

## CHAPTER XLVI.

## AFTER ATLANTA.

Sherman's Position after the Capture of Atlanta.—What to do next?—Hood's Army in his Front, and the Railroad to Chattanooga untenable.—Hood gets out of Sherman's Way.—President Davis makes another Western Tour.—His Speech at Macon.—He discloses his Plans to the Enemy.—An Advance northward determined on.—Forrest's prelude Invasion of Tennessee.—Thomas is sent to Nashville.—Hood shifts to the West Point Road, and at length crosses the Chattahoochee.—Sherman follows to Kenesaw.—Slocum left at Atlanta.—The Battle of Allatoona is fought, and the Confederates are repulsed.—Hood across the Coosa, followed by Sherman through Allatoona Pass.—Resaca held, but Hood takes Dalton, and, avoiding a Battle, retreats to Gadsden.—Is joined there by Beauregard.—The Confederate Plan of a Campaign against Nashville.—Sherman, tired of chasing Hood, prepares for his March to the Sea.—He sends the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps to Thomas.—His Theory of the grand March.—He puts his Plan into Operation.

THE period immediately following the campaign which had closed with the capture of Atlanta was full of contingencies and uncertainties. What shall I do next? was the question which occupied the minds both of Hood and Sherman. It was a brief period; for Hood could not wait long, and Sherman would not. The Federal commander, while he was compelling the exodus of citizens from Atlanta, reorganizing his army, protecting his rear, and making arrangements with General Hood for an exchange of prisoners, and for the relief of some of the inconveniences suffered by Union prisoners in the South,<sup>1</sup> was revolving great schemes in his mind. He must secure the position which he had already gained in the heart of the enemy's country. But when secured, Atlanta was of no consequence to him except as a point from which to strike. Of one thing he was well satisfied. Hood would not divide his army; it would remain, therefore, a compact organization, whether in his front or moved against his rear. Sherman's desire was to march through Georgia to the Atlantic coast. While guarding the railroad to Chattanooga, his eyes were fixed upon Savannah. But, so long as Hood's army remained in his front, no such scheme could be ventured, at least not until the Savannah River was in the possession of the Federal navy.<sup>2</sup> The Confederate cavalry swarmed about his army, and he could not advance far from Atlanta eastward or southward and protect the railroad in his rear without detaching forces which were necessary to his advance. If Canby should be heavily re-enforced and advance to Columbus, Georgia, and establish a new base for Sherman by way of the Alabama

<sup>1</sup> The relief which was proposed by General Sherman is indicated in the following letter from him to Hood, September, 1864:

"My latest information from Andersonville is to the 12th, and from what I learn, our prisoners of war confined there, and being removed to Savannah, Charleston, and Millen, need many articles which we possess in superfluity, and can easily supply with your consent and assistance, such as shirts and drawers, socks, shoes, soap, candles, combs, scissors, etc.

"If you will permit me to send a train of wagons, with a single officer to go along under a flag of truce, I will send to Lovejoy's or Palmetto a train of wagons loaded exclusively with 10,000 or 15,000 of each of these articles, and a due proportion of soap, candles, etc., under such restrictions as you may think prudent to name. I would like to have my officer go along to issue these things, but will have no hesitation in sending them if you will simply promise to have them conveyed to the places where our prisoners are, and have them fairly distributed."

Sherman expected a refusal. He writes to James G. Yeatman, President of the Western Sanitary Commission (date same as above): "I doubt if he [Hood] will consent." These Confederates are as proud as the devil, and hate to confess poverty, but I know they are unable to supply socks, drawers, undershirts, scissors, combs, etc., which our men need more than any thing else to preserve cleanliness and health."

In the same letter he says: "The condition of the prisoners at Andersonville has always been present to my mind, and, could I have released them, I would have felt more real satisfaction than to have won another battle." General Hood acceded to Sherman's request, and the articles were sent.

<sup>2</sup> We see clearly what Sherman's designs were from his dispatches during the month of September to Generals Halleck, Canby, and Grant. He writes to Halleck on the 4th (before he had in person entered Atlanta), evidently on the supposition that Hood would cover Macon:

"For the future I propose that of the drafted men I receive my due share, say 50,000 men; that an equal or greater number go to General Canby, who should now proceed with all energy to get Montgomery and the reach of the Alabama River above Selma; that when I know he can move on Columbus, Georgia, I move on La Grange and West Point, keeping to the coast of the Chattahoochee; that we form a junction, repair roads to Montgomery, and open up the Appalachicola and Chattahoochee Rivers to Columbus, and move from it as a base straight on Macon."

On the 10th he writes to Canby:

"We must have the Alabama River now, and also the Appalachicola at the old arsenal, and up to Columbus. My line is so long now that it is impossible to protect it against cavalry raids; but if we can get Montgomery and Columbus, Georgia, as bases in connection with Atlanta, we have Georgia and Alabama at our feet."

The same day he writes to Grant:

"I do not think we can afford to operate farther, dependent on the railroad, it takes so many men to guard it, and even then it is nightly broken by the enemy's cavalry that swarms about us. Macon is distant 103 miles, and Augusta 175 miles. If I could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at Augusta or Columbus, Georgia, I can march to Milledgeville, and compel Hood to give up Augusta or Macon, and could then turn on the other. The country will afford forage and many supplies, but not enough in any one place to admit of delay. . . . If you can manage to take the Savannah River as high as Augusta, or the Chattahoochee as far up as Columbus, I can sweep the whole state of Georgia; otherwise I would risk the whole army by going too far from Atlanta."

The above was in reply to Grant's suggestion that Canby should operate against Savannah and Sherman against Augusta.

On the 12th he writes to Grant:

"I don't understand whether you propose to act against Savannah direct from Fort Pulaski, or by way of Florida, or from the direction of Mobile. If you take Savannah by a sudden *coup de main*, it would be valuable."

On the 20th again: "It [Savannah] once in our possession, I would not hesitate to cross the State of Georgia with 60,000 men, hauling some stores, and depending on the country for the balance. Where a million of people find subsistence my army won't starve; but, as you know, in a country like Georgia, with few roads and innumerable streams, an inferior force could so delay an army and harass it that it would not be a formidable object; but if the enemy knew that we had our boats on the Savannah, I could rapidly move to Milledgeville, where there is abundance of corn and meat, and I could so threaten Macon and Augusta that he would give up Macon for Augusta; then I would move to interpose between Augusta and Savannah, and force him to give me Augusta, with the only powder-mills and factories remaining in the South, or let us have the Savannah River. Either horn of the dilemma would be worth a battle. I would prefer his holding Augusta, as the probabilities are, for then, with the Savannah River in our possession, the taking of Augusta would be a mere matter of time. This campaign would be made in the winter. But the more I study the game, the more am I convinced that it would be wrong for me to penetrate much farther into Georgia without an objective beyond. It would not be productive of much good. I can start east, and make a circuit south, and back, doing vast damage to the state, but resulting in no permanent good; but by merely threatening to do so I hold a rod over the Georgians, who are not over loyal to the South. I will therefore give my opinion that your army and Canby's should be re-enforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington you strike for Savannah and the river; that General Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi River, and send a force to get Columbus, Georgia, either by way of the Alabama or Appalachicola; and that I keep Hood employed, and put my army in fine order for a march on Augusta, Columbus, and Charleston. . . . The possession of the Savannah River is more than fatal to the possibility of a Southern independence. They may stand the fall of Richmond, but not of all Georgia. . . . If you can whip Lee, and I can march to the Atlantic, I think Uncle Abe will give us twenty days' leave of absence to see the young folks."

River, the difficulty would be obviated. Under all the circumstances, Sherman had little expectation that this would be accomplished.

But General Hood speedily relieved Sherman of all his difficulties by removing the Confederate army out of his way. Hood was the most accommodating general that we have ever heard or read of. No sooner was the truce which had been agreed upon concluded, than he proceeded to shift his entire army to Sherman's rear.<sup>1</sup> If he had not already determined upon this movement he would yet have been forced to make it by the Confederate President, who proceeded from Richmond about three weeks after the fall of Atlanta to urge its execution. On his way to Hood's army, Davis, on the 23d of September, reached Macon, and addressed the citizens of that town. Among the many impolitic acts of President Davis during his administration, this speech stands prominent. In the first place, it informed General Sherman of plans which, if adopted at all, should never have been discovered till the latest possible moment. And the abusive denunciation of Governor Brown, of Georgia, and of General Johnston, were so undignified, that the reported address was at once pronounced a forgery in the Richmond papers. Even the enemies of Davis refused to credit its authenticity. Governor Brown was denominated "a scoundrel" by Davis, and contempt was thrown upon Johnston's retreat from Dalton to the Chattahoochee. His speech was not, on the whole, very encouraging. He reported two thirds of the Confederate army as absent, most of them without leave. He said it was impossible to lend Georgia any aid from Virginia, where the disparity of forces was just as great as it was in Georgia. He disclosed to his hearers, to Georgia, to the world, the extremities to which the Confederacy had been reduced. He told of mothers who had given their last son for the war, and informed Georgians that Macon, and of course the whole route eastward to the Atlantic, if threatened, must not call upon Hood's army for protection, but that their old men must stand in the breach, reminding them that they had not many men left between the ages of 18 and 45. But that which must have seemed most ominous to his audience was the declaration that he was going to the army to confer with General Hood and his subordinates. In view of evident facts, and of the situation of the Confederacy which he had so fully disclosed, his predictions were ludicrous. The burden of his prophecy was that Sherman must retreat, like Napoleon from the deserts of Russia, escaping only with a body-guard!<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Hood's explanation of this movement is a weak apology for his folly. He says:

"A serious question was now presented to me. The enemy would not certainly long remain idle. He had it in his power to continue his march to the South, and force me to fall back upon Alabama for subsistence. I could not hope to hold my position. The country, being a plain, had no natural strength, nor was there any advantageous position upon which I could retire. Besides, the morale of the army, greatly improved during the operations around Atlanta, had again become impaired in consequence of the recurrence of retreat, and the army itself was decreasing in strength day by day. Something was absolutely demanded, and I rightly judged that any advance, at all promising success, would go far to restore its fighting spirit. Thus I determined, in consultation with the corps commanders, to turn the enemy's right flank, and attempt to destroy his communications and force him to retire from Atlanta. The operations of the cavalry under Wheeler in Georgia, and under Forrest in Tennessee, proved to me conclusively, and beyond a doubt, that all the cavalry in the service could not permanently interrupt the railroad communications in the enemy's rear sufficiently to cause him to abandon his position. To accomplish any thing, therefore, it became necessary for me to move with my entire force."

Instead of having any hope of forcing Hood to fall back upon Alabama for subsistence, Sherman was in doubt as to the possibility of his advance, so long as Hood was in his front, until he could dispense with dependence upon his present line of communications. As to the morale of Hood's army, he was not likely to improve it by leaving Georgia open to Sherman's destructive march.

<sup>2</sup> The following is a copy of Davis's Macon speech as reported in the Macon Telegraph:

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, FRIENDS AND FELLOW-CITIZENS.—It would have gladdened my heart to have met you in prosperity instead of adversity. But friends are drawn together in adversity. The son of a Georgian, who fought through the first revolution, I would be untrue to myself if I should forget the state in her day of peril. What though misfortune has befallen our arms from Decatur to Jonesboro', our cause is not lost. Sherman can not keep up his long line of communication, and retreat sooner or later he must; and when that day comes, the fate that befell the army of the French empire in its retreat from Moscow will be repeated. Our cavalry and our people will harass and destroy his army as did the Cossacks that of Napoleon; and the Yankee general, like him, will escape with only a body-guard. How can this be the most speedily effected? By the absence of Hood's army returning to their posts; and will they not? Can they see the banished exiles; can they hear the wail of their suffering countrywomen and children and not come? By what influences they are made to stay away it is not necessary to speak. If there is one who will stay away at this hour, he is unworthy of the name of Georgian. To the women no appeal is necessary. They are like the Spartan mothers of old. I know of one who has lost all her sons except one of eight years. She wrote that she wanted me to reserve a place for him in the ranks. The venerable General Polk, to whom I read the letter, knew that woman well, and said it was characteristic of her; but I will not weary you by turning aside to relate the various incidents of giving up the last son to the cause of our country known to me. Wherever we go we find the hearts and hands of our noble women enlisted. They are seen wherever the eye may fall or the step turn. They have one duty to perform—to buoy up the hearts of our people. I know the deep disgrace felt by Georgia at our army falling back from Dalton to the interior of the state. But I was not of those who considered Atlanta lost when our army crossed the Chattahoochee. I resolved that it should not be, and I then put a man in command who I knew would strike a manly blow for the city, and many a Yankee's blood was made to nourish the soil before the prize was won. It does not become us to revert to disaster. Let the dead bury the dead. Let us, with one arm and one effort, endeavor to crush Sherman. I am going to the army to confer with our generals. The end must be the defeat of our enemy. It has been said that I abandoned Georgia to her fate. Shame upon such falsehood. Where could the author have been when Walker, when Polk, and when General Stephen D. Lee were sent to her assistance. Miserable man. The man who uttered this was a scoundrel. He was not a man to save our country. If I knew that a general did not possess the right qualities to command, would I not be wrong if he was not removed? Why, when our army was falling back from Northern Georgia, I even heard that I had sent Bragg with pontoons to cross it to Cuba. But we must be charitable. The man who can speculate ought to be made to take up his musket. When the war is over, and our independence won—and we will establish our independence—who will be our aristocracy? I hope the limping soldier. To the young ladies I would say that, when choosing between an empty sleeve and the man who had remained at home and grown rich, always take the empty sleeve. Let the old men remain at home and make bread. But should they know of any young man keeping away from the service, who can not be made to go any other way, let them write to the executive. I read all letters sent me from the people, but have not the time to reply to them. You have not many men between eighteen and forty-five left. The boys—God bless the boys!—are, as rapidly as they become old enough, going to the field. The city of Macon is filled with stores, sick and wounded. It must not be abandoned when threatened; but when the enemy comes, instead of calling upon Hood's army for defense, the old men must fight, and when the enemy is driven beyond Chattanooga, they too can join in the general rejoicing. Your prisoners are kept as a sort of Yankee capital. I have heard that one of their generals said that their exchange would defeat Sherman. I have tried every means, conceded every thing to effect an exchange, but to no purpose. Butler, the Beast, with whom no commissioner of exchange would hold intercourse, had published in the newspapers that if we would consent to the exchange of negroes all difficulties might be removed. This is reported as an effort of his to get himself whitewashed, by holding intercourse with gentlemen. If an exchange could be effected, I don't know but I might be induced to recognize Butler. But in the future every effort will be given, as far as possible, to effect the end. We want our soldiers in the field, and we want the sick and wounded to return home. It is not proper for me to speak of the number of men in the field, but this I will say, that two thirds of our men are absent—some sick, some wounded, but most of them absent without leave. The man who repents and goes back to his commander vol-





JAMES D. MORGAN.

A new problem was now presented to General Sherman. He was astonished at Hood's withdrawal from the Macon Road. It was true the Confederate army was at West Point, in a position to move on his flank; but Davis's Macon speech, which he had read in full in the Southern papers, left him no room for doubt that an attempt would be made by the enemy, moving in full force to his rear, to compel him to release his hold upon Georgia. He could not decide at once as to his future movements. It was still a question with him whether, while protecting Tennessee against Hood's invasion, he would have men enough left for the execution of his favorite project—the march eastward to Georgia. This question was soon settled by General Grant's generous co-operation<sup>1</sup> and encouragement, and by the patriotism of the loyal states. Every day increased Sherman's confidence. In the mean time he carefully watched the enemy's movements. Tennessee must be protected at all hazards. The devastation of Georgia and the capture of Savannah would not compensate for the surrender of Nashville and Chattanooga to the Confederates.

Hood had already sent Forrest with a cavalry force 7000 strong into Middle Tennessee as a prelude to the march of his whole army. Forrest, on the 20th of September, crossed the Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and destroyed a portion of the railroad between Decatur and Athens. On the 23d he appeared before the latter place, and drove the garrison of 600 men into their fort. The commander of this post was Colonel Campbell, who, in a personal interview with Forrest on the 24th, was persuaded that it was useless to resist the odds against him, and induced to surrender. In half an hour two regiments of Michigan and Ohio troops came to his assistance, and were driven back. Before Forrest reached Pulaski, General Rousseau had collected a force sufficient to defend that place, and the Confederate cavalry on the 29th swung around upon the Nashville and Chattanooga Road, and began to break it up between Tullahoma and Decherd. Rousseau had also moved promptly eastward, and at Tullahoma again barred the progress of Forrest northward. Steadman also, with 5000 men from Chattanooga, had crossed the Tennessee, and put his force in front of the enemy, compelling the latter to fall back through Fayetteville. The injuries done to the road were repaired in the course of a single day. Forrest now divided his force into two columns, commanded by Buford and himself, his own consisting of 3000 men. Buford demanded the surrender of Huntsville on the 30th, and being refused, proceeded against Athens, which General R. S. Granger had ordered to be reoccupied by the Seventy-third Indiana, and, attacking the

untarily appeals strongly to executive clemency. But suppose he stays away until the war is over, and his comrades return home, and when every man's history will be told, where will he shield himself? It is upon these reflections that I rely to make men return to their duty; but, after conferring with our generals at headquarters, if there be any other remedy it shall be applied. I love my friends and I forgive my enemies. I have been asked to send re-enforcements from Virginia to Georgia. In Virginia the disparity in numbers is just as great as it is in Georgia. Then I have been asked why the army sent to the Shenandoah Valley was not sent here. It was because an army of the enemy had penetrated that valley to the very gates of Lynchburg, and General Early was sent to drive them back. This he not only successfully did, but, crossing the Potomac, came well-nigh capturing Washington itself, and forced Grant to send two corps of his army to protect it. This the enemy denominated a raid. If so, Sherman's march into Georgia is a raid. What would prevent them now, if Early were withdrawn from taking Lynchburg, and putting a complete cordon of men around Richmond? I counseled with that great and grave soldier, General Lee, upon all these points. My mind roamed over the whole field. With this we can succeed. If one half the men now absent without leave will return to duty, we can defeat the enemy. With that hope I am going to the front. I may not realize this hope; but I know there are men there who have looked death in the face too often to despond now. Let no one despond. Let no one distrust; and remember that if genius is the beau ideal, hope is the reality.

<sup>1</sup> Grant writes him September 27:

"It is evident from the tone of the Richmond press, and all other sources, that the enemy intend making a desperate effort to drive you from where you are. I have directed all new troops from the West, and from the East too, if necessary, if none are ready in the West, to be sent to you."

garrison, was repulsed, without having effected any thing of any consequence. Forrest's command recrossed the Tennessee southward about the 3d of October.

