce. But in this way only a few exchanges took place. Without instructions from the general government, our generals declined to receive communications on the subject from the other side. Thus, after the battle of Belmont, in November, 1861, General




HENRY W. BELLOWS.

¹ The commission was composed of the following gentlemen: Rev. H. W. Bellows, D.D., New York; Professor A. D. Bache, Vice-President, Washington; Elisha Harris, M.D., Corresponding Secretary, New York; George W. Cullum, U. S. A., Washington; Alexander E. Shiras, U. S. A., Washington; Robert C. Wood, M.D., U. S. A., Washington; W. H. Van Buren, M.D., New York; Wolcott Gibbs, M.D., New York; Cornelius R. Agnew, M.D., New York; George T. Strong, New York; Frederick Law Olmstead, New York; Samuel G. Howe, M.D., Boston; J. S. Newberry, M.D., Cleveland, Ohio. Others were afterward included, and there were nearly 600 associate members in all parts of the country.



THE CHRISTIAN COMMISSION ON THE BATTLE-FIELD.



CAMP OF CONFEDERATE PRISONERS AT ELMIRA, NEW YORK.

Grant refused to treat with General Polk for a general exchange of prisoners captured in that action. The shyness of the national government in this matter was as ridiculous as it was unnecessary. The existence of the blockade was a recognition of belligerent rights as full as that involved in a cartel for the exchange of prisoners. In neither case did the recognition of belligerent rights involve a recognition of sovereignty. If the necessities of war justified the blockade, the necessities of humanity justified and demanded an arrangement in regard to prisoners.

In the latter part of December, 1861, a joint resolution was adopted by Congress, requesting the President to take immediate measures to effect a general exchange. During the following January Secretary Stanton appointed two commissioners, the Rev. Bishop Ames and the Hon. Hamilton Fish, "to visit the prisoners belonging to the army of the United States now in captivity at Richmond, in Virginia, and elsewhere, and under such regulations as may be prescribed by the authorities having custody of such prisoners, relieve their necessities and provide for their comfort at the expense of the United States." The authorities at Richmond refused to admit the commissioners, but declared their readiness to negotiate for a general exchange of prisoners. Negotiations for this purpose were accordingly opened at Norfolk, Virginia. These resulted in an agreement for an equal exchange. The Confederates at this time held 300 prisoners in excess of those captured by the national troops. These they proposed to release on parole, provided the United States would release the same number of those who might afterward be captured by them. The exchanges were commenced in the latter part of February, 1862, but were interrupted on the 18th of March by a message from President Davis to the Confederate Congress, recommending that all the Confederate prisoners who had been paroled by the United States government be released from the obligations of their parole. In the mean time, the captures made at Roanoke Island and Fort Donelson left an excess of many thousands of prisoners in the hands of the national government.

On the 22d of July a cartel was agreed upon for a general exchange, based upon that established between the United States and Great Britain in 1812. According to the provisions of this cartel, an equal exchange was to be made. All prisoners taken on either side were to be released in ten days after their capture; and those for whom no exchange could be rendered were to be bound by parole not to perform military duty until exchanged.¹

¹ The following is the text of this cartel:

"The undersigned, having been commissioned by the authorities they respectively represent to make arrangements for a general exchange of prisoners of war, have agreed to the following articles:

"ARTICLE 1. It is hereby agreed and stipulated that all prisoners of war held by either party, including those taken on private armed vessels, known as privateers, shall be discharged upon the conditions and terms following:

"Prisoners to be exchanged man for man and officer for officer; privates to be placed on the footing of officers and men of the navy.

"Men and officers of lower grades may be exchanged for officers of a higher grade, and men and officers of different services may be exchanged according to the following scale of equivalents:

"A general commander-in-chief or an admiral shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or forty-six privates or common seamen.

The provisions of this cartel were carried out generally in good faith on both sides; but in some instances its perfect execution was interrupted.

"A flag officer or major general shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or for forty privates or common seamen.

"A commodore carrying a broad pennant, or a brigadier general, shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or twenty privates or common seamen.

"A captain in the navy, or a colonel, shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or for fifteen privates or common seamen.

"A lieutenant colonel, or a commander in the navy, shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or for ten privates or common seamen.

"A lieutenant commander or a major shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or eight privates or common seamen.

"A lieutenant or a master in the navy, or a captain in the army or marines, shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or six privates or common seamen.

"Masters' mates in the navy, or lieutenants and ensigns in the army, shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or four privates or common seamen.

"Midshipmen, warrant officers in the navy, masters of merchant vessels, and commanders of privateers, shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or three privates or common seamen; second captains, lieutenants, or mates of merchant vessels or privateers, and all petty officers in the navy, and all non-commissioned officers in the army or marines, shall be severally exchanged for persons of equal rank, or for two privates or common seamen; and private soldiers and common seamen shall be exchanged for each other, man for man.

"ART. 2. Local, state, civil, and militia rank held by persons not in actual military service will not be recognized, the basis of exchange being of a grade actually held in the naval and military service of the respective parties.

"ART. 3. If citizens held by either party on charge of disloyalty or any alleged civil offense are exchanged, it shall only be for citizens, captured sutlers, teamsters, and all civilians in the actual service of either party, to be exchanged for persons in similar position.