Forrest retreated just in time; for before the end of September, Newton's (now Wagner's) division of Stanley's corps had relieved Steadman's command at Chattanooga; Morgan's division of Jeff. C. Davis's corps was on the way to Stevenson; and Rousseau was in pursuit of Forrest with 4000 cavalry and mounted infantry, and was soon to be joined by General C. C. Washburne with 3000 cavalry and 1500 infantry from Memphis. On the 29th, General Thomas had been sent to Nashville to take command of the forces covering Tennessee. Thomas reached Nashville on the 3d of October, and had made such a disposition of his command that, but for the rise of the Elk River, Forrest would have had great difficulty in effecting his escape. Corse's division had been dispatched to Rome, and all the new recruits and such detachments of troops as could be spared from the more northern posts of the West had been ordered to Nashville as reserves.

In the mean time Hood was moving to accomplish his daring scheme of Northern invasion. Removing the rails from the Augusta and Macon Roads for forty miles out from Atlanta, he repaired the West Point Road, toward which he began to shift his army on the 18th of September. Here he remained in the vicinity of Palmetto, with his left touching the Chattahoochee, and, having accumulated provisions for his march, began to cross the river on the 29th. By the 3d of October his army reached the neighborhood of Lost Mountain, with his cavalry on his front and right. The next day he dispatched Stewart's corps with orders to strike the railroad at Ackworth and Big Shanty. The garrisons at both these stations, numbering about 400 men, were captured. Hood's three *corps d'armee* were at this time commanded by Stewart, Cheatham, and Lee.

The entire Confederate army having crossed the Chattahoochee, Sherman, leaving Slocum's corps to occupy Atlanta and guard the crossing of the Chattahoochee, moved the rest of his army—the Fourth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Twenty-third Corps—northward, reaching Kenesaw on the 5th of October. The position of the Confederate army threatened Allatoona, where a million of rations were stored. This post was held by three regiments (890 men) under Colonel Tourtellotte, and was well protected by redoubts. General Sherman had anticipated an attack upon Allatoona, and had, by means of signals, ordered General Corse to re-enforce that post from Rome. The enemy had already got upon the railroad, as we have seen, by the 4th, destroying the railroad and cutting the telegraph; and on the night of that day, General Corse, with Rowett's brigade and 165,000 rounds of ammunition, reached Allatoona just in time to meet the attack made on the morning of the 5th by French's division of Stewart's corps. Sherman reached the top of Kenesaw Mountain at 10 A.M., and from that point—a distance of 18 miles—he could see the smoke of the battle and hear faintly the sound of the artillery. He could not reach the scene of conflict in time, nor was it probable that he could afford any assistance from his main army; but he sent General J. D. Cox, with the Twenty-third Corps, to attack the assailants in the rear, on the Dallas and Allatoona Road. Signals were exchanged between Sherman and General Corse, and as soon as the Federal commander learned that the latter was at the point of danger, all his anxiety vanished. Corse's arrival increased the number of the garrison to 1944 men. By 8 30 A.M. French had turned Allatoona, reaching the railroad north, and cutting off communication with Cartersville and Rome. At this time he sent a flag of truce summoning the garrison to surrender, "to avoid needless effusion of blood." Corse promptly replied that he was prepared for "the needless effusion of blood," whenever it would be agreeable to General French. The enemy then attacked with great fury, the first assault falling upon Colonel Rowett, who held the western spur of the ridge. This onset was successfully resisted, but the assault was repeated over and again, and as often repulsed. On the north side, a brigade of the enemy under General Sears made an attack in flank with better success. "The enemy's line of battle," reports General Corse, "swept us like so much chaff." But Tourtellotte from the eastern spur poured on Sears's advancing troops a fire which caught them in flank and broke their ranks. The battle thus far had been going on outside of the fort, into which, by the volume and impetuosity of the enemy's assaults, the garrison was driven before noon. But, notwith-



LOVELL H. ROUSSEAU.





HOOD'S ATTACK ON ALLATOONA.

standing the odds against them, they had inflicted sufficient injury upon French's division to make it pause, and consider whether it was worth the while to attack the fort, held by men who, outside of its walls, had fought with such obstinacy. The delay gave Corse time to dispose his force in the trenches and behind the parapet. From noon till almost night the enemy closed around the fort, enfilading its trenches, and making death almost certain to those who ventured to expose themselves. The unyielding temper of the garrison baffled the enemy, who, learning that a hostile force was almost upon his rear, gave up the contest. In this action General Corse was wounded in the face.<sup>1</sup> The loss of the garrison was about 700 men—over one third of the entire command. Corse reports that he buried 231 of the enemy's dead and captured 411 prisoners, one of whom, Brigadier General Young, estimated the Confederate loss at 2000. In no instance during the war was the value of the Signal Corps more fully illustrated than in the affair at Allatoona. The service which it rendered here, General Sherman afterward said, more than paid its entire expense from the time of its origination.

The army with which Hood had crossed the Chattahoochee, if we include Wheeler's command which subsequently joined him, numbered about 36,000, of which one fourth was cavalry. After his failure at Allatoona, Hood moved northwestwardly across the Coosa. Sherman followed by the railroad, marching through Allatoona Pass on the 8th, and reaching Kingston on the 10th. Here he found that, making a feint on Rome, the enemy had crossed the river about 11 miles below that place. The next day, therefore, he advanced to Rome, pushing forward Garrard's cavalry and the Twenty-third Corps, with instructions to cross the Oostenaula and threaten Hood's right flank, if the latter continued his movement northward. But the Confederates, by reason of their superior cavalry force, moved more rapidly, and on the 12th Hood summoned the garrison of Resaca to surrender, threatening to take no prisoners if the surrender was refused. Colonel Weaver, the commander at Resaca, saw no cause for alarm, and bluntly refused. He had been re-enforced by Sherman, and the enemy, deeming it prudent to avoid a battle, pushed on toward Dalton, destroying the railroad in his progress. Capturing the garrison at Dalton, he moved through Tunnel Hill to Villanow.

Sherman reached Resaca on the 15th, and endeavored to force Hood to a battle by moving upon his flank and rear. Howard's army was ordered to Snake Creek Gap, where the enemy was found occupying the former Federal defenses. Here Howard tried to hold Hood until Stanley, with the Fourth Corps, could come up in his rear at Villanow. But the Confederate commander did not intend to fight Sherman's army; he was well content with being chased. Covering his rear with Wheeler's cavalry, he fell back to Gadsden, Alabama. Sherman followed as far as Gaylesville. Here there was a pause on the part of both armies. At Gadsden, General Beauregard, commanding the military division of the West, joined Hood. The latter had anticipated that Sherman would divide his forces, and give him a chance, but he had been disappointed. To venture a general engagement in the open field with an enemy whom he had been unable to oppose behind the

fortifications of Atlanta was a step too reckless for even General Hood to take. To retreat utterly at this stage of affairs would be the ruin of his own not-too-well-established reputation, and would demoralize his army. It was therefore finally determined between him and General Beauregard that Sherman should be drawn north of the Tennessee.

But Sherman had long been growing weary of chasing an army that would not, and could not be made to fight. He had now a splendid position for defense, covering Bridgeport, Rome, Chattanooga, and the railroad thence to Atlanta. It was necessary that he should hold this position for a time, until his plans were matured. The strategy to which Hood was about to tempt him was not the strategy suited to his nature. If Hood would only cross the Tennessee, he would soon gratify him by a division of the Federal army. The railroads were speedily repaired, and Atlanta was being supplied with an abundance of provisions. Sherman was urging upon Grant his project of the march through Georgia to Savannah, and anxiously watching the accumulation of an army under Thomas sufficient to oppose Hood, leaving himself free to use his main army for offensive operations.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Sherman says in his report: "Hood's movements and strategy had demonstrated that he had an army capable of endangering at all times my communications, but unable to meet me in open fight. To follow him would simply amount to being decoyed away from Georgia, with little prospect of overtaking and overwhelming him. To remain on the defensive would have been bad policy for an army of so great value as I then commanded, and I was forced to adopt a course more fruitful in results than the naked one of following him to the southwest. I had previously submitted to the commander-in-chief a general plan, which amounted substantially to the destruction of Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga, and sallying forth from Atlanta, through the heart of Georgia, to capture one or more of the great Atlantic sea-ports. This I renewed from Gaylesville, modified somewhat by the change of events."

Sherman's dispatches during this period contain a very complete history of the progress of his favorite scheme of the March to the Sea. They are so characteristic that we here give all of them which have a direct bearing upon the subject:

September 29, 1864. To General HALLECK: "I prefer for the future to make the movement on Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah River."

September 30. To General COX: "I may have to make some quick counter-moves east and southeast. Keep your folks ready to send baggage into Atlanta, and to start on short notice. . . . There are fine corn and potato fields about Covington and the Ocmulgee bottoms. . . . If we make a counter-move I will go out myself with a large force, and take such a route as will supply us, and at the same time make Hood recall the whole or part of his army."

September 30. To General THOMAS: "If he [Hood] moves his whole force to Blue Mountain, you watch him from the direction of Stevenson, and I will do the same from Rome; and as soon as all things are ready, I will take advantage of his opening to me all of Georgia."

October 30. To General GRANT: "Hood is evidently on the west side of Chattanooga, below Sweetwater. If he tries to get on my road this side of the Etowah, I shall attack him; but if he goes on to the Selma and Talladega Road, why would it not do for me to leave Tennessee to the forces which Thomas has, and the reserves soon to come to Nashville, and for me to destroy Atlanta, and then march across Georgia to Savannah or Charleston, breaking roads, and doing irreparable damage? We can not remain on the defensive."

There is no immediate reply to this from Grant.

October 1. To Generals HOWARD and COX: "It is well for you to bear in mind that if Hood swings over to the Alabama Road, and thence tries to get into Tennessee, I may throw back to Chattanooga all of General Thomas's men as far down as Kingston, and draw forward all else, send back all cars and locomotives, destroy Atlanta, and make for Savannah or Charleston via Milledgeville and Millen. If Hood aims at our road this side of Kingston, and in no manner threatens Tennessee, I will have to turn on him. Keep these things to yourselves. The march I propose is less by 200 miles than I made last fall, and less than I accomplished in February, and we could make Georgia a break in the Confederacy by ruining both east and west roads, and not running against a single fort until we get to the sea-shore, and in communication with our ships."

October 1. To General THOMAS: "Use your own discretion as to the matters north of the Tennessee River. If I can induce Hood to swing across to Blue Mountain, I shall feel tempted to start for Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah or Charleston, absolutely destroying all Georgia, and taking either Savannah or Charleston. In that event, I will order back to Chattanooga every thing the other side of Kingston, and bring forward all else, destroy Atlanta and the bridge, and absolutely scour the Southern Confederacy. In that event, Hood would be puzzled, and would follow me; or, if he entered Tennessee, he could make no permanent stay. But if he attempts the road this side of Kingston or Rome, I will turn against him."

<sup>1</sup> The day after the battle, Corse writes to Sherman: "I am short a cheek-bone and one ear, but am able to whip all hell yet."



Sherman had already submitted to Grant the general outlines of his scheme of a march to the Atlantic. But at that time Hood was in his front, on the

October 7. To General CORSE: "Keep me well advised, for I now think Hood will rather swing against Atlanta and the Chattahoochee Bridge than against Kingston and the Etowah Bridge; but he is eccentric, and I can not guess his movements as I could those of Johnston, who was a sensible man, and only did sensible things. If Hood does not mind, I will catch him in a worse snap than he has been in yet."

October 9. To General THOMAS: "I came up here to relieve our road. Twentieth Corps at Atlanta. Hood reached our road and broke it between Big Shanty and Ackworth, and attacked Allatoona, but was repulsed. . . . I want to destroy all the road below Chattanooga, including Atlanta, and make for the sea-coast. We can not defend this long line of road."

October 9. To General GRANT: "It will be a physical impossibility to protect the road, now that Hood, Forrest, and Wheeler, and the whole batch of devils, are turned loose, without home or habitation. . . . I propose that we break up the railroad from Chattanooga, and strike out with wagons for Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah. Until we can repopulate Georgia it is useless to occupy it, but the utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people will cripple their military resources. By attempting to hold the roads we will lose a thousand men monthly, and will gain no result. I can make the march, and make Georgia howl. We have over 8000 cattle, and 3,000,000 rations of bread, but no corn; but we can forage in the interior of the state."

October 10. To General GRANT: "Hood is now crossing the Coosa, twelve miles below Rome, bound West. If he passes over to the Mobile and Ohio Road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas, with the troops now in Tennessee, to defend the state. He will have an ample force when the re-enforcements ordered reach Nashville."

The same day Thomas writes to Sherman: "I will not say positively that I can hold Hood with the present force I have and the re-enforcements expected, because I do not know how many re-enforcements are coming. I will do my best, however, and, as you direct, will concentrate the infantry force about Stevenson and Huntsville, leaving a portion of the cavalry to watch the river between Decatur and Eastport."

October 11. To General GRANT: "Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome. He threw one corps on my road at Ackworth, and I was forced to follow. I hold Atlanta with the Twentieth Corps, and have strong detachments along my line. These reduce my active force to a comparatively small army. We can not remain now on the defensive. With 25,000 men, and the bold cavalry he has, he [Hood] can constantly break my road. I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city, send back all my wounded and worthless, and with my effective army move through Georgia, smashing things to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to follow me. Instead of being on the defensive, I would be on the offensive. Instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in war is full 25 per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoochee (Apalachicola). Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long."

October 16. To General SCHOFIELD: "I want the first positive fact that Hood contemplates an invasion of Tennessee. Invite him to do so. Send him a free pass in."

October 17. Slocum telegraphs to Sherman the statement made in a Montgomery paper that Beauregard is with Hood, and that the army is going to cross the Tennessee.

October 17. Sherman is advised by Thomas to "adopt Grant's idea of turning Wilson loose rather than undertake the plan of a march with the whole force through Georgia to the sea." Again, the next day, Thomas writes: "I don't want to be in command of the defense of Tennessee, unless you and the authorities in Washington deem it absolutely necessary."

October 19. To General HALLECK: "The enemy will not venture into Tennessee except around by Decatur. I propose to send the Fourth Corps to General Thomas, and leave him with that corps, the garrisons, and new troops, to defend the line of the Tennessee, and with the rest to push into the heart of Georgia and come out at Savannah, destroying all the railroads of the state."

October 19. To General THOMAS: "Make a report to me as soon as possible of what troops you now have in Tennessee, what are expected, and how disposed. I propose, with the armies of the Tennessee and the Ohio, and two corps of yours, to sally forth, and make a hole in Georgia and Alabama, that will be hard to mend. Hood has little or no baggage, and will escape me. He can not invade Tennessee except to the west of Huntsville. . . . I will send back into Tennessee the Fourth Corps, all dismounted cavalry, all sick and wounded, and all encumbrances whatever, except what I can haul in our wagons, and will probably, about November, break up the railroad and bridges, destroy Atlanta, and make a break for Mobile, Savannah, or Charleston. I want you to remain in Tennessee, and take command of all my division not actually present with me. Hood's army may be set down at 40,000 of all arms fit for duty; he may follow me or turn against you. If you can defend the line of the Tennessee in my absence of three months is all I ask."

October 19. To Colonel BECKWITH (Act'g Q. M. at Atlanta): "Hood will escape me. I want to prepare for my big raid. On the 1st of November I want nothing in Atlanta but what is necessary to war. Send all trash to the rear, and have on hand thirty days' food and but little forage. I propose to abandon Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga, and sally forth to ruin Georgia and bring up on the sea-shore."

October 19. To General HALLECK: "We must not be on the defensive, and I now consider myself authorized to execute my plan, to destroy the railroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city. . . . strike out into the heart of Georgia, and make for Charleston, Savannah, or the mouth of the Apalachicola. General Grant prefers the middle one, Savannah, and I understand you to prefer Selma and the Alabama. I must have alternatives, else, being confined to one route, the enemy might so oppose that delay and want would trouble me; but, having alternatives, I can take so eccentric a course that no general can guess at my objective. Therefore, when you hear I am off, have look-outs at Morris Island, South Carolina, Ossabaw Sound, Georgia, Pensacola, and Mobile Bays. I will turn up somewhere, and believe I can take Macon, Milledgeville, Augusta, and Savannah, Georgia, and wind up with closing the neck back of Charleston, so that they will starve out. This movement is not purely military or strategic, but it will illustrate the vulnerability of the South. They don't know what war means; but when the rich planters of the Oconee and Savannah see their fences, and corn, and hogs, and sheep vanish before their eyes, they will have something more than a mean opinion of the 'Yanks.' Even now our poor mules laugh at the fine corn-fields, and our soldiers riot on chestnuts, sweet potatoes, pigs, chickens, etc. The poor people come to me and beg us for their lives; but my customary answer is, 'Your friends have broken our railroads which supplied us bountifully, and you can not suppose our soldiers will suffer when there is abundance within reach.'

"It will take ten days to finish up our roads, during which I will eat out this flank, and along down the Coosa [Sherman, when writing this, was at Summerville, Georgia], and then will rapidly put into execution 'the plan.' In the mean time I ask that you will give General Thomas all the troops you can spare of the new levies, that he may hold the line of the Tennessee during my absence of, say, ninety days."

October 19. To General WILSON: "General Garrard has about 2500 cavalry, General Kilpatrick 1500, General McCook 600; there may be about 1000 other cavalry with my army. These embrace all the cavalry ready for battle. I wish you would . . . bring to me about 2500 new cavalry, and then go to work to make up three divisions, each of 2500, for the hardest fighting of the war. I am going into the very bowels of the Confederacy, and propose to leave a trail that will be recognized fifty years hence."

October 20. To General THOMAS: "I think I have thought over the whole field of the future, and, being now authorized to act, I want all things bent to the following general plan of action for the next three months."