"ART. 4. All prisoners of war to be discharged on parole in ten days after their capture, and the prisoners now held and those hereafter taken to be transported to the points mutually agreed upon at the expense of the capturing party. The surplus prisoners not exchanged shall not be permitted to take up arms again, nor to serve as military police or constabulary force in any fort, garrison, or field-work held by either of the respective parties, nor as guards of prisoners, depôts, or stores, nor to discharge any duty usually performed by soldiers, until exchanged under the provisions of this cartel. The exchange is not to be considered complete until the officer or soldier exchanged for has been actually restored to the lines to which he belongs.

"ART. 5. Each party, upon the discharge of prisoners of the other party, is authorized to discharge an equal number of their own officers or men from parole, furnishing at the same time to the other party a list of their prisoners discharged and of their own officers and men relieved from parole, enabling each party to relieve from parole such of their own officers and men as the party may choose. The lists thus mutually furnished will keep both parties advised of the true condition of the exchanges of prisoners.

"ART. 6. The stipulations and provisions above mentioned to be of binding obligation during the continuance of the war, it matters not which party may have the surplus of prisoners, the great principle involved being,

"1. An equitable exchange of prisoners, man for man, officer for officer, or officers of higher grade exchanged for officers of lower grade or for privates, according to the scale of equivalents.

"2. That privates and officers and men of different services may be exchanged according to the same rule of equivalents.

"3. That all prisoners, of whatsoever arm of service, are to be exchanged or paroled in ten days from the time of their capture, if it be practicable to transfer them to their own lines in that time; if not, as soon thereafter as practicable.

"4. That no officer, soldier, or employé in the service of either party is to be considered as exchanged and absolved from his parole until his equivalent has actually reached the line of his friends.

"5. That the parole forbids the performance of field, garrison, police, or guard or constabulary duty.

"D. H. HILL, Major General C. S. Army."

JOHN A. DIX, Major General.

Supplementary Articles.

"ART. 7. All prisoners of war now held on either side, and all prisoners hereafter taken, shall be sent with all reasonable dispatch to A. H. Aikens, below Dutch Gap, on the James River, in Virginia, or to Vicksburg, on the Mississippi River, in the State of Mississippi, and there exchanged, or paroled until such exchange can be effected, notice being previously given by each party of the number of prisoners it will send, and the time when they will be delivered at those points respectively; and in case the vicissitudes of war shall change the military relations of the places designated in this article to the contending parties, so as to render the same inconvenient for the delivery and exchange of prisoners, other places, bearing as nearly as may be the present local relations of said places to the lines of said parties, shall be, by mutual agreement, substituted. But nothing

The execution of William B. Mumford by order of General Butler at New Orleans; the measures taken by Federal generals to prevent private citizens not in the regular service of the Confederates from engaging in acts of war; the orders of General Pope for the impressment of property required for the use of his army in Virginia; and the action of Generals Hunter and Phelps in regard to slaves, led to a series of retaliatory orders from Richmond, issued partly for popular effect, but which were only partially executed. They contributed, however, to exaggerate the animosity of the war. Still the exchanges went on regularly at City Point during the year, and the excess of prisoners on either side was not sufficient to occasion apprehension as to the good faith of the other.

But, in the mean time, President Lincoln had issued his Emancipation Proclamation, and measures had been taken by the United States government for the employment of negroes in its military service. These measures produced consternation and fear in the minds of the Southern people. President Davis, in his message (January 14, 1863), declared his determination to deliver over to the state authorities all commissioned officers of the United States thereafter captured in any of the states embraced in the Emancipation Proclamation, to be punished as criminals engaged in exciting servile insurrection. This determination was supported by the Confederate Congress.¹

The cartel remained in operation until July, 1863. On the third of that month, an order was issued by the Adjutant General at Washington requiring all prisoners to be delivered at City Point and Vicksburg, there to be exchanged, or paroled until exchange could be effected. The only exception allowed was in the case of the two opposing commanders, who were authorized to exchange prisoners or to release them on parole at other points agreed upon. This order was issued to prevent unauthorized paroles, and in order that the balance of exchanges might be accurately kept. The very next day General Lee was defeated at Gettysburg, and released a number of prisoners which he was unable to take with him into Virginia. He therefore paroled them, and the parole was not recognized by the United States, as it had not been made in strict accordance with the cartel, nor by the mutual agreement of the opposing commanders. At the same time, a large number of Confederate prisoners fell into the hands of the Federals by the captures of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. These were paroled by mutual agreement between the Federal and Confederate commanders. The Confederate government, without any plausible reason, declared these prisoners released from their parole, and thousands of them fought under Bragg in the battles about Chattanooga in November. But this violation of good faith did not permanently interrupt the exchange of prisoners.

The real difficulty, however, soon presented itself in the refusal of the Confederate government to recognize negro soldiers captured as prisoners of war. That government refused to exchange negro prisoners or the commissioned officers of negro regiments. The United States could not honorably make any distinction between its soldiers on the ground of color. When, therefore, the Confederate government adopted the policy of reducing to slavery all negro prisoners, and of delivering over to the state gov-

in this article contained shall prevent the commanders of two opposing armies from exchanging prisoners or releasing them on parole at other points mutually agreed on by said commanders.

"ART. 8. For the purpose of carrying into effect the foregoing articles of agreement, each party will appoint two agents, to be called Agents for the Exchange of Prisoners of War, whose duty it shall be to communicate with each other by correspondence and otherwise, to prepare the list of prisoners, to attend to the delivery of the prisoners at the places agreed on, and to carry out promptly, effectually, and in good faith, all the details and provisions of the said articles of agreement.

"ART. 9. And in case any misunderstanding shall arise in regard to any clause or stipulation in the foregoing articles, it is mutually agreed that such misunderstanding shall not interrupt the release of prisoners on parole, as herein provided, but shall be made the subject of friendly explanations, in order that the object of this agreement may neither be defeated nor postponed.

"D. H. HILL, Major General C. S. A."

"JOHN A. DIX, Major General.

¹ The following joint resolutions were adopted by the Confederate Congress:

"Resolved, by the Congress of the Confederate States of America, in response to the message of the President, transmitted to Congress at the commencement of the present session, That, in the opinion of Congress, the commissioned officers of the enemy ought not to be delivered to the authorities of the respective states, as suggested in the said message; but all captives taken by the Confederate forces ought to be dealt with and disposed of by the Confederate government.

"Sec. 2. That, in the judgment of Congress, the proclamations of the President of the United States, dated respectively September 22d, 1862, and January 1st, 1863, and the other measures of the government of the United States and of its authorities, commanders, and forces, designed or tending to emancipate slaves in the Confederate States, or to abduct such slaves, or to incite them to insurrection, or to employ negroes in war against the Confederate States, or to overthrow the institution of African slavery and bring on a servile war in these states, would, if successful, produce atrocious consequences, and they are inconsistent with the spirit of those usages which in modern warfare prevail among civilized nations; they may, therefore, be properly and lawfully repressed by retaliation.

"Sec. 3. That in every case wherein, during the present war, any violation of the laws and usages of war among civilized nations shall be, or has been, done and perpetrated by those acting under the authority of the government of the United States, on the persons or property of the citizens of the Confederate States, or of those under the protection of the land or naval service of the Confederate States, or of any state of the Confederacy, the President of the Confederate States is hereby authorized to cause full and complete retaliation to be made for every such violation, in such manner and to such extent as he may think proper.

"Sec. 4. That every white person, being a commissioned officer, or acting as such, who, during the present war, shall command negroes or mulattoes in arms against the Confederate States, or who shall arm, train, organize, or prepare negroes or mulattoes for military service against the Confederate States, or who shall voluntarily aid negroes or mulattoes in any military enterprise, attack, or conflict in such service, shall be deemed as inciting servile insurrection, and shall, if captured, be put to death, or be otherwise punished at the discretion of the court.

"Sec. 5. Every person, being a commissioned officer, or acting as such in the service of the enemy, who shall, during the present war, excite, attempt to excite, or cause to be excited servile insurrection, or who shall incite or cause to be incited a slave to rebel, shall, if captured, be put to death, or be otherwise punished, at the discretion of the court.

"Sec. 6. Every person charged with an offense punishable under the preceding resolutions shall, during the present war, be tried before the military court attached to the army or corps by the troops of which he shall have been captured, or by such other military court as the President may direct, and in such manner and under such regulations as the President shall prescribe, and, after conviction, the President may commute the punishment in such manner and on such terms as he may deem proper.

"Sec. 7. All negroes or mulattoes who shall be engaged in war or be taken in arms against the Confederate States, or shall give aid or comfort to the enemies of the Confederate States, shall, when captured in the Confederate States, be delivered to the authorities of the state or states in which they shall be captured, to be dealt with according to the present or future laws of such state or states."

ernments for punishment the commissioned officers of negro regiments, President Lincoln issued a proclamation ordering that for every national soldier killed a Confederate soldier should be executed, and for every negro in the national service sold into slavery, a Confederate prisoner should be placed at hard labor on the public works.¹ This proclamation prevented the Confederate government from carrying out its inhuman policy; but it persisted in refusing to exchange negro prisoners. This refusal interrupted the execution of the cartel of exchange. At the close of 1863 there had been captured from the Confederates one hundred and fifty thousand prisoners, of whom about 30,000 remained in the hands of the government.

In 1864 the situation in regard to prisoners remained unchanged. The positions occupied by the two governments were so antagonistic that agreement was impossible. The national government refused to exchange white for white, because the enemy would thus be relieved of the burden of maintaining his white prisoners, and, getting back his soldiers, he would dispose of the negro as he chose, since there would be left no means of retaliation. Finally, the excess of prisoners in the hands of the government became so large that the discussion ceased. It was certainly the policy of the Confederate government to yield the point in dispute. The prisoners which it held, if returned, would not, in most cases, resume their places in the field, their terms of service having expired. The Confederate prisoners, on the other hand, were soldiers for the war, and could be made immediately available. Their presence in the field was, moreover, a necessity which became every day more pressing.

What it could not accomplish by negotiation the Confederate government sought to extort by cruelty. The prison camps at Belle Isle, Andersonville, Millen, and Salisbury were each transformed into human shambles. Thousands of men were huddled together within narrow limits. In the midst of a country abounding in timber, they were deprived of all means of shelter. Exposure to rains, dews, and frost generated disease, and there was neither medical relief at hand nor suitable food. No opportunities were afforded for cleanliness, and the prisoners were covered with vermin, which, in many cases, they were too weak to remove. They were shot by those guarding them for offenses the most trivial; they were plundered of every thing which was deemed valuable by their captors; supplies sent for their relief were in many cases appropriated by Confederate officers in charge; and the charities of Southern citizens excited in their behalf were repelled. Thousands died in those prison Golgothas, and many, from weakness induced by starvation, became idiots.² These barbarities were not only known to the Confederate authorities, but seem to have been encouraged by them. The officers placed over the prison appear to have been selected for their brutal capacity to carry out this system of cruelty. Among these was the notorious Captain Henry Wirz, the Anderson jailer, who was after the war tried by a military commission, and executed on the 10th of November, 1865.³

¹ Executive Mansion, Washington, July 30th.