"Out of the forces now here and at Atlanta I propose to organize an efficient army of 60,000 to 65,000 men, with which I propose to destroy Macon, Augusta, and, it may be, Savannah and Charleston; but I will also keep open the alternatives of the mouth of the Apalachicola and Mobile. By this I propose to demonstrate the vulnerability of the South, and make its inhabitants feel that war and individual ruin are synonymous terms. To pursue Hood is folly, for he can twist and turn like a fox, and wear out any army in pursuit; to continue to occupy long lines of railroads simply exposes our small detachments to be picked up in detail, and forces me to make countermarches to protect lines of communication. I know I am right in this, and shall proceed to its maturity. As to details, I propose to take General Howard and his army, General Schofield and his, and two corps of yours, viz., Generals Davis's and Slocum's. I propose to remain along the Coosa watching Hood until all my preparations are made, viz., until I have prepared the railroad, sent back all surplus men and material, and stripped for the work. Then I will send General Stanley, with the Fourth Corps, across by Will's Valley and Caperton's to Stevenson, to report to you. If you send me 5000 or 6000 new conscripts, I may also send back one of General Slocum's or Davis's divisions, but I prefer to maintain organizations. I want you to retain command in Tennessee, and before starting I will give you delegated authority over Kentucky and Mississippi, Alabama, etc., whereby there will be unity of action behind me. I will want you to hold Chattanooga and Decatur in force; and on the occasion of my departure, of which you will have ample notice, to watch Hood close. I think he will follow me, at least with his cavalry, in which event I want you to push south from Decatur and the head of the Tennessee for Columbus, Mississippi, and Selma—not absolutely to reach those points, but to divert or pursue, according to the state of facts. If, however, Hood turns on you, you must act defensively on the line of the Tennessee. I will ask, and you may also urge, that at the same time General Canby act vigorously up the Alabama River."

"I do not fear that the Southern army will again make a lodgment on the Mississippi, for past events demonstrate how rapidly armies can be raised in the Northwest on that question, and how easily handled and supplied. The only hope of a Southern success is in the remote regions difficult

Macon Road. He was not, under these circumstances, willing to make the venture unless he could be sure of some objective point, like Savannah, al-

of access. We have now a good entering wedge, and should drive it home. It will take some time to complete these details, and I hope to hear from you in the mean time. We must preserve a large amount of secrecy, and I may actually change the ultimate point of arrival, but not the main object."

October 20. To General SLOCUM: "Use all your energies to send to the rear every thing not needed for the grand march. I will take your corps along. We will need 1,500,000 rations of bread, coffee, sugar, and salt, 500,000 rations of salt meat, and all else should be shipped away. . . . I want to be near Atlanta and ready by November 1st."

October 22. To General GRANT: "I feel perfectly master of the situation here. I still hold Atlanta, and the road with all bridges and vital points well guarded, and I have in hand an army before which Hood has retreated precipitately down the Coosa. It is hard to divine his future plans; but by abandoning Georgia, and taking position with his rear to Selma, he threatens the road from Chattanooga to Atlanta, and may move up to Tennessee by Decatur. He can not cross the Tennessee except at Muscle Shoals, for all other points are patrolled by our gun-boats."

"I am now perfecting arrangements to put into Tennessee a force able to hold the line of the Tennessee while I break up the railroad in front of Dalton, including the city of Atlanta, and push into Georgia and break up all its railroads and dépôts, capture its horses and negroes, make desolation every where, destroy the factories at Macon, Milledgeville, and Augusta, and bring up with 60,000 men on the sea-shore about Savannah or Charleston. I think this far better than defending a long line of railroad. I will leave General George H. Thomas to command all my military division behind me, and take with me only the best fighting material. Of course I will subsist on the bountiful corn-fields and potato-patches, as I am now doing, luxuriously."

October 23. To General SLOCUM: "Go on; pile up the forage, corn, and potatoes, and keep your artillery horses fat; send back all unserviceable artillery, and, at the last moment, we can count up our horses, and see what we can haul, and send back all else. One gun per thousand men will be plenty to take along. Hood is doubtless now at Blue Mountain, and Forrest over about Corinth and Tusculumbia, hoping by threatening Tennessee to make me quit Georgia. We are piling up men in Tennessee enough to attend to them, and to leave me free to go ahead. The railroad will be done in a day or two. We find abundance of corn and potatoes out here, and we enjoy them much; they cost nothing a bushel. If Georgia can afford to break our railroads, she can afford to feed us."

October 23. To General THOMAS: "Hood is now at Blue Mountain, and Forrest evidently over about Tusculumbia. No doubt they will endeavor conjointly to make me come out of Georgia, but I don't want them to succeed. All Georgia is now open to me, and I do believe you are the man best qualified to manage the affairs of Tennessee and North Mississippi."

"I want approximate returns of all troops subject to your orders; and, as I wrote you, I can spare you the Fourth Corps and about 5000 men not fit for my purposes, but which will be well enough for garrison at Chattanooga, Murfreesborough, and Nashville. What you need is a few points fortified and stocked with provisions, and a movable column of 25,000 men that can strike in any direction."

October 24. To General HALLECK: "Beauregard announces his theorem to be to drive Sherman out of Atlanta, which he still holds defiantly, and dares him to the encounter, but is not willing to chase him all over creation."

October 26. To General THOMAS: "A reconnaissance pushed down to Gadsden to-day reveals the fact that the rebel army is not there, and the chances are it has moved West. If it turns up at Guntersville I will be after it, but if it goes, as I believe, to Decatur and beyond, I must leave it to you at present, and push for the heart of Georgia."

October 28. To General THOMAS: "I have already sent the Fourth Corps, which should reach Wauhatchee to-morrow; use it freely, and if I see that Hood crosses the Tennessee I will send Schofield. On these two corps you can ingraft all the new troops; with the balance I will go south."

October 29. To General THOMAS: "Ingrate on Stanley and Schofield all the new troops. Give Schofield a division of new troops. Give General Tower all the men you can to finish the forts at Nashville, and urge on the navy to pile up gun-boats in the Tennessee."

October 29. To General ROSECRANS: "I have pushed Beauregard to the west of Decatur, but I know he is pledged to invade Tennessee and Kentucky, having his base on the old Mobile and Ohio Road. I have put Thomas in Tennessee, and given him as many troops as he thinks necessary, but I don't want to leave it to chance, and therefore would like to have Smith's and Mower's divisions up the Tennessee River as soon as possible. . . . I propose myself to push straight down into the heart of Georgia, smashing things generally."

November 1. To General GRANT: "As you foresaw, and as Jeff. Davis threatened, the enemy is now in the full tide of execution of his grand plan to destroy my communications and defeat this army. His infantry, about 30,000, with Wheeler and Roddy's cavalry, from 7000 to 10,000, are now in the neighborhood of Tusculumbia and Florence, and the water being low, are able to cross at will. Forrest seems to be scattered from Eastport to Jackson, Paris, and the Lower Tennessee, and General Thomas reports the capture by him of a gun-boat and five transports. General Thomas has near Athens and Pulaski Stanley's corps, about 15,000 strong, and Schofield's corps, 10,000, en route by rail, and has at least 20,000 to 25,000 men, with new regiments and conscripts arriving all the time also. General Rosecrans promises the two divisions of Smith and Mower, belonging to me, but I doubt if they can reach Tennessee in less than ten days. If I were to let go Atlanta and North Georgia and make for Hood, he would, as he did here, retreat to the southwest, leaving his militia, now assembling at Macon and Griffin, to occupy our conquests, and the work of last summer would be lost. I have retained about 50,000 good troops, and have sent back 25,000, and have instructed General Thomas to hold defensively Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur, all strongly fortified and provisioned for a long siege. I will destroy the railroads of Georgia, and do as much substantial damage as is possible, reaching the sea-coast near one of the points hitherto indicated, trusting that Thomas with his present troops, and the influx of new troops promised, will be able in a very few days to assume the offensive. Hood's cavalry may do a good deal of damage, and I have sent Wilson back with all dismounted cavalry, retaining only about 4500. This is the best I can do, and shall, therefore, when I get to Atlanta the necessary stores, move south as soon as possible."

The same day Grant writes to Sherman: "Do you not think it advisable, now that Hood has gone so far north, to entirely ruin him before starting on your proposed campaign? With Hood's army destroyed, you can go where you please with impunity. I believed, and still believe, if you had started south while Hood was in the neighborhood of you, he would have been forced to go after you. Now that he is so far away, he might look upon the chase as useless, and he will go in one direction while you are pushing the other. If you can see the chance for destroying Hood's army, attend to that first, and make the other move secondary."

November 2. To General THOMAS: "According to Wilson's account, you will have, in ten days, full 12,000 cavalry, and I estimate your infantry force, independent of railroad guards, full 40,000, which is a force superior to the enemy."

November 2. To General GRANT: "If I could hope to overhaul Hood, I would turn against him with my whole force; then he would retreat to the southwest, drawing me as a decoy from Georgia, which is his chief object. If he ventures north of the Tennessee, I may turn in that direction and get between him and his line of retreat, but thus far he has not gone above the Tennessee. Thomas will have a force strong enough to prevent his reaching any country in which we have an interest, and he has orders, if Hood turns to follow me, to push for Selma. No single army can catch him, and I am convinced the best results will follow from our defeating Jeff. Davis's cherished plan of making me leave Georgia by manœuvring. Thus far I have confined my efforts to thwart his plans, and have reduced my baggage so that I can pick up and start in any direction; but I would regard a pursuit of Hood as useless. Still, if he attempts to invade Middle Tennessee, I will hold Decatur, and be prepared to move in that direction; but, unless I let go Atlanta, my force will not be equal to his."

To this Grant replies the same day: "Your dispatch of 9 A.M. yesterday is just received. I dispatched you the same date, advising that Hood's army, now that it had worked so far north, ought to be looked upon more as the object. With the force, however, you have left with General Thomas, he must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him. I really do not see that you can withdraw from where you are to follow Hood, without giving up all we have gained in territory."

November 2. To General GRANT: "General Thomas reports to-day that his cavalry reconnoitred within three miles of Florence yesterday, and found Beauregard intrenching. I have ordered him to hold Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur, all well supplied for a siege; all the rest of his army to assemble about Pulaski, and to fight Beauregard cautiously and carefully; at the same time, for A. J. Smith and all re-enforcements to get up to enable him to assume a bold offensive, and to enable Wilson to get a good amount of cavalry. I think Jeff. Davis will change his tune when he finds me advancing into the heart of Georgia instead of retreating, and I think it will have an immediate effect on your operations at Richmond."

November 3. To General HALLECK: "The situation of affairs now is as follows: Beauregard, with Hood's army, is at Florence, with a pontoon bridge protected from our gun-boats from below by the Colbert Shoals, from above by the Muscle Shoals. He has with him Wheeler's and Roddy's cavalry. Forrest's cavalry is down about Fort Heiman. The country round about Florence has been again and again devastated during the past three years, and Beauregard must be dependent on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, which also has been broken and patched up in its whole extent. He purposes and promises his men to invade Middle Tennessee for the purpose of making me let go Georgia. The moment I detected that he had passed Gadsden, I dispatched the Fourth Corps, General Stanley, 15,000 strong, who is now at Pulaski, and subsequently the Twenty-third Corps, General Schofield, 10,000, who is now on cars moving to Nashville. This gives General Thomas



ready in possession of the national armies. But, as soon as Hood moved from his front, the way seemed open for an advance through Georgia to the

two full corps and about 8000 cavalry, besides 10,000 dismounted cavalry and all the new troops recently sent to Tennessee, with the railroad guards, with which to encounter Beauregard, should he advance farther. Besides which, General Thomas will have the active co-operation of the gun-boats both above and below the Shoals, and the two divisions of Smith and Mower, en route from Missouri. I therefore feel no uneasiness as to Tennessee, and have ordered General Thomas to assume the offensive in the direction of Selma, Alabama. With myself I have the Twentieth Corps at Atlanta, the Fifteenth and Seventeenth near Kenesaw, and the Fourteenth here [near Kingston]. I am sending to the rear, as fast as cars will move, the vast accumulation of stuff that, in spite of my endeavors, has been got over the road, and am sending forward just enough bread and meat to enable me to load my wagons, destroy every thing of value to the enemy, and start on my contemplated trip. I can be ready in five days, but am waiting to be more certain that Thomas will be prepared for any contingency that may arise. It is now raining, which is favorable to us and unfavorable to the enemy. Davis has utterly failed in his threat to force me to leave in thirty days, for my railroad is in good order from Nashville to Atlanta, and his army is farther from my communications now than it was twenty days ago. . . . I propose to adhere, as near as possible, to my original plan, and, on reaching the sea-coast, will be available for re-enforcing the army in Virginia, leaving behind a track of desolation, as well as a sufficient force to hold fast all that is of permanent value to our cause."

November 6. To General Grant:

"DEAR GENERAL,—I have heretofore telegraphed and written you pretty fully, but I still have some thoughts in my busy brain that should be confided to you as a key to future developments."

"The taking of Atlanta broke on Jeff. Davis so suddenly as to disturb the equilibrium of his usually well-balanced temper, so that at Augusta, Macon, and Columbia, South Carolina, he let out some of his thoughts, which otherwise he would have kept to himself. As he is not only the President of the Southern Confederacy, but also its commander-in-chief, we are bound to attach more importance to his words than we would to those of a mere civil chief magistrate."

"The whole burden of his song consists in the statement that Sherman's communications must be broken and his army destroyed. Now it is a well-settled principle that, if we prevent his succeeding in his threat, we defeat him, and derive all the moral advantages of a victory. Thus far Hood and Beauregard conjointly have utterly failed to interrupt my supplies or communications. My railroad and telegraph are now in good order from Atlanta back to the Ohio River. His losses in men at Allatoona, Resaca, Ship's Gap, and Decatur exceed in number ours at the block-houses at Big Shanty, Allatoona Creek, and Dalton; and the rapidity of his flight from Dalton to Gadsden takes from him all the merit or advantage claimed for his skillful and rapid lodgment on my railroad. The only question in my mind is whether I ought not to have dogged him far over into Mississippi, trusting to some happy accident to bring him to bay and to battle; but I then thought that by so doing I would play into his hands, by being drawn or decoyed too far away from our original line of advance. Besides, I had left at Atlanta a corps, and guards along the railroad back to Chattanooga, which might have fallen an easy prey to his superior cavalry. I felt compelled, therefore, to do what is usually a mistake in war—divide my forces—send a part back into Tennessee, retaining the balance here."

"As I have before informed you, I sent Stanley back directly from Gaylesville, and Schofield from Rome, both of which have reached their destination; and thus far Hood, who has brought up at Florence, is farther from my communications than when he started; and I have in Tennessee a force numerically greater than his, well commanded and well organized, so that I feel no uneasiness on the score of Hood reaching my main communications."

"My last accounts from General Thomas are to 9 30 last night, when Hood's army was about Florence in great distress about provisions, as it well must be, and that devil Forrest was down about Johnsonville, making havoc among the gun-boats and transports; but Schofield's troops were arriving at Johnsonville, and a fleet of gun-boats was reported coming up from below, able to repair that trouble. You know that line of supplies was only opened for summer's use, when the Cumberland is not to be depended upon. We now have abundant supplies at Atlanta, Chattanooga, and Nashville, with the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and the Cumberland River unmolested, so that I regard Davis's threat to get his army on my rear, or on my communications, as a miserable failure."

"Now as to the second branch of my proposition. I admit that the first object should be the destruction of that army; and if Beauregard moves his infantry and artillery up into the pocket about Jackson and Paris, I will feel strongly tempted to move Thomas directly against him, and myself move rapidly by Decatur and Purdy to cut off his retreat. But this would involve the abandonment of Atlanta, and a retrograde movement, which would be very doubtful of expediency or success; for, as a matter of course, Beauregard, who watches me with his cavalry and his friendly citizens, would have timely notice, and slip out and escape, to regain what we have earned at so much cost. I am more than satisfied that Beauregard has not the nerve to attack fortifications, or it would be a great achievement for him to make me abandon Atlanta by mere threats and manoeuvres."

"These are the reasons which have determined my former movements."

"I have employed the last ten days in running to the rear the sick, wounded, and worthless, and all the vast amount of stores accumulated by our army in the advance, aiming to organize this branch of my army into four well-commanded corps, encumbered by only one gun to a thousand men, and provisions and ammunition which can be loaded up in our mule-wagons, so that we can pick up and start on the shortest notice. I reckon that by the 10th instant this end will be reached, and by that date I also will have the troops all paid; the presidential election over and out of the way; and I hope the early storms of November, now prevailing, will also give us the chance of a long period of fine healthy weather for campaigning. Then the question presents itself, 'What shall be done?' On the supposition always that Thomas can hold the line of the Tennessee, and very shortly be able to assume the offensive against Beauregard, I propose to act in such a manner against the material resources of the South as utterly to negative Davis's boasted threat and promises of protection. If we can march a well-appointed army right through his territory, it is a demonstration to the world—foreign and domestic—that we have a power which Davis can not resist. This may not be war, but rather statesmanship; nevertheless, it is overwhelming to my mind that there are thousands of people abroad and in the South who will reason thus: If the North can march an army right through the South, it is proof positive that the North can prevail in this contest, leaving only open the question of its willingness to use that power. Now Mr. Lincoln's election (which is assured), coupled with the conclusion thus reached, makes a complete logical whole. Even without a battle, the results, operating upon the minds of sensible men, would produce fruits more than compensating for the expense, trouble, and risk."

"Admitting this reasoning to be good, that such a movement *per se* be right, still there may be reasons why one route should be better than another. There are three from Atlanta—southeast, south, and southwest—all open, with no serious enemy to oppose at present."

"The first would carry me across the only east and west railroad remaining to the Confederacy, which would be destroyed, and thereby the communication between the armies of Lee and Beauregard severed. Incidentally I might destroy the enemy's dépôts at Macon and Augusta, and reach the sea-shore at Charleston and Savannah, from either of which points I could re-enforce our armies in Virginia."

"The second and easiest route would be due south, following substantially the valley of Flint River, which is very fertile and well supplied, and fetching up on the navigable waters of the Appalachicola, destroying en route the same railroad, taking up the prisoners of war still at Andersonville, and destroying about 400,000 bales of cotton near Albany and Fort Gaines. This, however, would leave the army in a bad position for future movements."

"The third, down the Chattahoochee to Opelika and Montgomery, thence to Pensacola or Texas Bayou, in communication with Fort Morgan. This latter route would enable me at once to co-operate with General Canby in the reduction of Mobile, and occupation of the line of the Alabama."

"In my judgment, the first would have a material effect upon your campaign in Virginia; the second would be the safest of execution; but the third would more properly fall within the sphere of my own command, and have a direct bearing upon my own enemy, 'Beauregard.' If, therefore, I should start before I hear farther from you, or before farther developments turn my course, you may take it for granted that I have moved via Griffin to Barnsville; that I break up the road between Columbus and Macon good, and then, if I feign on Columbus, will move via Macon and Millen to Savannah, or, if I feign on Macon, you may take it for granted I have shot off toward Opelika, Montgomery, and Mobile Bay or Pensacola."

"I will not attempt to send couriers back, but trust to the Richmond papers to keep you well advised. I will give you notice by telegraph of the exact time of my departure."