"It is the duty of every government to give protection to its citizens, of whatever class, color, or condition, and especially to those who are duly organized as soldiers in the public service. The law of nations, and the usages and customs of war, as carried on by civilized powers, permit no distinction as to color in the treatment of prisoners of war as public enemies. To sell or enslave any captured person on account of his color, and for no offense against the laws of war, is a relapse into barbarism and a crime against the civilization of the age. The government of the United States will give the same protection to all its soldiers; and if the enemy shall sell or enslave any one because of his color, the offense shall be punished by retaliation upon the enemy's prisoners in our hands.

"It is therefore ordered that for every soldier of the United States killed in violation of the laws of war, a rebel soldier shall be executed, and for every one enslaved by the enemy or sold into slavery, a rebel soldier shall be placed at hard labor on the public works, and continue at such labor until the other shall be released and receive the treatment due a prisoner of war.


"ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

² A letter of the Confederate Inspector General Chandler, dated July 5, 1864, and addressed to Colonel Chilton, of Richmond, thus describes Andersonville:

"No shelter whatever, nor materials for constructing any, had been provided by the prison authorities, and the ground being entirely bare of trees, none is within reach of the prisoners, nor has it been possible, from the overcrowded state of the inclosure, to arrange the camp with any system. Each man has been permitted to protect himself as best he can by stretching his blanket, or whatever he may have about him, on such sticks as he can procure. Of other shelter there has been none. There is no medical attendance within the stockade. Many (twenty yesterday) are carted out daily who have died from unknown causes, and whom the medical officers have never seen. The dead are hauled out daily by the wagon-load, being first mutilated with an axe in the removal of any finger-rings they may have. Raw rations have to be issued to a very large portion, who are entirely unprovided with proper utensils, and furnished with so limited a supply of fuel that they are compelled to dig with their hands in the filthy marsh before mentioned for roots, etc. No soap or clothing has ever been issued. After inquiry, the writer is confident that, with slight exertions, green corn and other antiscorbutics could readily be obtained. The present hospital arrangements were only intended for the accommodation of ten thousand men, and are totally insufficient, both in character and extent, for the present needs, the number of prisoners being now more than three times as great. The number of cases requiring medical treatment is in an increased ratio. It is impossible to state the numbers of sick, many dying within the stockade whom the medical officers have never seen or heard of till their remains are brought out for interment. The transportation of the post is also represented to be entirely insufficient, and authority is needed by the quartermaster to impress wagons and teams, and saw-mills when not employed by the government, and kept diligently occupied, and instructions given to the quartermaster in charge of transportation to afford every facility practicable for transporting lumber and supplies necessary for prisoners."

³ The following testimony, given before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, January 30, 1865, by Albert D. Richardson, a *Tribune* correspondent, describes the situation of our prisoners at Salisbury, North Carolina:

"I am a *Tribune* correspondent, and was captured by the rebels May 3, 1863, at midnight, on a hay-bale in the Mississippi River, opposite Vicksburg. After confinement in six different prisons I was sent to Salisbury, N. C., February 3, 1864, and kept there until December 18, when I escaped. For several months Salisbury was the most endurable rebel prison I had seen. The six hundred inmates exercised in the open air were comparatively well fed and kindly treated. But early in October 10,000 regular prisoners of war arrived there, and it immediately changed into a scene of cruelty and horrors. It was densely crowded; rations were cut down and issued very irregularly; friends outside could not even send in a plate of food. The prisoners suffered constantly and often intensely for want of water, bread, and shelter. The rebel authorities placed all the prison hospitals under charge of my two journalistic comrades (Messrs. Brown and Davis) and myself. Our positions enabled us to obtain exact and minute information. Those who had to live or die on the prison rations always suffered from hunger. Very frequently one or more divisions of a thousand men would receive no rations for twenty-four hours; sometimes they were without a morsel of food for forty-eight hours. The few who had money would pay from five to twenty dollars, rebel currency, for a little loaf of bread. Most of the prisoners traded the buttons from their blowses for food. Many, though the weather was very inclement and snows frequent, sold coats from their backs and shoes from their feet. Yet I was assured, on authority entirely trustworthy, that the great commissary warehouse near the prison was filled with provisions; that the commissary found it difficult to obtain storage for his flour and meal; that when a subordinate asked the post commandant, Major John H. Gee, 'Shall I give the prisoners full rations?' he replied, 'No, God damn them, give them quarter rations.' I know, from personal observation, that



THE ANDERSONVILLE BURIAL-GROUNDS WHERE WERE INTERRED 14,000 UNION PRISONERS.