To this Grant replies, November 7: "I see no present reason for changing your plan; should any arise, you will see to it, or if I do, I will inform you. I think every thing here favorable now. Great good fortune attend you. I believe you will be eminently successful, and at worst can only make a march less fruitful of results than hoped for."

November 8. To G. W. TYLER, Louisville, Ky.: "Dispatch me to-morrow night and the next night a summary of all news, especially of elections, that I may report them to Governor Brown at Milledgeville, where I expect a friendly interview in a few days. Keep this very secret, for the world will lose sight of me shortly, and you will hear worse stories than when I went to Meridian. Jeff. Davis's thirty days are up for wiping us out, and we are not wiped out yet by a good deal."

November 10. To C. A. DANA, Assistant Secretary of War: "If indiscreet newspaper men publish information too near the truth, counteract its effect by publishing other paragraphs calculated to mislead the enemy—such as Sherman's army has been much re-enforced, especially in the

sea-coast. He had then to consider whether he could make the march, and at the same time protect Chattanooga and Nashville. This was a question which could only be answered when it was certainly ascertained what reinforcements would be received. By the middle of October Hood had been driven off from the Chattanooga and Atlanta Railroad. About the 1st of November he threatened to cross the Tennessee in the neighborhood of Decatur. This, indeed, was the only point at which he could effect a crossing, the rest of the river—from Muscle Shoals above, and Colbert Shoals below—being guarded by gun-boats. Sherman had, by this time, dispatched Stanley's Fourth and Schofield's Twenty-third Corps—about 25,000 infantry—to General Thomas. Brevet Major General James Wilson had arrived from the Army of the Potomac, to take command of Sherman's cavalry, and it seemed probable that in the course of a few days he would be able to mount 12,000 men. New regiments of recruits were continually coming into Nashville, and Sherman ordered these to be ingrafted into the veteran corps of Stanley and Schofield. Hood would be delayed for some days in the accumulation of supplies, and in the mean time A. J. Smith's and Mower's divisions could be brought over from Missouri. With these divisions added to his other forces, Sherman thought Thomas would have a force sufficient to attend to Hood. He thought, however, that Hood, learning of his march eastward, would follow him, at least with his cavalry. In any event, he had no uneasiness in regard to Tennessee."

But Thomas was not so confident. He thought it would be better to send Wilson's cavalry through Georgia, and fight Hood with the whole of Sherman's army. Grant also urged this at first; but Sherman's arguments finally convinced him that Thomas could take care of Tennessee, and that it was better that Sherman should carry out his project. Thomas also, in the end, reached the same conclusion."

Sherman's perfect confidence in his own scheme excites our admiration. He had no doubts. He had carefully balanced the forces on both sides, and knew that Thomas would be a match for Hood. To protect his long line of railroad, garrison Atlanta, and pursue Hood "all over creation" involved, in his judgment, the waste of 60,000 men. To make a wreck of Atlanta and Rome, and of the railroad from Atlanta to Dalton, left nothing for the enemy to occupy, nothing for himself to guard. The four army corps which he still retained—60,000 strong—contained the best fighting material of his command. North of Atlanta they were not needed. If they should operate with Thomas against Hood, the latter, "turning and twisting like a fox," would slip out of their hands, and thus time, energy, and opportunity would be wasted, without any adequate results. In the strict economy of war, therefore, Sherman was justified in using this superfluous army elsewhere, striking instead of waiting, marching, and countermarching. It is true there were no armies in his front to strike, southward or eastward. Still, there were several important ends to be attained by his march."

In the first place, the march of an organized army, as strong in numbers as that with which Sherman proposed to move through the interior of the enemy's country, from its easternmost to its westernmost limit, would at the same time illustrate the inherent weakness of the Confederacy and the strength of the national armies. Such a march, with such an army, would demonstrate to the world that the ultimate triumph of the nation over the rebellion was an assured fact. In connection with President Lincoln's reelection, it would ruin the hopes of the peace party in the loyal states. It would also destroy all confidence on the part of the Southern people that their usurped government could afford them protection. Well might Sherman say that, "even without a battle, the results, operating upon the minds of sensible men, would produce fruits more than compensating for the expense, trouble, and risk."

But it would not be simply a political demonstration. The military cavalry, and he will soon move in several columns in a circuit, so as to catch Hood's army. Sherman's destination is not Charleston, but Selma, where he will meet an army from the Gulf," etc.

November 11. To General HALLECK: "My arrangements are now all complete. Last night we burned all foundries, mills, and shops of every kind in Rome, and to-morrow I leave Kingston, with the rear-guard, for Atlanta, which I propose to dispose of in a similar manner, and to start on the 16th on the projected grand raid. All appearances still indicate that Beauregard has gone back to his old hole at Corinth, and I hope he will enjoy it; my army prefers to enjoy the fresh sweet-potato fields of the Ocmulgee. I have balanced all the figures well, and am satisfied that General Thomas has in Tennessee a force sufficient for all probabilities, and I have urged him, the moment Beauregard turns south, to cross the Tennessee at Decatur and push straight for Selma. To-morrow our wires will be broken, and this is probably my last dispatch. I would like to have Foster break the Savannah and Charleston Road about Pocatigo about the 1st of December. All other preparations are to my entire satisfaction."


The same day Colonel Beckwith reports to Sherman as follows: "The Army of the Tennessee have obtained and have got in their wagons all they can haul and all they want; same of the Twentieth Army Corps. There is great plenty of salt, coffee, meat, pepper, and soap here. The Fourteenth Army Corps may want a little more bread, and perhaps a little more sugar. I have about 100,000 rations of bread for the Fourteenth Army Corps; 22,000 rations sugar. I do not know how much General Davis may have on hand, but presume he has 200,000 rations of bread. Every thing is loaded in Atlanta save what is held for the Fourteenth Army Corps. There are at least 11,200,000 rations of the principal rations in hands of troops and available."

November 11. To General THOMAS: "All right. I can hardly believe Beauregard would attempt to work against Nashville from Corinth as a base at this stage of the war, but all information points that way; if he does, you will whip him out of his boots. But I rather think you will find commotion in his camp in a day or two. Last night we burned Rome, and in two days more will burn Atlanta, and he must discover that I am not retreating, but, on the contrary, fighting for the very heart of Georgia. . . . By using detachments of recruits and dismounted cavalry in your fortifications, you will have Schofield, and Stanley, and A. J. Smith strengthened by eight or ten new regiments, and all of Wilson's cavalry; you could safely invite Beauregard across the Tennessee, and prevent his ever returning. I still believe, however, that public clamor will force him to turn and follow me, in which event you should cross at Decatur, and move directly toward Selma as far as you can transport supplies. The probabilities are the wires will be broken to-morrow, and that all communication will cease between us. . . . You may act, however, on the certainty that I sally from Atlanta on the 16th, with about 60,000 men, well provisioned, but expecting to live liberally on the country."

Thomas replies the next day: "I have no fears that Beauregard can do us any harm now, and if he attempts to follow you I will follow him as far as possible; if he does not, follow you. I will then thoroughly organize my troops, and, I believe, shall have men enough to ruin him unless he gets out of the way very rapidly. The country of Middle Alabama, I learn, is teeming with supplies this year, which will be greatly to our advantage. . . . I am now convinced that the greater part of Beauregard's army is near Florence and Tusculumbia, and that you will at least have a clear road before you for several days, and that your success will fully equal your expectations."

This was the last dispatch received by Sherman from Thomas before starting out on the great march. Sherman replied "All right," and the wires were cut.





DESTRUCTION OF THE DEPOTS, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND MANUFACTORIES AT ATLANTA.

sequences of such a march must be important and decisive. The cities of the Atlantic sea-board were doomed the moment Sherman's army should reach their rear. At Savannah or Charleston this army could be transported by sea, or could march by land through the Carolinas, and, re-enforcing Grant, terminate the long-protracted conflict with Lee's army.

But what if Thomas should be conquered by Hood? Then, indeed, Sherman's march would have demonstrated only his own folly. He would have ascended like a rocket and come down a stick. But to have anticipated such an event would have been an insult to General Thomas, and to the armies of Schofield, Stanley, and Smith. Sherman had no apprehensions on that score. Not until Thomas had himself expressed his faith in his own power to ruin Hood, if the latter advanced, or to assume the offensive against him if he retreated, did Sherman move from Atlanta.

By the 14th of November, the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Twentieth Corps were grouped about Atlanta, constituting an army 60,000 strong, with an additional force of cavalry under Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick, numbering 5500 men. The artillery consisted of about 60 guns, or one piece to every thousand men. Every thing had been sent to the rear which could not be used in the campaign. The railroad north had been destroyed as far as Dalton. Rome and Atlanta had been burned, only the dwelling-houses and churches escaping destruction. On the 16th of November Sherman commenced his grand March to the Sea. While he is advancing eastward through the fruitful fields of Georgia, let us follow the counter-movement of Hood against Nashville.

## CHAPTER XLVII.

### BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.

Hood attacks Decatur and is repulsed.—Forrest's Demonstration against Johnsonville.—Hood north of the Tennessee.—Estimate of the opposing Forces.—Schofield abandons Pulaski.—Retreat from Columbia to Franklin.—Narrow Escape at Spring Hill.—Battle of Franklin.—Its Results.—Hood in front of Nashville.—Demonstration against Murfreesborough.—Preparations for Battle on both sides.—Inclement Weather.—General Thomas assumes the Defensive.—Battles of December 15th and 16th.—Defeat of Hood's Army.—The Pursuit.—Results of the Nashville Campaign.—Gillen defeated by Breckinridge.—Stoneman drives Breckinridge into North Carolina.—Destruction of the Works at Saltville.

FORREST had intended to cross the Tennessee in the vicinity of Gunter's Landing and threaten Bridgeport, thus compelling Sherman to abandon Georgia in order to protect Tennessee. Beauregard had ordered Forrest to move with his cavalry into Tennessee, Hood not having a sufficient cavalry force to protect his trains north of the river.<sup>1</sup> These orders did not reach Forrest in time, and Hood was therefore compelled to move down the Tennessee and await Forrest's arrival. On the 26th of October a portion of Hood's infantry appeared before Decatur, on the south side of the river, at the southern terminus of the Nashville and Decatur Railroad, and on the afternoon of that day made a feeble attack on the garrison, which was commanded by R. S. Granger. Granger was re-enforced by two regiments from Chattanooga, and instructed to hold his post at all hazards. The next day the enemy established a line of rifle-pits within 500 yards of the town. On the 28th a sortie was made by a part of the garrison, which, advancing under cover of the guns of the fort, down the river bank and around to the rear of the enemy's rifle-pits, dislodged the Confederates, capturing 120 prisoners. Forrest in the mean while had reached Corinth, and advanced from that point upon Fort Heiman, on the west bank of the Tennessee, about 75 miles from Paducah. Here he captured the gun-boat No. 55 and two transports on the 31st, having previously burned the steamer Empress. He had about 17 regiments of cavalry, probably numbering altogether 5000 men, and 9 pieces of artillery. On the 2d of November he planted batteries above and below Johnsonville, one of General Thomas's bases of supplies on the river, isolating, at that place, three gun-boats and eight transports. The gun-boats made an unsuccessful attack upon the lower batteries, but, though repulsed, they recaptured from the enemy one of the transports which he had taken, and forced him to destroy the gun-boat No. 55. On the 4th Forrest made an attack on the gun-boats and the garrison, consisting of 1000 men. The gun-boats, being disabled, were burned to prevent their falling into the enemy's hands, and the fire, spreading to the buildings of the commissary and quartermaster's departments, and to the stores on the levee, caused the government a loss estimated at \$1,500,000. The next morning Forrest repeated his attack upon the garrison, and, after a furious cannonade of over an hour's duration, withdrew from Johnsonville.


Hood's army arrived at Florence on the 31st of October, one month after it had been transferred from Sherman's front. This long delay, caused partly by the difficulties attending the transportation of supplies, had thwarted the sole object of Hood's campaign. It had given Sherman and Thomas time for completing their preparations, the former for his march eastward, and the latter for the accumulation of an army large enough to protect Tennessee.

Hood's force, including all arms, on the 1st of November did not number over 40,000 effective men. Thomas had in his command a considerably larger force. After deducting the garrisons of Nashville, Decatur, and Chattanooga, however, his army available for battle numbered about 30,000 men.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Hood's Report.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas says in his report: "At this time (November 5th) I found myself confronted by the army which, under General J. E. Johnston, had so skillfully resisted the advance of the whole active army of the military division of the Mississippi from Dalton to the Chattahoochee, re-enforced by a well-equipped and enthusiastic cavalry command of over 12,000, led by one of the boldest and most successful commanders in the rebel army. My information from all sources confirmed the reported strength of Hood's army to be from 40,000 to 45,000 infantry, and from 12,000 to 15,000





MAP ILLUSTRATING HOOD'S INVASION.

Hood persisted in his scheme of invading Tennessee. General Beauregard does not seem to have exercised a very potent influence in this matter. The problem now presented puzzled him, and he could not solve it. He therefore left it to Hood's option to do as he pleased—either to divide his forces, sending a part against Sherman and advance with the other, or to move against Thomas with his whole force. Hood had delayed on the banks of the Tennessee till past the middle of November, and until Sherman was on his march. He had laid a pontoon bridge across the river, mooring it to the piers of the old railroad bridge at Florence, and had crossed Lee's corps and two divisions of cavalry. Stewart and Cheatham still remained on the south side until November 17th. On the 21st Forrest's cavalry joined the main army, and the movement northward was commenced.

If the Confederate army of Tennessee had been under the disposition of General Grant to move where it would best suit him, he would not, he declares in his official report, have made any other disposition of it than that made by General Hood. Hood's reasoning upon the proper course for him to take is exceedingly shallow. He says: "The enemy having for the first time divided his forces, I had to determine which of the two parts to direct my operations against. To follow the forces about to move through Georgia under Sherman would be to again abandon the regained territory to the forces under Thomas, with little hope of being able to reach the enemy in time to defeat his movement, and also to cause desertion and greatly impair the morale, or fighting spirit of the army, by what would be considered a compulsory retreat." It was, indeed, of no use to follow Sherman except with cavalry. But the reason which Hood gives for advancing against Thomas is simply ludicrous. For what had he gained thus far in his campaign that he should hesitate to abandon? He had advanced from Jonesborough to Dalton, capturing some unimportant stations which he had hastily released, destroying a few miles of railroad which it had taken less than a fortnight to repair, then had fallen back to Gadsden, and had moved thence to Corinth and Florence. He held no post of any military value to himself or to his foe. Indeed, he had nothing to abandon except his design of invasion. But the chief motive of the invasion—namely, to compel Sherman to leave Georgia for the protection of Tennessee—no longer existed,

cavalry. My effective force at this time consisted of the Fourth Corps, about 12,000, under Major General D. S. Stanley; the Twenty-third Corps, about 10,000, under Major General John M. Schofield; Hatch's division of cavalry, about 4,000; Croxton's brigade, 2,500, and Capron's brigade of about 1,200. The balance of my force was distributed along the railroad, and posted at Murfreesborough, Stevenson, Bridgeport, Huntsville, Decatur, and Chattanooga, to keep open our communications and hold the posts above named, if attacked, until they could be re-enforced, as up to this time it was impossible to determine which course Hood would take—advance on Nashville or turn toward Huntsville.

According to this report, Hood had from 52,000 to 57,000 men, and Thomas about 30,000, exclusive of his detachments on the railroad and at the posts mentioned.

As to the numbers of Hood's army, the best authority is the official return of the Confederate Army of Tennessee for November 6th, 1864, which gives a force of 30,600 men. This is exclusive of Forrest's cavalry, which probably did not reach 10,000.

As to Thomas's command, Sherman represents the Fourth Corps as 15,000 strong; but, taking Thomas's estimate, we have his available force (November 5th):

Stanley's Corps .....	12,000	Croxton's Cavalry .....	2,500
Schofield's Corps .....	10,000	Capron's Cavalry .....	1,200
Hatch's Cavalry .....	4,000		
			29,700

But to this must be added Washburne's command, 4,500, which makes 34,200. It must also be remembered that, in case of an important battle, at least 6,000 veteran troops, in addition to those above enumerated, could be brought into action. And in this estimate no notice whatever is taken of four elements which would soon give Thomas a very great preponderance of force as compared with Hood's, namely: 1st, new regiments of recruits constantly arriving at Nashville; 2d, A. J. Smith's two divisions on the way from Missouri; 3d, Wilson's cavalry, which in a few days would amount to about 12,000 men; and, 4th, about 7,000 men suitable for garrison duty which would soon be sent back to Thomas from Sherman's army, on account of their unfitness for the great march.

In connection with the official return of Hood's army for November 6th, one thing is worthy of notice. On the 20th of September, before Hood moved from the Macon Road, his army numbered 40,406. It is plain, therefore, that in the course of the advance to Dalton, the retreat to Gadsden, and the movement to Florence, Hood had lost about 10,000 men; and a large proportion of this loss must be attributed to desertion. Hood, it is clear, had not by his invasion very much improved the morale of his army.

for Sherman had defied his projected invasion in the boldest and bluntest terms. The railroad from which Hood had been driven Sherman had destroyed with his own hands. Atlanta, which Hood had hoped to recover, Sherman had made a useless possession to the enemy as well as to himself. And Georgia, which Hood was pledged to redeem, was already being trampled down under the heels of 60,000 men, whom, with his own army, he could not reach if he would, and whom, if he could have reached, he dared not encounter. As to the morale of his army, Hood's invasion thus far had certainly not improved that; for since he had started from Jonesborough he had lost 10,000 men, or one fourth of his army, though in that time he had only fought a single serious battle—that of Allatoona. Hood could have lost nothing by a judicious retreat which could be compared with what he risked by an advance against Thomas. To allow the Federal forces to assume the defensive was to give them such advantages as must be decisive. The advance was the result of the infatuation of both Hood and Davis. The threat had been uttered, the pledge given, and it was too late now to hesitate or falter.

The wager which Hood had offered Thomas was ready to accept. The latter would have preferred an encounter with the enemy south of Duck River: this would have been possible if the Confederate army had delayed its movements for a week or ten days. The Federal cavalry guarding the Tennessee about Florence had already been driven back, so that Croxton was on the east side of Shoal Creek, and Hatch occupied Lawrenceburg. Schofield, with the Twenty-third Corps, had arrived at Nashville November 5th, and was directed to join the Fourth Corps at Pulaski, take the command of the troops at that point, and, as far as possible, retard Hood's advance into Tennessee. It was obviously Thomas's policy to impede Hood's movements, gradually withdrawing Schofield and Stanley, until he could receive the re-enforcements under A. J. Smith, and organize Wilson's cavalry and the new regiments. Hood's army moved by parallel roads to Waynesborough and eastward of that place, with Forrest on the right flank. On the 22d of November Hatch's cavalry was driven from Lawrenceburg. Hood desired to push his army up between Nashville and Schofield's command; but on the 23d the Federal forces evacuated Pulaski, and fell back to Columbia, on the Duck River. The retreat was ably conducted, all the public property being removed beforehand from Pulaski, and the trains carefully guarded. Thomas had meanwhile received some 7,000 men which had been sent back from Atlanta by General Sherman; his command had also been re-enforced by 20 new one-year regiments, very many of which were absorbed in the veteran corps, replacing old regiments whose term of service had expired. R. S. Granger had withdrawn the garrisons at Athens, Decatur, and Huntsville, Alabama, taking a part of the force thus collected to Stevenson, and sending back five regiments to Murfreesborough. The garrison at Johnsonville was withdrawn to Clarksville.

Hood's movement on Columbia was slow; not until the evening of November 27th had his advance reached Schofield's front. During that night Schofield crossed Duck River, taking a position on the north bank, where he was not disturbed during the 28th. General Wilson's cavalry, 4,300 strong, guarded the crossings of the river above and below. On the afternoon of the 29th Wilson was pressed back and cut off from Schofield, while Hood's infantry crossed the river, and threatened to turn Schofield's flank by an advance on Spring Hill, about 15 miles north of Columbia. Schofield, therefore, sending Stanley with Wagner's division to Spring Hill to head off the enemy at that point and cover the retreat, prepared to fall back toward Franklin. Stanley reached Spring Hill just in time to check Forrest's advance and save the trains. The Confederate infantry coming up to Forrest's assistance, a doubtful battle was maintained till dark, in which the enemy nearly succeeded in dislodging Stanley from his position. Schofield, having sent back his trains, was at the same time occupied in resisting the enemy's attempts to cross Duck River in his front, and, after having several times repulsed the Confederate force opposed to him, retreated at night, his command making 25 miles under cover of the darkness, and, passing Spring Hill in safety, got into position at Franklin, 18 miles south of Nashville, on the morning of the 30th.

With Cheatham's corps supported by Stewart's, it seems that the enemy ought to have defeated Stanley at Spring Hill and cut off Schofield's retreat. But Stanley maintained his position and saved the army.<sup>1</sup> He was re-enforced toward night by Ruger's division of the Twenty-third Corps. But, even after this re-enforcement, the enemy had the advantage. With two

<sup>1</sup> General Hood, in his report, gives the following account of the affair at Spring Hill:

"When I had gotten well on his flank, the enemy discovered my intention, and began to retreat on the pike toward Spring Hill. The cavalry became engaged near that place about midday, but his trains were so strongly guarded that they were unable to break through them. About 4 P.M. our infantry forces, Major General Cheatham in the advance, commenced to come in contact with the enemy, about two miles from Spring Hill, through which place the Columbia and Franklin Pike passes. The enemy was at this time moving rapidly along the pike, with some of his troops formed on the flank of his column to protect it. Major General Cheatham was ordered to attack the enemy at once, vigorously, and get possession of this pike, and, although these orders were frequently and earnestly repeated, he made but a feeble and partial attack, failing to reach the point indicated. Had my instructions been carried out there is no doubt that we could have possessed ourselves of this road. Stewart's corps and Johnson's division were arriving upon the field to support the attack. Though the golden opportunity had passed with daylight, I did not at dark abandon the hope of dealing the enemy a heavy blow. Accordingly, Lieutenant General Stewart was furnished a guide, and ordered to move his corps beyond Cheatham's, and place it across the road beyond Spring Hill. Shortly after this General Cheatham came to my headquarters, and when I informed him of Stewart's movement, he said that Stewart ought to form on his right. I asked if that would throw Stewart across the pike. He replied that it would, and a mile beyond. Accordingly, one of Cheatham's staff officers was sent to show Stewart where his (Cheatham's) right rested. In the dark and confusion, Stewart did not succeed in getting the position desired, but about 11 P.M. went into bivouac. About 12 P.M., ascertaining that the enemy was moving in great confusion—artillery, wagons, and troops intermixed—I sent instructions to General Cheatham to advance a heavy line of skirmishers against him, and still farther impede and confuse his march. This was not accomplished. The enemy continued to move along the road in hurry and confusion, within hearing, nearly all the night. Thus was lost a great opportunity of striking the enemy, for which we had labored so long, the greatest this campaign had offered, and one of the greatest during the war."





G. D. WAGNER.

full corps of Forrest's cavalry in the vicinity of Spring Hill, Schofield ought to have been cut off at least from the direct road to Franklin. His main army did not leave Duck River, where it had been fighting Lee, until after dark, and passed Spring Hill about midnight. It certainly had a narrow escape. General Wagner's division of Stanley's corps held on to its position at Spring Hill until near daylight. Notwithstanding the superior numbers of the enemy, the only disturbances suffered in the retreat was from a slight attack made north of Thompson's by Forrest's cavalry, causing the loss of a few wagons. General Cooper, who had been left to guard the crossing at Duck River, was cut off from the direct road to Franklin, and proceeded to Nashville.

When Schofield reached Franklin he found no wagon bridge across the Harpeth River, and the fords in a bad condition. The railroad bridge was rapidly repaired and a foot-bridge was constructed, which was also available for the use of wagons. He sent his train across, and intended to cross with his army. But the enemy was in too close proximity. As the Federal troops arrived they were placed in position on the south side of the river, the Twenty-third Corps, under General Cox, on the left and centre, covering the approaches from Columbia and Lewisburg, and Kimball's division of Stanley's corps on the right; both flanks of the army resting on the river. Wood's division of Stanley's corps was sent to the north side of the river to cover the flanks, in the event of Hood's crossing above or below. Two brigades of Wagner's division—the last to reach Franklin—were left in front, to retard the advance of the enemy.

At daylight Hood had commenced the pursuit, which was pushed with great vigor. Stewart was in the advance, Cheatham following, while Lee, with the trains, brought up the rear from Columbia. Hood determined to make a direct attack with Stewart's and Cheatham's corps without waiting for Lee. No flank movement which he could now make would prevent Schofield from reaching Nashville.<sup>1</sup> Stewart advanced on the right, Cheatham on the left, with the cavalry on either flank, the main body of the latter, under Forrest, moving to the right. Johnson's division of Lee's corps arrived during the engagement, and went in on the left.

Fortunately for Schofield, Hood's attack was delayed until 4 o'clock on the afternoon of the 30th. In the mean time the Federal troops were constructing breastworks and protecting them by a slight abatis on the left. To them, with the river in their rear, and with the roads, by which alone retreat was possible, crowded with the wagon trains, defeat would have been a terrible disaster, affecting the safety of Nashville. On both sides the decisive nature of the contest was fully appreciated. It was a brief battle, for at this season of the year 4 P.M. was the verge of twilight.<sup>2</sup> Wagner's men, holding the outposts, "imprudently brave," reports Schofield, maintained the conflict outside of the intrenchments longer than was necessary, suffering heavy loss. When they fell back it was at a full run, and this movement swept back a portion of the first line in the works, allowing the enemy to

enter in large numbers. In this attempt to fight a battle with outposts Wagner lost over a thousand men. The enemy had gained an advantage, which, if pressed, might have resulted in success. Victory seemed almost within his grasp. The Federal line had been broken in the centre; two batteries of four guns each had been captured. But at this moment Opdyke, commanding the remaining brigade of Wagner's division, which had been held in reserve inside the works, leading his men on, shouting "Forward to the lines!" rushed forward, recovered the lost batteries, and captured 400 prisoners. The gap had been closed; but the enemy, though disappointed, was not disheartened. He charged the works, making four distinct attacks, and was each time hurled back with heavy loss. "So vigorous and fierce were these assaults that the enemy reached the exterior slope of the rude intrenchments, and hand-to-hand encounters occurred between the enraged combatants across the works."<sup>3</sup> Between the assaults, the enemy, covered by the undulations of the ground, pressed his sharpshooters close to the works, and kept up a galling fire.

The Confederates persistently assailed Schofield's line until after dark, continuing the attack at intervals until near midnight, but were repulsed in every attempt to carry the works. The Confederate loss was between 4500 and 6000 men. Schofield lost 2326, of which number of casualties 1241 occurred in Wagner's division.<sup>2</sup> On the Federal side, General Stanley was severely wounded in the neck. The Confederate loss in general officers was very great, including among them Major General Pat. Cleburne, and Brigadier Generals Gist, John Adams, Strahl, and Granbury; Brigadier Generals Carter, Manigault, Quarles, Cockrell, and Scott were wounded, and Brigadier General Gordon was captured.<sup>3</sup> At midnight Schofield withdrew from the trenches which he had held against the repeated assaults of far superior numbers, and fell back to Nashville.

Hood's orders to his corps commanders to drive Schofield into the river, and for Forrest to advance and capture the trains, had failed of execution. General Thomas's position was now secure. On the 1st of December he had behind the fortifications of Nashville and covering its southern approaches an investing force superior to General Hood's, and a cavalry force in process of organization at Edgefield, north of the river, which in a few days would in numbers be at least equal to Forrest's command. A. J. Smith's command of three divisions had also reached Nashville. Smith was placed on the right of the line, Wood, now commanding the Fourth Corps, in the centre, and Schofield on the left.

The next day, December 2d, the enemy advanced to within two miles of Nashville, and invested the town on the south side, General Lee holding the centre of the line, Cheatham the right, and Stewart the left; the cavalry on either flank extended to the river. The whole line was intrenched, and strong detached works were constructed to guard the flanks against attack. On Hood's right, Murfreesborough was held by a Federal force 8000 strong under General Rousseau, which cut off all communication with Georgia and Virginia. Bates's division of Cheatham's corps attacked the block-house at Overall's Creek, four miles north of Murfreesborough, on the 4th of December. The garrison maintained its position, and being soon re-enforced from Murfreesborough with three infantry regiments, four companies of cavalry, and a section of artillery, the enemy was driven off. During the 5th, 6th, and 7th, Bates, re-enforced by the greater portion of Forrest's cavalry, demonstrated against Fortress Rosecrans at Murfreesborough. As the enemy hesitated to make a direct assault, Rousseau determined to assume the offensive himself. Accordingly, on the 8th, General Milroy, with seven infantry regiments (3325 men), proceeded to the Wilkinson Pike, there encountered Bates and Forrest, and drove them from their temporary breastworks, capturing 207 prisoners.<sup>4</sup> The Federal loss in killed and wounded was 205. Buford's division of Forrest's cavalry entered the town of Murfreesborough the same day, but was speedily driven out by a single infantry regiment and a section of artillery. Forrest's cavalry, retiring from before Murfreesborough, proceeded northward to Lebanon, and threatened to cross the Cumberland above Nashville and cut off Thomas's communications by the Louisville Road. This movement was thwarted by a division of gun-boats and a detachment of Wilson's cavalry.

From the 3d to the 15th of December was spent by both armies in preparation for the conflict which was to decide the fate of Nashville. Hood was furnishing his army with supplies and with shoes. From the 7th to the 14th both armies were ice-bound. Thomas thus had time to remount Wilson's cavalry, increase the strength of his works, bring up re-enforcements of new recruits and temporary volunteers, and to mature his plan of operations. Nashville was well fortified when Thomas entered it with his army. The southern approaches were covered by Forts Negley, Morton, Confiscation, Houston, and Gillem. Some of these had been constructed in the latter part of 1862, when the city was threatened by a portion of Bragg's army. These forts were situated on commanding hills near the city, and some distance beyond ran the line now held by Thomas's army. From Fort Morton westward an interior line of defense was also constructed, along the range of hills nearer Nashville.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> General T. J. Wood's Report.

<sup>2</sup> Hood reports his own loss as 4500. Schofield, from information obtained afterward, makes the enemy's loss "1750 buried upon the field, 3800 disabled, and 702 prisoners." Hood claims that he captured 1000 prisoners. This tallies well with Schofield's report, in which he admits 1104 missing, 670 of whom were from Wagner's division.

<sup>3</sup> Hood's Report.

<sup>4</sup> Hood reports that Bates's division behaved badly.

<sup>5</sup> Thomas's army at Nashville consisted of the following forces:

Schofield's Twenty-third Corps.....	9,000 men.
Wood's Fourth Corps.....	11,000 "
A. J. Smith's Corps, say.....	11,000 "
Stedman's Command, which arrived at Nashville from December 1.....	5,200 "
Wilson's Cavalry.....	12,000 "
Quartermaster's Troops under Brigadier General Donaldson, and other forces under General Miller used in the immediate defense of Nashville, say.....	8,000 "
Total.....	55,200 "

<sup>1</sup> "I learned from dispatches captured at Spring Hill, from Thomas to Schofield, that the latter was instructed to hold that place till the position at Franklin could be made secure, indicating the intention of Thomas to hold Franklin and his strong works at Murfreesborough. Thus I knew that it was all-important to attack Schofield before he could make himself strong, and, if he should escape at Franklin, he would gain his works about Nashville. The nature of the position was such as to render it inexpedient to attempt any farther flank movement, and I therefore determined to attack him in front, and without delay."—Hood's Report.

<sup>2</sup> On the 30th of November, 1864, the sun set at 4 39. Schofield's report makes the battle to have commenced at 3 30 P.M.





MAP OF THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.



The severity of the weather began to relax on the 14th, and on the afternoon of that day Thomas issued orders to his corps commanders for an advance against the enemy. His army was now 50,000 strong, and fully prepared for battle. A large portion of Forrest's cavalry was still absent from the Confederate army. Hood seems in his infatuation to have been absolutely confident of victory in the event of Thomas's assuming the offensive.<sup>1</sup> He even dreamed of besieging Nashville. But the swollen river, patrolled by gun-boats, hindered an advance against the Louisville Road, and, even if this road had been reached and broken by Confederate cavalry, Thomas was well supplied at Nashville with all that was necessary for either a defensive or offensive campaign. The term siege would be scarcely applicable to General Hood's operations.

Upon his first approach to the city on the 2d of December, Hood had seized Montgomery Hill, within 600 yards of the Federal centre, and thrown up strong lines of earth-works on the hills south and parallel with those occupied by Thomas. His infantry stretched from the Nolensville Pike, on the right, along the high ground south and east of Brown's Creek, and across the Franklin and Granny White Pikes to the hills bordering the Hillsborough Pike. A wide interval, therefore, separated his left from the river. This—as also the corresponding interval between the Nolensville Pike and the river—was held by the cavalry, who had established batteries about eight miles below Nashville, blockading the river. The weak point of the Confederate position was its left flank, which, though strongly intrenched, was easily turned.

Thomas's long silence appeared to have increased Hood's confidence. It also led to considerable apprehension on the part of Lieutenant General Grant, who, at so great a distance from the field, was not aware of the rigorous cold which hindered Thomas's advance, and was also a serious inconvenience to the poorly-clad soldiers of Hood's army. He thought that Thomas ought to have moved upon Hood as soon as the latter had made his appearance in front of Nashville, and before he was fortified, and that by waiting to remount Wilson's cavalry he had made a great mistake. Perhaps, also, the narrow escape of Schofield's army in the retreat from Columbia to Franklin—an escape which could only be attributed to either the stupidity of the Confederate generals or to their want of confidence in their commander—led him to suspect that the campaign was not being properly conducted. At any rate, so great was his impatience that he started West with the idea of superintending matters there in person. He had only reached Washington when he received a dispatch from Thomas announcing the successful commencement of the battle of Nashville.<sup>2</sup>

General Thomas's plan of the battle was very simple, involving the turning of the enemy's left flank by a sudden and irresistible blow to be struck with the bulk of his army, and to be followed up until Hood's army was destroyed or dispersed in utter rout. Success was as certain as the event of a battle ever could be. The execution of this plan was so perfect in all its details that it justly conferred upon General Thomas the first rank among the Union generals as a tactician.<sup>3</sup> He had delayed for the purpose of organizing an efficient cavalry corps, in order that, in the event of victory, he might reap its full fruits by a relentless pursuit of the defeated army. He was prepared to attack a week before he did, but the weather, as we have said, was unfavorable. On the 12th Wilson's cavalry had crossed the Cumberland from Edgefield to the left of the Hillsborough Pike.

The morning of the 15th of December was every way favorable to the immediate execution of General Thomas's plans. The sheet of ice which had covered the earth for nearly a week was broken up; and, in addition to the undulations of the ground, a heavy mist, lasting until noon, completely


<sup>1</sup> "Should he attack me in position, I felt that I would defeat him, and thus gain possession of Nashville, with abundant supplies for the army. This would give me possession of Tennessee."—Hood's Report.

<sup>2</sup> In his official report, Grant says:

"Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was increased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the Cumberland into Kentucky. I feared Hood would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there. After urging upon General Thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, I started West to superintend matters there in person. Reaching Washington City, I received General Thomas's dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the result as far as the battle had progressed. I was delighted. All fears and apprehensions were dispelled. I am not yet satisfied but that General Thomas, immediately upon the appearance of Hood before Nashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out with his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it impracticable to attack earlier than he did. But his final defeat of Hood was so complete that it will be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment."

<sup>3</sup> The following is a copy of Thomas's order issued to his corps commanders on the 14th:

"As soon as the state of the weather will admit of offensive operations, the troops will move against the enemy's position in the following order: Major General A. J. Smith, commanding detachment of the Army of the Tennessee, after forming his troops on and near the Hardin Pike, in front of his present position, will make a vigorous assault on the enemy's left. Major General Wilson, commanding the cavalry corps, Military Division of the Mississippi, with three divisions, will move on and support General Smith's right, assisting, as far as possible, in carrying the left of the enemy's position, and be in readiness to throw his force upon the enemy the moment a favorable opportunity occurs. Major General Wilson will also send one division on the Charlotte Pike to clear that road of the enemy, and observe in the direction of Bell's Landing, to protect our right rear until the enemy's position is fairly turned, when it will rejoin the main force. Brigadier General T. J. Wood, commanding Fourth Army Corps, after leaving a strong skirmish line in his works from Laurens's Hill to his extreme right, will form the remainder of the Fourth Corps on the Hillsborough Pike to support General Smith's left, and operate on the left and rear of the enemy's advanced position on Montgomery Hill. Major General Schofield, commanding the Twenty-third Army Corps, will replace Brigadier General Kimball's division of the Fourth Corps with his troops, and occupy the trenches from Fort Negley to Laurens's Hill with a strong skirmish line. He will move with the remainder of his force in front of the works, and co-operate with General Wood, protecting the latter's left flank against an attack of the enemy. Major General Steedman, commanding the District of Etowah, will occupy the interior line in front of his present position, stretching from the reservoir on the Cumberland River to Fort Negley with a strong skirmish line, and mass the remainder of his force in its present position, to act according to the exigencies which may arise during these operations. Brigadier General Miller, with the troops forming the garrison of Nashville, will occupy the interior line from the battery on hill 210 to the extreme right, including the inclosed work on the Hyde's Ferry Road. The quartermaster's troops, under command of Brigadier General Donaldson, will, if necessary, be posted on the interior line from Fort Morton to the battery on hill 210. The troops occupying the interior line will be under the direction of Major General Steadman, who is charged with the immediate defense of Nashville during the operations around the city. Should the weather permit, the troops will be formed to commence operations at 6 A.M. on the 15th, or as soon thereafter as practicable."