In the latter part of 1864, Lieutenant General Grant made an arrangement for an exchange of prisoners man for man, according to the old cartel, until on one side or the other the number of prisoners held was exhausted. The war seemed so near its close that the exchange could afford no substantial aid to the Confederacy, and every motive on the score of humanity demanded that the government, under these circumstances, should waive the old dispute respecting negro prisoners.¹

During the last few months of the war, when the prospects of Confederate success through regularly conducted warfare seemed desperate, a series of attempts were made to paralyze and subvert the national government by means which desperation naturally suggested to bold and unscrupulous men. The capture of the Confederate archives at the close of the war disclosed letters which showed that propositions for the destruction of officers connected with the government had not only, at various stages of the war, been received by the Confederate executive, but had been subjects of consideration. As early as June 19th, 1861, one C. L. V. De Kalb, representing himself to be the grandson of Baron De Kalb, of Revolutionary fame, addressed a letter to L. P. Walker, the Confederate Secretary of War, reminding the latter that the Federal Congress would assemble on the 4th of July, and that the Capitol and public buildings at Washington were undermined. In regard to

corn and pork are very abundant in the region about Salisbury. For several weeks the prisoners had no shelter whatever. They were all thinly clad; thousands were barefooted; not one in twenty had either overcoat or blanket; many hundreds were without shirts, and hundreds were without blowses. At last one Sibley tent and one 'A' tent were furnished to each squad of one hundred. With the closest crowding these sheltered about one half the prisoners. The rest burrowed in the ground, crept under buildings, or shivered through the nights in the open air upon the frozen, muddy, or snowy soil. If the rebels, at the time of their capture, had not stolen their shelter-tents, blankets, clothing, and money, they would have suffered little from cold. If the prison authorities had permitted a few hundred of them, either upon parole or under guard, to cut logs within two miles of the garrison, the prisoners would gladly have built comfortable and ample barracks in one week. But the commandant would never, in a densely wooded region, with the cars which brought it passing by the wall of the prison, even furnish half the fuel which was needed.

"The hospitals were in a horrible condition. By crowding the patients thick as they could lie upon the floor they would contain six hundred inmates. They were always full to overflowing, with thousands seeking admission in vain. In the two largest wards, containing jointly about two hundred and fifty patients, there was no fire whatever. The others had small fireplaces, but were always cold. One ward, which held forty patients, was comparatively well furnished. In the other eight the sick and dying men lay upon the cold and usually naked floor, for the scanty straw furnished us soon became too filthy and full of vermin for use. The authorities never supplied a single blanket, or quilt, or pillow, or bed, for those eight wards. We could not procure even brooms to keep them clean, or cold water to wash the faces of the inmates. Pneumonia, catarrh, and diarrhoea were the prevailing diseases, but they were directly the result of hunger and exposure. More than half who entered the hospitals died in a very few days. The deceased, always without coffins, were loaded in a dead-cart, piled upon each other like logs of wood, and so driven out to be thrown into a trench and covered with earth.

"The rebel surgeons were generally humane and attentive. They endeavored to improve the shocking condition of the hospitals, but the Salisbury and Richmond authorities both disregarded their complaints and protests.

"On November 25 many of the prisoners had been without food for forty-eight hours. Desperate from hunger, without any matured plan, a few of them said, 'We may as well die in one way as another; let us break out of this horrible place.' Some of them wrested the guns from a relief of fifteen rebel soldiers just entering the yard, killing two who resisted and wounding five or six. Others attempted to open the fence, but they had neither adequate tools nor concert of action. Before they could effect a breach every gun in the garrison was turned upon them, two field-pieces operated with grape and canister, and they dispersed to their quarters. Five minutes from the beginning the attempt was quelled, and hardly a prisoner was to be seen in the yard. My own quarters were a hundred and fifty yards from the scene of the insurrection. In our vicinity there had been no participation at all in it, and yet for twenty minutes after it was ended the guards upon the fence on each side of us, with deliberate aim, fired into the tents upon helpless and innocent men. They killed, in all, fifteen, and wounded about sixty, not one tenth of whom had taken part in the attempt, many of whom were ignorant of it until they heard the guns.

"Deliberate cold-blooded murders of peaceable men, where there was no pretense that they were breaking any prison regulation, were very frequent. On October 16, Lieutenant Davis, of the 155th New York Infantry, was thus shot dead by a guard, who the day before had been openly swearing that he would 'kill some damned Yankee yet.' November 6, Luther Conrod, of the 45th Pennsylvania Infantry, a delirious patient from one of the hospitals, was similarly murdered. November 30, a chimney in one of the hospitals fell down, crushing several men under it. Orders were immediately given to the guard to let no one approach the building, on the pretext that there might be another insurrection. Two patients from that hospital had not heard the order, and were returning to their quarters, when I saw a sentinel on the fence, within twenty feet of them, without challenging them, raise his piece and fire, killing one and wounding the other. Major Gee, at the time, was standing immediately beside the sentinel, who must have acted under his direct orders. December 16, Moses Smith, of 7th Maryland (colored) Infantry, while standing beside my quarters, searching for scraps of food from the sweepings of the cook-house, was shot through the head. There were very many similar murders. I never knew any pretense, even, made of investigation or punishing them. Our lives were never safe for one moment; any sentinel, at any hour of the day or night, could deliberately shoot down any prisoner, or into any group of prisoners, black or white, and he would not even be taken off his post for it.

"Nearly every week an officer came into the prison to recruit for the rebel army. Sometimes he offered bounties; always he promised good clothing and abundant food. Between 1200 and 1800 of our men enlisted in two months. I was repeatedly asked by prisoners, sometimes with tears in their eyes, 'What shall I do? I don't want to starve to death. I am growing weaker daily; if I stay here I shall follow my comrades to the hospital and dead-house; if I enlist I may live until I can escape.'

"I had charge of the clothing left by the dead, and reissued it to the living. I distributed articles of clothing to more than 2000 prisoners; but when I escaped there were fully 500 without a shoe or a stocking, and more yet with no garment above the waist except one blouse or one shirt. Men came to me frequently upon whom the rebels, when they captured them, had left nothing whatever except a light cotton shirt and a pair of light ragged cotton pantaloons.

"The books of all the hospitals were kept, and the daily consolidated reports made up, under my supervision. During the two months between October 18 and December 18, the average number of prisoners was about 7500. The deaths for that period were fully 1500, or twenty per cent. of the whole. I brought away the names of more than 1200 of the dead; some of the remainder were never reported; the others I could not procure on the day of my escape without exciting suspicion. As the men grew more and more debilitated, the percentage of deaths increased. I left 6500 remaining in the garrison, December 18, and they were dying then at the average rate of 28 a day, or thirteen per cent. a month.

"The simple truth is, that the rebel authorities are murdering our soldiers at Salisbury by cold and hunger, while they might easily supply them with ample food and fuel. They are doing this systematically, and, I believe, intentionally, for the purpose of either forcing our government to an exchange, or forcing our prisoners into the rebel army."

¹ General Grant's testimony (February 11, 1865) before the Committee on the Conduct of the War fully answers the charge which has been made against the government that it refused to consent to an exchange of prisoners because we found ours starved, diseased, and unserviceable when we received them. "There never," testifies General Grant, "has been any such reason as that for making exchanges. I will confess that if our men who are prisoners in the South were really well taken care of, suffering nothing except a little privation of liberty, then, in a military point of view, it would not be good policy for us to exchange, because every man they get back is forced right into the army at once, while that is not the case with our prisoners when we receive them. In fact, the half of our returned prisoners will never go into the army again, and none of them will until after they have had a furlough of thirty or sixty days. Still, the fact of their suffering as they do is a reason for making this exchange as rapidly as possible. . . . Exchanges having been suspended by reason of disagreement on the part of agents of exchange on both sides before I came in command of the armies of the United States, and it then being near the opening of the spring campaign, I did not deem it advisable or just to the men who had to fight our battles to re-enforce the enemy with thirty or forty thousand disciplined troops at that time. An immediate resumption of exchanges would have had that effect, without giving us corresponding benefits. The suffering said to exist among our prisoners South was a powerful argument against the course pursued, and I so felt it."

this matter, he begged "the honor of a few moments' private audience." The letter is indorsed "About blowing up the Capitol at Washington." Another letter, dated the next day, was also found, from which it appears that De Kalb had been granted an audience on the 19th, but that Walker had hesitated to consent to the diabolical scheme proposed, not on account of its nature, but because De Kalb was a stranger to him. In this letter of the 20th De Kalb discloses his antecedents, his relation to Baron De Kalb, his service in the Crimean War as second lieutenant of Engineers, his arrival at Quebec in November, 1860, and at Washington three weeks ago. "Does the Southern Confederacy," he adds, "consider the explosion of the Federal Capitol, at a time when Abe, his myrmidons, and the Northern Congress members are all assembled together, of sufficient importance as to grant me, in case of success, a commission as colonel of Topographical Engineers, and the sum of one million of dollars?" Walker, instead of spurning the proposition, indorsed the letter with the following phrase: "See this man with Benjamin." He proposed to make the matter a subject of consideration at an interview between himself, this murderous villain, and the Confederate Secretary of State. In the Confederate archives was also found a letter addressed to Jefferson Davis, September 12th, 1861, by J. S. Parramore, in which the writer offers "to dispose of the leading characters of the North," and upon the letter was Davis's indorsement indicating the object of the communication, and referring it to the Secretary of War. After due consideration, both De Kalb's and Parramore's schemes appear to have been rejected as unadvisable.

On the 17th of August, 1863, we find another letter written to Davis by H. C. Dunham, of Georgia, a volunteer in the Confederate service, in which the writer states that the evidences of Davis's Christian humility encourage him to propose the organization of from 300 to 500 men, "to go into the United States, and assassinate the most prominent leaders of our enemies—for instance, Seward, Lincoln, Greeley, Prentice, etc." This communication was also referred to the Secretary of War.

Still later, Lieutenant W. Alston, in November, 1864, offered to rid the Confederacy "of some of her deadliest enemies," and his communication is referred to the Confederate Secretary of War. These various propositions for the assassination of the prominent officers of the Federal government appear to have been considered and rejected for prudential reasons. The time for such desperate measures had not yet arrived. But still they were matters of deliberate consideration.

Other schemes also were proposed. In February, 1865, W. S. Oldham, of Texas, in company with Senator Johnson, of Missouri, conferred with Davis "in relation to the prospect of annoying and harassing the enemy by burning their shipping, towns, etc." The Confederate President interposed objections as to the practicability of the scheme proposed. These objections were subsequently rebutted by Oldham. "I have seen enough," says the latter, "of the effects that can be produced to satisfy me that in most cases, without any danger to the parties engaged, and in others but very slight, we can, first, burn every vessel that leaves a foreign port for the United States; second, we can burn every transport that leaves the harbor of New York, or other Northern port, with supplies for the armies of the enemy in the South; third, burn every transport or gun-boat on the Mississippi River, as well as devastate the country of the enemy, and fill his people with terror and consternation. I am not alone of this opinion, but many other gentlemen are as fully and thoroughly impressed with the conviction as I am. I believe we have the means at our command, if promptly appropriated and energetically applied, to demoralize the Northern people in a very short time. For the purpose of satisfying your mind upon the subject, I respectfully but earnestly request that you will have an interview with General Harris, formerly a member of Congress from Missouri, who, I think, is able, from conclusive proof, to convince you that what I have suggested is perfectly feasible and practicable." Davis requested the Secretary of War to confer with Harris, "and learn what plan he has for overcoming the difficulty heretofore experienced."