JAMES B. STEEDMAN.


masked the preparations for battle. Under these auspicious circumstances, Smith advanced immediately in front of his works, with Wilson's cavalry on his right. Wood and Schofield, leaving strong skirmish lines in their trenches, marched to the right, Wood forming in line on Smith's left, and Schofield supporting Wood, guarding the left flank against attack. Steedman, who had charge of the defenses of Nashville, leaving Donaldson's and Miller's troops to hold the interior line of defense, advanced with his main force against the enemy's right. Steedman's operations were demonstrative, and preceded the main attack. His force consisted of three brigades—Thompson's, Morgan's, and Grosvenor's, the two former being composed of disciplined negro soldiers. Though unsuccessful in his attack on the Confederate right, he succeeded in diverting the enemy's attention from the centre and left, leaving the way open for Wilson, Smith, Wood, and Schofield, 40,000 strong, to sweep around against the enemy's works on the Hillsborough Pike.

The advance of Smith and Wilson commenced as soon as Steedman's movement was completely developed on either side of the Hardin Pike. Over difficult and broken ground, their movement proceeded from the Cumberland and the hills adjoining it across and along the Hardin Pike, and then swept eastward, enveloping the Confederate left on the Hillsborough Pike, threatening to strike Brentwood, in Hood's rear, on the road to Franklin. Hood was completely surprised, and his cavalry, a great portion of which was in the vicinity of Murfreesborough and along the Cumberland, was too weak to meet the sudden blow. Hatch's cavalry division moved on Smith's right, with Croxton's brigade on his own right, and Knipe's division in support. McArthur's infantry division held the right, and therefore the advance of Smith's corps, and, with Hatch's cavalry, encountered the enemy a little after noon. On the right of the Hillsborough Pike the enemy had some advanced works protecting his left. The Confederates were driven from this position by Hatch and McArthur, who, swinging to the left, came upon a redoubt containing four guns, which was carried by a portion of Hatch's division, and the captured artillery turned upon the enemy. A second redoubt was then carried, with four guns and about 300 prisoners. McArthur justly shared the glory of these captures.


While the enemy's left was being driven back on the Granny White Pike, the Fourth Corps, under Wood, was assaulting the centre at Montgomery Hill. This position was carried by Post's brigade of Wagner's division, and several prisoners were captured. Wood now connected with Smith's left, and Schofield's corps was moved from the reserve to Smith's right, the cavalry, at the same time, being thrown still farther around against the enemy's rear. But, while Wilson, Schofield, and Smith pressed forward during the afternoon, sweeping every thing before them, Wood had still another line of works to assault on his front. This was at length carried, and 700 prisoners, 8 guns, and 5 caissons were captured. By night, Hood's army had been driven out of its original line of works, and back from the Hillsborough Road, but still held possession of two lines of retreat to Franklin by the main road through Brentwood and the Granny White Pike. Thomas had won substantial trophies of victory, his captures consisting of 1200 prisoners, 16 guns, 40 wagons, and a large number of small-arms. Owing to the unexpectedness of the attack, and the brilliant tactics of the Federal commander, these results had been gained with slight Union loss, while the Confederate loss was heavy. During the afternoon, Johnson's division of Wilson's cavalry had, with the co-operation of the gun-boats, captured the Confederate batteries blockading the river below Nashville at Bell's Landing. At 9 P.M. Thomas telegraphed to Washington: "I shall attack the enemy again to-morrow if he stands to fight, and if he retreats during the night I will pursue him, throwing a heavy cavalry force in his rear to destroy his trains, if possible."

But Hood did not yet give up the contest. During the night he withdrew






NASHVILLE, FROM EDGEFIELD.



NASHVILLE FROM THE OPPOSITE BANK OF THE CUMBERLAND.





EASTPORT, TENNESSEE.

his right and centre to conform to the left. Cheatham's corps was transferred from right to left, leaving Stewart in the centre and Lee on the right. Thus, when Wood advanced at 6 A.M. on the morning of the 16th, he found only skirmishers in his front. He advanced, therefore, directly south from Nashville on the Franklin Pike until he developed the enemy's main line. Then Steedman came up by the Nolensville Pike on Wood's left, and Smith on his right. These troops faced southward, while Schofield, facing to the east, held the position which he had gained the evening before. Wilson extended away off to the enemy's rear, still threatening Brentwood, at the same time that he guarded the Federal right, and was ready, in case of Hood's retreat, to fall upon his flank. Hood's right rested upon Overton's Hill, four miles north of Brentwood, and his left upon the hills bordering the Granny White Pike. His centre was weaker than either flank. The whole line, about three miles long, had been hastily but strongly intrenched, with abatis thrown up in front.

Not until mid-afternoon were Thomas's preparations for attack completed. About 600 yards separated the opposing armies. On the right, Wilson had extended well to Hood's rear and across the Granny White Pike. The tactics of the day before were repeated in the attack of the 16th. Wood and Steedman proceeded to assault Overton Hill. The movement, commencing at 3 P.M., was open to the enemy's observation, and troops were hurried from the Confederate left and centre to meet the attack at this point. Post's brigade, which the day before had stormed Montgomery Hill, again formed the main column of assault, Steedman's colored troops co-operating on the left. The result is thus briefly reported by General Thomas: "The assault was made, and received by the enemy with tremendous fire of grape and canister, and musketry. Our men moved steadily onward up the hill until near the crest, when the reserve of the enemy rose and poured into the assaulting column a most destructive fire, causing the men first to waver and then to fall back, leaving their dead and wounded, black and white indiscriminately mingled, lying amid the abatis, the gallant Colonel Post among the wounded."

Wood again reformed his command in its first position, and prepared to renew the attack. Hood, in the momentary enthusiasm following his partial success, began to hope that the day was already won. But his anticipations were doomed to disappointment; for Smith and Schofield had heard of Hood's weakening his lines in their front to support Lee's corps, and rushed forward upon the enemy's right and centre, "carrying all before them, irreparably breaking his lines in a dozen places, and capturing all his artillery and thousands of prisoners."<sup>1</sup> Among the latter were four general officers, including Major General Edward S. Johnson, and Brigadier Generals Jackson and Smith. Wilson made a simultaneous advance in the rear, falling upon the flank of the routed enemy and cutting him off from the Granny White Pike. This was a fitting prelude to Wood's second assault on Overton Hill. Once again the slopes of that eminence were ascended in the face of the enemy's fire. The summit was gained, the enemy was swept like chaff from his works, so many, at least, as were not taken prisoners, and all the artillery was captured. Hood's army, routed as no army had been in the history of the war, with but a remnant of artillery, abandoning its wagons and flinging aside its muskets, blankets, and every thing which might impede its own flight, or, clogging the road behind, might delay the pursuit of its victorious enemy, scattered in irrecoverable confusion down the Franklin Pike through Brentwood Pass.

If the battle could have been fought in the forenoon instead of in the afternoon, nothing could now have saved Hood's army from annihilation. The Fourth Corps pursued rapidly for several miles, capturing more prisoners, until darkness kindly enveloped the enemy's retreat. As soon as Hatch's dismounted men received their horses they also pursued on the Granny White Pike, Croxton and Knipe closely following. After proceeding about a mile, Hatch encountered Chalmers's Confederate cavalry, posted across the road behind barricades. The Twelfth Tennessee, Colonel Spaulding, charged and broke the enemy's lines, scattering the Confederates, and capturing, among other prisoners, Brigadier General G. W. Rucker.

Thus ended the two days' battle of Nashville. Hood's dead and wounded were left upon the field; besides these, he had lost 4462 prisoners, including 287 officers of all grades, from major general down, 53 guns, and thousands of small-arms.

The next morning the pursuit was continued. The Fourth Corps was followed by Steedman, and Wilson's cavalry by Schofield and Smith. Johnson's cavalry division was dispatched directly across the Harpeth to menace Franklin. Upon reaching the point where the Granny White runs into the Franklin Pike, Wilson took the advance, and encountered the Confederate rear-guard, under Stevenson, four miles north of Franklin, and charging in front and flank, dispersed the enemy and captured 413 prisoners. The presence of Johnson's cavalry division near Franklin compelled Hood to abandon that town, leaving in the hospitals over 2000 Confederate wounded. Wilson's cavalry still pursued. Now, more than ever, did Hood feel his need of Forrest, whom, in an evil moment, he had sent off on a bootless errand, just as formerly he had sent off Wheeler's cavalry at the very crisis of the Atlanta campaign. Forrest had been ordered back, but, owing to the swollen streams which barred his progress, he did not join Hood until the latter had reached Duck River. About five miles south of Franklin, the rear-guard, toward nightfall, made a temporary stand in the road, posting a battery of artillery on some rising ground. But Wilson, sending Hatch to the left and Knipe to the right of the road, with their batteries, charged Stevenson with his own body-guard, the Fourth Regular Cavalry, 180 strong. Freely using their sabres, the Union horsemen broke the Confederate centre,

<sup>1</sup> Thomas's Report.



Knipe and Hatch at the same time falling upon the flanks. Stevenson was thus swept from his chosen position for the second time, leaving his artillery in the road.

The 18th, like the day before, was rainy and dismal. The pursuit was continued to Duck River, where Hood had intrenched to make a stand, but wisely repented of his rash design and continued his flight to the Tennessee, leaving some of his guns at the bottom of Duck River. On reaching Rutherford's Creek, three miles north of Columbia, that stream was found impassable by the national troops. Sherman had taken the best pontoon train along with his army, and another, which had been hurriedly constructed at Nashville, was incomplete, and did not arrive in time. The delay thus occasioned relieved Hood from instant danger. But his army was reduced—so far as organization was concerned—to a simple rear-guard. Hood was retreating from Tennessee in precisely the same condition in which Davis had three months before predicted that Sherman would retreat from Georgia. Still, Thomas, as soon as possible, continued the pursuit to the Tennessee River. The route of the flying enemy—if toilsome dragging along the miry roads could be called flight—was easily traced by ruins of baggage wagons, by small-arms and blankets, and other *débris* of a demoralized army. At Pulaski, four guns were abandoned and thrown into Richland Creek; and a mile beyond, twenty wagons loaded with ammunition, and belonging to Cheatham's corps, were destroyed. All along the road Hood's stragglers lined the wayside, where they had fallen out, tired and discouraged.<sup>1</sup> The Confederate army, or rather its disorganized remnant, crossed the Tennessee on the 27th of December, and fell back to Tupelo, Mississippi. Here Hood, overwhelmed by the denunciations which beat upon him heavily from all sides, resigned his command of the wreck of an army which he had brought back, and was succeeded by General Dick Taylor, who had managed to get across from the west of the Mississippi.<sup>2</sup> But the Confederate Army of Tennessee, as an organized force, had fought its last campaign.

Thomas, on December 30th, announced to his army the successful completion of the campaign. It was an army which had been hastily gathered together from all quarters to meet Hood's invasion. Its numbers and efficiency were indications at the same time of the prompt and unyielding patriotism of the West, and of the generalship of Thomas. He it was who had moulded its segregate parts into a mobile army. And in all military history probably no army was ever more skillfully wielded. Thomas had quietly manifested his military capacity in the early battles of 1862; he had greatly distinguished himself, in a situation more adapted to a larger display of tactical skill, on the battle-field of Chickamauga, in 1863; but the battles of Nashville were the seal and impress of his military genius. In these latter battles he saw the end from the beginning; the victorious event was as clear to him on the morning of the 15th as on the night of the next day, when Hood had been routed; with him no mistake was possible, and thus upon victory followed its full fruits. For the first time in the history of the war, a Confederate army 40,000 strong had been destroyed on the field of battle and in its flight. The numbers *directly* brought to bear upon Hood's army had not been far superior; the result is therefore to be attributed to the admirable tactics of General Thomas. The battles of Nashville deserve to rank with those of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. A very memorable feature of these battles is the slight loss of the Federals in killed and wounded.<sup>3</sup> The grand result had been accomplished rather by skillful manoeuvre than by an enormous sacrifice of life. The Confederate loss had been heavier in killed and wounded, and, in addition, over 8000 prisoners had been captured. During the Tennessee campaign Hood lost 13,189 prisoners, and by desertion over 2000, besides 72 guns.

At the close of 1864 Thomas disposed of his army as follows: Smith's corps was stationed at Eastport, Mississippi; Wood's was concentrated at

Huntsville and Athens, Alabama; Schofield's at Dalton, Georgia; and Wilson's cavalry at Eastport and Huntsville.

In the mean time the cavalry force, 800 strong, which, under General Lyon, had been sent by Hood across the Cumberland to operate against Thomas's communications in Kentucky, had been defeated and driven back into Alabama, after some 600 of its number had been scattered or captured. The small remnant was about the middle of January surprised in camp between Warrenton and Tuscaloosa, where General Lyon, with about 100 of his men, was captured. Lyon was taken in bed, and, having been permitted to dress himself, he watched his opportunity and treacherously shot his sentinel, escaping in the darkness.

To finish this chapter, it remains only for us to glance at the operations which, toward the close of the year, had been going on east of Knoxville, on the yet contested border of East Tennessee and West Virginia.

General Morgan had been captured and killed on the 4th of September, 1864, at Greenville, in East Tennessee, and his command had passed into the hands of his confederate and recent biographer, General Basil Duke. In November General Breckinridge proceeded to East Tennessee, and took command of the operations in that quarter. On the 13th of November, with about 3000 men, he attacked Brigadier General A. C. Gillem, near Morristown, routing him and capturing his artillery (6 guns), with about 500 prisoners. The remainder of Gillem's command escaped to Strawberry Plains, and thence to Knoxville. Gillem's command, 1500 strong, had formerly belonged to the Army of the Cumberland, but at the instance of Governor Andrew Johnson had been made an independent command. It was this separation, and the consequent lack of co-operation between Gillem and the officers of Thomas's army, which doubtless led to this disaster.

Breckinridge followed up his success, moving through Strawberry Plains to the immediate vicinity of Knoxville, but on the 18th of November began hastily to retrace his line of advance. For General Thomas, in all his preparations against Hood, had not weakened his rear, and the force under Breckinridge was not competent to meet that suddenly brought to his front. On the 18th—the day of Breckinridge's retreat—General Ammen's troops, re-enforced by 1500 men from Chattanooga, reoccupied Strawberry Plains.


General Schofield had left Stoneman at Louisville to take charge of the Department of the Ohio during his absence with Thomas's army. Stoneman started for Knoxville, having previously ordered Brevet Major General Burbridge to march with all his available force in Kentucky, by way of Cumberland Gap, to Gillem's relief. On his way to Knoxville, Stoneman received instructions from Thomas to concentrate as large a force as possible in East Tennessee against Breckinridge, and either destroy his force or drive it into Virginia, and destroy the salt-works at Saltville, in West Virginia, and the railroad from the Tennessee line as far into Virginia as practicable.

Having rapidly concentrated the commands of Burbridge and Gillem at Bean's Station, on the 12th of December General Stoneman advanced against the enemy. Gillem struck Duke at Kingsport, on the north fork of the Holston River, killing, capturing, or dispersing the whole command. Burbridge, at Bristol, came upon the enemy under Vaughn, and skirmished with him until Gillem's troops came up. Vaughn then retreated. Burbridge pushed on to Abingdon, to cut the railroad between Wytheville and Saltville, to prevent re-enforcements from Lynchburg. Gillem also reached Abingdon on the 15th, and the next day struck the enemy at Marion, routed him, and captured all his artillery and trains, and 198 prisoners. Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, was destroyed, as also the extensive lead-works near the town, and the railroad bridge over Reedy Creek. Stoneman, having made a demonstration on Saltville, proceeded to join Burbridge at Marion, where Breckinridge had collected the scattered remnants of his command. But the Confederates avoided battle, retreating into North Carolina. Stoneman then moved on Saltville with his entire command, capturing at that place eight guns, a large amount of ammunition, and two locomotives. The salt-works were destroyed by breaking the kettles, filling the wells with rubbish, and burning the buildings. Stoneman then returned to Knoxville, accompanied by Gillem's command, while General Burbridge, by way of Cumberland Gap, fell back into Kentucky. The country marched over by Stoneman's troops during these operations was laid waste, and all mills, factories, and bridges were destroyed.


<sup>1</sup> "With the exception of his rear-guard, his army had become a disheartened and disorganized rabble of half-armed and barefooted men, who sought every opportunity to fall out by the wayside and desert their cause, to put an end to their sufferings. The rear-guard, however, was undaunted and firm, and did its work bravely to the last."—*Thomas's Report*.

<sup>2</sup> "Here, finding so much dissatisfaction throughout the country as in my judgment to greatly impair, if not destroy, my usefulness and counteract my exertions, and with no desire but to serve my country, I asked to be relieved, with the hope that another might be assigned to the command who might do more than I could hope to accomplish. Accordingly, I was so relieved on the 23d of January by authority of the President."—*Hood's Report*.

<sup>3</sup> General Thomas reports his loss in killed, wounded, and missing during the entire campaign as 10,000.



SALTVILLE, VIRGINIA.



SALT VALLEY.



## CHAPTER XLVIII.

## SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN.—THE MARCH TO THE SEA.


After the Battle of Nashville the East becomes the Theatre of the War.—Estimate of General Sherman's Generalship.—He marches from Atlanta.—Constitution of his Army.—The Order of March.—The Movement not simply "a big Raid."—The Country traversed.—Occupation of Milledgeville.—Action at Griswoldville.—Crossing of the Oconee.—Sandersville occupied.—Kilpatrick's Movement on Millen.—Destruction of Railroads.—Apprehension in the North.—Crossing of the Ogeechee.—The Approaches to Savannah.—Capture of Fort McAllister, and communication with Dahlgren's Fleet.—Investment of Savannah.—Sherman demands a Surrender.—Hardee declines.—Movement against the Charleston and Savannah Railroad.—Hardee's Retreat.—Sherman enters Savannah.—Results of the March.—The Amount of Property captured or destroyed.—Character of the Defenses of Savannah.—Conduct of Sherman's Army on the March.

BY Thomas's victory at Nashville the Confederate army of Tennessee had been eliminated from the problem of the war. After this event the continuance of the struggle on the part of the Confederate government involved a useless waste of human life. The interest of the war from this point is transferred to the East. With the exception of the conflict terminating in the capture of Mobile, there were, after the battle of Nashville, no great military operations in the West. We are therefore prepared to follow Sherman's March to the Sea, and thence to Goldsborough in North Carolina.

Since General Sherman had been given an independent command in the West, he had fully illustrated his characteristic qualities as a great captain. As a subordinate he had shown these qualities only in a limited degree, because in that capacity he could only display his power to execute operations which were conceived and planned by others. No officer had so completely won the confidence of General Grant. At Shiloh his military talents were so conspicuous that Grant afterward acknowledged that the final triumph of the national arms on that occasion was chiefly due to Sherman. Of course, in this acknowledgment, we must make large allowances on the score of General Grant's natural modesty; but, if he was modest, he was also just. Sherman's prompt and unquestioning obedience to the orders of his superior officer ought not, perhaps, to be remarkable, but it was, nevertheless. He was never behind time. His comprehension of the task assigned him made misconception or mistake impossible, and he never lacked in vigor of execution. It is true that he sometimes failed in the object sought. His assault on the Confederate works at Chickasaw Bayou has been frequently adduced as proof of his indiscretion. But it must be remembered, in the first place, that he was acting in obedience of positive orders, and, secondly, that he was ignorant of the failure that had attended General Grant's movement in the rear, and it was this latter circumstance alone which made the assault indiscreet, or its success impossible. The assault on Kennesaw has also been adduced for a similar purpose. But here, too, the critics have a losing case, unless they can withstand the testimony of General Thomas and the best officers of Sherman's army, who assert that success must have followed the attempt but for the fall of Harker and McCook at a critical moment. The popular conception of General Sherman is greatly at fault. It has been the fashion to accord him brilliancy of conception—great strategic powers—and to ignore those characteristic qualities of his mind without which his strategy would have been ludicrous and useless.

In the first place, a factitious distinction has been made between *strategy* and *tactics*, and Sherman has been pronounced a great strategist, but an inferior tactician. Strategy properly includes tactics. The commander who can so determine and control the movements of his army as to, in the surest way, and with the least friction and waste, accomplish the object in view, is a great strategist.<sup>1</sup> If we confine these movements to the disposition of an army upon the field of battle, then we have what is properly termed tactics. Of course the original conception of the object and plan of a campaign is back of both strategy and tactics, and depends upon the speculative side of military genius—the power of ideal combination. This power of combination may exist without the practical knowledge or experience necessary to successful strategy or to successful tactics. But this is rarely the case, for the very practicability of the theoretical scheme must be determined by a knowledge of the material elements involved. So also it might happen that a great strategist should not be a great tactician—that a commander might be successful in large movements, and fail in his combinations on the battle-field and in the presence of the foe. But such cases must of necessity be very exceptional; for the skillful disposition of an army on a large scale would naturally involve its skillful manipulation on a limited field of operations. The exception could only occur by reason of certain elements involved in actual battle which demand peculiar qualities in the commander. Thus a general might exhibit brilliant strategic powers in bringing his army upon a well-chosen field of battle, or in forcing a battle upon his antagonist, and yet utterly fail in the battle itself through a lack either of promptness or of self-control in the presence of the enemy. Certainly Sherman lacked none of the qualities demanded upon the battle-field. In what, then, did his poor tactics consist? Was it for his strategy or his tactics that Grant commended him at Shiloh? Or upon what battle-field did he illustrate his weakness in tactics? If the battle of Chickasaw Bayou was a failure, that certainly was not Sherman's fault. No general on earth could have succeeded there, and Sherman only obeyed orders in fighting there. Under the circumstances he had no discretion, any more than he had at Tunnel Hill, in the battle of Chattanooga. But if we consider the tactics displayed by Sherman in the Atlanta campaign, where he had an independent command, do we find him deficient? It is true that, at Resaca, Sherman failed to destroy Johnston's army, where that result was possible. But why? Simply because his orders were not executed. But the order given is to decide his tactical ability, and not its execution by a subordinate. Surely all the op-

<sup>1</sup> This is clear from the very etymology of the term *strategy*, which is from two Greek words—*stratos*, an army, and *ago*, to move.



THE FOURTEENTH AND TWENTIETH CORPS MOVING OUT OF ATLANTA.





Mower.

Blair.

Slocum.

Jeff. C. Davis.

SHERMAN AND HIS GENERALS.

Sherman.

Hazen.

Logan.

Kilpatrick.

Howard.



erations of the Atlanta campaign were tactical as well as strategic, and the success of these operations was as much due to skillful tactics as it was to skillful strategy.

It must be admitted that Johnston, by leaving open the approach to Resaca through Snake Creek Gap at the beginning of the campaign, afforded Sherman a splendid opportunity to destroy the Confederate army. And Sherman designed to accomplish this. He only failed through the excessive caution of McPherson. A similar opportunity was offered by Hood at the close of the Atlanta campaign by the division of his army. And here again, while Sherman's tactics were faultless, his subordinate officers failed him. But in both cases—at Resaca and Jonesborough—if Sherman's orders had been executed, the result would have involved the annihilation of the Confederate army.

It has also been said that Sherman could not organize and discipline an army. To this we only need reply that, so far as the purposes of war are concerned, Sherman's army was as well disciplined and efficient as any other. Beyond that it would be too curious to inquire.

General Sherman's conceptions were always bold, and his daring was only equaled by his confidence in ultimate success. No movement ever made by General Thomas or General Grant surpassed that by which Sherman transferred the bulk of his army to Jonesborough. Sherman was never vacillating or irresolute. His plans, once formed, were immutable. He was also as remarkable for discretion as for boldness. Thus his audacity never verged upon rashness. He was the Centaur general, being at once the fiery horse and the curbing rider. No pet military project could infatuate him. No better illustration of Sherman's caution can be given than his manner of undertaking the boldest movement of the war—his March to the Sea. With Hood in his front, he would not attempt the movement without an objective point on the coast already secured and awaiting his arrival. And even when Hood moved to the rear, leaving him an open path eastward, Sherman followed him, and, driving him far westward, waited and watched until he was over 200 miles west of Atlanta, and Thomas was prepared to meet his invasion.

Sherman's foresight was almost prophetic. At the beginning of the war he discerned the gigantic proportions which it would assume. He was laughed at, and thought insane, when he asserted that 200,000 men were necessary to prosecute the first great Western campaign; but time proved that he was right, and that the insanity with which he had been charged was lodged in other brains than his. He predicted Butler's failure at Fort Fisher. No military man ever had a clearer discernment between the practicable and the impracticable, or as to what might be accomplished with given means. He was as sure of the success of his grand march before he set out as when he reached its termination; he predicted the time of his arrival upon the coast, and anticipated the full effect of the movement in its bearings upon the war.

This foresight is not so strange when we consider Sherman's wonderful knowledge of the minute details of the conflict. He had been not only a careful student of military science, but also a careful observer of the country in which the war was conducted. He knew its mountains, its rivers, its railroads, its resources, and its people. His experience in regard to all these matters had been large before the war began, but since that time he had made them an especial study. What he once learned he never forgot. The movements of Cape Fear River were as well known to him as those of the Red River, upon whose banks he had lived. The whole Southern country was a grand chart before his mind; no geographical feature escaped him; he knew the natural products of each district, its population, its proportion of slaves, its cattle, its horses, its factories. This kind of knowledge his mind seemed to absorb and retain almost without effort. Yet, with all this attention to the *minutiae* of campaigning, Sherman always based his plans upon general principles. Therefore, while he knew perfectly how to feed, march, and fight an army of a hundred thousand men, the conceptions which controlled him in the use of this army, and which formed the basis of his campaign, were calculated to accomplish the grandest results possible with the means employed. Sherman's military economy, as illustrated in the Atlanta campaign, and the operations which were its natural sequel, will hereafter be to the military student the most instructive portion of the American Civil War. The greatest results were accomplished with the smallest possible waste of force.

Perhaps the most characteristic point of Sherman's generalship was his perfect appreciation of the American soldier and of the discipline best adapted to his peculiarities. He was *par excellence* the American general, and his army was the military microcosm of the republic, for the maintenance of which it fought and marched. Both on the part of the general and his army there was perfect military subordination; but there was, at the same time, absolute freedom from conventional or arbitrary restraint in minor details. The martial enthusiasm of the soldier was not held in check by petty restrictions. Sherman scouted the idea that the American army must be made a mere machine. In the place of a purely mechanical discipline he substituted one which recognized the intelligence, not only of his subordinate officers, but of every private in the army. To inspire his soldiers with his own ideas appeared to him a more efficient means of control than the establishment over them of a military autocracy. The result fully vindicated his peculiar mode of discipline. His army moved as if by in-

spiration; but its movements, like that of the tides, were mathematically accurate and certain. There was no lagging from the march, there was no shrinking from battle.

It was a grand moment for Sherman when he had been, by Hood's folly, released from his dependence upon the railroad in his rear. In the event of an advance upon an army in his front, this long line of communication was a serious and unavoidable perplexity. From Atlanta to Allatoona, Sherman's sub-base was 40 miles. Thence to Chattanooga was 98 miles. But Chattanooga itself was only a *dépôt*, and was exposed to siege and capture, unless a large portion of the army was detached for its protection. Thus Sherman's real base of supplies is pushed back to Nashville, 290 miles from Atlanta, and, in the case of a successful Confederate attack on Nashville, back to Louisville, nearly 500 miles. This perplexity, as we have seen, was removed by Hood's invasion of Tennessee; and by giving Thomas an army sufficient to meet Hood, Sherman was permitted to ignore his connection with the North, and move eastward with from 60,000 to 70,000 men.

On the 16th of November, Sherman's army, with the smoking ruins of Atlanta in his rear, began its great march.<sup>1</sup> The right wing of the army, under General Howard, with Kilpatrick's cavalry, was put in motion in the direction of Jonesborough, and McDonough, with orders to make a strong feint on Macon, to cross the Ocmulgee near Planter's Mills, and rendezvous in the neighborhood of Gordon in seven days. At the same time, Slocum, with the Twelfth Corps of the left wing, moved by Decatur, with orders to tear up the railroad from Social Circle to Madison, to burn the railroad bridge across the Oconee, east of Madison, and, turning south, to reach Milledgeville on the same day that Howard should reach Gordon. General Sherman in person accompanied Jeff. C. Davis's corps—the Fourteenth—on the road through Covington, directly to Milledgeville. All the troops were provided with good wagon trains, loaded with ammunition and supplies, approximating 20 days' bread, 40 days' sugar and coffee, with a double allowance of salt, and beef-cattle sufficient for 40 days' supplies. The wagons were supplied with three days' rations in grain. Each brigade commander was instructed to organize a foraging party, to gather near the route corn, forage, meat, and vegetables, aiming at all times to keep in the wagon trains at least 10 days' provisions and three days' forage. The cavalry was to receive orders direct from General Sherman. Soldiers were forbidden to enter the dwellings of the inhabitants or to commit any trespass, but were permitted, during a halt or when in camp, to gather vegetables, and to drive in stock in their front. On the march the gathering of provisions was to be left entirely to regular foraging parties. Army commanders were permitted to destroy mills, houses, cotton-gins, etc., but such destruction must only take place in regions where the army should be molested. Horses, mules, and wagons were to be appropriated as they were needed, but discrimination must be made in these captures, the rich rather than the poor being made the victims. No family was to be deprived of any thing necessary to its maintenance. Able-bodied negroes might be taken along, in so far as this would not cause embarrassment in the matter of supplies. The troops were to start each morning at 7 o'clock, and make about 15 miles per day.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Major Nichols thus describes the spectacle of Atlanta in flames: "A grand and awful spectacle is presented to the beholder in this beautiful city, now in flames. By order, the chief engineer has destroyed by powder and fire all the store-houses, *dépôt* buildings, and machine-shops. The heaven is one expanse of lurid fire; the air is filled with flying, burning cinders; buildings covering two hundred acres are in ruins or in flames: every instant there is the sharp detonation or the smothered booming sound of exploding shells and powder concealed in the buildings, and then the sparks and flame shoot away up into the black and red roof, scattering cinders far and wide."


"These are the machine-shops where have been forged and cast the rebel cannon, shot and shell that have carried death to many a brave defender of our nation's honor. These warehouses have been the receptacle of munitions of war, stored to be used for our destruction. The city, which, next to Richmond, has furnished more material for prosecuting the war than any other in the South, exists no more as a means for injury to be used by the enemies of the Union."

"A brigade of Massachusetts soldiers are the only troops now left in the town: they will be the last to leave it. To-night I heard the really fine band of the Thirty-third Massachusetts playing 'John Brown's soul goes marching on,' by the light of the burning buildings. I have never heard that noble anthem when it was so grand, so solemn, so inspiring."

<sup>2</sup> The following is a copy of the general orders for the march, issued by General Sherman at Kingston, November 9th:

"I. For the purpose of military operations, this army is divided into two wings, viz., the right wing, Major General O. O. Howard commanding, the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps; the left wing, Major General H. W. Slocum commanding, the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps."

"II. The habitual order of march will be, whenever practicable, by four roads, as nearly parallel



ATLANTA IN RUINS.





JUDSON C. KILPATRICK.

The line of march of the several corps of Sherman's army we shall not attempt to follow in detail, but will merely trace the general features of the movement. In the first place, it must be distinctly asserted that Sherman's

as possible, and converging at points hereafter to be indicated in orders. The cavalry, Brigadier General Kilpatrick commanding, will receive special orders from the commander-in-chief.

"III. There will be no general trains of supplies, but each corps will have its ammunition and provision train, distributed habitually as follows: Behind each regiment should follow one wagon and one ambulance; behind each brigade should follow a due proportion of ammunition wagons, provision wagons and ambulances. In case of danger, each army corps should change this order of march by having his advance and rear brigade unencumbered by wheels. The separate columns will start habitually at seven A.M., and make about fifteen miles per day, unless otherwise fixed in orders.

"IV. The army will forage liberally on the country during the march. To this end, each brigade commander will organize a good and sufficient foraging party, under the command of one or more discreet officers, who will gather near the route traveled corn or forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables, corn meal, or whatever is needed by the command; aiming at all times to keep in the wagon trains at least ten days' provisions for the command and three days' forage. Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of the inhabitants or commit any trespass; during the halt or a camp they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and other vegetables, and drive in stock in front of their camps. To regular foraging parties must be intrusted the gathering of provisions and forage at any distance from the road traveled.

"V. To army corps commanders is intrusted the power to destroy mills, houses, cotton-gins, etc., and for them this general principle is laid down: In districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, no destruction of such property should be permitted; but should guerrillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifest local hostility, then army corps commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostility.

"VI. As for horses, mules, wagons, etc., belonging to the inhabitants, the cavalry and artillery may appropriate freely and without limit; discriminating, however, between the rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor or industrious, who are usually neutral or friendly. Foraging parties may also take mules or horses to replace the jaded animals of their trains, or to serve as pack mules for the regiments or brigades. In all foraging, of whatever kind, the parties engaged will refrain from abusive or threatening language, and may, when the officer in command thinks proper, give written certificates of the facts, but no receipts; and they will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonable portion for their maintenance.

"VII. Negroes who are able-bodied, and can be of service to the several columns, may be taken along; but each army commander will bear in mind that the question of supplies is a very important one, and that his first duty is to see to those who bear arms.

"VIII. The organization at once of a good pioneer battalion for each corps, composed, if possible, of negroes, should be attended to. This battalion should follow the advance-guard, should repair roads and double them if possible, so that the columns will not be delayed after reaching bad places. Also, army commanders should study the habit of giving the artillery and wagons the road, and marching their troops on one side; and also instruct their troops to assist wagons at steep hills or bad crossings of streams.

"IX. Captain O. M. Poe, Chief Engineer, will assign to each wing of the army a pontoon train, fully equipped and organized, and the commanders thereof will see to its being properly protected at all times."

Sherman's army on the march, besides Kilpatrick's cavalry, 5500 strong, included the following forces:

march was not simply "a big raid." It accomplished all the purposes of a raid—the destruction of railroads and supplies. The large force with which Sherman marched of course more effectually accomplished these purposes than could have been done by a cavalry expedition. To destroy the railroads by which Georgia was connected with the Carolinas and with Virginia, and to consume the supplies upon which the Confederate armies depended, was a very important object. But, after all, this was only incidental. The Grand March was at once a magnificent raid and a decisive campaign. Sherman was conducting offensive operations against Lee's army, threatening his rear and flank.

Again, it was not Sherman's object to capture important strategic points upon his route to Savannah. Macon and Augusta were the main points likely to be defended by the enemy. Sherman could not afford to delay his columns in consideration of the results to be gained by the capture of either place; accordingly, he determined to demonstrate against each and avoid both. Kilpatrick, therefore, until the army was past Macon, kept on the right flank, and from that point covered the left wing, demonstrating against Augusta. Sherman's line of march followed the Georgia Central Railroad, covering a wide belt on either side, and, east of Louisville, extended over the entire tract—the most fertile in Georgia—between the Ogeechee and Savannah Rivers.


On the 23d of November Slocum occupied Milledgeville, the capital of Georgia, and Howard had reached Gordon. Slocum gained possession of

	Corps.	Divisions.
RIGHT WING, Major General O. O. HOWARD.	<i>Fifteenth,</i> Major General P. J. OSTERHAUS.	Brigadier General C. R. WOOD'S. " " W. B. HAZEN'S. " " J. E. SMITH'S. " " J. M. CORSE'S.
	<i>Seventeenth,</i> Major General FRANK P. BLAIR, JR.*	Major General T. A. MOWER'S. Brigadier General M. D. LEGGETT'S. " " G. A. SMITH'S.
	<i>Fourteenth,</i> Brevet Major General JEFF. C. DAVIS.	Brigadier General W. P. CARLIN'S. " " J. D. MORGAN'S. " " A. BAIRD'S.
LEFT WING, Major General H. W. SLOCUM.	<i>Twentieth,</i> Brigadier General A. S. WILLIAMS.	Brigadier General N. T. JACKSON'S. " " J. W. GRABY'S. " " W. T. WARD'S.

Brigadier General Judson C. Kilpatrick's cavalry division consisted of two brigades, commanded by Colonels Eli H. Murray and Smith D. Atkins.

\* Brigadier General T. E. G. Ransom had commanded this corps during the pursuit of Hood, though suffering from a severe attack of dysentery, and too weak to mount his horse. He died at Rome, October 29, 1864, aged thirty years.