What was the "difficulty heretofore experienced?" A number of Confederates—George N. Sanders, Beverly Tucker, Jacob Thompson, William C. Cleary, and Clement C. Clay—had been sent to Canada as agents of the Confederate government. Jacob Thompson appears to have been the treasurer of this special organization, the objects of which were the terror and consternation of the North through the destruction of shipping, the burning of hotels, the introduction of pestilence, and the assassination of the prominent officers of the national government. In the latter part of 1864 the attempt at arson had been tried without success, and the principals engaged were executed. John Y. Beall, detected in the act of destroying Federal vessels in the Northwest, was tried and condemned as a spy, and suffered death. One Kennedy, on the night of November 25th, 1864, with his confederates, attempted to set fire to four hotels in New York City. The attempt did not succeed, but Kennedy was apprehended and hung on the 19th of October. Three days later, Lieutenant Bennet H. Young, with from 30 to 40 Confederate associates, made a raid upon St. Albans, Vermont, 15 miles from the Canadian border. Over \$200,000 was captured from the banks, horses were seized, and several citizens were wantonly murdered. An unsuccessful attempt was also made to fire the town. The raiders were pursued, but escaped into Canada. Here they were arrested and brought before the Court of Quarter Sessions at Montreal. The judge, Mr. Coursol, released them from custody on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the case. Judge Coursol was afterward suspended for this action, and the raiders were rearrested, but the prisoners finally were again released without punishment.

These expeditions all originated in Canada, and proceeded under Confed-

erate authority. None of them had succeeded in accomplishing what they had attempted. Some difficulties had been experienced, and the Confederate government was now considering how these difficulties might be overcome. Soon, however, other and more desperate plans were found necessary. The old scheme of assassination, formerly laid aside, was reconsidered. Ready agents were found for its accomplishment. President Lincoln was murdered, but the conspirators did not succeed in subverting the government.

The war carried on by sea against the United States by the Confederates presents many novel features. Over 200 of the officers registered in 1864 as belonging to the Confederate navy were formerly United States naval officers. Although President Davis at the outset had issued letters of marque, a Confederate navy was impossible. There were many iron-clads and rams on the Southern rivers; the defenses of the Southern harbors by means of forts, ships, torpedoes, and obstructions were very formidable; but upon the sea the Confederacy had no chance, in so far as it depended upon its own resources. But what the Confederates lacked the people of Great Britain furnished, and thus it happened that while the United States was threatened with dissolution by intestine civil war, it was compelled also, at the same time, to contend on the ocean against a British fleet—British in every sense except that it did not receive its commissions from the English government—built at Liverpool and Glasgow, sailing from those ports by the connivance of the British government, armed with British guns, and manned, for the most part, with British crews.

In the early part of the war a number of strictly Confederate privateers were fitted out. Most of these, however, did not venture far from the coast. The *Sumter* and *Nashville*, who were bolder, had a short career, which has already been traced in these pages. The only vessels which materially injured the commerce of the United States were those built in British ports, and some of which were never in a port belonging to the Confederacy.

The history of the *Alabama* and the *Florida* has already been given. In 1864, three new British vessels—the *Tallahassee*, *Olustee*, and *Chickamauga*—were furnished to the Confederates by the British ship-builders, and contributed each its full share in the work of destruction and plunder. By their depredations American merchantmen were almost entirely driven from the seas.

The *Georgia* commenced her career in 1863. She was built at Glasgow, and left Greenock as the *Japan*. Off the French coast she received her armament and set out upon her cruise. After a short raid upon our commerce she was sold to a Liverpool merchant. Setting out again for Lisbon, she was captured twenty miles out from that port by Captain Craven, of the *Niagara*, who landed her crew at Dover, in England.

Early in 1865 two new vessels—the *Stonewall* and *Shenandoah*—were added to this British tribe of corsairs. The iron-clad ram *Stonewall*, Captain Page, was originally built for the Danish government, and afterward purchased by the Confederates. She arrived at Ferrol, in Spain, February 4th, closely followed by the United States steamers *Niagara* and *Sacramento*. The *Stonewall* shifted quarters to Lisbon in March, and the Federal vessels again followed her. The Portuguese government ordered the privateer to leave, and by maritime law the national vessels were required to remain for 24 hours before entering upon the pursuit. While changing their anchorage in the Tagus, these vessels were fired upon from Belem Tower under the supposition that they were about to leave the port. No injury was done, and ample apology was rendered by the Portuguese government. On the 11th of May the *Stonewall* arrived at Havana. Here she was closely blockaded by Admiral Godon, with several iron-clads, and soon surrendered herself to the Spanish authorities, by whom she was given over to the United States.

The *Shenandoah* was built at Glasgow in 1863, and was called the *Sea King*. In September, 1864, she was sold to Richard Wright, of Liverpool, and thus passed into the hands of the Confederacy. She cleared at London for Bombay ostensibly as a merchant vessel. On the same day that she left London, another vessel, the *Laurel*, left Liverpool with armament, stores, Confederate officers, and several men enlisted in the Confederate service. At Madeira the two vessels met; the *Laurel* fitted out the *Sea King*, which then became the *Shenandoah*, and set forth on her piratical cruise. She destroyed a few vessels in the neighborhood of St. Helena, and on February 8th, 1865, sailed for the North Pacific from Melbourne, Australia. Between April 1st and July 1st she destroyed or bonded 29 vessels, thus breaking up the whaling season in that locality. Waddell, her captain, although aware of the surrender of the Confederate armies, continued his cruise until four months after the fall of Richmond. He then returned to England, never having been in a Confederate port, and surrendered his vessel to the English government, and by the latter was given up to the American consul at Liverpool.