EXTERIOR VIEW OF THE PRISON PEN AT MILLEN.




INTERIOR VIEW OF THE PRISON PEN AT MILLEN.



DESTRUCTION OF MILLEN JUNCTION.





MAP ILLUSTRATING THE MARCH TO THE SEA.

the bridge across the Oconee. The day before, a force of the enemy, consisting mainly of Cobb's militia, had advanced from Macon to Griswoldville, and attacked Walcott's infantry brigade and a portion of Kilpatrick's cavalry, but was severely punished, losing over 2000 men. In this affair General Walcott was wounded. A few days before Slocum's occupation of Milledgeville, the State Legislature, then assembled at the capital, had hurriedly absconded on hearing of Sherman's approach. The panic seems to have spread to the citizens, and the trains out of Milledgeville were crowded to overflowing, and at the most extravagant prices private vehicles were also pressed into service by the fugitives. Only a few of the Union troops entered Milledgeville. The magazines, arsenals, dépôts, factories, and storehouses, containing property belonging to the Confederate government, were burned; also some 1700 bales of cotton. Private dwellings were respected, and no instances occurred of pillage or of insult to the citizens. Sherman occupied the executive mansion of Governor Brown, who had not waited to receive the compliments of his distinguished visitor, but had removed his furniture, taking good care, it is said, to ship even his cabbages.

Slocum continued his progress eastward, crossing the Oconee, when it was discovered that Wheeler, with a large body of Confederate cavalry, had also crossed, and was covering the approaches to Sandersville, to which point he was driven by the advancing Federal column. On the 26th the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps entered the town. Howard, in the mean time, accomplished the passage of the Oconee lower down, in the face of a Confederate cavalry force under Wayne, and proceeded to Tennille Station, opposite Sandersville.

Before reaching Milledgeville, Kilpatrick had been ordered to move rapidly eastward to break the railroad from Augusta to Millen, and, turning upon the latter place, to rescue the Union prisoners there confined. He skirmished with Wheeler all the way to Waynesborough, destroying there the railroad bridge across Brier Creek, between Augusta and Millen. But at Millen he found only the empty prison pens in which the Union soldiers had been confined. For some time past the Confederates had been removing these prisoners to points far remote from Sherman's line of march. But they had left behind the traces of their cruel neglect. The corpses of several of those who had died in the prison were found yet unburied on the

cold ground, while near by lay the graves of 700 dead, marked only by head-boards designating them by the fifties.

By the last of November Sherman's army had crossed the Ogeechee River, still covered by Kilpatrick's cavalry—an impenetrable cloud to the enemy. The railroad was destroyed all along the line of march.<sup>1</sup> In the mean while the Confederates have been predicting the ruin of Sherman's army. They do not seem to have had any accurate knowledge of its numbers. Hood and Beauregard estimated it as about 36,000 strong. In the North there was great anxiety for Sherman's fate. Both the confidence of the enemy and the apprehensions of the loyal are indications of the impression which then prevailed as to the audacity of Sherman's movement.


After Sherman crossed the Ogeechee there was no opportunity for the enemy to oppose his march to the city of Savannah. "No opposition from the enemy worth speaking of," says Sherman, "was encountered until the heads of the columns were within fifteen miles of Savannah, where all the roads leading to the city were obstructed more or less by felled timber, with earth-works and artillery. But these were easily turned and the enemy driven away, so that by the 10th of December the enemy was driven within his lines at Savannah." There were five approaches to the city—the two railroads and three dirt pikes—but they were narrow causeways through otherwise impassable swamps, and were strongly guarded by artillery. The entrance of the Ogeechee River to Ossibaw Sound was guarded by Fort McAllister. To invest the city and to reduce this fort, so as to command an outlet to the sea, were the next things to be accomplished. Admiral Dahlgren's fleet was awaiting Sherman off Tybee, Warsaw, and Ossibaw Sounds; and, although the latter had an abundant supply of beef-cattle and breadstuffs, still he held it of the utmost importance that he should connect with the fleet outside. Captain Duncan, one of Howard's best scouts, had passed down the Ogeechee in a canoe to Dahlgren's fleet, giving full information of Sherman's present situation. But, in order to establish a line of communication with the sea by way of the Ogeechee River, it was necessary to reduce Fort McAllister.



CAPITOL AT MILLEDGEVILLE.

To Hazen's division of the Fifteenth Corps was allotted this work. On the 13th of December this division crossed to the southwest bank of the Ogeechee. The fort was commanded by Major Anderson, who had a garrison of about 200 men; it was mounted by 23 guns *en barbette*, and one mortar. As Hazen was crossing the Ogeechee, Generals Sherman and Howard went to Dr. Cheves's rice-mill on the river bank, whence they had a full view of the fort.

About noon they heard the guns of the fort open inland, and Hazen's skirmishers were seen firing in response. By means of signals, Hazen was ordered to take the work that day, if possible. He soon accomplished his mission. The guns, being *en barbette*, were not available for defense. With a loss of only about 90 men, the Union troops carried the work by assault and captured the garrison. That very night Sherman and Howard, in a small boat, passed down the river to the fort, and thence down to a steamer which during the conflict had passed up from the fleet within view of the army.



FORT McALLISTER.

<sup>1</sup> "The destruction of railroads in this campaign has been most thorough. The work of demolition on such long lines of road necessarily requires time, but the process is performed as expeditiously as possible, in order to prevent any serious delay of the movement of the army. The method of destruction is simple, but very effective. Two ingenious instruments have been made for this purpose. One of them is a clasp, which locks under the rail. It has a ring in the top, into which is inserted a long lever, and the rail is thus ripped from the sleepers. The sleepers are then piled in a heap and set on fire, the rails roasting in the flames until they bend by their own weight. When sufficiently heated, each rail is taken off by wrenches fitting closely over the ends, and, by turning in opposite directions, it is so twisted that even a rolling-machine could not bring it back into shape. In this manner we have destroyed thirty miles of rail which lay in the city of Atlanta, and all on the Augusta and Atlanta Road from the last-named place to Madison, besides the entire track of the Central Georgia line, from a point a few miles east of Macon to the station where I am now writing."—*Nichols's Story of the Great March.*



ASSAULT ON FORT McALLISTER.







WILLIAM B. HAZEN.

By the route thus opened abundant supplies were soon brought from Hilton Head, and heavy ordnance for the reduction of Savannah. Sherman's army had already invested the city, shutting up every avenue of supply, and the only possible way of retreat left to General Hardee, who now, with about 10,000 men, mostly militia, conducted the defense of Savannah, was in the northeast toward Charleston. On the 17th General Sherman demanded the surrender of the city. He wrote to Hardee that he held all the avenues by which Savannah was supplied, and that if the city was surrendered he would grant liberal terms to the garrison, while, if he was compelled to assault, or depend upon the slower process of starvation, he should feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and should make little effort to restrain his army, "burning to avenge the great national wrong

they attach to Savannah and other large cities, which have been so prominent in dragging our country into civil war." To this communication Sherman added: "I inclose you a copy of General Hood's demand for the surrender of the town of Resaca, to be used by you for what it is worth."

General Hardee declined to surrender on the ground that he still maintained his line of defense, and was in communication with his superior officer. In order to complete the investment of Savannah on the north, and across the plank road on the South Carolina shore, known as the "Union causeway," it would be necessary for Sherman to throw his left across the Savannah River. This would be scarcely safe, since the enemy still held the river opposite the city with gun-boats, and could easily destroy the pontoon bridge and isolate any force which might cross to that side. General Foster, with Admiral Dahlgren's co-operation, had established a division of troops on the narrow neck between the Coosawatchee and Tullifiny Creeks, at the head of Broad River, threatening the Savannah and Charleston Railroad, which was within easy range of his artillery. On the 20th Sherman started for Port Royal by water to confer with Foster and Dahlgren. He intended to increase the forces operating up Broad River, which would thus be able to break the railroad, and then turn upon the single line of retreat held by Hardee. He left instructions for his army commanders to prepare for an attack on the enemy's lines before Savannah.


But, before Sherman's arrangements were concluded, Hardee evacuated the city, retreating to Charleston, and on the morning of the 21st the Federal army took possession of the enemy's lines. The next morning Sherman, having returned up the Ogeechee, rode into the city of Savannah. Then, in a brief note to President Lincoln, Sherman thus announced the termination of his campaign:

"I beg to present you, as a Christmas gift, the city of Savannah, with 150 heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, and also about 25,000 bales of cotton."

Between the 16th of November and the 10th of December, Sherman's entire army had marched 255 miles.<sup>1</sup> For the greater portion of the army, the march really commenced at Rome and Kingston, and extended over 300 miles. The railroads had been rendered completely useless along the line of march, and a belt of country from Atlanta to Savannah, thirty miles wide, had been exhausted of supplies. If we include the devastation involved in the Atlanta campaign, Sherman's immense army had spread itself over more than one third of the State of Georgia. Georgia, as a feeder of the Confederacy, had been wholly annihilated. Sherman estimates the damage done to the state as fully \$100,000,000, one fifth of which had been of use to his


<sup>1</sup> It is 190 miles in a straight line from Atlanta to Savannah. The following is a table of distances on the road followed by the Twentieth Corps:

	Miles.		Miles.
Atlanta to Decatur	7	Milledgeville to Hebron	18
Decatur to Rockbridge	14	Hebron to Sandersville	10
Rockbridge to Sheffield	13	Sandersville to Davisboro'	10
Sheffield to Social Circle	14	Davisboro' to Louisville	12
Social Circle to Rutledge	7	Louisville to Millen	30
Rutledge to Madison	9	Millen to Springfield	40
Madison to Eatonton	20	Springfield to Savannah	30
Eatonton to Milledgeville	21	Atlanta to Savannah	255




SHERMAN'S ARMY ENTERING SAVANNAH.





FORT JACKSON, SAVANNAH.



REBELS EVACUATING SAVANNAH, DEC. 20/64.

CONFEDERATES EVACUATING SAVANNAH.

own army, and the rest sheer waste and destruction. "This," he adds, "may seem a hard species of warfare, but it brings the sad realities of war home to those who have been directly or indirectly instrumental in involving us in its attendant calamities." About 7000 negroes followed the march through to the coast, and General Slocum estimates that as many more joined the Federal columns, but through weakness or old age were unable to hold out to the end. Over 10,000 horses and mules were captured on the march. A large quantity of cotton, estimated at about 20,000 bales, was destroyed before reaching Savannah. As regards the provisions captured, the estimate given is almost incredible, including 10,000,000 pounds of corn, and an equal amount of fodder. Slocum reports the capture of 1,217,527 rations of meat, 919,000 of bread, 483,000 of coffee, 581,534 of sugar, 1,146,500 of soap, and



137,000 of salt. Howard estimates the breadstuffs, beef, sugar, and coffee captured by the Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps as amounting in value, at the government cost of rations at Louisville, to \$283,202.<sup>1</sup>

The grand prize of the campaign, however, was the city of Savannah. This was indeed a precious "Christmas gift" to the nation. It had been gained—if we count out the assault on Fort McAllister—without a battle. The whole number of casualties on the march had not amounted to 1000 in killed and wounded. With Savannah were captured 25,000 bales of cotton, and, as was found on a careful reckoning, about 200 guns. The city was almost impregnable against a purely naval attack. Both the north and the south branch of the Savannah River, at the head of Elba Island, were obstructed by a double line of cribs, to remove which, so as to allow a channel in each branch a little over 100 feet wide, occupied the navy for

<sup>1</sup> Howard's report includes the following statistics of property captured and destroyed, negroes freed, and prisoners taken by the right wing:

Negroes set free (estimated number).....	3,000	
Prisoners captured.—By Fifteenth Army Corps:		
Commissioned officers.....	32	
Enlisted men.....	515	547
By Seventeenth Army Corps:		
Commissioned officers.....	2	
Enlisted men.....	117	119
Total prisoners captured.....		666
Escaped Federal prisoners:		
Commissioned officers.....	6	
Enlisted men.....	43	49
Bales of cotton burned.....		3,523
Ocmulgee Mills, 1500. Spindles and large amount of cotton cloth burned, value not known.		
Subsistence captured; namely, breadstuffs, beef, sugar, and coffee, at government cost of ration in Louisville.....	\$283,202	
Command started from Atlanta with head cattle.....	1,000	
Took up as captured.....	10,500	11,500
Consumed on the trip.....	9,000	
Balance on hand December 18, 1864.....		2,500
Horses captured.—By the Fifteenth Army Corps.....	369	
By the Seventeenth Army Corps.....	562	931
Mules captured.—By the Fifteenth Army Corps.....	786	
By the Seventeenth Army Corps.....	1,004	1,850
Corn.—By the Fifteenth Army Corps.....	2,500,000	
By the Seventeenth Army Corps.....	2,000,000	4,500,000
Fodder.—By the Fifteenth Army Corps.....	2,500,000	
By the Seventeenth Army Corps.....	2,000,000	4,500,000
Miles of railroad destroyed.....		191

Slocum's report gives the following estimate for the left wing:

"It was thirty-four days from the date my command left Atlanta to the day supplies were received from the fleet. The total number of rations required during this period was 1,360,000. Of this amount there were issued by the Subsistence Department 440,900 rations of bread, 142,473 rations of meat, 876,800 of coffee and tea, 778,466 of sugar, 213,500 of soap, and 1,123,000 of salt. As the troops were well supplied at all times, if we deduct the above issues from the amount actually due the soldiers, we have the approximate quantities taken from the country, namely, rations of bread, 919,000; meat, 1,217,527; coffee, 483,000; sugar, 581,534; soap, 1,146,500; salt, 137,000. The above is the actual saving to the government in issue of rations during the campaign, and it is probable that even more than the equivalent of the above supplies was obtained by the soldiers from the country. Four thousand and ninety (4090) valuable horses and mules were captured during the march, and turned over to the Quartermaster's Department. Our transportation was in far better condition on our arrival at Savannah than it was at the commencement of the campaign.


"The average number of horses and mules with my command, including those of the pontoon train and a part of the Michigan engineers, was fourteen thousand five hundred. We started from Atlanta with four days' grain in wagons. Estimating the amount fed the animals at the regulation allowance, and deducting the amount on hand on leaving Atlanta, I estimate the amount of grain taken from the country at five million pounds; fodder, six million pounds; besides the forage consumed by the immense herds of cattle that were driven with the different columns. It is very difficult to estimate the amount of damage done the enemy by the operations of the troops under my command. During the campaign one hundred and nineteen miles (119) of railroad were thoroughly and effectually destroyed, scarcely a tie or rail, a bridge or culvert, on the entire line being left in a condition to be of use again. At Rutledge, Madison, Eatonton, Milledgeville, Tennille, and Davisboro', machine-shops, turn-tables, depôts, water-tanks, and much other valuable property was destroyed. The quantity of cotton destroyed is estimated by my subordinate commanders at seventeen thousand bales. A very large number of cotton-gins and presses were also destroyed.

"Negro men, women, and children joined the column at every mile of our march, many of them bringing horses and mules, which they cheerfully turned over to the officers of the Quartermaster's Department. I think at least fourteen thousand of these people joined the two columns at different points on the march; but many of them were too old and infirm, and others too young, to endure the fatigues of the march, and were therefore left in the rear. More than one half of the above number, however, reached the coast with us. Many of the able-bodied men were transferred to the officers of the Quartermaster and Subsistence Departments, and others were employed in the two corps as teamsters, cooks, and servants."

nearly three weeks. These obstructions were commanded by four works—Forts Lee and Jackson, Battery Lawton, and a water battery—mounted with 26 heavy guns, of which 13 were Columbiads. The river is so completely lined with marshes that the attack in front could have no co-operation from troops on either side. To guard against the approach by St. Augustine Creek there were also formidable batteries—Turner's Rocks, Thunderbolt, and Barton, with its outpost Causton's Bluff—mounting 34 heavy cannon; and obstructions were sunk in the narrow channel of the creek. But this entire net-work of defenses could be turned by troops landing on the Vernon and Ogeechee Rivers. To prevent this, the former was closed with obstructions commanded by Fort Beaulieu, 9 guns, while Big Ogeechee, in addition to the obstructions, was guarded by Fort McAllister with 23 guns. On the Little Ogeechee stood Fort Rosedew, with 6 guns. In the land works around the city there were 116 cannon of less calibre. Altogether the defensive works of Savannah mounted 229 cannon. It is clear, therefore, that, without a great sacrifice of life, Savannah could not have been captured in any other way than that adopted by General Sherman.

In justice to General Sherman and to the United States government, it is necessary that we should, in our comments upon the Great March, allude to the conduct of the army. It must be candidly admitted that many outrages were committed, or, to use the words of General Sherman, his soldiers "did some things they ought not to have done." We can safely affirm, however, that, with the same opportunities for wantonness, no European and no other American army would have accomplished the march with less violence. The only way in which outrage could have been absolutely prevented by the commander would have been the disbandment before the march of every soldier who would, under strong temptation, disobey the Decalogue. It is simply nonsense to attribute the violence of scattered foraging parties to the lack of discipline in Sherman's army. The strictest orders were given forbidding soldiers to enter the dwellings of the inhabitants, or to commit any trespass. If General Sherman could have been every where present these orders would have been obeyed. It must be remembered that whatever supplies could in any way assist the Confederates in prolonging the war were a legitimate prize. In many cases there was wanton plunder. Many of the wealthy planters had fled suddenly on the approach of Sherman's army, and had hastily concealed their treasures of gold, silver, and precious stones in the earth. Aided by the disclosures of the negroes, these places were diligently sought and rifled wherever opportunity offered. This gave color to extravagant reports, which had no other basis of credibility than the imagination of those who circulated them. But the violence actually perpetrated was far less than, under the circumstances, might have been expected. While we do not exculpate the wrong, we entirely exonerate General Sherman in the matter. No restrictions imposed by discipline would have prevented the evil done; and that there was no serious want of discipline in Sherman's army is clearly shown by the promptness with which the march was accomplished, and the perfect efficiency of the army as an organization when it reached Savannah. This would have been impossible if the army had not been held under restraint. There is universal and undisputed testimony that, in connection with the occupation of Savannah, there was no breach of good order.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In regard to this, General Sherman reports: "The behavior of our troops in Savannah has been so manly, so quiet, so perfect, that I take it as the best evidence of discipline and true courage. Never was a hostile city, filled with women and children, occupied by a large army with less disorder, or more system, order, and good government. The same general and generous spirit of confidence and good feeling pervades the army which it has ever afforded me especial pleasure to report on former occasions."



SHERMAN'S HEADQUARTERS AT SAVANNAH.