It is estimated that during the war 30 vessels of all descriptions were employed by the enemy as privateers. Only seven of these were very formidable, and of these seven five were British vessels. 275 vessels were captured, comprising four steamers, 78 ships, 43 brigs, 82 barks, and 68 schooners. On the other hand, 1143 vessels were captured by blockading squadrons, valued at \$24,500,000, and 355 destroyed, worth about \$7,000,000.¹

In regard to one at least of the privateers issuing from British ports, the circumstances appeared to justify the United States in claiming redress by way of compensation for the injurious consequences to American commerce. This was the case of the *Alabama*. The facts of the case were briefly these: The *Oreto* had already been permitted to sail from a British port, notwithstanding the protest of Mr. Francis Adams, the United States minister in England. Afterward Mr. Adams and the American consul at Liverpool were satisfied, upon competent evidence, that a vessel known as the 290 had been built for the Confederate service in the dock-yard of persons, one of whom was then sitting as a member of the House of Commons. This evidence was laid before the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, but the latter decided that nothing had yet transpired which appeared to demand a special report. Farther evidence was procured and submitted, which, in the opinion of the queen's solicitor, was sufficient to justify the Liverpool collector in seizing the vessel. But, while the Lords Commissioners were deliberating upon the matter, the 290 sailed from Liverpool without register or clearance. Earl Russell explained to Mr. Adams that the delay in determining upon the case had been caused by the sudden illness of Sir John D. Harding, the Queen's Advocate.

It was apparent, therefore, that the fault, with its responsibility, rested upon the British government. Mr. Adams was therefore directed "to solicit redress for the national and private injuries already thus sustained, as well as a more effective prevention of any repetition of such lawless and injurious proceedings in her majesty's ports hereafter." Earl Russell replied to this demand that her majesty's government could not admit that they were under any obligation to render compensation to United States citizens for the depredations of the *Alabama*. There has since been a voluminous correspondence upon the subject, but the matter still stands just where it stood in 1863. Certainly it is a case in which the interests of the British government are more jeopardized by its refusal to grant compensation than its treasury could suffer by payment; and it is equally true that the United States government can well afford to waive its claim, and let the whole matter rest just as it lies.

The foreign complications with the French government arising out of the ill-advised Mexican expedition, and which at one period of the war threatened serious danger to the United States, were, soon after the suspension of hostilities, removed by the withdrawal of the French troops from Mexico. From that moment the Mexican empire which had been established rapidly waned until early in 1867, when it fell, and the Emperor Maximilian became a martyr to the cause of imperialism, which he had fought out to the bitter end.

At the close of the civil war our political sky was bright with promise. The defeated Confederates seemed disposed to accept the situation in good faith, and, on the other hand, the victorious party exhibited signs of noble magnanimity. It is true that there were in the South those who still retained the spirit which had brought on the war. Such a one was that old man Edmund Ruffin, of South Carolina, who fired the first gun against his country's flag, and who, when the national triumph was fully consummated, committed suicide. So also, on the other side, there were those who nursed a vindictive spirit against a conquered people. But, notwithstanding these exceptions, a glorious future seemed about to dawn upon the republic. How this situation was changed, and a political strife engendered which agitated the country for a series of years, and postponed the restoration and harmony which ought to have followed immediately upon the close of the war, will form the subject of the concluding chapter of this history.

¹ The number of vessels captured and sent to the United States Admiralty Courts for adjudication from May 1, 1861, to the close of the war, was 1143, of which there were—steamers, 210; schooners, 569; sloops, 139; ships, 13; brigs and brigantines, 29; barks, 25; yachts, 2; small boats, 139; rams and iron-clads, 6; gun-boats, torpedo-boats, and armed schooners and sloops, 10; class unknown, 7—making a total of 1149. The number of vessels burned, wrecked, sunk, and otherwise destroyed during the same time were—steamers, 85; schooners, 114; sloops, 32; ships, 2; brigs, 2; barks, 4; small boats, 96; rams, 5; iron-clads, 4; gun-boats, torpedo-boats, and armed schooners and sloops, 11; total, 355—making the whole number of vessels captured and destroyed 1504. During the war of 1812, the naval vessels, of which there were 301 in service at the close, made 291 captures. There were 517 commissioned privateers, and their captures numbered 1428. Nearly all the captures of value in the recent war were vessels built in so-called neutral ports, and fitted out and freighted for the purpose of running the blockade. The gross proceeds of property captured since the blockade was instituted, and condemned as prize prior to the 1st of November, 1865, amount to \$21,829,543 96; costs and expenses, \$1,616,223 96; net proceeds for distribution, \$20,501,927 69. At the close of the year there were a number of important cases still before the courts, which will largely increase these amounts. The Secretary of the Navy estimates that the value of the 1143 captured vessels will not be less than \$24,500,000, and of the 355 vessels destroyed at least \$7,000,000, making a total valuation of not less than \$31,500,000, much of which was British property.—*American Cyclopædia*, 1865.